










The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/31879 holds various files of this Leiden University 
dissertation. 
 
Author: Adak Turan, Sevgi 
Title: Kemalism in the periphery: anti-veiling campaigns and state-society relations in 
1930s Turkey 






Kemalism in the Periphery: 
Anti-Veiling Campaigns and  






ter verkrijging van  
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden, 
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. C.J.J.M. Stolker,  
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties  
te verdedigen op donderdag 12 februari 2015  






Sevgi Adak Turan 
 






Promotores:  Prof. dr. Touraj Atabaki (Universiteit Leiden) 
  Prof. dr. Erik-Jan Zürcher (Universiteit Leiden) 
 
Overige leden:  Prof. dr. Deniz Kandiyoti (University of London, SOAS) 
Dr. Nicole A.N.M. van Os (Universiteit Leiden) 









































In memory of my grandmother, Fatma Gazalcı 


































Kemalism in the Periphery: 
Anti-Veiling Campaigns and State-Society Relations in 1930s Turkey 
 
© Sevgi Adak, 2015 
Cover photo: A woman and her daughters in Antalya, 1933.  




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
List of Illustrations ........................................................................................ iii 
Acknowledgements  ....................................................................................... v
        
Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................... 1
  
Chapter 2. The Debate on Women’s Veiling and the Anti-Veiling 
Campaigns before the 1930s  ..................................................................... 22  
I. The Ottoman Legacy ...................................................................... 22 
II. Kemalist Vision of Women’s Modernization and the Question of 
Veiling ................................................................................................ 30 
III. Republic’s First Dress Reform: The Hat Law of 1925 ................ 37 
IV. Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the 1920s: a Weak Attempt at 
Changing Women’s Dress.................................................................. 47 
V. Conclusion..................................................................................... 59
  
Chapter 3. Contextualizing the Anti-Veiling Campaigns of the 1930s: 
An Overview ............................................................................................... 61 
I. Turkey in the 1930s ........................................................................ 61 
II. Women’s Modernization and Un/Veiling in the 1930s ................. 71 
III. Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the 1930s .......................................... 77 
III.a. Timing ............................................................................. 77 
III.b. Scope, Content and Discourse ........................................ 83 
III.c. The Legal Framework ..................................................... 90 
IV. Conclusion ................................................................................... 98 
 
Chapter 4. Negotiating Kemalism: The Local Elite in the Anti-Veiling 
Campaigns of the 1930s ........................................................................... 100 
I. Defining the Local Elite in the Turkish Context ........................... 100 
II. Between Hesitation and Intervention: Ankara on the Anti-Veiling 
Campaigns ........................................................................................ 112 
III. Anti-Veiling Campaigns and the Role of the Local Elite .......... 124 




Chapter 5. Popular Resistance and Women’s Agency  ......................... 159 
I. Diversifying the Local: Multiple Actors, Multiple Voices ........... 159 
II. Popular Resistance to Anti-Veiling Campaigns .......................... 161 
III. How to Approach Women’s Agency ......................................... 171 
IV. Women in the Anti-Veiling Campaigns .................................... 178 
IV.a. Incompliance, resistance, selective adaptation ............. 178 
IV.b. Compliance, support, participation ............................... 193 
V. Conclusion................................................................................... 203 
 
Chapter 6. Reflections on the Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim 
World ......................................................................................................... 206 
I. The Turkish Case in a Larger Context .......................................... 206 
II. The Arab World, the Caucasus and Central Asia ........................ 214 
III. Iran, Albania and Turkey: Some Comparative Remarks ........... 228 
IV. Conclusion ................................................................................. 251 
 
Chapter 7. Conclusions ............................................................................ 257 
 
Appendix  ................................................................................................... 269  
Bibliography  .............................................................................................. 278 
Samenvatting  ............................................................................................. 303 














List of Illustrations 
 
 
Figure 2.1.  A postcard from the Second Constitutional Period showing a 
group of women in black çarşafs in Istanbul. 
Source: Sacit Kutlu, Didar-ı Hürriyet: Kartpostallarla İkinci 
Meşrutiyet (1908-1913), Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi 
Yayınları, 2008.  ................................................................. 27 
 
Figure 2.2. A colored image of a group of women in “modernized” 
çarşafs, Istanbul, early 1920s. 
Source: The film Istanbul Do/Redo/Undo: Waters, Streets, 
Faces by Nezih Erdoğan.  ................................................... 30 
 
Figure 2.3.  A page from the journal Resimli Ay, showing fashionable 
models of çarşaf and headdress in the 1920s. Resimli Ay, 
1924.  .................................................................................. 36 
 
Figure 3.1. A propaganda poster of the RPP in mid-1930s. 
Source: Lilo Linke, Allah Dethroned: A Journey through 
Modern Turkey, London: Constable & Co LTD, 1937.  ..... 71 
 
Figure 3.2.  Women in peştamal veil at a local market in Sivas in mid-
1930s. 
Source: Lilo Linke, Allah Dethroned: A Journey through 
Modern Turkey, London: Constable & Co LTD, 1937.  ..... 77 
 
Figure 3.3.  A clip from a local newspaper. Yeni Mersin, 1 July 1934. .. 88 
 
Figure 3.4.  A clip from a Bursa newspaper, reporting the meeting of the 
city council. Hakkın Sesi, Bursa, 3 February 1935.  ........... 95 
 
Figure 5.1.  Letter sent by the governor of Konya to the Ministry of 
Interior. TNPA 13216-7/1, 5 November 1935.  ................ 170 
 
Figure 5.2.  Women at a sewing course in 1930s Hacı Bektaş, Nevşehir.  
Source: Cumhuriyet’in Aile Albümleri, Feride Çiçekoğlu and 
Oya Baydar (eds.), Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 




Figure 5.3.  Women at the Develi branch of the Airplane Association, 
Kayseri, 1930s.    
Source: 75 Yılda Değişen Yaşam, Değişen İnsan: Cumhuriyet 
Modaları, Derya Özkan and Oya Baydar (eds.), Istanbul: 
Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998.  ........................................... 202  
 
Figure 6.1.  Afghan students who were sent to Istanbul for education, 
1928. 
Source: Yaiha Baiza, Education in Afghanistan: 
Developments, Influences and Legacies since 1901, London: 
Routledge, 2013.  .............................................................. 209 
 
Figure 6.2.  A photograph of Nazira Zayn al-Din, appeared as the 
frontispiece of her book.  
Source: Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citizens: Republican 
Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and 
Lebanon, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. . 220 
 
Figure 6.3.  A clip from Turkish national newspaper Cumhuriyet, showing 
“modern” Iranian women watching a sports game. 
Cumhuriyet, 25 November 1935.  ..................................... 238 
 
Figure 6.4.  A clip from a local newspaper in Konya, announcing the 
banning of the peçe in Albania, with an illustration of King 






















My journey to becoming a scholar began at Bilkent University, in the 
Department of Political Science. I am grateful to all my professors there, and 
especially, to Banu Helvacıoğlu, for all the inspiration she has given to me. 
The Graduate Program in History at Sabancı University and my professors 
there have shaped me in irreversible ways. I would like to thank Ayşe Gül 
Altınay in particular for her support over the years and for being a dear friend. 
I learned a lot from my professors and friends at York University, Toronto, 
and Central European University, Budapest - two places that contributed 
immensely to my academic development. I thank them all. I would like to 
thank the staff of the Turkish Prime Ministry Republican Archives in Ankara, 
the British National Archives, the US National Archives, Leiden University 
Library, the library of the International Institute of Social History in 
Amsterdam, Beyazıt Library in Istanbul, Kent Kitaplığı in Izmir, and the 
Municipal Library and Kent Kitaplığı in Bursa for their help during my 
research for the thesis. My special thanks go to the ISAM library in Istanbul 
where I completed much of the writing process. I also would like to thank 
Sylvia Zeybekoğlu for meticulously editing the final text. 
I was lucky to be surrounded by the best friends on the planet. First of 
all, I would like to thank Eric Peterse for all his support in Leiden, although 
nothing can compensate for his generosity and kindness. I thank my friends 
and fellow colleagues in Leiden, especially Serhan Afacan, for sharing the 
various difficulties of being a PhD student, and Emre Erol, for patiently 
answering my inquiries regarding the defense process. I am grateful to Eva 
Forrai, the best Hungarian-British friend ever, for all the fun and sharing over 
the last ten years and for accommodating me during my research at the British 
archives. As always, Şebnem Oğuz has been my best mentor and confidant 
during my doctoral studies. I am especially thankful to her. I thank all my 
friends in academia, whom I know from Bilkent, Sabanci, York, CEU, Leiden 
and elsewhere, and who shared and discussed with me over the years and thus 
contributed to my development as a scholar. Although it is impossible to state 
all of them by name here, I particularly want to mention Zeynep İnanç, Aysel 
Yıldız and Gülhan Balsoy. I also would like to thank my feminist comrades. 
We have transformed each other profoundly, and I learned a lot from each and 
every one of them. Most importantly, perhaps, they made me realize that even 
though we have been trying to struggle against the most exasperating state 
policies and increasing level of violence against women in Turkish society,  
vi 
 
and usually felt stressed and disappointed, our struggle itself is one of the most 
important sources of strength and inspiration I have in my personal and 
academic life. Last but not least, I would like to thank my oldest and closest 
friends, Özge Doğan, Şafak Pesen, Hande Ersoy and Ayşe Bilge Yılmaz for 
simply being there for me for more than twenty years. Hande, in particular, 
was very supportive in every way during my application process to Leiden 
and I would remain especially grateful to her for this. 
My parents, Emel Gazalcı and Murat Adak, had to go through a very 
long and stressful process with their daughter and patiently supported me 
throughout my graduate studies even if they could not always understand and 
approve of the decisions I made. I would like to thank them so much for this. 
My sister, Ezgi Adak, has always been my source of joy. I could not be there 
for her as much as I would have liked to, but she grew up quickly and became 
a psychologist who was willing to spend hours on the phone dealing with the 
anxieties of a PhD student. In addition, she found the time and energy to help 
me during my research at the Izmir Kent Kitaplığı. I am grateful to her. I am 
also thankful to the members of my extended family. I particularly thank my 
cousins Cemal and Can Gazalcı and their families in Ankara who hosted me 
while I conducted research at the Turkish state archives. My uncle, Mustafa 
Gazalcı, was my first role model in life. As a little girl, I came to learn about 
the pleasure of reading and writing through his guidance. I am thankful to him 
for beginning this journey.      
Finally, I reserve my deepest gratitude for Ömer Turan. I met him 
during my second year as an undergraduate student at Bilkent University, and 
since then, we have grown up together on the path to becoming academics. As 
my partner and comrade, he contributed to my intellectual and scholarly 
development more than anybody else. He read every piece I wrote, discussed 
even the smallest detail, and most importantly, he has always been enthusiastic 
about my work. He believed in me more than I did. No words can express how 
much I feel lucky to have him in my life.    
While writing this thesis, I lost two of my loved ones. My father-in-
law, Ali Eşref Turan, died suddenly in 2012. Ömer and I had to go on and 
finish our dissertations having lost the most passionate supporter of our 
academic and intellectual endeavors. He never made me feel like a daughter-
in-law in the traditional sense this role has in Turkish society, and always 
cared as much about my scholarly progress as he did about his son’s. I would 
like to express here my appreciation.  
vii 
 
My grandmother, Fatma Gazalcı, passed away in 2009 in our 
hometown, Güney, in the province of Denizli, where she had spent her entire 
life. Her biggest regret was that her parents did not send her to school and so 
she remained illiterate. She would always watch us with admiration while we 
read, and try to follow the latest news if we grandchildren were willing to read 
her favorite newspaper, Cumhuriyet, aloud to her. She always wore the local 
peştamal veil when going out; but, at the same time, never saw it as 
contradictory to be a devoted supporter of “Atatürk’s party.” Thus, she was a 
living indication of the many complexities of the Kemalist experience. Her 
constant advice to us was to read and read more. How I wish she was here to 
see that I took her advice very seriously and wrote with the inspiration she and 
her fellow women of Güney have given to me. This thesis is dedicated to her 















One summary day in the early 2000s, in my mother’s hometown Güney, a 
small district in the province of Denizli in Turkey’s Aegean region, I was 
sitting in the garden of our house and listening to the conversation between 
my grandmother and her niece, who was only two years younger than her. My 
grandmother’s niece complained about the regular pain she had in her leg, 
saying that she had been suffering from it since the day she fell down and 
injured her leg while trying to escape from a gendarmerie soldier when she 
was a teenager. My grandmother seemed to know the incident and showed no 
significant reaction; it would pass as a small detail in their conversation had I 
not intervened and asked the reason why she had to run away from the soldier. 
She answered that the gendarmerie had tried to stop her in the street because 
she was wearing the local peştamal veil.1 “The peştamal was banned in Güney 
those days,” she said, referring to the late 1930s and early 1940s; but 
nevertheless, her father would not allow her to go out without wearing it. 
 I was surprised. To me, the peştamal was an ordinary, local cloth; I 
have known it as the main outdoor veil of women in Güney since my 
childhood. In fact, it was still common among older women at the time of this 
conversation; my grandmother, her niece and other women from their 
generation would wear it while going out. Why would the peştamal be 
banned? Who banned it and how? If it was banned, and if this ban was put 
into practice by force to the extent that the gendarmerie was employed in its 
implementation, then how did the peştamal survive this ban for decades? More 
striking, perhaps, was that in the literature on early Republican Turkey, it has 
been argued that although the Kemalist single-party regime (1923-1945) 
celebrated a new, “modern” Turkish woman and thus generally “discouraged” 
                                                          
1 Peştamal is a local fabric veil that has been used especially by rural women. Its color and 
pattern are different in different regions. In Güney, for example, it is composed of two 
rectangular pieces of cloth: a black and white plaid veil to cover the head and the upper body, 




veiling, there was no direct state intervention on women’s clothing. The 
standard comparison was with the aggressive attitude of the regime in 
changing men’s clothing: while there was a law banning the wearing of the 
fez and other traditional men’s headgears, there was no law banning women’s 
veils. In all major works on the period, we had read that women’s clothing 
was not regulated by the state, apart from the clothing of those women who 
were state officials. How could one understand this gap between the literature 
and the real life experiences of ordinary people in the periphery of the 
country?  
 This anecdote and the questions it raised continued to occupy my 
mind as I read more about the single-party era. As the formative years of the 
Turkish Republic, this period has been analyzed as an era of authoritarian 
modernization, characterized by some very radical reforms that were 
formulated by the ruling elite and imposed on the society in a top-down 
manner. Usually characterized as “modernization from above,” the Kemalist 
experience has been studied through a state-centered approach, preoccupied 
with the high politics of the political elite. As a result, the historiography of 
early republican Turkey has been heavily built on the analysis of the 
intellectual inspirations, ideological underpinnings and the political discourse 
of the regime elite, particularly placing Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his vision, 
ideas and “projects” at the center. The tendency to analyze a process 
dominated and shaped by Mustafa Kemal and the elites within his close 
political circle was not limited to those works that follow the Kemalist 
interpretations of the era. Studies that were critical of such interpretations also 
focus primarily on the doings of the regime as they could be followed in 
Ankara, and thus predominantly confined to the sphere of political history.2    
 The change in the theoretical frameworks through which the single-
party era has been analyzed since the 1960s could hardly make a difference in 
terms of shifting the focus away from the state and the elite. Major works on 
modern Ottoman/Turkish history were written following the assumptions of 
modernization theory.3 In the narratives of the modernization process built on 
                                                          
2 Gavin D. Brockett, “Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for 
the Social History of the Atatürk Era, 1923-38,” Middle Eastern Studies 34(4), October 1998, 
pp. 44-66. See also Gavin D. Brockett, “Revisiting the Turkish Revolution, 1923-1938: Secular 
Reform and Religious ‘Reaction’,” History Compass 4(6), 2006, pp. 1060-1072. 
3 On the main assumptions of the modernization theory, see Wolfgang Knöbl, “Theories that 
Won’t Pass Away: The Never-ending Story of Modernization Theory,” in Handbook of 
Historical Sociology, Gerard Delanty and Engin F. Işın (eds.), London: Sage Publications, 




this theory, the state appears as an autonomous institution controlled by the 
modernizing elite and it is seen as the main agent of social change. Prominent 
scholars of modern Turkey, such as Bernard Lewis and Niyazi Berkes, whose 
works remain among the best accounts of Ottoman/Turkish modernization, 
tend to present the republican state as the driving force in the formation of a 
modern Turkish society, which is a process seen as the logical result of the 
modernizing efforts put forward by the Kemalist modernizers’ Ottoman 
antecedents.4 Another set of works, framed by what comes to be called  “the 
strong state approach,” also continued, even reinforced, this central place of 
the state in modern Turkish history.5 Accordingly, the Turkish state was a 
strong state, a polity with a strong state tradition historically inherited from 
the Ottoman Empire. This state tradition is defined by Özbudun in the 
following way: “a strong and centralized state, reasonably effective by the 
standards of its day, highly autonomous of societal forces, and occupying a 
central and highly valued place in Ottoman political culture.”6 Within this 
framework, the society appears as weak and predominantly passive or 
unimportant compared to this highly autonomous strong state. Even those 
approaches that were more sociologically oriented and emerged as a critique 
of the modernization school, such as the center-periphery analysis of Şerif 
Mardin, did not go beyond this dualism and, actually, contributed to the 
reproduction of the state-society dichotomy.7 Although the social actors, “the 
periphery,” was given more agency in this analysis, the distinction between 
the state and society as fixed entities positioned in opposition to each other 
remained intact and the Kemalist reforms were largely analyzed based on the 
ideology of the elite. For example, Mardin claimed that “the meaning of 
                                                          
4 See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1961; Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Montreal: McGill University 
Press, 1998[1964]. See also Daniel Lerner, The Passing of the Traditional Society: Modernizing 
the Middle East, New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1958.                               
5 For a classical example of this approach, see Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, 
Beverley: Eothen Press, 1985.        
6 Ergun Özbudun, “The Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle 
East,” in Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East, L. Carl 
Brown (ed.), New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 133-157.  
7 See Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?,” Daedalus 102(1), 
Winter 1973, pp. 169-190. For more on the center-periphery analysis, see the first section of 
Chapter 4. For a detailed critique of the center-periphery approach, see Fethi Açıkel, “Entegratif 
Toplum ve Muarızları: ‘Merkez-Çevre’ Paradigması Üzerine Eleştirel Notlar,” Toplum ve Bilim 
105, 2006, pp. 30-69; Suavi Aydın, “Paradigmada Tarihsel Yorumun Sınırları: Merkez-çevre 
Temellendirmeleri Üzerinden Düşünceler,” Toplum ve Bilim 105, 2006, pp. 70-95; and 





[Kemalist] laicism as a project is best highlighted not by a description of its 
practice but by its relation to the primordial goals of the republican regime.”8 
In fact, approaching state-society relations in oppositional terms, the center-
periphery analysis differed from the classical analysis of the Kemalist regime 
in emphasizing its failure in transforming the society based on a secular 
ideology. In other words, the authoritarian Kemalist state had failed to change 
the predominantly conservative society through its radical secular reforms, as 
the Muslim identity had remained strong and returned to fulfill the vacuum 
created by the single-party regime.9 
The predominance of the state-centered and elite-centered 
perspectives, and the salience of state-society dichotomy in the literature have 
important implications. I argue that the dominant theoretical frameworks in 
the study of the single-party era briefly outlined above fail to reveal the 
complexity of the socio-historical reality on the ground. They underestimate 
the readiness of the state actors to negotiate and compromise with the 
dominant practices and structures in the society, and the tendency of the 
societal actors to tackle the reform processes in various and quite creative 
ways. In the literature, the role of non-state elite actors in the society, such as 
religious leaders or local notables, are either largely neglected or incorporated 
into the analysis as forces of “traditional” opposition.10 The Kemalist regime 
is portrayed as completely detached and alienated from the “people” (halk), 
imagined to be composed of uneducated, highly religious and conservative, 
poor masses. Within this rigid dichotomy, the regime vs. the halk, there is little 
                                                          
8 Şerif Mardin, “Religion and Secularism in Turkey,” in Atatürk: Founder of A Modern State, 
Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (eds.), London: C. Hurst & Co., 1981, pp. 191-219. For 
Mardin, these goals were, first, to find a new principle of social cohesion for Turkish society in 
order to replace Islam, and second, to devise a means of raising social consciousness.    
9 See Şerif Mardin, Din ve İdeoloji, Istanbul: İletişim, 1992. For an article explaining the 
resurgence of political Islam in the 1980s based on this line of thinking, see Fuat Keyman, 
“Modernity, Secularism and Islam: The Case of Turkey,” Theory, Culture & Society 24(2), 
2007, pp. 215-234.  
10 This is in fact quite a prevalent assumption in the studies dominated by the modernization 
paradigm, since the history of non-Western countries has been seen as a struggle between the 
forces of modernity and tradition. For a critique of this assumption in the case of the Middle 
East, see Stephanie Cronin, “Introduction,” in Subalterns and Social Protest: History from 
Below in the Middle East and North Africa, Stephanie Cronin (ed.), London: Routledge, 2008, 
pp. 1-22. In the case of Turkey, exceptional here are the works by İsmail Beşikçi that focus on 
the relationship of the state with the Kurdish notables without falling into the trap of such 
established dichotomies. See his Doğu Anadolu’nun Düzeni: Sosyo-ekonomik ve Etnik 
Temeller, Istanbul: E Yayınları, 1969; Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası’nın Tüzüğü (1927) ve Kürt 
Sorunu, Ankara: Komal Yayınevi, 1979; and Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası’nın Programı (1931) ve 




room to acknowledge the multiplicity of actors and discourses in all levels, 
and the complexity of their interactions. The role lower-level elites played in 
the way the regime functioned, for example, does not receive enough 
attention, and the fact that a considerable number of people were involved in 
Kemalist policies, supported them and shaped them in critical ways is 
overlooked.11 The non-elite groups and subordinated sectors of the society, 
namely, the experiences of the ordinary people, have almost been totally 
ignored. The field of social history of modern Turkey, particularly of the 
single-party era, is much poorer compared to the field of political history.12 
This has resulted in an unbalanced analysis: we know a great deal about the 
visions of the Kemalist elite, their ideological tenets and motivations, and the 
main frameworks of the reforms and policies formulated by them, but we 
know little about how these reforms and policies were implemented, how the 
main political and ideological parameters drawn in Ankara traveled to the 
provinces and translated into the daily mechanisms and conducts of the state, 
and how they entered the everyday life of ordinary citizens and were 
consumed by the individuals and communities. In other words, “the meeting 
ground of the fact and fiction” in Kemalist modernization, the encounter and 
interaction between the power of the modernizing state, and the limits of and 
myths about that power remain largely unexamined.13     
 These questions can be addressed by a change in our perspective, in 
theoretical frameworks and conceptual tools we use to understand state-
society relations. In this direction, one can draw upon ideas and inspirations 
from a number of theoretical and methodological debates. One of them is the 
theoretical break put forward by the critical historiography of the “history 
from below” school and the subaltern studies. Emerging out of a critical 
engagement with Marxist conceptual categories of social history and a 
                                                          
11 Zürcher briefly touches on the lack of the attention in literature on the those educated sectors 
of the society who in fact supported the regime: “the Kemalist leadership did inspire a great 
many people – mostly writers, teachers, doctors and other professionals and students – with its 
vision of a modern, secular, independent Turkey. These people, who saw themselves as an elite, 
with a mission to guide their ignorant compatriots, often worked very hard and with great 
personal sacrifice for their ideals. This ‘noblesse oblige’ attitude of the Kemalist elite is 
something that modern revisionist writers of the right and the left tend to overlook.” Erik J. 
Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004[1993], p. 181. 
12 Brockett, 2006; Touraj Atabaki, “Introduction,” in The State and the Subaltern: 
Modernization, Society, and the State in Turkey and Iran, Touraj Atabaki (ed.), London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2007, pp. xiii-xvi.   
13 Joel Migdal, “Finding the Meeting Ground of Fact and Fiction: Some Reflections on Turkish 
Modernization,” in Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, Sibel Bozdoğan and 




Gramscian intellectual agenda, both came as a challenge against traditional 
elitist perspectives, emphasizing the agency of the subaltern classes and the 
historical experience of the common people.14 The call for grassroots by the 
“history from below” tradition aimed at bringing back the common people, 
especially the working class, as actors of their own history.15 Likewise, in 
addressing the history of postcolonial South Asia, subalternist historians 
aimed to “rectify the elitist bias characteristic of much research and academic 
work in this particular field.”16 In addition to the critique of elite-centered 
narratives, another major contribution of the subaltern studies school was their 
challenge to Eurocentrism, which opened the way to investigate the non-
Western pathways to modernity and to rewrite the history of the 
modernization process in non-Western societies by analyzing the politics and 
agency of the societal actors. 17        
Another theoretical source for drawing an alternative understanding 
of state-society interaction can be derived from the literature on relational 
sociology.18 In this approach, critical concepts of social theory, such as power 
and agency, are redefined as concepts referring to a relationship. Therefore, 
agency cannot be separable from the dynamics of situations. The situatedness 
of agency within the structure should not be ignored; agency and structure 
reproduce and transform one another through this interaction. Accordingly, 
structure cannot be equated with constraint only; “it is always both 
constraining and enabling.”19 This also necessitates a redefinition of the state 
in a relational manner, and more specifically, a rethinking of the state-society 
divide. Recently flourishing literature on the anthropology of the state and the 
theoretical approaches behind it can be quite helpful in this regard. These 
                                                          
14 Vinayak Chaturverdi, “Introduction” in Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial, 
Vinayak Chaturverdi (ed.), London: Verso, 2000, pp. vii-xix. For classical examples of these 
approaches, see Eric Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social 
Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959; E. 
P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, London: Victor Gollancz, 1963; 
Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1983; Sumit Sarkar, Popular Movements and Middle-class Leadership in Late 
Colonial India, Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi, 1984; Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rethinking Working-Class 
History: Bengal 1890-1940, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. 
15 Eric Hobsbawm, On History, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997, pp. 201-227. 
16 Ranajit Guha, “Preface,” in Subaltern Studies I, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. vii. 
17 See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
18 Mustafa Emirbayer, “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology,” The American Journal of 
Sociology 103(2), 1997, pp. 281-317. 
19 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, 




approaches, derive from theorists like Gramsci and Foucault and formulated 
by scholars like Philip Abrams and Timothy Mitchell, seek to go beyond the 
understanding of the state as a clearly bounded, autonomous institution that is 
distinct from the society. Rather, they try to “reconceptualize the state within 
other institutional forms through which social relations are lived.”20 In this 
understanding, the state-society boundary is not a fixed, but an elusive one. 
This, however, does not mean to erase the distinction altogether, nor it means 
to conceptualize the state as a pure social construct. “The state cannot be 
dismissed as an abstraction or ideological construct and passed over in favor 
of more real, material realities.”21 Rather, it means that it is necessary to revise 
the dominant understanding of the state-society relations in oppositional 
terms, and as a unidirectional interaction, formed and dominated by the state.  
Anthropological perspectives to state-society relations contribute also 
to our understanding of how people perceive the state through their own 
experience of encounter with the state in their localities. The interaction 
between the state officials and common people in local contexts is essential to 
understanding how the state manifests itself in everyday life. This reminds us 
the significance of the micro in studying the macro; the critical role that “the 
micropolitics of state work,” namely, how the state operates in daily lives and 
plays a role in the making of larger processes. It also suggests that it is this 
encounter in the local context through which people create their own means 
to cope with these larger processes. As Sharma and Gupta suggest,  
 
Everyday statist encounters not only shape people’s imagination of 
what the state is and how it is demarcated, but also enable people to 
devise strategies of resistance to this imagined state. Those who are 
subjects or targets of state programs, and thus ‘outside’ bureaucracies, 
learn to use the very same techniques that lower-level state agents use 
to sabotage official mandates and orders.22 
 
In grasping the strategies of common people in tackling the state, 
James Scott’s conception of the “everyday forms of resistance” can be 
illuminating. According to Scott, the most significant difference of everyday 
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resistance is “its implicit disavowal of public and symbolic goals” and its 
avoidance of direct confrontation with the authority, interested largely in 
immediate, de facto gains.23 Everyday forms of resistance are shaped by the 
form of control and domination. In other words, each form of control is likely 
“to generate its own distinctive form of quiet resistance and 
counterappropriation.” By the same token, different ways in which the societal 
actors respond to control and domination bring along different state policies 
in response. The crucial point is that whatever the response, the resistance of 
the common people changes or narrows the policy options available to the 
state.24 Therefore, it is this interplay that determines the outcome of state-
society interaction, and of the processes that are shaped by this interaction.   
Perhaps Joel Migdal’s state-in-society approach is one that most 
directly deals with the question of how to understand state-society relations 
beyond a dichotomous view. Having emerged as a part of the Weberian 
literature on state and state-society relations, the state-in-society approach 
shares the assumptions regarding the analytical separation of state and society 
and the significance of states as agents of change.25 However, it diverges from 
the state-oriented approaches in critical ways and thus offers valuable insights 
to maintain a more balanced perspective in analyzing state-society interaction 
and social change. One of the main pillars of this balanced perspective is an 
understanding of state as an agent situated in a certain social setting (thus 
“state-in-society”) and susceptible to the influence of social forces. In other 
words, the state-in-society approach is a critique of seeing state as the fulcrum 
of the process of domination and change, as a force capable of shaping 
people’s lives entirely.26 In contrast, it maintains that state is by no means the 
only force that matters, and not even the central one: “societies affect states as 
much as, or possibly more than, states affect societies.”27 In this sense, state 
autonomy and effectiveness are always constrained, and even in countries 
                                                          
23 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Resistance, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985, p. 33. See also Jim Scott, “Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance,” 
Journal of Peasant Studies, 13(2), 1986, pp. 5-35. 
24 Scott, 1985, p. 36. 
25 Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue, “Introduction: developing a state-in-society 
perspective,” in State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third 
World, Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli and Vivienne Shue (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994, pp. 1-6.   
26 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute 
One Another 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 7-8. 




with authoritarian regimes, the reach of state is more limited than it is usually 
assumed.  
 
The concept of a state’s “autonomy” is often an illusion and helps 
explain very little; a state’s apparent disconnectedness from social 
groups turns out to be associated in some cases with “strength” (as in 
some rapidly industrializing countries) and in other cases with 
“weakness” (as in several African countries). We suggest instead that a 
state’s relative effectiveness is a function of the varied forms in which 
state-society relations are interwoven.28  
 
As an implication of such an understanding of state, the second pillar 
of state-in-society approach is an emphasis on the process of interaction 
between the state and social forces, “on the ongoing struggles among shifting 
coalitions over the rules for daily behavior.”29 This implies a change in focus, 
from the center of state power to periphery, from the peak institutions of the 
state to its diffuse parts. Rather than clear-cut boundaries, the state-in-society 
approach sees blurred and constantly changing boundaries between the state 
and the society, and it is in the study of these boundaries, these junctures of 
encounter, conflict, negotiation and compromise we can better evaluate the 
state power and its effectiveness, and the power of the societal dynamics and 
the extent of social change. In such an analysis, just like the state, the social 
forces are also contingent on empirical conditions.30 The state and the society 
are mutually transformative, and, thus, the outcome of their interaction is 
rarely predictable. By referring to Scott’s analysis of the failures of state plans 
in Seeing Like a State, Migdal claims that “state policy implementation and 
the outcomes in society have ended up quite different from the state’s original 
blueprints. Even the boldest state plans, as Scott has demonstrated in his 
discussion of the designs of modernism, can turn into disastrous follies.”31 
This is why the state-in-society approach suggests that in order to understand 
the processes of domination and change, we should analyze the “practices” of 
the state while also recognizing the “image” of the state, that is, “a clearly 
bounded, unified organization that can be spoken of singular terms.” In other 
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words, the state is also composed of “the practices of a heap of loosely 
connected parts and fragments, frequently with ill-defined boundaries 
between them and other groupings inside and outside the official state borders 
and often promoting conflicting sets of rules with one another and with 
‘official’ law.”32   
Migdal’s state-in-society approach proved particularly inspiring for 
studying authoritarian regimes and developing countries. It has also been 
noted in some recent studies as being useful for analyzing the Turkish case.33 
In fact, Migdal himself commented on the Turkish experience of 
modernization.34 He indicated that to understand the social transformation 
initiated by the Kemalist regime, one should look at the “effects” of the 
modernity project and these effects “can be found not in an examination of 
elites and their institutions exclusively, nor in a focus solely on the poor or 
marginal groups of society, but on those physical and social spaces the two 
intersect.”35 
Recently, a new body of literature on modern Turkey, which is 
inspired by these theoretical insights and turns the focus away from Ankara 
and the central elite, has begun to flourish. Diverse in their focus, methods and 
sources, these works nevertheless share a similar perspective. Though in 
varying degrees, they are all concerned about examining the dynamics of the 
state-society relations, restoring the agency of people as social actors, and 
looking at the everyday politics of modernization as a relational process. 
Meeker’s anthropological work, for instance, ascertained the ways in which 
the Turkish state was embedded in the local society and how this 
embeddedness remained basically intact in transition from the Ottoman 
Empire to the Turkish Republic.36 New sources were analyzed to shed more 
light on the mechanisms though which the agents of the state encountered the 
society. For example, in his article on the petitions received by the secretary-
general of the Republican People’s Party (RPP), the party that ruled Turkey 
for two decades until the transition to multi-party system in 1945, Akın 
analyzed these documents to understand “the intricate web of discursive and 
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practical interactions between people and representatives of state and party 
power.”37 Brocket looked at the provincial newspapers that were published 
immediately after the beginning of multi-party politics in 1945 to understand 
how the larger sectors of the society raised their voice through print media and 
how they challenged and negotiated the parameters of the national identity 
envisioned by the single-party regime in the previous era.38 Studies that focus 
on the implementation process of a particular reform enlarged our 
understanding of the gap between the visions and plans of the Kemalist elite 
in introducing that reform on the one hand, and what had actually happened 
in practice when the “plan” was confronted by the micro mechanisms of 
interaction and negotiation between the forces of the state and the society, on 
the other.39  
 Drawing on the theoretical insights stemming from studies on social 
history, the anthropology of the state, state-society relations, everyday life and 
subordinated groups, and particularly, from Migdal’s state-in-society 
approach, this thesis is a part of and contributes to this recently flourishing 
body of literature on the Turkish Republic. In general terms, it is a study of 
state-society relations in 1930s Turkey, aiming to understand the ways in 
which the Kemalist policies and reforms were received, interpreted, 
negotiated, compromised and/or resisted by various actors in the provinces. It 
looks at the spaces/fields where these actors interacted, and how these 
interactions drew and redrew, and thus contested and blurred the boundaries 
that are supposed to clearly separate the state and the society. The argument 
is that through an analysis of these spaces of interaction, it is possible to reveal 
a better understanding of the actors, dynamics and complexities of the social 
change experienced under the Kemalist single-party regime. The space/field 
this study focuses on to address these questions is the regulation of women’s 
clothing, namely, the anti-veiling campaigns in the 1930s.  
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The focus of the study: Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the 1930s  
Like other modernizing regimes, for the Kemalists, the importance of clothing 
primarily originated in the power it had on shaping identities in the public 
sphere. As Alev Çınar argues, clothing can be considered as “one of the most 
powerful tools for the display of identities due to its temporally and spatially 
proliferative quality,”40 and this quality was what concerned the Kemalist 
regime the most, in terms of both controlling and regulating the society and 
transforming it into a modern, civilized nation. The Hat Law in 1925 was 
perhaps the most apparent and earliest manifestation of this Kemalist concern. 
Regulating men’s clothing only, the law nevertheless made it explicit that one 
fundamental aspect of the Kemalist project of building a secular nation state 
was to create new, “modern” subjects who would transform the public sphere 
into a modern domain through their very existence. Unlike its determined will 
to directly intervene in men’s headgear, however, the Kemalist regime was 
more hesitant and reluctant to apply the same approach to women’s veiling 
and clothing.  
The main strategy Ankara followed regarding the issue of unveiling 
was to transfer the matter to the local level and to encourage the local 
administrative bodies and their actors to deal with it. In other words, despite 
the fact that there was no law or decree banning women’s veiling country-
wide, there were anti-veiling campaigns organized at the local level that were 
clearly encouraged by Ankara, but in some cases, could also stem from the 
local elite’s own initiatives. Thus, there was state intervention on women’s 
clothing in the early Turkish Republic, but it was local in character, shaped 
and implemented mainly by the local actors. Given the complicated 
involvement of Ankara in the process and its reluctant  attitude swaying 
between promoting local efforts and limiting them, combined with the 
diversity of the attitudes and reactions of the local elite and the larger societal 
actors, the process at the local level was in fact quite complex. The local 
character of the anti-veiling campaigns and the lack of solid and consistent 
policy guidelines allowed space for discussions, negotiations and local 
variations, which, in the end, resulted in a complex and less radical 
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transformation of women’s clothing in the provinces. Moreover, although 
Europeanization of women’s dress was the ideal, the anti-veiling campaigns 
mainly aimed at the removal of the peçe (face veil) and the çarşaf,41 and 
certain local equivalents of the çarşaf, such as the peştamal. The covering of 
the hair was never openly targeted. This limited scope of the campaigns 
provided certain room for women’s selective adaptation, and created 
possibilities of maintaining the existing dress norms, except for the use of the 
peçe, the çarşaf, and the peştamal. 
 Since veiling encompassed the whole system of seclusion of women,42 
unveiling entailed a direct state intervention both in deeply-rooted gender 
codes and the private concerns of the people. As such, the example of anti-
veiling campaigns offers a very rich terrain to explore the attitudes, strategies, 
and actions of the central state actors, local elites, and ordinary people, and 
the ways in which they interacted and negotiated. One additional opportunity 
the study of the anti-veiling campaigns provides is to see how deeply gendered 
these interactions and negotiations were. In other words, the analysis of the 
anti-veiling campaigns support the argument that the gender aspect of the 
social change initiated by the state elite cannot be treated as a chapter separate 
from other processes. As Kandiyoti emphasized, women-related issues were 
in fact part of an ideological terrain where broader questions, such as 
modernity, secularism or cultural identity were discussed, and as such, they 
functioned as “boundary markers” for all actors.43 The transformation of the 
gender regime appears as a field where one can observe the intersection and 
conflict of various discourses. Likewise, any political discourse or debate on 
social change had connotations for women’s social position, and for gender 
relations.  
However, the number of studies on the anti-veiling campaigns in early 
republican Turkey is very limited. In fact, as stated above, even the knowledge 
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of state intervention in women’s veiling during the single-party era was 
lacking in the literature until quite recently. The first scholarly work that 
mentioned local bans on the peçe and the çarşaf issued by a number of 
municipalities and provincial councils was Bernard Caporal’s doctoral 
dissertation entitled “La Femme turque à travers le kémalisme et le 
postkémalisme (1919-1970),” which was translated into Turkish and 
published in 1982.44 Caporal, however, did not discuss these bans in any detail 
except for listing the dates and places of the bans he could locate.45 This short 
note mentioned by Caporal remained largely unnoticed until women’s 
headscarf became an issue in Turkish universities and was transformed into a 
matter of political controversy in the public debates in the 1980s. Those 
women who faced the headscarf ban in the universities became increasingly 
politicized. Religious women intellectuals, in particular, began to search for 
the historical grounds on which women’s veiling came to be linked to political 
debates on modernity, secularism and the public sphere in Turkey. One of 
those women, Cihan Aktaş, published a detailed account of the history of state 
intervention in clothing in the Ottoman/Turkish context based on secondary 
sources, in which she cited Caporal on the local bans on the peçe and the 
çarşaf, complemented with a few oral historical accounts.46 In the first major 
scholarly works that were published on the headscarf issue and Islamic 
women’s identity in the early 1990s, a discussion on the question of state 
intervention in women’s veiling in the early republic was still missing, apart 
from the emphasis on the Kemalist project of creating a modern and national 
Turkish womanhood.47  
A short but important article by Metin Çapa in Toplumsal Tarih 
provided the first account of the banning of the peçe in Trabzon in 1926.48 
Another article by Hakkı Uyar enlarged Çapa’s analysis of this early banning 
of the peçe in Trabzon, and established that the peçe and the çarşaf had in fact 
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became an issue in Turkey in the mid-1930s by referring to the discussion held 
at the RPP general congress in May 1935.49 This was a discussion on whether 
to enact a law banning the peçe and the çarşaf countrywide.50 Uyar had 
encountered a number of news items on the banning of the peçe and the çarşaf 
in some provinces in the 1930s in a few local newspapers during his 
dissertation research about the provincial branches of the RPP.51 His notes 
based on these news items provided brief yet significant information, 
especially on the banning of the peçe and the çarşaf in Trabzon in 1936. 
Uyar’s article was also encouraging for further research, since it showed that 
more information on the anti-veiling campaigns in 1930s Turkey could be 
uncovered by consulting the provincial newspapers of the time, which were 
sources that had been largely neglected in the literature until then.  
The opening of the Prime Ministry Republican Archives (Başbakanlık 
Cumhuriyet Arşivi) was a major development contributing to the emergence 
of a new body of literature drawing on the rich documents made available to 
researchers working on the early Turkish republic.52 The first article that 
benefited from this advantage and used a few documents from the archive of 
the RPP on the anti-veiling campaigns in the 1930s was Kemal Yakut’s 
article.53 Yakut also referred to a compilation of police documents that was 
published by the General Directorate of Security (Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü) 
on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the establishment of Turkish 
Republic in 1998.54 Based on these few documents, more information was 
revealed on the anti-veiling campaigns in provinces other than Trabzon, such 
as Afyon, Maraş and Yozgat. In particular, the police documents published in 
the compilation, although composed of only a very limited number of 
examples from an apparently very rich archive that was closed to researchers, 
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provided a hint of the involvement of Ankara in the process, as it included one 
circular about the issue by the Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya addressed to 
all governors and general inspectors.     
These three short but important articles published in Turkish did not 
receive the attention they deserved in subsequent scholarly works. Although 
they were able to reveal only a few examples of anti-veiling campaigns and 
discussed them very briefly, they were crucial contributions to the literature 
since they established that there was in fact state intervention in women’s 
clothing in the early republican era, albeit at the local level. They also 
provided some significant insights as to how research on the anti-veiling 
campaigns could be enlarged. Following these insights, Hale Yılmaz devoted 
a chapter on the regulation of women’s clothing in the early republic in her 
dissertation, which has recently been published as a book.55 The chapter 
discusses the unveiling campaigns with a focus on their social and cultural 
implications as experienced in the everyday lives of women and men. 
Yılmaz’s work is an important contribution, since it brings the anti-veiling 
campaigns into the English-written literature on early Turkish republic and 
expands the discussion on them based on new documents from police archives 
and oral historical accounts. Her own interview with a woman from an 
educated, middle class family in Trabzon, combined with recently published 
accounts from other provinces, allow us to hear the voices of people who had 
lived through the anti-veiling campaigns and how they recall that experience.56 
Most recently, an edited volume by Stephanie Cronin brought together 
examples of fresh and critical research on the anti-veiling campaigns in the 
Muslim world.57 Three chapters in this volume, written by Libal, Metinsoy 
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and myself, are devoted to the Turkish case and discuss the anti-veiling 
campaigns from different angles by using a rich variety of sources, including 
the police archives and the memoirs.58      
This study is the first monograph on the anti-veiling campaigns in the 
early Turkish Republic. It aims to go beyond an analysis of these campaigns 
based on the discourse and strategies of the high-level state actors. Such an 
elite-centered analysis has in fact shaped much of the literature on clothing 
change in the Middle East. As Tapper and Ingham indicate, approaches to 
dress and clothing change in the region have been focusing exclusively on the 
role of political or religious authorities. According to this approach, the 
impetus for clothing change comes only from above and inevitably and 
automatically change social and cultural identities in the way the imposer of 
the change/reform imagined.59 This thesis rather examines them as they were 
implemented through concrete policies and actions at the local level, and 
shaped as a result of the interaction of various actors and positions. Its 
contribution to the existing literature on the anti-veiling campaigns in early 
republican period is two-fold. First, it presents a detailed trajectory of the 
debates on and attempts at women’s unveiling in Turkey starting from the late 
Ottoman Empire onwards, discusses the anti-veiling campaigns of the 1920s 
separately as weak but significant attempts creating certain patterns for later 
campaigns, and focuses on what I call the main wave of anti-veiling 
campaigns in the mid-1930s, by contextualizing them as part of a new phase 
the Kemalist regime entered in the 1930s. Thus this study gives the most 
comprehensive account of the anti-veiling campaigns in the early Turkish 
republic, analyzing the general political discourse behind them and looking at 
the legal and institutional mechanisms through which they were formulated 
and implemented. It provides a snapshot of the campaigns in all aspects and 
as a general reform experience. By drawing upon a large survey of provinces, 
                                                          
58 See Kathryn Libal, “From Face Veil to Cloche Hat: The Backward Ottoman versus New 
Turkish Woman in Urban Public Discourse,” in Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: 
Gender, Modernism and the Politics of Dress, Stephanie Cronin (ed.), London: Routledge, 
2014, pp. 39-58; Sevgi Adak, “Anti-Veiling Campaigns and the local elites in Turkey of the 
1930s: A View from the Periphery,” in Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: Gender, 
Modernism and the Politics of Dress, Stephanie Cronin (ed.), London: Routledge, 2014, pp. 
59-85; and Murat Metinsoy, “Everyday Resistance to Unveiling and Flexible Secularism in 
Early Republican Turkey,” in Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: Gender, 
Modernism and the Politics of Dress, Stephanie Cronin (ed.), London: Routledge, 2014, pp. 
86-117.  
59 Nancy Lindisfarne-Tapper and Bruce Ingham, “Approaches to the Study of Dress in the 
Middle East,” in Nancy Lindisfarne-Tapper and Bruce Ingham (eds.), Languages of Dress in 




this study clearly demonstrates that unlike Yılmaz’s claim that bans on the 
peçe and the çarşaf were more common in the Western provinces and in the 
coastal and border cities, the anti-veiling campaigns were a country-wide 
phenomena with no specific regional concentration.60 
Second, while looking at the main characteristics of the anti-veiling 
campaigns across the provinces and analyzing them as a wide-spread reform 
process, at the same time, this study digs deeper into the local context. With a 
strong emphasis on the significance of studying the local, it analyzes the 
campaigns within the complexities of their local settings and politics. 
However, digging into the local context does not mean focusing on a small 
number of cases. This study does not claim that it discusses a particular anti-
veiling campaign in all its details, for example. Nor does it aim at such an 
exhaustive analysis. In other words, this is not a study of the local as micro 
history. Rather, it delves into the local to see the micro dynamics of the 
campaigns across various cases, and examines them within common 
conceptual frameworks such as resistance and agency. Two of these 
conceptual frameworks, in particular, through which I examine the anti-
veiling campaigns, the concept of the local elite and women’s agency, set this 
study’s analysis of the campaigns aside from other studies.  
This two-fold focus of the study, the general discursive, legal and 
institutional framework within which the anti-veiling campaigns were shaped 
and implemented country-wide, on the one hand, and the micro dynamics of 
this process at the local level, on the other, was possible based on a selection 
of diverse sources. First, this study is the first study that makes extensive use 
of the local newspapers for the study of the anti-veiling campaigns. Twelve 
local newspapers from eight provinces, Adana, Antalya, Bursa, Izmir, İçel, 
Kars, Konya and Trabzon, were analyzed.61 This not only provided a very rich 
and new body of information to see the details of the situation at the local 
level, but also to draw the most comprehensive map of the anti-veiling 
campaigns in the 1930s existing in the literature so far.62 Second, like Yılmaz 
and Metinsoy, I use documents from the state and the police archives, some 
of which are new to the literature. The correspondence between the provinces 
and the Ministry of Interior proved to be specifically helpful in discussing the 
role of the local elites. Third, this study also uses American and British 
consular reports, most of which are revealed for the first time. The British 
                                                          
60 See Yılmaz, 2013, p. 102. 
61 For the list of these newspapers, see the bibliography.  




consular reports, in particular, were extremely helpful to enrich the analysis 
of the local context, since they provided very rare observations of the situation 
at the local level, which could be compared and contrasted with the reports 
coming from Turkish state sources in the provinces. In fact, it is the 
combination of these three different sources of information, the local 
newspapers, the Turkish state and police documents and the consular reports 
that provided a very rich lens to get a general picture of the patterns of 
interaction between actors in various levels while at the same time to dig into 
the local to see the complexity and diversity in the periphery of the country. 
 
The Plan of the Study 
The thesis is composed of five main chapters. Chapter 2 focuses on the debates 
on women’s un/veiling and attempts of anti-veiling campaigns before the 
1930s. The chapter first begins with a discussion on the Ottoman legacy, 
showing that the debate on the peçe and the çarşaf goes back to the 19th 
century and originates from questions of modernization, progress and 
women’s roles in the context of a rapidly changing Ottoman society. It draws 
connections between the Kemalist state’s attempts at unveiling and the 
initiations of the Ottoman state to intervene in women’s clothing. The chapter 
then looks at the initial years of the Turkish Republic, early Kemalist vision 
of women’s clothing and modernization, the Hat Law of 1925, and the 
question of how the regime’s intervention to male clothing was linked to the 
question of women’s veiling. A number of anti-veiling campaigns that were 
initiated at the local level in the second half of the 1920s are discussed in 
detail. They are analyzed within the context of a general discourse and 
campaign on the modernization of dress that the Hat Law of 1925 triggered. 
The chapter concludes by discussing the patterns and mechanisms these early 
attempts at women’s unveiling set for the following anti-veiling campaigns in 
the next decade.   
Chapter 3 discusses the anti-veiling campaigns in the 1930s as the 
main wave of women’s unveiling and situates them within the broader context 
of 1930s Turkey. Following a discussion of the 1930s as a turn to a more 
authoritarian Kemalist regime, eager to penetrate into the society and to 
increase its control over the economic, social and cultural domains, the chapter 
looks at the anti-veiling campaigns as one of the reforms that characterized 
this turn from the mid-1930s onwards. It analyzes the increasing 
stigmatization of the peçe and the çarşaf as “uncivilized” clothing as part of 




the 1930s and a greater emphasis on their “emancipation” given by the regime 
in order to incorporate them as agents of modernization. In the third section, 
the anti-veiling campaigns are analyzed as a country-wide, general 
phenomenon by detailed discussions on three main questions: why did the 
main wave of the anti-veiling campaigns begin in the mid-1930s, more 
specifically, in 1934? What were their scope, content and political discourse? 
And on which legal bases were they organized and implemented? Overall, 
chapter 3 provides a macro picture of 1930s Turkey as a new phase of the 
Kemalist regime, and of the anti-veiling campaigns as an important country-
wide reform shaped as part of this phase. 
Chapter 4 turns the focus to the local and looks particularly at the role 
the local elites played in the anti-veiling campaigns. It first discusses the place 
of the local in the literature on the single-party era in Turkey and claims that 
the local should be brought into the picture in order to better understand the 
dynamics and outcomes of the modernization process as experienced in the 
provinces. The first section provides a working definition of the concept of 
local elite and examines how to utilize this concept in order to see the diversity 
of actors at the local level. The second section outlines the position of Ankara 
on the anti-veiling campaigns. It shows the gradual increase in Ankara’s 
tendency to intervene in the local context and control the situation in the 
provinces while at the same time remaining hesitant to intervene in people’s 
lives “too much” in the issue of un/veiling. This, in a sense, ambivalent 
position of the central elites on the anti-veiling campaigns, it is argued, helped 
to widen the space of action for the local elites. The third section focuses on 
this space of action and looks at the various ways in which the local elites 
influenced the shaping and the implementation of the anti-veiling campaigns. 
It shows that as a composite group, the attitudes of the local elites were diverse 
and their tackling of the question of women’s unveiling ranged from “being 
more royalist than the king” to openly resisting it. While some local elites 
envisioned themselves as the agents of change in the provinces, others just 
pretended that they were. State officials seemed more supportive in the reform 
processes, but those local elites who were natives of the provinces they resided 
could also act quite actively in the shaping of the campaigns. 
Chapter 5 discusses the questions of resistance and agency in the anti-
veiling campaigns. It continues to focus on the local context, but turns to the 
attitudes and reactions of the ordinary people with the contention that the 
importance of the local cannot be fully highlighted by looking at how the local 




the local elites were part of a matrix of actors and power struggles where the 
societal forces also played a crucial role. The chapter discusses the reactions 
of non-elite actors, defined as popular resistance, and the extent to which this 
resistance could influence the shaping of the anti-veiling campaigns. Then, the 
chapter specifically focuses on reactions of women as the primary target of 
the campaigns. As a much less visible group, largely neglected in the 
conventional historiography, women are situated as “visible” actors whose 
agency could not be reduced to the dichotomy of passive compliance and open 
resistance. One aim of Chapter 5 is to also engage in a critical dialogue with 
the feminist literature on the Kemalist regime. It emphasizes the complex 
ways in which women became subjects of the Kemalist modernization and 
how this contributed to women’s visibility and participation in the public life. 
Chapter 6 locates the Turkish anti-veiling campaigns within the 
greater map of the Muslim world in terms of the debates on and attempts at 
changing women’s clothing during the inter-war period. It discusses the 
Turkish experience of unveiling together with other experiences of state-
initiated campaigns for women’s unveiling and deals with the question of how 
these experiences informed and influenced each other. It contends that general 
common trends and discourses on issues of women and the modernization of 
their clothing can be traced across the Muslim world. However, the way these 
issues were handled differed quite significantly. While the cases of the Arab 
countries, Afghanistan and Muslim countries under the Soviet rule are also 
discussed, it is claimed that three cases, Albania, Iran and Turkey, differ from 
the other examples and should be analyzed comparatively. A separate section 
attempts at such a comparative discussion with the aim of understanding the 























“Yandan yırtmaç çarşaflar 
Görünüyor tombul bacaklar 
Kapanın şeytan postallar 




I. The Ottoman Legacy 
Women’s clothing has been a matter of intense debate in Turkey since the 
Ottoman period. The Ottoman state issued various directives and regulations 
to control women’s dress, and, especially, to monitor Muslim women’s loyalty 
to Islamic dress codes, by intervening in the length of veils or thickness of the 
fabric used for them. The color, size and form of women’s dress were all 
subject to state regulation. As Quataert emphasizes, these regulations were 
part of a long tradition of Ottoman clothing laws that aimed at extending state 
control over society and disciplining the behavior of its subjects.64 In the 18th 
century, for example, when upper class Ottoman women began to wear fancy 
feraces, the Ottoman state had to impose some restrictions on ferace styles, 
especially banning tight models and thin fabrics due to pressure from the 
ulema.65 Regulations demanding modesty in women’s clothes, and, above all, 
                                                          
63 An anonymous song criticizing modernized çarşafs that had a vent, and asking women to 
cover themselves properly in order not to attract the esnaf (tradesmen). The song is claimed to 
be from the last years of the Ottoman era, circa 1915-1918. Reşat Ekrem Koçu, Türk Giyim 
Kuşam ve Süslenme Sözlüğü, Istanbul: Sümerbank Kültür Yayınları, 1969, p. 9.   
64 Donald Quataert, “Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 29(3), 1997, pp. 403-425. 
65 Aktaş, 2006, p. 54; Serpil Çakır, Osmanlı Kadın Hareketi, Istanbul: Metis, 2011[1994], p. 
247. The ferace is a long mantle, a full coat with wide arms and body, and skirts to the floor, 
worn by Ottoman women as outdoor clothing. The ferace changed significantly, especially in 
the 19th century. Its form and color diversified and it turned into a long overcoat-like outdoor 
dress by the end of the empire. See Koçu, 1969, pp. 108-111. For more on the Ottoman women’s 
attire in the 19th century, see Melek Sevüktekin Apak, Filiz Onat Gündüz and Fatma Öztürk 
Eray, Osmanlı Dönemi Kadın Giyimleri, Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1997. 




admonishing Muslim women against imitating Christian women or European 
styles, were on the rise with the increasing influence of the West in the 19th 
century.66 This increase was related to the ongoing change in women’s social 
role and dress since the Tanzimat era, and particularly, to the tendency of the 
upper class Ottoman women in urban areas to follow and adopt European 
fashions, notably after the Crimean War.67 
Women’s clothing and attire had become a central issue, a locus of 
struggle for the supporters of various political positions by the late 19th 
century.68 In the 1870s, a set of regulations concerning women’s dress, 
prohibiting the use of transparent face veils and light-colored feraces were 
issued.69 This was also a period when the çarşaf increasingly replaced the 
ferace as Ottoman women’s outdoor attire.70 However, in 1881, Sultan 
                                                          
End of the 19th Century,” in Women in Modern Turkish Society, Şirin Tekeli (ed.), London: 
Zed Books, 1995, pp. 25-45. 
66 It should be underlined that it is not always clear to what extent these regulations were 
applicable or were intended to be applied in the entire Ottoman land. In other words, given the 
ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity of the Ottoman society, which spread over many 
provinces, it is difficult to make generalizations on clothing and clothing change, except for the 
cases where the Ottoman state issued laws concerning the state officials or the army. Most of 
the time, the sources are also not clear about the targeted geography of the clothing regulations 
regarding women’s dress. Many of the regulations in the 19th century, for example, seemed to 
be limited to Istanbul. Reşat Ekrem Koçu indicates that the first regulation that prohibited the 
Ottoman women from dressing inappropriately (meaning, not properly covered) and fanciful 
was issued in the 18th century, during the reign of Sultan Ahmet III. This regulation was 
concerned only with the clothing of the women in Istanbul, for example. Likewise, the 
regulations in the Hamidian era seem also limited to Istanbul. See Koçu, 1969, p. 8-9. 
67 Yakut, 2002. See also Sarah Graham-Brown, Images of Women, The Portrayal of Women in 
Photography of the Middle East, 1860-1950, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988 and 
Fanny Davis, The Ottoman Lady: A Social History from 1718 to 1918, New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1986. Şeni indicates that in its transformed form, elite Ottoman women’s outdoor 
clothing was  in fact very similar to that worn by  the European women in the late 19th century, 
and this similarity was criticized by the Ottoman satire of the time. Şeni, 1995, p. 30. For a 
defense of women’s veiling and its compatibility with women’s education and participation in 
social life in one of the first women’s journals published during the Tanzimat Era, see Ayşenur 
Kurtoğlu, “Tanzimat Dönemi İlk Kadın Yayınında Dinin Yer Aşıl Biçimleri,” in Osmanlı’dan 
Cumhuriyet’e Kadının Tarihi Dönüşümü, Yıldız Ramazanoğlu (ed.), Istanbul: Pınar Yayınları, 
2000, pp. 21-52.     
68 Şeni indicates that women’s covering, together with polygamy, was one of the dominant 
themes of the modernist literature at the end of the century. Şeni, 1995, p. 27. 
69 Meral Akkent and Gaby Frager, Başörtü, Frankfurt: Dağyeli, 1987, p. 106.  
70 According to some scholars, the çarşaf originated in the Arab provinces, and the first woman 
that appeared in Istanbul in the çarşaf was the wife of the Syrian governor, Suphi Pasha, in the 
mid-19th century. See Akkent and Frager, 1987, p. 105; Apak et.al., 1997, p. 103; Aktaş, 2006, 
p. 68-70. It is argued that it was adopted as a reaction to cultural Westernization of 19th century 




Abdülhamid II issued a regulation based on the advice of the Şeyhülislam, the 
highest religious office of the Ottoman state, which banned the use of the 
çarşaf in public and crowded places, limited its use to side streets, and urged 
the police to report women wearing thin face veils and gathering in groups in 
public places.71 Regulations on women’s clothing continued throughout the 
reign of Abdülhamid II, but restrictions had little effect, and various kinds of 
women’s outdoor dress continued to coexist in the public space. In 1889, the 
use of the ferace was restricted and allowed only for palace women.72 This 
resulted in an increase in the use of the çarşaf especially by urban women. 
Nevertheless, due to the security concerns of the sultan, who was worried that 
the çarşaf would be used to hide the wearer’s identity, it was banned in 1892.73 
This ban also proved ineffective and women continued to use the çarşaf as a 
common veil.74 
The public debate over the peçe and the çarşaf intensified in the 
aftermath of the 1908 Constitutional Revolution. In fact, according to the 
foreign observers, one of the immediate changes the 1908 revolution brought 
was the decrease in the number of women wearing the peçe and the çarşaf in 
Istanbul.75 The latest trends in European fashion, which came to be associated 
with progress, were adopted by the elite women.76 Çarşaf models became 
                                                          
See Muhaddere Taşçıoğlu, Türk Osmanlı Cemiyetinde Kadının Sosyal Durumu ve Kadın 
Kıyafetleri, Ankara: Akın Matbaası, 1958, p. 23.                          
71 Akkent and Frager, 1987, p. 106. Women’s access to certain public places in Istanbul, such 
as Beyazıd, Aksaray and the Grand Bazaar was also restricted by the same regulation. It has 
been argued that in addition to the concern about the misuse of the çarşaf to hide the wearer’s 
identity, another reason for the decision of Abdulhamid II to limit the use of the çarşaf was his 
first impression that this black veil resembled the mourning cloths of Christian women. Aktaş, 
2006, p. 69.  
72 Servet Muhtar Alus, “II. Abdülhamid Devrinde Kadın Kıyafetleri,” Resimli Tarih Mecmuası 
2(13), January 1951, pp. 544-547. Koçu argues that this decision proved ineffective. See also 
Koçu, 1969, p. 9. 
73 Akkent and Frager mentions that the sultan had prohibited the use of the çarşaf in 1883 as 
well. See Akkent and Frager, 1987, pp. 106-109. 
74 Işın argues that although there were strict regulations concerning women’s clothing and 
appearance in public life, the Hamidian era was also a time when women began to participate 
in the public sphere in an unprecedented manner. Likewise, through fashion journals and 
newspaper advertisements on women’s health, hair styles and cosmetics, women’s outdoor 
clothes and dress models changed significantly in this era. See Ekrem Işın, “Tanzimat, Kadın 
ve Gündelik Hayat,” Tarih ve Toplum 51, March 1988, pp. 22-27. See also Palmira Brummet, 
Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911, Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2000, pp. 226-227.   
75 Caporal, 1982, p. 146. Some women were attacked in Istanbul for not abiding by the religious 
norms. See Yakut, 2002, pp. 23-24.  
76 Brummet, 2000, p. 226. However, Brummet also indicates that in the saritical press of the 




shorter and more diversified, and began to resemble cloaks.77 Continuous 
warfare in the 1910s also had dramatic effects on the life and public 
appearance of Ottoman women. Many women began to work in governmental 
offices, workshops and trades, thereby significantly increasing women’s 
participation in public life.78 This created greater room for women’s freedom 
and eased the pressure of seclusion. Further relaxation of women’s veiling in 
the urban centers was criticized by conservatives on the grounds of women’s 
dignity and the duty of the Ottoman state to abide by Islamic regulations.79 In 
1912, the chief religious official, Şeyhülislam Abdurrahman Nesib Efendi, 
issued a statement declaring that change in the form of women’s çarşafs would 
not be tolerated and women should abide by the Sharia norms regarding 
clothing. Yakut indicates that while the statement was not effective, similar 
regulations were attempted by other conservative state officials in the later 
years and the question of controlling women’s veiling continued to be a 
concern.80 Women who adopted more modernized versions of the peçe and 
the çarşaf were severely criticized. There were even attacks on women in the 
streets of Istanbul.81 To counter the popular propaganda that the Balkan Wars 
                                                          
“conspious consumption was satirized as a weakness to which Ottoman women were 
particularly prone; their consumption of European styles and the drain on financial resources 
that it entailed had to be restrained, as did their attraction to allafranga lifestyle.” Ibid., p. 230.  
77 There were different çarşaf models in use, such as baggy-çarşaf (torba çarşaf) and cloak-
çarşaf (pelerinli çarşaf). See Apak, et.al., 1997, p. 104. Taşçıoğlu mentions a çarşaf type called 
“tango-çarşaf,” which was a name used in this era for the Europeanized çarşaf models with 
shorter skirts and cloaks, usually worn together with long gloves. Taşçıoğlu, 1958, p. 53.  
78 See Yavuz Selim Karakışla, Women, War and Work in the Ottoman Empire: Society for the 
Employment of Ottoman Muslim Women (1916-1923), Istanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and 
Research Centre, 2005. On the other hand, although the number of women who joined the 
workforce increased in urban settings, the situation was different for women in rural part of the 
empire. Emphasizing the shift in textile production from small workshops of Anatolia to 
workshops and factories in more industrialized urban areas, van Os points to the deteriorating 
situation of women in Anatolia. See Nicole A.V.M. van Os, “Feminism, Philanthropy and 
Patriotism: Female Associational Life in the Ottoman Empire,” unpublished PhD thesis, Leiden 
University, 2013, pp. 337-378.     
79 For a summary of the debate on women’s veiling during the Second Constitutional Era, see 
Yakut, 2002. In this period, the idea of making the çarşaf compulsory for women by law was 
proposed by some in conservative journals like Sırat-ı Müstakim. See Caporal, 1982, p. 81.                
80 Yakut, 2002, p. 24. Lewis mentions that in April 1911, the Şeyhülislam issued a warning for 
all Muslim women, urging them not to wear European dress. See Lewis, 1961, p. 229. In 1919, 
during the government of Damat Ferit, the idea of issuing a regulation on women’s veiling came 
up. The Şeyhülislam of the time, Mustafa Sabri Efendi, suggested that the issue would better be 
solved by enacting legislation rather than a regulation. See Yakut, 2002, p. 25. 
81 Yaprak Zihnioğlu, Kadınsız İnkılap: Nezihe Muhittin, Kadınlar Halk Fırkası, Kadın Birliği, 




had been lost because of uncovered women, Mehmet Tahir had to write and 
publish a small brochure in which he tried to convince the public that these 
women had made important sacrifices and aided the Ottoman army.82 
Reformist male intellectuals, by contrast, emphasized the social harm 
women’s seclusion had inflicted on Ottoman society. They openly condemned 
women’s veiling, especially, the use of the peçe, maintaining that it excluded 
women from social life, prevented them from getting an education, and 
therefore, impeded their social development. For Abdullah Cevdet, one of the 
most prominent Unionist and materialist Ottoman intellectuals, for example, 
the çarşaf was one of the reasons for degeneration in Ottoman society. He 
argued that a woman’s veiling was not meant to segregate her from public life, 
but to protect her dignity.83 Likewise, for another modernist author, 
Selahaddin Asım, Ottoman women had lost their social function and become 
sexual objects; women’s veiling was one of the reasons for this miserable 
situation in Ottoman society.84 Another advocate of a reform in women’s 
clothing, Kılıçzade Hakkı, pinpointed women’s veiling as the reason behind 
women’s ignorance, moral decadence, and the backwardness of the Ottoman 
state.85 It was not reasonable to maintain such a harmful practice in the name 
of a religious and national tradition.86 In his ideal Ottoman society, women 
would dress as they wished and nobody would interfere in their choice; there 
would be no state regulation of women’s veiling. For Ziya Gökalp, a 
prominent ideologue of Turkish nationalism in the late Ottoman period, 
continuation of such an ancient and primitive tradition like veiling was an 
insult to Turkish women; he asserted that it should be abolished.87 Towards 
                                                          
Interior had issued an order that banned those foreigners who published against veiling from 
the Ottoman Empire. Ibid., p. 221.    
82 See Mehmet Tahir, Çarşaf Meselesi, Istanbul: Sancakciyan Matbaası, 1915.    
83 Niyazi Berkes, Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1973, pp. 390-391; 
Caporal, 1982, p. 89.  
84 Selahaddin Asım, Türk Kadınlığının Tereddisi yahud Karılaşmak, Istanbul: Resimli Kitab 
Matbaası, n.d. For a more recent edition, see Selahaddin Asım, Osmanlıda Kadınlığın Durumu, 
Metin Martı (ed.), Istanbul: Arba, 1989.  
85 Kılıçzade Hakkı, “Pek Uyanık Bir Uyku,” İçtihad 55, 21 February 1328[1912]. It is 
interesting to note that Kılıçzade Hakkı’s suggestion for how to reform women’s clothing was 
not to opt for state regulation but for a gradual, moderate change through practice. See Yakut, 
2002, p. 24.  
86 Kılıçzade Hakkı, “Kadın ve Tesettür Meselesi,” transcribed and reprinted in “Kılıçzade 
Hakkı’nın Tesettüre İlan-ı Harbi,” Toplumsal Tarih 66, June 1999, pp. 34-36.    
87 Aktaş, 2006, p. 114. In his memoirs, as Ahmet Emin (Yalman) mentions that Gökalp had 
indeed prepared a pamphlet against veiling, linking it with “primitive social origins.” However, 
the pamphlet was too radical to publish at the time. See Ahmet Emin, Turkey in the World War, 




the end of the empire, the newspaper İleri, published by Celal Nuri and Suphi 
Nuri, well-known Unionists of the era, in particular, became a platform for 







The subject of women’s veiling was also a concern for the Ottoman 
women’s movement.89 Although the primary points of struggle for the 
members of the movement were women’s right to education and participation 
in the public life, they also began to discuss the proper form of women’s 
veiling in the public sphere and what form the “national dress” (millî kıyafet) 
of the Ottoman women should assume.90 For many, Ottoman women’s veiling 
                                                          
88 Zihnioğlu, 2003, pp. 85-88.  
89 For Ottoman women’s movement, see Çakır, 2011. For a discussion on feminism in the 
Ottoman Empire, see Nicole A.N.M. van Os, “Osmanlı Müslümanlarında Feminizm,” in 
Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce I: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi, Mehmet Ö. Alkan 
(ed.), Istanbul: İletişim, 2001, pp. 335-347.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
90 For more on the “national dress” debate in the late Ottoman Empire, see Nicole A.N.M. van 
Os, “Millî Kıyafet: Ottoman Women and the Nationality of Their Dress,” in The Turks, vol. 4, 
Hasan Celal Güzel, C. Cem Oğuz and Osman Karatay (eds.), Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 
2002, pp. 580-592. 
Figure 2.1. A postcard from the Second Constitutional Period showing a group of women 
in black çarşafs, watching a parade in Istanbul. 
Source: Sacit Kutlu, Didar-ı Hürriyet: Kartpostallarla İkinci Meşrutiyet (1908-1913), 




was improper; it was in line with neither the Islamic veiling codes nor the 
necessities of public life.91 Among the women’s journals, the journal Kadınlar 
Dünyası (Women’s World) was particularly vocal in advocating a change in 
women’s veiling and in underlining the necessity to define the national dress 
of Ottoman women.92 The journal even voiced the idea of founding an 
association to nationalize women’s dress.93 This idea was not realized, 
however. Nevertheless, the Association for the Defense of Women’s Rights 
(Müdafaa-i Hukuk-u Nisvan Cemiyeti), which was one of the women’s 
organizations that flourished during the Second Constitutional Era, declared 
among its primary goals in its program the reforming of women’s clothing, 
increasing their participation in the workforce and eliminating traditions that 
had deleterious effects on Ottoman women.94 The main target for Ottoman 
supporters of women’s rights was the peçe since there was near consensus 
among the reformists on its non-Turkish character and its negative impact on 
women’s health and social roles; it impeded their participation in the 
workforce. Reformists criticized the inconsistency in women’s veiling: 
women in Anatolia did not wear the peçe, and there was a great deal of 
variation even among the districts of Istanbul.95 It is important to note that one 
of the concerns these women’s journals had in suggesting a reform in women’s 
veiling was the extent to which the reform complied with Islamic norms. The 
claim that the peçe and the çarşaf were not Islamic was used to support the 
idea that they could be eliminated.96 Likewise, women’s rights advocates were 
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equally cautious in their criticism of the peçe and the çarşaf so as not to lead 
the way towards excessive Westernization in women’s clothing. Their 
campaign for a reform in women’s dress was shaped within a nationalist 
framework, one that emphasized national economy, saving, consumption of 
national goods, and the dangers of following Western fashion to the extreme.97 
Women’s dress in urban settings changed further especially after 
WWI. The use of the peçe decreased, and particularly in Istanbul, more 
women began to use overcoats or cloaks instead of the çarşaf, together with 
various different models of headscarves.98 As in previous decades, these 
changes went hand in hand with attempts to control women’s clothing, and 
women’s veiling continued to be a matter of regulation for the state authorities 
as well as the subject of an intense debate with wider political implications 
until the end of the empire.99 At the same time, an increasingly important 
component of the modernist Ottoman elite’s political vision was the idea of 
the “new woman,” i.e., the woman who broke with old traditions, participated 
in the public life, and worked with men to save the nation and the state. As 
early as 1913, in her novel Yeni Turan (The New Turan), Halide Edip, the 
most important female  figure of the Turkish nationalist movement, had 
imagined this new Turkish woman dressed in an overcoat, her hair covered 
with a headscarf; she had removed her peçe and çarşaf.100 
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II. Kemalist Vision of Women’s Modernization and the Question of 
Veiling 
Berktay argues that although there is a strong continuity between the late 
Ottoman Empire and the Turkish republic in the emphasis on the “new 
woman” and her central role in the nationalist agenda, the male elite of the 
republic had to face, to a much greater degree than did their Ottoman 
counterparts, the difficult task of reconciling the ideal “national woman” with 
the ideal “modern woman.”101 In other words, it was difficult to bring together 
the image of the new Turkish woman as the embodiment of national values 
and identity, and the new modern woman as the reflection of the Europeanized 
face of the new state. Especially in the first years of the regime following the 
War of Independence, the emphasis on the role of women in the war, 
particularly on the self-sacrifice of the Anatolian women, became the image 
along the lines of which the new Turkish woman would be envisioned. There 
was a glorification of the traditional peasant woman of Anatolia as the essence 
of national womanhood. At the same time, however, women were called into 
the public sphere to take their part in national development and to play their 
role as the symbols and carriers of modernization. The issue of women’s 
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Figure 2.2. A colored image of 
a group of women in 
“modernized” çarşafs in early 
1920s Istanbul. 
Source: The film Istanbul 
Do/Redo/Undo: Waters, Streets, 




clothing and outward appearance was perhaps the terrain where this paradox 
became the most crystallized.       
Even in the women’s movement inherited by the republic from the 
empire, which became institutionalized as the Turkish Women’s Union (Türk 
Kadınlar Birliği), the emphasis on the “national” was quite strong during the 
years of transition to the new regime. While the organization backed the 
republican project of modernization, its supporters were keen not to 
compromise national identity and morality.102 The çarşaf had acquired new 
meaning during the national struggle; at the very first protest organized in 
Istanbul in reaction to the invasion of Izmir by the Greek army in 1919, all 
women in attendance were wearing black çarşafs, even though it had become 
very rare attire in the capital by then.103 In 1923, when asked about her views 
on women’s veiling, Nezihe Muhiddin, the head of the Turkish Women’s 
Union, which was the most active and radical women’s organization during 
the early republic, maintained that women’s covers were their national dress 
and that the çarşaf was an obstacle neither to progress nor to women’s 
participation in public life.104 As Zihnioğlu suggests, this was probably an 
attitude Muhiddin had adopted in order not to overshadow the primary point 
of struggle of the union: gaining the political rights of women. However, it 
reflects the atmosphere at the dawn of the republic regarding women’s veiling. 
Although the founders of the Women’s Union appeared in the press in 1923 
having removed their face veils, they were all covered, many of them in the 
çarşaf, which was still considered as the national dress of Turkish women. 
Two delegates who represented Turkey at the congress of the International 
Alliance of Women in Rome in 1923 also wore this national dress, albeit in 
its quite modern form, and without the peçe.105 
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It was, in fact, quite apparent even in the first years that the new 
regime favored modernization of women’s clothing, more particularly, the 
removal of the peçe. Although Mustafa Kemal never directly addressed the 
issue of unveiling or referred to the necessity of organizing anti-veiling 
campaigns to change women’s dress, it was obvious in a number of his 
speeches that for him, the general habits of dress widespread among women 
in Turkey in the early years of the republic did not have a modern and national 
character.106 In one of his speeches in Izmir in 1923, having mentioned that 
the most important aspect of social life that draws foreigners’ attention in the 
cities of Turkey was women’s veiling, he emphasized that it should be simple; 
it should also not be such that it prevents women from participating in public 
life. For him, this was the type of veiling required by Islam.107 During his visit 
to Konya in March 1923, he argued that women’s education and participation 
in public life should be the main concerns, and that the issue of clothing was 
secondary. He also stated, however, that what had to be taken into 
consideration in the issue of veiling were both the spirit of the nation and the 
necessities of the time. Without mentioning the peçe or the çarşaf, he advised 
women to abstain from going too far in either direction: meaning to neither 
veil nor unveil to excess. He also mentioned that the form of veiling assumed 
should be simplified.108 
 It is important to note that in Mustafa Kemal’s public speeches, there 
was no overt censure of covering the hair. In fact, he was critical of women 
who tried to imitate European women and carried the change in their style to 
extremes, and urged Turkish women to maintain their modesty.109 However, 
his preference, reflected in the way women around him dressed and in the 
general discourse of the regime on women’s modernization, was Turkish 
women’s adaptation to “civilized” norms in every field, including clothing. 
While the number of these norms governing women’s clothing increased over 
the years, during the early years of the republic, women’s emancipation was 
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very much associated with women revealing their faces to the world. Grace 
Ellison, a British author who interviewed Mustafa Kemal right before his 
marriage to Latife Hanım in 1923, quotes him as saying that women would be 
liberated in a year’s time, meaning that they would uncover their face and 
participate in the public space alongside men.110 Until their divorce in 1925, 
Latife Hanım, Mustafa Kemal’s wife, always appeared in public without the 
peçe and accompanied her husband, which was something extraordinary at the 
time and a dramatic change for many of her contemporaries, men and women 
alike.111 Most of the news about the couple did not fail to mention that Latife 
Hanım was without the face veil (peçesiz olarak) though she wore the çarşaf 
occasionally and certainly used a headscarf all the time.112 Foreign journalists 
and correspondents also stressed her difference from the majority of the 
Turkish women by referring to her removal of the face veil. Isaac Marcosson, 
an American journalist, for example, describes the moment he met Latife 
Hanım during his interview with Mustafa Kemal as follows: 
 
A few moments later the most attractive Turkish woman I had yet met 
entered - I should say glided - into the room. She was of medium height, 
with a full Oriental face and brilliant dark eyes. Her every movement 
was grace itself. Although she wore a sort of non-Turkish costume - it 
was dark blue - she had retained the charming head-dress which is 
usually worn with the veil and which, according to the old Turkish 
custom, must completely hide the hair. The veil, however, was absent 
for Madame Kemal was one of the emancipated ones. Some of her 
brown tresses peeped out from beneath the beguiling cover.113 
 
Mustafa Kemal was mainly concerned with gender segregation and 
women’s exclusion from the public sphere, which was the general norm in 
most parts of the country. In 1923, during their tour in Western Anatolia, he 
and Latife Hanım had not met a single woman in the places they visited, and 
so he was relieved when they were welcomed by a group of women, school 
teachers and wives of a few professionals living in the town, dressed in the 
çarşaf but without the face veil, in Edremit, a small seaside town in the north 
of Izmir. Mahu Hanım, one of those women and the owner of the house where 
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Mustafa Kemal and Latife Hanım stayed in Edremit, remembers Mustafa 
Kemal thanking her for the only civilized night they had spent during the 
entire visit; civilized because of the participation of women.114 In the 1920s, 
even Ankara, the capital of the new republic, was famous as a city with no 
woman around. Many of the bureaucrats and parliamentarians had not brought 
their families to the city, and the few women who did come from Istanbul were 
a source of gossip when they were seen in public places in their Istanbul style 
çarşaf.115 Even some of the leading elite of the new regime seemed to have 
reservations about women’s public visibility and mixed-gender gatherings 
that were newly emerging in the capital.116 
Women’s veiling and segregation was such a prevailing practice in 
the first years of the republic that Latife Hanım’s abandonment of the peçe, 
her modern way of dressing, and her appearance at public meetings and 
accompanying her husband on visits was made an issue by the opposition; her 
clothing and attitude was an indication of the anti-religious character of the 
regime that Mustafa Kemal and his followers were trying to establish.117 At 
the beginning of 1923, one of the opposition groups, the Ottoman 
Revolutionary Committee of Anatolia (Anadolu Osmanlı İhtilal Komitesi), 
distributed a handout calling Muslims to resist Mustafa Kemal. On the 
handout, there was a picture showing Latife Hanım sitting with Mustafa 
Kemal and a few other men at a public meeting, with her hair covered, but her 
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face uncovered.118 She was the embodiment of the new Turkish woman that 
Mustafa Kemal’s regime aimed to create. The handout implied that Muslims 
had to resist Mustafa Kemal if they did not want to see their wives and 
daughters behaving so immorally. Even Latife Hanım’s crossing of her legs 
while sitting was a sign of immorality. During the visit of Mustafa Kemal and 
Latife Hanım to Adana in March 1923, the müftü of Adana issued a public 
declaration, which was published in the newspapers of the time, assuring that 
Latife Hanım’s accompanying her husband was not contrary to Islam, and that 
her clothing was in line with  Sharia.119 The Adana müftü’s statement was 
probably seen as necessary to prevent public reaction. It was in a way also a 
declaration that the removal of face veil was not against Islamic dress codes.  
On the other hand, the modernization of women’s clothing that had 
begun in the late Ottoman Empire was continuing, even accelerating, under 
the republic. Çarşaf models had already been changed considerably in big 
cities; cloak-like çarşafs with shorter lengths were common, and more 
modernized forms of covering the hair had become fashionable. In major 
cities, more women had begun to remove their peçe, to replace their çarşaf 
and to wear overcoats instead, and to prefer covering their hair with turbans 
or with a black rectangle scarf tied at the back of the neck, which was called 
the sıkmabaş style.120 The educated and elite segments of the population were 
the forerunners since they were already adopting European styles in their daily 
lives even before the republic. The general public’s perception of what Atatürk 
preferred with respect to women’s clothing also played a role in women’s 
adoption of modern styles.121 Female teachers were the vanguard in this regard 
since the dress code of state officials had been determined by a number of 
state regulations, one of which banned the use of the peçe for school teachers 
on 15 January 1924.122 The existence of a considerable number of women who 
had already removed their peçe and çarşaf was also important for legitimizing 
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the new forms of women’s clothing as the modern and national norm, and for 
consolidating them as symbols of these norms. The press, in particular, played 
a significant role in promoting new dress norms for men and women alike, 
publishing the latest trends in Western fashion regularly as a guide for 
readers.123 Women’s journals also had a crucial impact on transforming 
women’s dress and trying to create a national synthesis of Western styles and 
local traditions, the latter believed to be authentically Turkish. Mixed-gender 
public meetings became the norm and European style entertainment, such as 
balls or tea parties, began to characterize the republican social life, especially 
in big cities. These gatherings created the occasions where unveiled women 
would appear confidently as the new participants in public life.124 Therefore, 
there had already been a gradual change in women’s dress beginning from the 
early years of the republic. In the 1920s, a more radical change, however, 
would take place in men’s clothing through direct state intervention.  
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Figure 2.3. A page from the journal 
Resimli Ay, showing fashionable 
models of çarşaf and headdress in 
the 1920s. The caption reads 
“çarşaf and headdress models.” 





III. Republic’s First Dress Reform: The Hat Law of 1925 
In almost all major studies on early republican Turkey, published both in 
Turkey and abroad, the introduction of the European hat to replace the 
Ottoman fez is considered to be one of the most significant, if not the boldest, 
of Kemalist cultural reforms, and has been widely known as “the” dress 
reform of the new regime. The debate over the modernization of men’s 
headgear had in fact begun earlier in the nineteenth century and intensified 
during the Second Constitutional Period after 1908.125 Thus the hat was not a 
total novelty in the 1920s, at least not for the elite segments of the population. 
Some Ottoman intellectuals, for example, had proposed a dress reform in the 
army and argued that all soldiers should wear the modern hat.126 However, 
with the Balkan Wars and World War I, and, especially afterwards, during the 
occupation of Istanbul and parts of Anatolia, the hat again came to be 
associated primarily with foreigners, occupiers, and “infidels.”127 The fez 
continued to signify the Muslim-Turkish identity, while the kalpak, a black 
Turkic wool cap wider at the top, would become the symbol of Turkish 
national struggle, since it was the headgear of the leaders of the resistance 
movement in Anatolia.128 
The introduction of the hat as modern men’s headgear came during 
the visit of Mustafa Kemal to Kastamonu and İnebolu in August 1925. He first 
arrived in the city of Kastamonu bareheaded, holding a Panama hat, to the 
surprise of many, and emphasized the importance of modern clothing during 
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his meetings with different segments of the population.129 Two days later, in 
his speech at the Turkish Hearth (Türk Ocağı) in İnebolu,130 having 
characterized the contemporary Turkish dress as neither national nor 
international, he introduced the hat as civilized headgear and proclaimed it as 
a necessity of modern life: 
 
My friends, there is no need to seek and revive the costume of Turan. 
A civilized, international dress is worthy and appropriate for our nation, 
and we will wear it. Boots or shoes on our feet, trousers on our legs, 
shirt and tie, jacket and waistcoat – and of course, to complete these, a 
cover with a brim on our heads. I want to make this clear. This head-
covering is called a ‘hat’ (şapka).131 
 
On his return to Ankara on 1 September 1925, those who came to 
welcome Mustafa Kemal were all wearing a hat. The next day, a governmental 
decree made it compulsory for state officials to wear the hat.132 On 16 October 
1925, a group of deputies introduced a bill to the parliament proposing that 
the hat should be compulsory for state officials, and that all men’s headgear 
other than the hat, including, of course, the traditional Ottoman fez, should be 
banned. The reasoning of the bill was that the issue of headgear, though in fact 
an insignificant matter in itself, had a special importance for the Turkish 
nation whose aim was to join the family of contemporary civilized nations.133 
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133 T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi [Turkish Grand National Assembly Minute Book], Volume 19, 




The fez had become a mark to distinguish the Turkish nation from the civilized 
nations and it was necessary to erase this “identification mark,” and to replace 
it with the common headgear of all modern nations, the modern hat. Nurettin 
Pasha, a deputy of Bursa, maintained that the bill was trying to codify what 
had already been regulated by a governmental decree, so the decree could be 
lifted.134 He also argued that the law’s intention to limit people’s choice of 
headgear was a violation of the constitution. This proposal received severe 
criticism in the parliament.135 The main argument of the supporters of the bill 
was that the hat had already been adopted by many in the society. In the end, 
the law required all state officials and members of the parliament to wear hats, 
characterized the hat as the general headgear of the Turkish nation and banned 
the “continuation of any habit that was incompatible with this.” Thus, wearing 
traditional or local headgears such as the fez was prohibited. Article 3 of the 
law made the parliament as well as the council of ministers responsible for 
monitoring the implementation of the law.136 
The hat reform received substantial societal reaction. According to 
Halide Edip, among all Kemalist reforms until then, it was the one most 
seriously opposed.137 A number of protests occurred in provinces like Sivas, 
Malatya, Erzurum, Kayseri, Rize, Giresun, and Maraş.138 These protests were 
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repressed very severely, people who were involved were characterized as 
reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries by the official discourse and in the 
press, and many protesters were tried by the Independence Tribunals, which 
had been established and equipped with enormous powers after the Sheikh 
Said Rebellion, a Kurdish-Islamic uprising that had emerged and quickly 
spread in the southeastern provinces of the country at the beginning of the 
same year.139 These trials resulted in the persecution of some people, and in 
the arrest of many more.140 
The economic aspect of the reform also created social discontent since 
hats were scarce in the country, and when available, they were very expensive. 
It was particularly difficult for the poor masses. Because going out bareheaded 
was considered inappropriate, there were individual instances of 
nonobservance of the law apart from collective resistance.141 In fact, although 
the law stated that headgear other than the modern hat was banned, criminal 
sanctions remained uncertain, as the criminal law had yet to be amended. This 
did not occur until 1939, when wearing of headgear other than the hat was 
penalized with up to three months imprisonment.142 Yet, many people faced 
police prosecution for continuing to wear turban, fez, or local headgear, not 
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only in the immediate period after enactment of the law, but continuously 
(though unsystematically) throughout the single-party era and even later.143 
One crucial aspect of the Hat Law of 1925 was its timing. It came after 
the Law on the Maintenance of Order, which was introduced to equip the 
government with extraordinary powers in order to secure the order that had 
been shaken by the Sheikh Said Rebellion. Mustafa Kemal himself pointed at 
the relationship between this law and the hat reform as follows: 
 
We did that [the Hat Law] while the Law for Maintenance of Order was 
still in force. If it had not been in force we should have done so all the 
same; but one can say with complete truth that the existence of this law 
made the thing much easier for us. As a matter of fact, the application 
of the Law for Maintenance of Order prevented the morale of the nation 
from being poisoned to a great extent by reactionaries.144 
 
The Law on the Maintenance of Order shaped the second half of the 1920s in 
a critical way, significantly increasing the control of the regime over every 
domain of the social and political life, until its abolition in 1929. This period, 
sometimes referred as the Period of Maintenance of Order, was the formation 
period of the Kemalist single-party regime. It is characterized by very 
important reforms, ranging from secularization of the family law to the 
adoption of the Latin alphabet. In other words, the growing authoritarianism 
of the regime paved the way to more radical cultural change, including the 
modernization of clothing.           
There were two other aspects of the hat reform that were particularly 
relevant to the issue of women’s un/veiling. On the one hand, the Hat Law 
marked a turning point in the public debate on modern and national clothing. 
The law itself and the public discussion that ensued focused on men’s 
clothing, but they had wider references to the importance of the modernization 
of the outfit of the nation, and thus with direct implications for women’s 
clothing.145 Mustafa Kemal himself touched upon the issue of women’s 
veiling during the very same visit to Kastamonu when he introduced the hat. 
In fact, this was one of the very few occasions where he rather explicitly 
referred to the form of veiling from which women should abstain. In one of 
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his speeches during this visit, he stated that women could uncover their face 
and see the world around them; there was no harm in this if women were to 
be inculcated with religious and national morality.146 In another speech, he 
mentioned that he had seen some women who were trying to cover their face 
with a piece of cloth or peştamal and turning their back or closing up by sitting 
on the ground when they came across men in the street. He characterized these 
acts as strange and primitive and the source of ridicule of the Turkish nation, 
and said: “Gentlemen, would the mothers and daughters of a civilized nation 
assume such an absurd and vulgar pose? This is a situation that ridicules our 
nation. It has to be corrected immediately.”147 
Thus, the Hat Law of 1925, while only touching upon men’s headgear, 
created a general atmosphere where clothing change became a signifier for the 
modernization of the new republic and women’s dress was not an exception 
in this regard. The distinction between “civilized” and “uncivilized” forms of 
clothing came to occupy public discourse; modern women’s clothing began to 
appear more frequently in the press. It was only to be expected that women’s 
veiling would become an issue given this mood that had taken on the tone of 
a national campaign for modern clothing: the link between the reform of men’s 
headgear and women’s veils was in the air. The speech of Mustafa Kemal 
against the face veil during his visit to Kastamonu helped to reinforce this link 
and forge the idea or perception that, like the fez, women’s veiling was also 
not approved by the new regime, despite the fact that no open reform agenda 
or official move in this issue had been put into practice.148 Some opponents, 
for example, used this perceived link between the abolition of the fez and the 
removal of the veil to mobilize people against the Hat Law. In some of the 
organized reactions to the hat reform, protestors claimed in their propaganda 
that women’s face would also be uncovered.149 In Kayseri, for example, a 
rumor that the government would soon outlaw the veil played a role in 
reactions against the Hat Law.150 Oral historical testimonies also indicate that 
there were rumors in Istanbul that the çarşaf had been prohibited, that Atatürk 
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had ordered women to stop wearing it, just like men had been ordered to stop 
wearing their fez and turban.151 A telegraph of a group of women 
schoolteachers in Sivas, which was directly sent to the Prime Minister İsmet 
Pasha in February 1926, perhaps best illustrates how the link between the 
introduction of the hat and the removal of the veil was perceived and 
experienced at the local level. The women teachers complained about the 
rumors created by some men in Sivas who had claimed that the hat would be 
removed soon and women would have to wear the çarşaf again. Women 
teachers asked the prime minister to see to it that the necessary measures be 
taken concerning these rumors and those who had spread them.152 
The hat reform and the way it was applied had serious repercussions 
among ordinary people concerning women’s veiling as well. Many women 
had removed their peçe and çarşaf because of such rumors and because of the 
encouraging atmosphere created by the hat reform to modernize clothing. Afet 
İnan, for example, argues that it became possible for the women students of 
the Faculty of Medicine to remove their çarşaf only after the inculcations of 
Mustafa Kemal in his speeches on modern clothing in 1925, and after the 
enactment of the Hat Law.153 On Republic Day in October 1925, following 
the beginning of the hat reform during Mustafa Kemal’s visit, newspapers 
reported that everybody, including the women teachers, had participated in the 
celebrations in Ankara with modern hats on their heads. One of those teachers, 
Mevhide Atıfet Hanım, had criticized the peçe and the çarşaf after she argued 
that Turkish women became equal with men under the republic: “The new 
enlightened mothers of the future are not so naïve a people that they would 
search for honor, virtue and grace under the peçe, under the çarşaf. They are 
confident that honor and purity are to be found in spirit, in manners, deep in 
essence.”154 The change in women’s clothing towards the end of 1925 was so 
visible, at least in the major cities, that the foreign press also celebrated this 
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as the liberation of women and their becoming the symbols of modern Turkish 
life under the new regime.155 
Likewise, the Hat Law could function as a reference point for those 
who wanted to initiate a similar change in the way women dressed.  In fact, as 
shall be seen in the following section, the first anti-veiling campaigns emerged 
after the implementation of the hat reform, and some local administrators who 
organized these campaigns invoked the hat reform as a source of inspiration 
and legitimacy. It can be argued that the speech about women’s dress that 
Mustafa Kemal delivered within the context of the hat reform probably served 
to encourage some sectors of the local elite who wanted to lead a change in 
women’s dress similar to the one in men’s clothing. The fact that the anti-
veiling campaigns of the 1920s primarily targeted the peçe should not appear 
as a coincidence since Mustafa Kemal’s speech could be read as his direct 
criticism of the segregation of women and, particularly, the covering of their 
face, thus, the use of the peçe. As vanguards of the revolution, some state 
officials and members of the provincial elite saw themselves in the position of 
leading the way in their localities for the modernization of women’s clothing 
as well.  
On the other hand, the fact that women’s veiling remained intact in 
the official clothing reform of the regime created an ambiguous and 
ambivalent situation that shaped the anti-veiling campaigns in the years to 
come. In other words, the Hat Law perhaps had a more significant mark on 
the transformation of women’s clothing in terms of the method that should be 
followed in such a reform process. The decision of the regime not to outlaw 
the veil deserves attention in understanding the anti-veiling campaigns in the 
mid-1920s and afterwards, given the determination of the new regime to 
modernize clothing (as it was reflected in the Hat Law) and the means it had 
secured to do so. As stressed by Lewis, “even the great reformer, buttressed 
as he was by the Law for the Maintenance of Order and the ‘independence 
tribunals,’ did not venture to legislate against the veil.”156 The second half of 
the 1920s was in fact a time of very important and radical reforms in Turkey. 
Thus, a law banning the peçe and the çarşaf would not be unthinkable. 
However, it was deliberately avoided, and never even suggested until the mid-
1930s. The determined way the Hat Law was applied and the reactions it 
received perhaps formed one crucial element shaping the attitude of the 
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Kemalist regime on the reform of women’s clothing, preventing it from 
outlawing veiling out of fear that it might cause a social reaction even stronger 
than the one the Hat Law received.157 This point was in fact underlined by 
some contemporary observers of the reforms in Turkey. Toynbee, for 
example, refers to the accounts of Western travelers in Central and East 
Central Turkey  in 1925 and 1926, and quotes them, arguing that “to enforce 
the emancipation of women in rural districts by the same drastic methods 
which they had employed in forcing hats upon the men would raise a 
storm.”158 
Therefore, one can argue that the enormous reaction the Hat Law 
received was one important factor underlying the decision of the Kemalist 
regime not to outlaw veiling. However, it is also important to note here that 
this was not the only reason. Falih Rıfkı Atay, a member of Mustafa Kemal’s 
close circle of friends, for example, argues that the president was convinced 
that women’s emancipation would be realized gradually, as a result of 
education and social transformation, rather than as a byproduct of a law or 
regulation. He claims that Mustafa Kemal knew from the very beginning that 
the issue of honor was as central as religion for Turkish society and acted 
accordingly; this was why there was no article related to women’s clothing in 
the Hat Law.159 He also claims that although he tried to promote modern life 
in the cities, Mustafa Kemal did not force peasant women to change and this 
was perhaps the only issue he favored an evolutionary approach.160 Having 
analyzed the reports sent from various consulates in the provinces regarding 
the social position of women, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Sir George 
R. Clark, was also reporting in 1927 along the same lines:  
 
In general the results seem to be such as might be expected when a 
Muslim country is swung from the extreme repression of women laid 
down by Islamic Law to the freedom of 20th-century Europe. Still, it is 
worthy of note that the rulers of modern Turkey have had the wisdom 
or prudence to allow a considerable measure of liberty to those elements 
which continue to think the veil and the customs of Islam a necessity. 
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Doubtless they trust to the schools to inculcate in the new generation 
ideas that will bring in the projected reforms automatically.161 
 
If one reason for the Kemalist decision to not take a radical stance on 
women’s dress was the prudence of the leading elite, the other one was related 
to the patriarchal concern the regime shared while trying to modernize gender 
relations. The emphasis on the necessity of remaking the nation’s women 
along modern lines existed side by side with an equally strong emphasis on 
protecting women’s morality, pointing to a process which is characterized by 
Zehra Arat as the replacement of Islamic patriarchy with a modern one.162 In 
other words, reforms were within the “modern-yet-modest” formulation, the 
patriarchal consensus between the elite and non-elite male actors.163 This 
implied a strategy of initiating a change in women’s clothing without so much 
undermining existing hierarchies and moral codes. The motivation behind 
understanding unveiling as the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf, without for 
example attacking covering of the hair as such, can be best understood within 
this framework. However, contrary to what has been generally emphasized in 
the literature,164 neither the prudence of the regime nor its patriarchal concerns 
led to a total abandonment of the idea of regulating women’s veiling through 
official decisions. Such decisions were indeed taken in the 1920s to ban the 
peçe and the çarşaf, albeit only at the local level and only with the efforts of 
the provincial elite, lacking a central coordination, and the strength of a law, 
or even of a general decision or regulation originating from the center. This 
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was precisely what was expected from the local administrators and the state 
officials: to lead the way and to try to make the ideals of modernization a 
reality in their localities.165 
 
 
IV. Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the 1920s: a Weak Attempt at Changing 
Women’s Dress 
On 29 October 1925, the second anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic, the head of the Turkish Hearth and the Teachers’ Union in Trabzon, 
Mustafa Reşit Bey, addressed the crowd gathered for the celebration of this 
national holiday. Decorated with laurel leaves and flags, like the other major 
buildings in the city, the Turkish Hearth was the center of the celebrations in 
Trabzon town square, and Mustafa Reşit Bey made his speech from the 
balcony of the building. Underlining the merits of the republican regime 
compared to its predecessor, which he characterized as the “corrupt” Ottoman 
regime, he finished his speech with the following statements: 
 
The civilized world has known us as an uncivilized people in bizarre 
clothing, in baggy trousers and big turbans. But in fact, these are the 
lands of the most civilized and dignified people in the world. Foreigners 
would certainly see the true essence of this dignified nation in our 
contemporary clothing. A thousand thanks and gratitude to the Republic 
that would carry us to prosperity with the blessings and prosperity of 
the motherland, and to the great savior who rescued it. Long live the 
nation; long live the revolution; long live the Republic!166 
 
Having been born in Trabzon in 1892, educated in Istanbul as a 
biology teacher, and served as a teacher and mid-level bureaucrat in the 
Ministry of Education and the General Inspectorships with different capacities 
in different places throughout his career, Mustafa Reşit Bey was typical of the 
republican local elite in the provinces. His reference to clothing as the final 
mark of his speech for the Republic Day in October 1925 was in fact no 
coincidence. The hat had very recently been introduced as the modern male 
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headgear by Mustafa Kemal, and the bill to ban all headgear other than the hat 
countrywide had been proposed to parliament only two weeks earlier, turning 
the issue of the modernization of clothing into one of the most topical issues 
in the country. It was thus within such a context that Mustafa Reşit Bey talked 
of the backwardness of the old clothing in his speech, and tried to promote the 
idea in Trabzon that modern clothing would fit the Turkish nation and 
represent its “civilized essence.” 
 The efforts of the provincial elite in Trabzon to promote modern 
clothing, in fact, went beyond the support they had given to the regime’s legal 
reform to change men’s headgear. On 2 October 1925, members of the Turkish 
Hearth in Trabzon decided at a mixed-gender meeting that women members 
should remove their peçes and çarşafs, wear overcoats and hats, and 
participate in social life.167 They also decided that male members should wear 
a hat, following the example of Mustafa Kemal. As the earliest example of an 
anti-veiling campaign we know in the 1920s,168 this decision of the Trabzon 
Turkish Hearth was seen by its members as a natural result of the role of the 
Turkish Hearth in guiding the people of Trabzon in their adaptation to modern 
ways and in being good supporters and promoters of the ideals of the 
revolution.169 Members also decided to advise women of the city accordingly 
in private meetings and conversations, and to encourage them to participate in 
public life. 
 This local initiative to change women’s clothing in Trabzon was 
followed by similar attempts in a number of other cities. The mayor of 
Eskişehir issued a statement in December 1925 calling for the women of the 
city to remove their peştamal. The statement was issued only a few days after 
the enactment of the Hat Law and was clearly motivated by it:  
 
My dear townsmen, who lead the way in the struggle for civilization as 
they did in the struggle for liberation. 
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At a time when the last law has spread the hat among the Turkish nation, 
the time has also come to bring the peştamal veiling, which is very 
uncomely, into line with civilized clothes and civilized views; thus this 
peştamal veiling, which is a very primitive and uncivilized dress, has to 
end. Instead, dresses worn by a fraction of our women have to prevail. 
The peştamal veils, which look especially grim because of their colors, 
have to be dyed with simpler and more dignified colors, and 
transformed into civilized clothing by changing their form. The 
municipality asks and requests this from our respected people and is 
confident that this change will be pursued until the beginning of 
January.170 
 
The “request” of the mayor of Eskişehir shows not only how strongly the link 
between the hat reform and the change of women’s clothing was felt at the 
local level, but also the willingness of the local elite to reach a compromise on 
existing practices. No penalty was mentioned in the statement in the case of 
non-compliance. Although a total removal of the peştamal was the ideal, the 
mayor was ready to settle for a few civilizing adaptations, if women were 
unable to do away with it completely. Peştamals were too colorful to look 
civilized, according to the mayor; they gave the women of Eskişehir a rural 
and backward appearance at a time of national revival for civilized dress. It is 
also interesting to note that the mayor was referring to a group of women of 
Eskişehir whose clothing should set an example for other women. Not 
mentioning exactly the kind of dress to which he was referring, the mayor 
probably meant the way some teachers or other state officials dressed in 
Eskişehir at the time.   
 Later developments in Eskişehir demonstrate that this initial statement 
of the mayor was ineffective and did not bring the expected change in 
women’s clothing. Having seen this, the city council of Eskişehir issued a 
decree banning the peçe, the peştamal and the bohças women carry while 
going to the public baths.171 However, it seems that this decree was not or 
could not be implemented very effectively. Then, in January 1927, the 
provincial council of Eskişehir (Vilayet Genel Meclisi) issued a regulation 
along the same lines: 
 
                                                          
170 Çapa, 1996, p. 24. 
171 A bohça is a kind of bag created by tying up the crosswise ends of a square cloth. It is used 
in villages or by the poor more often, and thus has rural connotations. As we understand from 
the ban, some women in Eskişehir were carrying their clothes and goods to the public bath by 
making bohças, and this must have been a concern for the local authorities because of the rural 




Article 1-It has been decided by the city council to ban in the city center, 
the peçe and the peştamal used by some women and to prohibit bohças 
that women carry when they go to the public bath.  If there are still 
people who refuse to comply with the decision,  the relevant article of 
the Law on the General Administration of Provinces will be 
implemented;  that is, based on the minutes handed over by the 
Committee of Provincial Administration [Vilayet İdare Heyeti], they 
will be fined, from five to twenty-five liras, . 
Article 2- In the district capitals of the province, this decision will be 
applied two months after its declaration. 
Article 3- In the villages of the province, this decision will be put into 
practice six months after its declaration.172 
 
All the headmen (muhtar) would be informed of the decision of the provincial 
council by the police in the neighborhoods in the provincial center, and by the 
gendarme in the district capitals and villages of the province. The headmen 
would be responsible for notifying the public accordingly, by visiting each 
house, door by door. The police, the gendarme and the municipal police 
sergeants (belediye çavuşları) would be responsible for implementing the 
decision. Yakut argues that the decision of the provincial council proved quite 
effective in the province of Eskişehir, especially in the provincial center.173 
In the meantime, the scope of the anti-veiling campaign in Trabzon 
surpassed that of the decision of the members of the Turkish Hearth. A group 
of members of the Turkish Hearth and the Teachers’ Union, organized as 
“guidance committees” (irşad heyetleri), began visiting the districts of the 
province and the villages, informing people about the reforms of the new 
regime and its views on civilization and modern clothing.174 There were also 
news items and articles in the local newspapers promoting modern dress. 
Some members of the Trabzon Provincial Council submitted a proposal in 
                                                          
172 Yakut, 2002, p. 27. 
173 Ibid., p. 28. Yakut also mentions that similar anti-veiling campaigns were organized in Bursa 
and Ordu in the 1920s, but he does not provide any details about the time and content of these 
campaigns. 
174 Guidance committees were inculcating the notion, for example, that the hat was not contrary 
to Islam. Their work was of course not limited to propaganda directed at modern clothing, but 
also advised against speaking in Greek or encouraged saving. Some of these committees had 
medical doctors as members, and thus provided free medical care in the villages they visited. 
Since he was the head of both Trabzon Turkish Hearth and the Teachers’ Union, Mustafa Reşit 
Bey had assured that the members of these two organizations work in coordination in these 
committees. He himself presided over the visits of some of these committees to the villages. 




December 1926 to ban the peçe, and to reform women’s dress, thereby 
transforming it into a modern and national form: 
 
The Turkish republic is based on Turkish culture, and its reference is 
our great Gazi [Mustafa Kemal]. The whole society is a follower of this 
great guide. Our province is a port of the Orient, its door opening to the 
West. It is the strongest holder of the Turkish existence. Therefore, it is 
a requirement of public interest to make a decision about contemporary 
women’s clothing, which is a product of a foreign culture and lacks a 
national character. We propose a reform of this primitive and non-
national clothing, the banning of the peçe, and the transforming of the 
clothing of women, who comprise half of our society, into a national 
and civilized form. We request an urgent debate on this proposal.175 
 
The proposal submitted to the provincial council was discussed at a meeting 
in the Trabzon branch of the Republican People’s Party before it was 
discussed and voted on in the council, which indicates the support and 
involvement of the local party members in the process.176 The proposal was 
accepted unanimously, and the peçe was prohibited in Trabzon on 11 
December 1926.177 As the British Consul in Trabzon reports, the edict of the 
vilayet was “threatening the refractory and their nearest male relations with 
sundry fines and varying terms of imprisonment.”178 The province of Rize 
soon followed Trabzon; a similar decision banning the peçe in the city was 
made by the provincial council in January 1927.179 
In some of the provinces, decisions of the local authorities to ban the 
peçe and the çarşaf seemed to have been influenced by the orientation of the 
Prime Minister, İsmet Pasha, during his visits to these cities. In Aydın, the 
provincial council decided to prohibit the peçe, the çarşaf and the peştamal, 
together with some men’s clothing, like the zeybek attire, which was peculiar 
to the region, at the beginning of 1927, following the visit of the prime 
minister. The governor of Aydın later informed the prime minister about the 
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proposal, were making those who wear them look primitive and “semi-savage.” The proposal 
was accepted and peasant men were given six months to adopt civilized village clothes. Some 
district municipalities also issued similar regulations. See ibid.   
176 Yahut, 2002, p. 27. 
177 Çapa, 1996, p. 27. 
178 Report from Consul Knight to Sir. G. Clerk in Constantinople, FO 371/12320, 12 May 1927. 
Caporal claims that the police was ordered to take those who continued veiling to the nearest 





decision of the council in a letter in which he referred to the “wish” İsmet 
Pasha had expressed during his visit concerning the transformation of the 
clothing of the people of Aydın into a civilized form: 
 
To the Prime Minister of Turkish Republic, His Excellency İsmet Pasha 
2.2.1927, Aydın 
 
My honorable pasha, 
At its first meeting on the first day of the new year, the general council 
of the province issued a decision, the copy of which is attached, that the 
clothing of the people of Aydın, especially that of the women, which 
you noticed  during your visit to Aydın last year, should be transformed 
into a civilized form. I am proud to inform you that I am striving toward 
the fulfillment of your wish, and with this opportunity, I request you 
accept my most special respects.  
 
The Governor of Aydın180 
 
As the letter of the governor shows, the anti-veiling campaign in 
Aydın was inspired by the visit of the prime minister and his ideas regarding 
the clothing of the people in the province. There is no mention in the letter of 
an order given by the prime minister to ban the veil, or a directive to issue a 
decision through the provincial council. Thus it remains unclear whether he 
ordered the governor to initiate a direct ban. However, it is certain that the 
need to civilize the clothing of the people of the province, or at least the 
concern of the prime minister that the dress widespread in the city was 
uncivilized, had been voiced during the conversations between the prime 
minister and the governor. This demonstrates the role the “wish” the central 
elite had to civilize women’s clothing and their encouragement of it played in 
the initiation of the anti-veiling campaigns, and particularly in motivating the 
local administrators to realize these campaigns so as to gain the approval of 
Ankara. As it had been in Aydın, the peçe was banned by the provincial 
council of Muğla, also at its meeting following the visit of the Prime Minister 
İsmet Pasha.181 
                                                          
180 PMRA 030.10/53.346.6. Zeybeks were the irregular militia in the Aegean region of the 
Ottoman Empire, who fought against the Greek occupation during the Turkish national 
struggle. The zeybek costume was banned in Aydın most probably because it was seen as 
backward and rural, just like the peştamal veil, by the political elite.     
181 PMRA 490.01/17.88.1. The date of the meeting is unclear in the document, but as understood 




With the encouragement coming from Ankara and the motivation of 
the provincial administrators, the need for the modernization of women’s 
clothing began to be voiced in many cities, and local newspapers were central 
for this campaign. In the anti-veiling campaigns of the 1920s, the issue of 
women’s veiling was approached not only as part of the modernization of 
Turkish society in general, but also as part of the struggle for women’s equal 
rights. The idea that women were emancipated by the new regime was 
prevalent and this was further strengthened by the momentum created by the 
campaign of the Women’s Union for women’s political rights,182 and 
especially by the total secularization of the Civil Code in 1926. This idea 
provided a further support to the local efforts to modernize women’s dress. In 
1928, a local newspaper in the province of Ordu published an article in which 
it was argued that Turkish women had been granted all the rights and freedom 
they needed by the revolution and that the peçe and the çarşaf were 
inappropriate for the new position of the Turkish women.183 Enlightened 
Turkish women had understood this fact, the author argued; they had freed 
themselves from the meaningless and feudal influence of the peçe and the 
çarşaf. Contemporary civilization would not tolerate women wearing these 
forms of clothing. In these “historical days,” Turkish women had all the right 
to dress in a modern way, and there was no need for a directive to come from 
the center for this to happen.  
 As seen in the last example, the general discourse of these early anti-
veiling campaigns in the second half of the 1920s revolved around the 
distinction between civilized and uncivilized ways of clothing. The logic the 
political elite, both in the center and the provinces, used was similar to what 
fueled the opposition to the fez, which had been characterized as Oriental, 
non-Turkish, and traditional. The peçe, the çarşaf and the peştamal were 
viewed as rural, backward, and uncivilized. The survival of traditional 
women’s clothes at a time of a national celebration of modernization and 
women’s rights in the discourse of the new regime was seen by many Kemalist 
elites in the provinces, men and women alike, as a contradiction, as something 
                                                          
182 In many Anatolian cities, Turkish Hearths were the centers of the campaign for women’s 
political rights, which was initiated by the Turkish Women’s Union right after their 
establishment in 1923. Trabzon Turkish Hearth, for example, also actively supported the 
campaign by organizing meetings where women members would support the cause for 
women’s right to elect and to be elected. Such meetings also provided opportunities for women 
to appear in public in modern clothing. See Caporal, 1982, pp. 690-691. See also, Öksüz and 
Usta, 2008. 




dissonant with the spirit of the time. Removal of the peçe and the çarşaf was 
perceived as an indispensable part of women’s emancipation and their 
civilized status under the republican regime. 
The impact of the efforts and campaigns of the local elite in the 1920s, 
however, remained limited. Although Mustafa Reşit Bey was confident in his 
memoirs that new reforms had received no negative reaction from the people 
of his hometown, Trabzon, and that even the most difficult of the changes, 
such as the abandoning of gender segregation and women’s seclusion, had 
been adopted quite easily,184 the reality was in fact quite different. Writing 
about the political situation in Turkey around the same time the ban was put 
into practice in Trabzon, Toynbee reported the failure of the anti-veiling 
campaigns in 1927: “at the time of writing, the Government had been 
attempting to make the abandonment of the veil obligatory in the Vilayet of 
Trebizond and in certain other districts, but had been compelled to abandon 
this experiment owing to the strength of the opposition which it 
encountered.”185 Having noted the reputation of Trabzon as one of the most 
“reactionary” cities in Turkey, the British Consul in Trabzon  explained the 
continuation  of the old veiling habits by underlining the strategies women 
used to get around the banning of the peçe. According to the consul, the 
inhabitants of Trabzon were “somewhat easy-going” compared to the other 
cities in his consular district, Rize and Erzurum, and this was reflected in the 
way they reacted to the anti-veiling campaign initiated by the local 
government.186 Women were almost completely absent in the public life of 
Trabzon except as teachers and students, but it appears that, according to the 
account of the consul, in the few instances they appeared in public, women in 
Trabzon wore the çarşaf in a way not requiring the peçe to cover their face:  
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subjective readings of the British consul as a foreigner. In fact, as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious 
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Some Aspects of Their Ethnic and Cultural Background,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 2(4), October 1971, pp. 318-345. See also Renée Hirschon (ed.), Crossing the Aegean: 
An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey, 
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, a second anti-
veiling campaign was launched in Trabzon in mid-1930s, which faced severe opposition from 




At all events, being confronted in the present instance with a mere 
conciliar decree lacking the force of law, they [women of Trabzon] and 
their men-folk devised a compromise which, from their point of view, 
proved a complete success. The “petché,” or short black veil which fell 
over the face, was duly discarded, while the “charshaf,” as not being a 
veil in the sense of the decree, was retained in all its amplitude, and 
serves to protect the features to the exact extent desired by the wearer. 
Modesty being as much a distinguishing mark of the Trebizond women 
as jealousy is of their husbands, the situation has, to all intents and 
purposes, remained the same as before the promulgation of the edict, 
and with this state of affairs the local authorities have to be satisfied, at 
least for the present. The few female faces to be seen in the streets are, 
with very few exceptions, those of either school-mistresses or 
schoolgirls, who, having been the objects of special legislation, are, of 
course, in a category apart. The latter, growing up without the 
traditional restrictions of dress or manners will doubtless never adopt 
those of their mothers, except possibly in the case of a very few old-
fashioned families where the tradition of filial piety is still strong.187 
 
 It seems that while the banning of the peçe in Trabzon had some 
impact, it did not result in the modernization of women’s clothing or a decline 
in the practice of veiling itself. As the British Consul suggested, the main 
difference that could be seen was generational due to the impact of modern 
education and schooling. In another report on the progress of modernization 
in his consular district, the consul wrote that European-type  entertainment 
and social gatherings were very exceptional in Trabzon, and at such gatherings 
like balls, only the wives of the officials and officers or  schoolgirls could be 
seen, and the very few Turkish women who danced belonged to the latter 
group. Despite this very limited progress in eliminating gender segregation 
and modernizing women’s clothing in Trabzon, he nevertheless noted that the 
situation of women of Trabzon was still better compared to what it was in 
other eastern cities, where women’s veiling remained intact: “In my despatch 
No. 3 of the 12th May I had the honour to report on the almost total absence 
of modernization with regard to the position of women, and in this respect 
Trebizond, backward though it be, is ahead of the other eastern vilayets, 
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Trabzon post-office. He noted, however, women were to be seen everywhere in the country-




where, at least in the towns, the face is still hidden by the “petché” as 
completely as if the Ghazi had never been heard of.”188 
 In other cities, as well, the change in women’s clothing was primarily 
visible in the dress of state officials and women of high-status families. The 
British Consul in Mersin consular region, for example, reported in 1927 that 
although his district was “old-fashioned and fanatical” in general, there was 
steady progress in the emancipation of women:  
 
The new type of woman now so familiar in Constantinople, turbaned or 
hatted and dressed in the modes of Paris, most of whom set a distinctly 
rapid pace, is making her appearance in Adana and Mersina in the shape 
of wives and daughters of imported officials or manufacturers and 
notables who had been abroad. Officials on the spot are also dutifully 
modernizing their womenfolk.  
 
He noted a livelier social life compared to Trabzon, at least in the city centers 
of Mersin and Adana, mentioning mixed-gender public places and gatherings 
among the higher classes for which the harem would seem to have remained 
in the past. Girls had begun to walk about the town by themselves in Mersin, 
more Turkish women had started to appear at the public balls, and more of 
them had learned how to dance, with the daughter of the governor leading the 
way in this regard.189 The countrywomen had never worn the veil anyway, and 
girls who had begun to go to school adopted the modern manners in clothing, 
as in the case of Trabzon, which would, according to the consul, contribute to 
the extinction of the veil in the future, despite the fact that it was observed by 
many women: “a large number of townswomen of the bourgeoise class are 
still heavily veiled or half-veiled, and I understand that the Ghazi is wise 
enough not to impose any unveiling order in these parts. But the veil is, I think, 
dying a natural death. Girls growing up will simply not wear it.”190 
 Such observations of the foreign diplomats point to a geographical 
difference in terms of the pace or scope of the change as well.191 Having read 
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189 Report from Consul Chafy to Sir G. Clerk in Constantinople, FO371/12320, 21 May 1927. 
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190 Ibid. See also the Report from Consul Chafy to Sir G. Clerk in Constantinople, FO 
371/12320, 27 May 1927. 
191 For a detailed discussion on the influence of geographical differences in explaining the 




all the reports, the British Ambassador in Istanbul also claimed that larger 
towns accessible to the sea or the railway were ahead of those in the interior 
of the country and the countryside in adopting European type manners, 
clothing, social gatherings, and entertainment.192 In Izmir, for example, which 
was one of the most cosmopolitan cities in Turkey, there was a lively social 
life among the elite, and increasing interest in modern sports, theater and 
dancing. The acting British Consul underlined the distinctive character of 
social gatherings as follows: “the real change lies not so much in the closer 
association of the Turk and the European as in the admission of his women-
folk to the revels. Today the shortest skirts and the most powdered face are to 
be seen on the Turkish lady at these gatherings. It is only at the gaming tables 
that she has not yet made her appearance in public.”193 According to his 
observation, the veil (meaning, the face veil) had practically disappeared in 
Izmir, although it was still possible to see it on some older women, in some 
villages or in remote and poorer suburbs, like Buca and Bornova, which points 
to an uneven change even within a particular province.194 Although people in 
the upper classes and the younger generation, in particular, were prepared to 
adopt the European clothing, it appears that the ordinary women had removed 
the face veil, but were more reluctant to a total change in clothing even in a 
city like Izmir: “modern European headgear is as yet practically unknown to 
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192 Despatch N. 380 from Sir G. Clerk to Sir Austen Chamberlain, FO 371/12320, 20 July 1927. 
For the British diplomats, the existence of Europeans or non-Muslims living in a town was also 
a factor influencing the pace of change in women’s clothing. The British Consulate in Edirne 
(Adrianople), for example, reported along the same lines as the consul of Mersin district that a 
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become rare since “the Jewesses of the town (of whom there are many) are always there to set 
at least a Levantine, if not a European, standard of dress and behavior.” See the Report from 
Consular Officer, FO 371/12320, 25 May 1927.      
193 Copy of the Report from Acting Consul in Smyrna, in Despatch N. 380 from Sir G. Clerk, 
FO 371/12320.  
194 The acting consul also reports, for example, that a large number of women were veiled in 
the province of Aydın when he visited there the previous holiday, but that the authorities had 
not interfered: “It appears that there had been considerable traffic in undesirable women in 
certain cabarets and clubs of Aidin, and the more conservative portion of the population 
objected to the scenes which took place there. In  Sokia [Söke, a district of the province of 
Aydın], on the other hand, the large garden belonging to the resident manager for the 
Macandrews and Forbes Company had been recently lent for a garden party for charitable 
purposes. The whole population of Sohia attended and none of the women was veiled.” See 
Copy of the Report from Acting Consul in Smyrna, in Despatch N. 384 from Sir G. Clerk, FO 




the Turkish women of Smyrna. As a general rule the Turkish costume is little 
changed except for the omission of the veil. It appears to go against the grain 
for the Turkish woman to do away with the symbol of the distinction between 
Moslem and the non-Moslem.”195 
 In short, it seems that despite all the campaigns and propaganda, the 
change in women’s dress in the 1920s was limited to the elite or educated 
segments of the population. In fact, even among some elites, there was still 
reluctance to getting used to the “modern” ways, especially regarding 
women’s clothing and public appearance. One of the most prominent speakers 
of the Kemalist regime, Falih Rıfkı, expressed this reluctance in 1929 as an 
impact of yet uneradicated “Oriental” mind and past:   
 
In the houses in which we were born, in the schools in which we studied, 
in the thoughts, feelings, and customs by which we were raised, in our 
clothing, our common understandings, and the way that we carry 
ourselves, from top to bottom, everything has changed. Neither a man 
nor a generation can emotionally absorb such widespread chaos that has 
taken place in the past eight to ten years, no matter how much he had 
every intention of doing so. The wound of being Oriental has encrusted 
us. There yet exists a scab on our skin. With a vigorous brush of this 
scab, it can again be infected. We are half humans. Our correct ideas 
are still fighting against our wrong feelings. We still have a 
considerable number of brave revolutionaries who won’t let their wives 
emerge from the kafes. The sarık that we cast off winds itself around 
our feet and trips us.196 
 
Likewise, speaking on Republic Day in October 1928 at the Istanbul branch 
of the Women’s Union, İffet Halim Hanım pointed to the slow pace of 
development in the modernization of women’s clothing even in a city like 
Istanbul: 
 
Our men have put on the hat and understood its benefits in a very short 
time. It was hoped that after them, our women would also feel the same 
necessity especially in a place like Istanbul, which is one of the most 
civilized cities of Turkey. However, unfortunately, the last couple of 
years have been wasted as a period of stagnancy. An outside eye would 
see us dressed in complete confusion. Some of us wear overcoats, some 
of us cover our heads with turbans, some with tulle, and a small number 
of us wear hats. We can no longer hesitate to choose a way of dressing 
that is equivalent to the way men do. Those who, I do not know why, 
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still continue to hide their faces, still cover their head, should sincerely 
admit that they do not recognize how much harm they do to themselves 




The question of women’s unveiling had been on the agenda of the modernist 
elite, men and women alike beginning in the late Ottoman Empire. It was 
particularly shaped by the stigmatization of the peçe and the çarşaf as 
uncivilized clothing, and, hence, focused on their removal. The initial changes 
in women’s dress along these lines had already begun before the establishment 
of the republic, and locally organized bodies, like the Turkish Hearths, had 
already created spaces in the provinces for women’s greater public 
participation and for the struggle against gender segregation.198 The anti-
veiling campaigns of the 1920s can thus be seen as a continuation of a line of 
thought in Ottoman/Turkish history that had linked modernization and social 
development with women’s emancipation and with the change of their outfit 
since the 19th century. On the other hand, they were unprecedented since the 
provincial elite attempted to directly intervene in women’s clothing.   
 The anti-veiling campaigns in the 1920s were limited in number and 
remained as local initiatives. Although they stemmed from a much older 
debate ideologically, they were clearly motivated by the Hat Law of 1925 in 
terms of timing and as a source of legitimacy. Even though the law only 
concerned men’s headgear, it triggered a public debate on civilized dress, 
including women’s clothing, and the importance of modernizing the outlook 
of the Turkish nation. Therefore, a campaign for the modernization of clothing 
of nearly national proportions was waged throughout 1925. Moreover, the 
attempts to change women’s dress by the local elite of some provinces had 
emerged as part of this general momentum. The uncompromising manner in 
which the Hat Law was put into practice by the Kemalist regime and the 
reactions it received led to the tendency to deal with women’s clothing not by 
enacting laws or imposing central decisions, but through propaganda, 
guidance, and most importantly, by trusting the modernist visions and 
ambitions of the local elite. As the case of Aydın shows, the central elite also 
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did not hesitate to encourage the provincial administrators to work towards 
making these visions a reality.   
 Although limited to a few provinces, the early examples of anti-
veiling campaigns in the 1920s created a path that would be followed later. In 
provinces where there was an outright ban, the campaigns were more limited 
at first, as was the case with the statement of the mayor of Eskişehir, or the 
decision of the Trabzon Turkish Hearth. However, they gradually accelerated 
and were reinforced by the decisions of the local administrative bodies when 
the initial attempt was unsuccessful. Decisions to ban veiling in the 1920s 
were mainly made by the provincial councils, which were probably thought to 
have a more effective legal capacity compared to municipalities based on the 
Law on the General Administration of Provinces. The early campaigns of the 
1920s seem to be more focused on the removal of the peçe and elimination of 
rural clothing peculiar to each province. The aim was to change women’s 
clothing primarily in the provincial centres, although some of the decisions 
were to be applied in the district capitals and villages as well, as in the case of 
Eskişehir. 
 As discussed above, however, early anti-veiling campaigns did not 
become country-wide phenomena, and in places where they were initiated, 
they proved largely ineffective. The fact that similar bans were issued in the 
1930s by the provincial authorities of the same cities that had initiated a 
campaign in the 1920s can be seen as an indication of the limited and weak 
impact of the earlier attempts. The main wave of anti-veiling campaigns would 
begin in the 1930s, when the Kemalist single-party regime became 
increasingly authoritarian in every domain following its consolidation of 
power. Local attempts to eliminate the peçe and the çarşaf, and to modernize 
women’s clothing would be applied in a much more comprehensive manner 
during this main wave, both in terms of content and the scope, and the intensity 
















Contextualizing the Anti-Veiling Campaigns of the 1930s: An Overview 
 
 
“Kadını asırlarca kafes, dam, peçe altına hapsederek 
körelttikten sonra uluorta muhakeme yürütüyorlar. … 
Kadın şiir, roman yazar mıymış? Resim yapar 
mıymış? … Yapmamalı imiş; şiiri, güzelliği inceliği 
kaybolurmuş. Görüyorsun ya, onu, hâlâ, saksıda çiçek 




I. Turkey in the 1930s 
Many scholars of early republican Turkey see a change in the character of the 
Kemalist regime beginning in the 1930s. Mete Tunçay, a prominent historian 
of the period, argues, for example, that until 1931, it was the formation process 
for the new regime.200 In his periodization, the year 1931 marks the 
consolidation of the authoritarian single-party system in Turkey, with the 
period between 1931 and 1945 being relatively stronger and more compact in 
political terms. According to him, the consolidation of the regime in 1931 was 
realized and implicitly declared at the “third” congress of the RPP in 1931,201 
where the main characteristics and principles of the regime were formulated. 
These principles constituted the official state ideology known as the Six 
Arrows.202 The 1931 RPP congress and the party program issued during it 
were the manifestations of the policies that would shape Turkey in the 1930s.  
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It was in fact 1929 when the extraordinary measures taken after the 
Kurdish/Islamic rebellion of 1925 had come to an end, and the government 
decided to abolish the Law on the Maintenance of Order. The prime minister 
İsmet Pasha (İnönü), in his speech at the party meeting, explained this decision 
of the government by referring to their confidence that a legal and 
administrative system that would prevent oppositional forces from mobilizing 
against the regime had been  successfully established during the four years the 
law was in force.203 He argued that the government succeeded in finding a new 
type of state based on an understanding of republican citizenship and the 
separation of religion and state.                      
 Considering İsmet Pasha’s speech declaring the end of the emergency 
period and beginning of a new era in 1929, the periodization offered by 
Tunçay might sound contradictory at first sight. However, after publicly 
maintaining that it had abolished all opposition and succeeded in creating a 
strong, established order, the Kemalist regime suffered two unexpected blows 
to its self-esteem. The first one was a short experience in 1930 with multi-
party system, which turned into a test of confidence and legitimacy for the 
regime. Established in August 1930 with the encouragement of Mustafa 
Kemal, the Free Republican Party (FRP) became unexpectedly popular as an 
opposition party, especially amongst the middle and lower segments of the 
society, reflecting their discontent with some of the Kemalist reforms 
instigated up until then.204 As the second attempt to initiate a transition to a 
multi-party system,205 the FRP was considerably successful in the local 
elections against the RPP, which represented the regime, Atatürk being its 
immutable president. The FRP’s party meeting in Izmir turned into a protest 
against the government. This success of the FRP alarmed the regime and drew 
its attention once again to its inability to spread its ideals to the larger public. 
Faced with an increasing social support for the FRP, which tended to get out 
of their control, the ruling elite turned their back on the opposition party 
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shortly after its establishment. The party was closed just three months after it 
opened.  Immediately following its closure, Mustafa Kemal began a three-
month-long inspection tour throughout the country. The tour gave him the 
opportunity to more closely observe the scale of and the reasons for the social 
discontent, which had risen to the surface during the FRP experience. The tour 
also gave him the chance to formulate a new road map to institute a stronger 
regime.206   
 The second shock was an incident in Menemen, a small town in the 
province of Izmir, on the Western coast of the country. In December 1930, a 
small group in Menemen, who called themselves the Army of the Caliphate, 
attempted to declare an Islamic order against the republican administration.207 
The incident was quickly suppressed, but the rioters beheaded a young officer 
who tried to stop them. Even more traumatic for the regime than this violent 
act was the indifference or reluctance of the people of Menemen to intervene. 
Mustafa Kemal had interpreted this reluctance as a tacit support or approval 
on the part of at least some segments of the population: “the approval shown 
by some members of the community of Menemen for the savageness 
displayed by the reactionaries (mürteciler) is a source of shame for all patriots 
and the supporters of republicanism.”208 This reaction of the political authority 
to the Menemen incident was also due to its crucial difference from the other 
rebellions that had previously occurred.  This incident had occurred in a town 
of a province in the West, supposedly more developed in terms of urban and 
economic parameters than those in the Eastern parts of Turkey, and which, 
therefore, should have been well-integrated into the Kemalist regime and/or 
easily controlled by it.  
 This event had such an effect upon the political elite that it initiated a 
discussion similar to the one raised after the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925. In 
addition to the ineffectiveness of the reforms that had been carried out thus 
far, some elite even criticized some of the Westernized practices of the new 
era, such as the beauty contests, which only served to alienate the majority 
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from the principles of the state.209 The political elite’s perception of the event 
also revealed its awareness of an existing discontent within society. The 
president demanded an investigation into the political roots of the event and 
strict control over the press in addition to the harsh suppression of the 
rebellions and forced migration of the people in the region who were accused 
of being involved in the uprising.210  
 The reactions the regime faced in 1930 and the rising discontent 
within the population were as much the result of the economic failure brought 
on by the Great Depression, as they were of the national policies and 
extraordinary measures applied during the second half of the 1920s. In fact, 
Cem Emrence argues that the effects of the economic crisis on Turkey were 
one of the primary reasons for the founding of the FRP.211 As an 
overwhelmingly agricultural economy exporting agricultural goods, Turkey 
was hit hard by the crisis, which was felt severely by both the peasantry in the 
countryside and the merchants and workers in the cities. “Rising social 
discontent became the undisputed reality,” Emrence suggests, which then led 
the president to try to channel this increasing opposition to a new political 
party that would work under his control. The program of the opposition party 
focused on economic issues, following a liberal agenda to counter the effects 
of the crisis.212 With the FRP’s elimination from the political scene, Turkey 
turned towards statism and state-led industrialization as a reaction to the Great 
Depression.213     
 This turn towards more state control in the economy had a spillover 
effect on other segments of the political and social sphere. Önen and Reyhan, 
for example, indicate that the Provincial Law of 1929, which entailed a 
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centralist structure in public administration, was directly linked to the 
economic policy of statism.214 Zürcher also argues that having maintained a 
leading role in the economy, the Turkish state increased its power in every 
aspect, which marked a different phase in the history of the Kemalist regime 
beginning with the 1930s. The elimination of all civil society organizations, 
their incorporation into the party structure, and the merger of the state and 
party in 1936 were the main components of the political repression that 
characterized the second phase of Kemalism, and this political repression was 
linked to the economic policies that emerged as a reaction to the effects of the 
Great Depression.215 The crisis of 1929 deepened the social discontent and 
paved the way for a mutual loss of trust between the political elite and the 
majority of the population, combined with the traumatic events of 1930 – the 
FRP experience and the Menemen incident. Thus, “the authoritarian state that 
had been in being since 1925 felt a need for total control of every aspect of 
social life” in the 1930s.216 
 Çağaptay also characterizes the 1930s in a similar way, as “High 
Kemalism” or “Kemalism par excellence,” by focusing on the ideological 
components rather than the effects of the Great Depression and the statist 
policies following it.217 According to Çağaptay, Turkey had focused on 
recovering from a decade of continuous warfare and major reforms of political 
restructuring in the 1920s. It was only after the establishment of a secular 
republic that Kemalism turned its attention to matters of ideology and became 
a more nationalist and authoritarian regime. Bozarslan also differentiates the 
1930s from the previous phases of Kemalism by referring to its assuming a 
relatively compact form as an “autonomous” ideology with the formulation of 
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the Six Arrows.218 He argues that compared to a “Janus-like” Kemalism of the 
1920s, “which was at the same time nationalist and the bearer of a project of 
civilization,” Kemalism of the 1930s was transformed into an ideology of a 
nationalist revolution, creating “an openly and self-consciously anti-liberal 
and anti-democratic regime.” 
 Many changes in the 1930s indicate such a turn towards a more 
authoritarian regime. One was the increasing role of the RPP as an important 
instrument for spreading the ideology of the state and mobilizing the society. 
The party was of course there before the 1930s as well, but it was much less 
active and crucial politically, due to the extraordinary powers of the cabinet 
based on the Law on the Maintenance of Order between 1925 and 1929.219 It 
became much more active in the first half of the 1930s, especially under Recep 
Peker, the secretary-general of the party between 1931 and 1936. The party, 
however, could never turn into an independent institution, and in 1936, it 
became closely identified with the state apparatus, a process known as the 
merger of the state and the party in the literature. The first steps towards this 
merger were taken at the general congress of the RPP in May 1935. In the new 
regulation of the party that was accepted at the congress, the party and the 
government were described as two complementary organizations. According 
to the new regulation, the government was born out of the party and they 
together constituted a union.220 The merger was put into practice by a circular 
of the Prime Minister İnönü in June 1936.221 According to the circular, the 
Minister of Interior would become the general secretary of the party, the 
governor of a province would at the same time be the head of the RPP local 
branch, and the inspector-generals would also monitor the party branches and 
activities in the region where they served. Although it has been characterized 
as a merger of the state and the party, it can indeed be seen as a process through 
which the state took over the party: all those who were in charge at the time 
as the head of the party branch in the provinces were removed from the office 
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by the circular and the current governors took over their duty. The secretary 
general of the party, Recep Peker, was removed from his position three days 
before the circular.222 The merger of the state and the party was completed by 
the incorporation of the Six Arrows into the constitution in 1937, thus making 
the party principles the main principles of the state.223    
 As part of these policies of centralization and increasing state control, 
the number of general inspectorships, which were institutions in charge of 
controlling the affairs of the provinces and organizing the operations of all 
governmental departments in the general inspection zone, also increased in 
the 1930s.224 The First General Inspectorship (Birinci Umûmî Müfettişlik) was 
established in 1927 in the Kurdish provinces in southeast Turkey following 
the Sheikh Said rebellion. The second one was formed in February 1934 for 
the Thrace region, followed by the Third General Inspectorship in 1935 in 
charge of eastern and north-eastern provinces. As part of the policy of the 
merger of the state apparatus and the party mentioned above, the general 
inspectors were also the highest inspectors of all the branches of the party 
organization in their areas, and thus the inspectorships and the RPP were in 
close contact and relationship. Moreover, in addition to their primary aim of 
maintaining security and state control in their inspection zone, general 
inspectorships were also concerned about creating “civilized” cities. 
According to the law, part of the responsibilities of the general inspectors was 
to monitor and support the development of their inspection zones, not only in 
terms of economy, infrastructure or public health, but also in terms of social, 
cultural and civilizational progress.225 Such generally defined responsibilities 
of the inspectors would sometimes lead their heavy involvement in attempts 
to change social life and manners in their regions. As it will be discussed in 
the next chapter, some general inspectors played an active role in the 
implementation of the anti-veiling campaigns within this framework.              
In addition to the RPP and the General Inspectorships, one other 
institution that is particularly important for understanding the policies and 
nature of the Kemalist regime in the 1930s is the People’s Houses 
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(Halkevleri). Established in 1932 (right after the abolition of the Turkish 
Hearths) as a cultural organization organically linked to the RPP, the People’s 
Houses aimed primarily at educating the masses and mobilizing people at the 
local level in accordance with the ideals of the new regime.226 They were 
designed to be the major center for meeting and socialization in a particular 
city, and they would lead the social and cultural life in their localities through 
their activities and publications, reaching far to the villages by organizing 
village committees and People’s Chambers.227 The People’s Houses were 
responsible for creating an atmosphere where provincial people could become 
familiar with elements of modern life, from theater to dancing. It is therefore 
not surprising that they were heavily involved in initiatives for cultural 
change, including the anti-veiling campaigns. In fact, as it will be seen in detail 
in the following chapters, together with the municipalities, these three 
important institutions and their administrators – the RPP local branches, the 
inspectors-generals and the People’s Houses – played a critical role as the 
actors of the anti-veiling campaigns in the periphery, and as milieus in which 
dynamics of the campaigns were shaped.          
Besides the mark of these institutions, a second wave of reforms, 
especially ones targeting cultural and social modernization, took place in 
Turkey in the 1930s.228 Western weights and measures were adopted in 1931. 
The call to prayer (ezan), together with other elements of worship, such as the 
sermons, was Turkified in 1932.229 The music reform (modernization of 
Turkish music) and the language reform (purification of Turkish and 
elimination of words with Persian and Arabic origin) were among the most 
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radical of Kemalist reforms in the 1930s aiming at cultural modernization.230 
The Society for the Study of Turkish History, established in April 1931, and 
the Society for the Study of Turkish Language, founded in June 1932, both 
played an active role in launching research and theories in support of Turkish 
nationalism, which did not remain as academic studies but were included in 
school curriculum as part of ideological indoctrination.  
The year 1934 was particularly significant in terms of the intensity of 
changes and reforms introduced. The Settlement Law, which entailed the 
resettlement of thousands of people due to the state alleged security concerns, 
was enacted in June;231 the Surname Law, which made acquisition of family 
names mandatory for all citizens, was issued in July;232 the law on the removal 
of appellations and titles like efendi and pasha, and the abolition of all civilian 
grades, decorations and medals was passed in November. Towards the end of 
the year, women gained the right to vote and to be elected in parliamentary 
elections, which was celebrated in the public discourse as the last and most 
important breakthrough towards women’s emancipation.233 Another law, 
usually referred to as the Dress Law (Kisve Kanunu) in December prohibited 
the clergy from wearing their religious garments outside of service. The law 
included the people of all religions, including Jewish and Christian clergy.234 
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Writing in December 1934, right after the enactment of the Dress Law and at 
the heyday of the language and music reform, the American ambassador 
reported his observations of the societal reaction to this sequence of reforms 
in the following way: “society, meaning the totality of the Turkish population 
and the foreign element in the country as well, is more bewildered then ever 
by this latest addition to the astonishing succession of ‘movements’ put under 
way within the last few weeks.”235 The acceleration of the reforms in 1934 
was also recognized at the local level. In one article published by an Adana 
newspaper, the author characterized the last months of 1934 as the fastest and 
most valuable days of the “big Turkish transformation.”236  
In short, the 1930s mark the Kemalist regime’s consolidation as an 
authoritarian single-party regime. From the beginning of the decade onwards, 
the Turkish state extended its control over society and increased its 
interventions in the cultural and social life of its citizens in an unprecedented 
manner. A series of reforms were put into practice in many areas, from music 
to language, which aimed at a more determined break with the Ottoman past, 
and with all habits and norms coded as traditional, uncivilized, false or 
backward. This was a time when visual expressions of modernization, such as 
clothing, gained a particular significance reflecting “the progress” brought 
about by the Kemalist regime. As Bozdoğan puts, “what was unique to the 
Kemalist program in the 1930s was the inordinate time and energy invested in 
changing the forms of things and the official production, supervision, and 
dissemination of a distinctly republican visual culture of modernity.”237 Placed 
in this larger context, the anti-veiling campaigns thus can be seen as part of 
the attempts at cultural modernization in the 1930s, a project which gained 
one of its most symbolic manifestations in the discussions about women’s 
modernization and emancipation.   
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II. Women’s Modernization and Un/Veiling in the 1930s  
On 14 June 1930, a French journalist’s visit to Istanbul and his article 
discussing Turkish women’s progress made the headline of the national 
newspaper Cumhuriyet.238 Reprinting the photographs used by the journalist, 
photographs that show Turkish women in their old clothing, Cumhuriyet 
quoted what the article had to say about how Turkish women had become 
modern in a very short time after the establishment of the republic. The 
indications of this change was the total disappearance of the peçe and the 
çarşaf, except for some old ladies in the remote corners of Istanbul and 
Ankara, and the increased presence of women in the public sphere. The 
newspaper  celebrated  the observations of the French journalist that “the East 
was totally erased” in Turkey; Turkish women had been freed  from the 
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Figure 3.1. A propaganda poster 
of the RPP in mid-1930s, showing 
the “revolution” brought about 
by the new regime in clothing 
and marriage. 
Source: Lilo Linke, Allah 
Dethroned: A Journey through 
Modern Turkey, London: 





shackles  of religion, and they were now living, dressing and marrying exactly 
like their sisters in the West. 
 It was quite common in the Turkish newspapers of the 1930s, national 
and provincial alike, to publish articles from Western newspapers praising the 
progress of Turkey.239 Ideas of the European observers on Turkey, their 
approval and praise were the litmus test used to assess degree of 
modernization and the success of the republic. European dress codes and 
habits were a constant reference point. It was a matter of pride when an article 
published in a Dutch newspaper characterized the dress of the people of 
Ankara as “clean, orderly and European.”240 The way Westerners approached 
Turkish women’s appearance was especially important. Since “no single item 
of clothing has had more influence on Western images of Middle Eastern 
women than the veil,”241 its removal would be the most powerful symbol of 
social change, both for the Western observers and in the eyes of the Kemalists. 
In other words, changing Turkish women’s images by emancipating them 
from the “chains” of the peçe and the çarşaf and bringing them into the public 
sphere were the best ways of distancing the new republic from its Ottoman 
and Islamic past, and creating a sense of a break with and triumph over it.242 
Among the Turkish upper classes, “you look like a foreigner” was the biggest 
courtesy a woman could receive.243    
Although these motivations were already guiding Kemalist policies 
and discourse on women in the 1920s, the stigmatization of the peçe and the 
çarşaf as uncivilized attire grew and more explicitly expressed in public in the 
1930s. The propaganda posters of the RPP in the 1930s reflected this 
stigmatization through women’s images; the contrast between the peçe and 
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the çarşaf on the one hand, symbolizing the old and backward, and their 
removal and adoption of modern clothes on the other, symbolizing the new 
and modern.244 As Bozdoğan underlines,  
 
Among the most canonical photographs of the Kemalist inkılap 
[revolution] are those of unveiled women in educational and 
professional settings – as students, artists, lawyers, doctors, even 
aviators. There were also photographs of women in public spaces of 
parks, sports events, fairs, and national holidays. Images of modern 
women as inhabitants of modern spaces were preferred propaganda 
statements.245   
 
In various mediums of popular culture -  films, novels, advertisements, 
women’s journals and lifestyle magazines -  an ideal image of new Turkish 
woman in modern attire and outlook was promoted and the removal of the 
peçe and the çarşaf was identified with incorporating modern norms into one’s 
life, with being civilized and becoming part of the new Turkey as modern 
citizens.246       
In addition to women’s public visibility and participation in the 
professional life alongside  men, certain idealized characteristics of Turkish 
women, such as beauty and good manners, were particularly celebrated as part 
of their roles as representatives of Turkey’s modernization. One important 
occasion where such characteristics were promoted in the 1930s was the 
national beauty contests, the first of which was organized in 1929 by the 
newspaper Cumhuriyet. Having a beauty contest would be an indication that 
Turkey was as civilized as the other countries that were sending their beauty 
queens to international beauty competitions and that Turkish women were as 
beautiful and modern as their counterparts in the West.247 These contests were 
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also an opportunity to stage the new image of Turkish, unveiled and dressed 
in modern clothing. In fact, many news reports and commentaries published 
about these contests, in and outside of Turkey, did not fail to make references 
to the removal of the veil. When she returned to Turkey from the international 
competition in Paris, the Turkish beauty queen of 1931, Naşide Saffet Hanım, 
said in an interview that the most frequent question she received was whether 
Turkish women were wearing the peçe or dressed like her. She had assured 
the international public that Turkey had now adopted European manners; the 
peçe had been removed.248 When Miss Turkey, Keriman Halis Hanım, won 
the international contest and became Miss World in 1932, this was celebrated 
as a “national victory” and as the most effective propaganda campaign that 
Turkey could ever launch at the global level; the whole world had the chance 
to learn about the new Turkish woman and centuries of harem legends and 
images of the peçe and the çarşaf were finally erased.249 However, beauty 
contests and such propaganda campaigns were concerned with sending the 
Turkish public a message as much as they were with conveying the right 
image in the West. As Shissler suggests, “Turkish beauty queens really did 
embody a social agenda just by existing.”250 One primary element of this 
agenda inside the country was to normalize women’s new image; to defame 
the peçe and the çarşaf as uncivilized attire responsible for Turkey’s 
backwardness and to promote the adoption of modern clothing.        
 The emphasis on women’s outward appearance in the 1930s was also 
related to women’s increasing political mobilization. It is not be a coincidence 
that the importance of women’s roles in social and political life was underlined 
in the party program issued at the general RPP congress in 1931.251 With the 
decision to allow women’s participation in the local elections in 1930, 
women’s membership in the party began to be considered very critical by the 
regime leadership. As one party document indicates, initially, women’s 
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applications for membership to local party branches were subject to the 
approval of the party center. The process was simplified in 1930 and the 
approval of the local branches was seen enough for women’s acceptance into 
the party.252 It is crucial to emphasize, however, that the target of the party 
was those women who were not state officials, since officials were not allowed 
to be the members of the party according to the Law on State Officials 
(Memurin Kanunu).253  
As much of the news and articles revealed in the provincial 
newspapers, however, despite these initial efforts, the level of women’s 
participation in the party as well as in organizations like the People’s Houses 
was still considered low. Women’s acquisition of the right to participate in 
parliamentary elections in 1934, and the upcoming national elections in 1935 
were particularly seen as appropriate occasions to reverse this situation. The 
party center kept sending directives to its local branches to increase women’s 
membership in the party in this period; it was characterized as vital for the 
success of party activities to secure women’s active participation.254 These 
directives were also published in the provincial newspapers.255 Some local 
branches of the RPP were trying to mobilize women for party membership by 
organizing meetings at which women could learn about the party principles 
and program. The RPP Administration in the province of Kars, for example, 
published in the provincial newspaper an announcement explaining that 
according to the party regulations, party members were not allowed to vote 
for non-member candidates; thus women had to be party members in order to 
be elected as second voters.256 They organized a meeting specifically for 
women at the local party branch to explain the party program and to make it 
easier for women to join the party. In the announcement, the local party 
administration  informed the women of the city that the first phase of the 
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general elections (to elect the second voters) was fast approaching and “it was 
in women’s own interest” to participate in  this party meeting. A similar 
meeting was organized in Izmir by women themselves; more women began to 
become members of the party and the People’s House in order to show their 
gratitude for their newly acquired rights.257 Women’s compliance with these 
calls and applications for membership to the party in various cities were also 
frequently reported in the provincial newspapers, most probably in order to 
contribute to further political mobilization of women.258 Some even claimed 
that the number of women becoming party members was about to exceed the 
number of male party members in certain cities.259 Women’s active 
involvement as delegates in the local party congresses and their election as 
members of the local administrative councils were also publicly celebrated in 
the newspapers.260     
Women’s membership in the party and other political institutions, and 
their political mobilization would almost automatically imply their removal of 
the peçe and the çarşaf; stigmatized as backward, uncivilized and non-
Turkish, these veils were the ideological opposites of all the norms that the 
Kemalist regime was trying to promote. However, despite all the propaganda 
and efforts to the contrary, the picture was quite different than it was depicted 
in the article of the French journalist that mentioned at the beginning of this 
section. The “East” was in fact not erased; the peçe, and particularly, the 
çarşaf were still pretty common in Turkey in the mid-1930s. Towards the end 
of 1934, Mahmut Yesari, a well-known novelist and playwright of the time, 
complained in his column in Yedigün that women were still veiled in some 
parts of Turkey.261 That is why a second wave of anti-veiling campaigns would 
be organized, this time in a much more militant way compared to the 
campaigns of the 1920s.  
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III. Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the 1930s 
III. a. Timing 
The main wave of the anti-veiling campaigns began in mid-1934 and reached 
its peak in 1935.262 As mentioned above, there were a great many reforms in 
1934, but it is hard to explain simply why the anti-veiling campaigns started 
in 1934. It seems that particularly significant in terms of the timing of the anti-
veiling campaigns was women’s acquisition of their political rights on 5 
December 1934. Although there were anti-veiling campaigns before this date, 
they increased dramatically in number afterwards. Anti-veiling campaigns 
spread all over the country in 1935. They often came with references to the 
prior reforms that had been carried out to elevate women’s social status, 
especially regarding acquisition of political rights.  
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Figure 3.2. Women in 
peştamal veil at a local market 
in Sivas in mid-1930s. 
Source: Lilo Linke, Allah 
Dethroned: A Journey through 
Modern Turkey, London: 




 In Turkey, women’s struggle to gain their full political rights had 
begun long before the 1930s. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
pioneering organization in this regard during the republican period was 
Turkish Women’s Union, which was established in 1924 primarily to achieve 
this goal.263 While the idea of granting women’s political rights had surfaced 
several times in and outside of the parliament before 1930, particularly during 
the debates on the changes in the electoral law and in the constitution, 
women’s struggle was able to gain its first concrete achievement with the 
acceptance of the new Municipal Law of 1930. With this law, women were 
granted the right to vote and to be elected in local elections. In 1934, with 
changes in the constitution, women finally gained the right to elect members 
and to be elected to the parliament. On the day the necessary changes were 
accepted in the parliament, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü delivered a speech in 
which he characterized this reform as one of the highest achievements of the 
Kemalist revolution; the Kemalist revolution would always be known as a 
revolution of women’s liberation.264 According to İnönü, Turkish women, 
who had acquired their social rights through the Civil Code of 1926, finally 
found the chance to complement them with political rights, which opened to 
them the door of public life. In other words, the idea was that the granting of 
these rights would increase women’s participation not only in political life, 
but also in every sphere of public life, implying that women would join the 
work force and would appear in public in variety of roles in greater numbers. 
In fact, as mentioned above, following the law granting women political 
rights, there was a campaign to increase women’s membership to the party. In 
addition to the party, there appeared also an increase in the organization of 
special women’s sections in the local branches of many associations in the 
provinces, or in the establishment of new associations by women 
themselves.265 The idea that this reform would bring women’s greater 
participation in the public life was also promoted in the local newspapers.266 
In many provinces, women organized meetings to celebrate their new rights 
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and to send thank you messages to the president, to the prime minister, to the 
RPP and to the parliament.267   
Women’s right to elect and to be elected was seen as the final and 
most important step in the new regime’s effort to modernize women. The lack 
of these rights in many European countries was a constant reference point in 
underlining the progressive character of this move for Turkish women. Many 
interpretations of this development, both at the national and local level, 
emphasized its (supposed/expected) effect of relegating Turkish women’s 
backward image as “hiders behind the peçe and the çarşaf” to the pages of 
history. In other words, news and articles on women’s gaining of their political 
rights usually referred to the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf as well; there 
was a connection between the two in terms of the advancement of women’s 
social status. In fact, Mustafa Kemal himself hinted at a connection between 
women’s political rights and the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf in his 
speech after the granting of these rights:  
 
This decision provides Turkish women with a place in social and 
political life that is above all nations. From now on, in order to see 
Turkish women in the çarşaf, under the peçe and behind the kafes, it 
would be necessary to look at history. Turkish women have gained their 
civilized place at home and have shown success in business life. 
Turkish women whose first experience with political life was at the 
local elections now gained their biggest right with the right to elect and 
to be elected [to the parliament]. This right, which is lacking in many 
civilized nations, is now at the hands of Turkish women and they will 
use it with confidence and merit.268  
 
This connection between the modernization of women’s clothing and 
their political rights was also constantly emphasized in the local newspapers. 
An article published in a Trabzon newspaper shows how this link was 
reinforced at the local level: “The news agency notes the removal of the peçe 
and the çarşaf in Muğla. Does the women’s right to elect and to be elected to 
the parliament … not mean the abolition of the peçe and the çarşaf 
anyway?”269 Another article in a Kars newspaper celebrated women’s political 
rights as a sign of the universal character of the Turkish revolution; these 
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rights would rescue Turkish women from their ages of imprisonment 
symbolized by the peçe, the çarşaf and the kafes [lattice].270 Likewise, in his 
report on the yearly performance of the local party administration of Antalya, 
which was read at the local party congress, the head of the Antalya party 
branch pointed to the particular significance of the upcoming national 
elections because of women’s participation and their liberation from 
centuries-old segregation symbolized by the peçe and the çarşaf:  
 
The Turkish revolution had found the Turkish woman behind the kafes 
at home, in the peçe and the çarşaf in the street and in a servile situation 
in the family. But now, the Turkish woman is among us, equipped with 
rights that her sisters lack in the most civilized countries.271   
 
Evidently, there was a widespread assumption on the part of the Kemalist elite, 
at the center and in the periphery, that women’s acquisition of political rights 
meant their increasing participation in public life and, therefore, 
modernization of their dress. In other words, they assumed a direct link 
between women’s visibility and the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf, since 
they were the ultimate symbols of women’s seclusion, the very obstacle to 
their visibility. Women’s participation in the public sphere wearing peçes and 
çarşafs was a contradiction; having gained all their rights, modern Turkish 
women had to be modern in dress as well.  
 A contemporary observer also hinted at a link between the granting of 
women’s political rights and the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf. In fact, 
while reporting about the change in the election law to include women’s 
suffrage, the American ambassador argued that this change also included an 
article aiming at the elimination of the veil. Skinner mentioned in his 
correspondence that he had enquired into the matter at the Vilayet (the 
governor’s office), and learned that the article added to the election law about 
the recognition of the identity of the voter was concerned with women’s 
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wearing of the face veil. The ambassador interprets this as issuing a legal 
regulation concerning the use of the peçe: 
 
I now have the honor to enclose herewith translations of the laws in this 
regard, as published in the Official Gazette. Article 3 of Law No. 2598 
states: “The ballot of those voters whose person and identity is not 
discernible at the moment of the casting of the vote shall not be 
accepted.” Inquiry by the Embassy at the Vilayet indicates that this 
provision aims at the discouraging of the wearing of the veil by women 
in general and during the elections in particular. Thus, the granting of 
votes to women is used as another weapon towards the Government’s 
objective of abolishing the veil and the other relics of the Ottoman 
tradition. Previously the Republican régime has discouraged the use of 
the veil, but this is the first time that a positive legal measure in this 
regard has been taken.272 
 
The wording of the article, as it was correctly translated by the ambassador, 
did not include any direct reference to the face veil or elimination of the face 
veil.273 However, Skinner could be right to suspect that adding of this new 
article to the election law, while granting women the right to elect, could 
hardly be a coincidence. In other words, the spirit of the law might have 
entailed a concern about the veil, even if its wording did not. Ever since the 
era of Abdülhamid II, there had been an apprehension that the veil could be 
used to conceal one’s identity; so it is likely that this article was shaped by the 
fear that the veil would be used for a similar purpose during elections. It is 
debatable, however, whether this can be read as issuing a legal measure 
against the veil in the way that the American ambassador claims.        
Women themselves also drew a similar association between the 
gaining of political rights and unveiling. As it will be discussed in Chapter 5 
in more detail, in celebrations and gatherings women organize in various cities 
to celebrate their political rights, the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf was 
mentioned as part of women’s efforts to be worthy of this reform.274 The 
petition of Trabzon İdman Yurdu, a local youth and sports club in Trabzon, to 
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the city council requesting a ban on the peçe and the çarşaf also justified this 
request by referring to women’s new rights. Reporting from Trabzon, the local 
newspaper stated that at the meeting of the club, “it was decided that it is not 
right for Turkish women to continue wearing the çarşaf and the peçe at a time 
when they vote and are elected as deputies and as members of the municipal 
and provincial councils.”275 
 While trying to understand the timing of the anti-veiling campaigns, 
another possible connection can be made with Turkey’s hosting of the 12th 
Congress of the International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal 
Citizenship (IAW) in Istanbul in April 1935. This was an important 
opportunity for the Kemalist regime to display the progress it had achieved in 
the modernization of Turkish women. As Libal suggests, the congress may 
have created an additional impetus for women’s suffrage, since “having 
women in parliament when the IAW Congress convened in Istanbul a few 
months later would contribute to Turkey’s image as a ‘progressive’ and 
‘modern’ country.”276 In fact, the American ambassador also drew the 
connection between the granting of suffrage to women and the holding of the 
IAW Congress: 
 
It is not at all improbable that impetus was given to these concessions 
by the fact that on April 18th, next, the Twelfth Congress of the 
International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship 
will meet at Istanbul. Turkey is fond of modernization and of making 
good show, and women suffrage and eligibility to the Assembly is in 
step with occidental ideas and should make a favorable impression on 
the proposed International Congress of Women in Istanbul. Color is lent 
to these conjectures by the speech of the Prime Minister in which he 
said that the ballot and eligibility to the chamber were not given to 
women as favors but as just rights.277 
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Likewise, the congress may have also strengthened the aim of removing the 
peçe and the çarşaf, or at least decreasing their use as much as possible, given 
that unveiling, too, was an equally strong symbol of women’s emancipation 
to be displayed to the delegates coming from all around the world. In fact, 
references to Turkish women’s “liberation” from the veil could be seen in 
photos, publications and news about the congress and in the reports and press 
releases of the IAW.278 In her speech at the congress, the head of the Turkish 
Women’s Union, Latife Bekir Hanım, would thank Mustafa Kemal for 
“rescuing” women and for giving them their political rights by referring to 
unveiling: “in Turkey, women were called by Atatürk to remove the çarşaf 
and to take their place next to men.”279 There was no such public call by 
Atatürk; but there were anti-veiling campaigns initiated in different cities 
throughout the year before, as well as, after the congress.280  
 
III. b. Scope, Content and Discourse 
It is difficult to determine in exactly how many cities and towns anti-veiling 
campaigns were initiated.281 However, it can safely be argued that anti-veiling 
campaigns were very widespread in Turkey in the second half of the 1930s. 
For example, there were also some local attempts to eliminate certain men’s 
clothes, such as baggy trousers, and these were also initiated in the mid-1930s. 
However, they remained quite few in number and involved only a limited 
number of provinces.282 The anti-veiling campaigns, on the other hand, were 
                                                          
278 Libal, 2014. Libal mentions that numerous photos were showing Turkish delegates in 
fashionable Western attire. One of the U.S. delegates, Josephine Schain, argued on a radio 
program after her return from Turkey that she had seen only two veiled women during her entire 
trip in the country, which included not only Istanbul but also Ankara and a trip to some Turkish 
villages near Bursa. See ibid.  
279 Caporal, 1982, p. 695.  
280 It is interesting that Latife Bekir Hanım would refer to a call by Atatürk and thus reinforce 
a common idea that he called upon women to remove their peçe and çarşaf. Such statements 
were in fact contributing to the effectiveness of the campaigns in the 1930s. 
281 For the list of the cities where there was an outright ban, see Appendix. 
282 There was a campaign and a municipal ban against men’s traditional baggy trousers, the 
şalvar, in Adana, for example. See “Caket pantalon,” Akşam, 10 November 1934; “Adanada 
yasak edilen kıyafetler,” Cumhuriyet, 13 December 1934; “Ulusumuza yakışan kılık,” Ak 
Günler, 5 Ocak 1935; “Giyim kuşam işleri yabana atılamaz,” Ak Günler, 5 Ocak 1935. It is 
important to note that the ban on men’s şalvar was initiated earlier than the ban on the peçe and 
the çarşaf in Adana. See “Adana Belediyesi peçe çarşafı kaldırıyor,” Halk, 18 February 1935. 
Likewise, in Maraş, the baggy trousers of men, known as the karadon in the region, was banned 
by the municipal council. The decision was taken simultaneously with the ban on the peçe and 
the çarşaf. See the letter from the RPP Maraş Administration to RPP Secretariat General, 




countrywide phenomena; they were not geographically specific. Moreover, 
the existence of an anti-veiling campaign did not seem to be related to ethnic, 
religious or any other characteristic of the social composition of the city in 
which it was initiated.283 To the extent that can be followed from the local 
newspapers and archival documents, a large number of anti-veiling campaigns 
resulted in the declaration of outright bans. Although a few of these bans were 
issued by the provincial councils led by governors, the great majority of them 
were achieved through city councils, as part of the legal capacity of 
municipalities.284 In either case, implementation of the bans was mainly in 
hands of the municipal police (zabıta), and as it will be discussed in the next 
chapters in more detail, women who continued to wear the prohibited veils 
had to pay fines in some instances.      
The content of the bans and actors involved varied in different cities. 
Some cities only banned the çarşaf; others, both the peçe and the çarşaf; while 
in yet others, the ban also included the peştamal or other local varieties of veil. 
In Antalya and Erzincan, for example, the ban also included the kafes, in 
addition to the peçe and the çarşaf. The campaigns that included the removal 
of the kafes indicate that the eradication of gender segregation and the 
elimination of all barriers to women’s visibility were among the significant 
motivations behind the anti-veiling campaigns. In Rize, the city council even 
asked women to remove their umbrellas, which they were using to conceal 
themselves.285 In most of the decisions declared, women were given a certain 
period to adapt to the new norms and advised to replace their çarşaf with an 
overcoat. This period was different in every city, but the general tendency was 
to grant a shorter time, like a couple of weeks, for the removal of the peçe, 
and a longer one, three to six months, for the çarşaf.286 This was probably 
because the peçe was considered easier to remove, since women did not need 
to replace it with other clothing, unlike the çarşaf. It was perhaps also related 
to the fact that uncovering women’s faces was considered to be a more urgent 
task. 
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capitals to the smallest district capitals. As it will be discussed in the next chapter, such 
characteristics could affect the shape and end results of the campaign, however.  
284 In Erzincan, for example, the ban was issued by a decree of the provincial council.   
285 See “Rizede Peçeler ve Çarşaflar Kalkıyor,” Yeni Asır, 1 March 1935.  
286 For example, in Fethiye, a district of the province of Muğla, the city council had provided 
women with 15 days to remove their peçe, while they were given a six months’ time for the 
replacement of their çarşaf. See, “Bodrum kent kurultayı Çarşaf ve peçe giyilmesini yasak etti,” 




The process leading to a decision to ban the peçe and the çarşaf most 
often began as an initiative of a group of local elites in a certain local 
institution, supported by a propaganda campaign in the local newspapers, and 
in most cases, eventually followed with an outright ban. In Aydın, for 
example, the People’s House members began discussing the removal of the 
peştamal veil in early 1934, while the actual ban came a year later.287 Not only 
in Aydın but in many cities, especially People’s Houses and their members 
played a significant role in the organization of the campaigns. In Siirt, in 
March 1935, it was at a meeting of the People’s House that the decision to 
remove the peçe was first declared.288 In the case of Diyarbakır, for which we 
lack information whether or not an outright ban on the peçe or the çarşaf was 
issued, the anti-veiling campaign also began through the efforts of the 
members of the People’s House, who were all men, as understood from the 
news. They organized a meeting where they decided to be the first to remove 
their family members’ peçe and çarşaf so as to be the vanguards of the 
struggle.289 In some cities, People’s House was the center of the meetings held 
together with other local institutions in order to discuss the removal of the 
peçe and the çarşaf. In Çankırı, for example, “all institutions,” including the 
local party branch, had organized a joint meeting at the People’s House and 
decided to remove the peçe and the çarşaf in the city.290    
It should be emphasized that in Istanbul and Ankara, the two major 
cities or the “center” of the county, there was no anti-veiling campaign, at least 
not a publicly declared one, by either the city council or the initiative of any 
local institution.291 Ankara, the capital of the new republic, was a stage upon 
which to display the modern face of the Turkish society. Thus, the removal of 
the peçe and the çarşaf was perhaps considered as a given. Similarly, in 
Istanbul, issuing a ban on the peçe and the çarşaf would have undermined the 
image of the city as the most cosmopolitan and developed city of the country. 
In fact, there are indications that propaganda was considered sufficient to 
initiate a change in women’s dress in these cities. At least, this was what was 
declared by the authorities publicly. The lack of any decision in Istanbul, for 
instance, became an issue in some newspapers. Rumors emerged that the peçe 
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288 “Siirtte peçelerin kaldırılmasına karar verildi,” Halk, 25 March 1935.  
289 “D. Bekir Halkevi üyeleri kendi ailelelerinin çarşaf ve peçelerini kaldırdılar,” Halk, 24 
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290 “Çankırı’da Peçe Çarşafların Atılması Kararlaştırıldı,” Yeni Asır, 1 January 1935; 
“Memleketin her tarafında Çarşaf ve Peçeler kaldırılıyor,” Halk, 3 January 1935. 




and the çarşaf would also be banned in Istanbul, like in many Anatolian cities, 
but the governor of the city declared that there was no need for any decision 
or ban for the enlightened and progressive people of Istanbul; it was expected 
that women of this advanced city would remove their peçe and çarşaf by 
themselves.292 The case of Izmir, on the other hand, was more complicated. 
Together with Istanbul and Ankara, it can be considered as part of the “center” 
in terms of its socio-economic composition and relatively more cosmopolitan 
population. In fact, since there was no visible anti-veiling campaign in the 
city, it must have been seen as such by its local administrators as well as by 
the regime as well. However, one letter by the governor of Izmir, Fazlı Güleç, 
to the Ministry of Interior in 1937 indicates that there was a propaganda 
campaign behind the scenes to “convince” those women who were wearing 
the çarşaf in the city. In other words, without harming the image of Izmir as a 
“modern” city by openly organizing an anti-veiling campaign (and thus 
admitting that the peçe and the çarşaf were an issue), the governor had 
preferred to solve the “problem” ensuring that no report would appear about 
it in the newspapers.293  
Although local decisions to ban the peçe and the çarşaf may vary in 
terms of scope and mechanisms used, one can talk about overarching elements 
or reference points that were generally used in the propaganda discourse of 
almost all local campaigns against these veils. One of these references was the 
removal of any sign of the “old regime.” In many of the decisions banning the 
peçe and the çarşaf, and also in the commentaries and news reports about the 
anti-veiling campaigns, these forms of clothing were stigmatized as the 
remnants of the old regime, the old mentality, and the Ottoman past. In fact, 
this was a manifestation of a more general strategy of the new regime to rely 
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Istanbul which warned (tenkid) women who were living in their area of control against going 
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on binary oppositions and comparisons with the Ottoman past. As Libal puts, 
“the early republican regime relied upon discursive constructions of Ottoman 
backwardness to legitimize the new national leadership and construct a new 
Turkish citizen subject,” and this could be widely seen in the discussions on 
women’s clothing as well.294 In one of the articles published in Trabzon 
newspaper Halk calling upon women to remove their peçe and çarşaf, the 
author characterized the peçe and the çarşaf as the only remaining elements 
that continued to humiliate the Turkish nation; they were the “black stamp of 
the palace and the sultanate” on the blameless and clean forehead of a 
generation that was capable of proving its capacity to reach the highest point 
in the civilized social life.295 In another article, the same author equated 
women’s use of the peçe and the çarşaf with men’s use of the fes; like the fes, 
the peçe and the çarşaf were also Ottoman vestiges, and therefore, it was 
absurd to insist on wearing this kind of clothing in contemporary civilized 
times.296  
 Another frequent motive mentioned in the anti-veiling campaigns was 
the cleansing of the public sphere of anything that was coded as a sign of 
backwardness, and derived from “uncivilized” modes and behavior. The peçe 
and the çarşaf had been seen as signs of backwardness ever since they became 
an issue of debate, but this discourse reached an unprecedented level during 
the anti-veiling campaigns of the mid-1930s. In other words, equating the peçe 
and the çarşaf with backwardness, and therefore, with being uncivilized, was 
perhaps the most frequent reference point in the anti-veiling campaigns. At 
the meeting of a group of women in the province of Muğla in December 1934, 
for example, the women decided to remove their çarşaf by declaring that it 
was “the sign of backwardness” (gerilik alameti).297 In their petition to the city 
council to issue a ban on the peçe and the çarşaf, members of the youth and 
sports clubs in Trabzon, led by the Trabzon Home for Adolescents (Erginler 
Yurdu), argued that these old types of clothing were not compatible with the 
new advanced lifestyle of the Turkish nation, and contrary to the progressive 
move Turkish women had just started to make.298 In another newspaper in 
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295 Cemal Rıza, “Peçe ve Çarşaf,” Halk, 31 October 1935. See also Cemal Rıza, “Çarşaf,” Halk, 
12 November 1935.   
296 “Peçe ve Çarşaf, Şehrimizin sayın Bayanlarına,” Halk, 19 December 1935.  
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Trabzon, the peçe and the çarşaf were characterized as the dress of those 
people who believe in fairies, ghosts and fortune telling, and therefore, 
incompatible with the revolution, the republic Atatürk had entrusted to the 
Turkish youth.299  
 
 
The discourse on the peçe and the çarşaf was not solely concerned 
with their symbolic considerations, however. There were also some practical 
reasons and health concerns, it was underlined, that would make the removal 
of the peçe and the çarşaf beneficial for women. It would be easier for women 
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Figure 3.3. A clip from a local newspaper, Yeni Mersin, announcing the 
beginning of the ban on the çarşaf in Mersin. The caption reads “Woman is 





to walk and to move around in the city, for example.300 Women who removed 
these veils would also see sunlight, and thus they could get the necessary 
amount of vitamin D. Such health concerns were in fact used as the primary 
reasons for unveiling in some cities. In Sungurlu, for example, a district of the 
province of Çorum, the District Health Council (Sağlık Kurulu) was directly 
involved in the decision-making process at the municipality during the anti-
veiling campaign.301 The anti-veiling campaigns which included the banning 
of the lattice windows also did so out of deliberate concern for health.302       
 As much as it was identified with being new, modern, civilized and 
healthy, the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf was also seen as a sign of a 
return to the national. In other words, there was also a deliberate effort in the 
discourse used during the anti-veiling campaigns to promote the idea that the 
peçe and the çarşaf were alien to the essence of Turkish culture. Thus the 
modern was always reconciled with the national; the peçe and the çarşaf were 
not millî (national), while the modern clothing that was supposed to replace 
them perfectly was. Moreover, it was also quite frequently emphasized in the 
press that these veils were not Islamic either. This point was important not 
only to challenge resistance to the anti-veiling campaigns based on religious 
reasons but also to respond to a more general and perhaps stronger perception 
that linked the practice of veiling with morality. In fact, a counter discourse 
was utilized to break this link: the peçe and the çarşaf in fact highlighted 
women’s sexuality by covering their face and body. Thus they could not be 
seen as means to protect women’s chastity; their use had never helped to 
eliminate such social ills as adultery, prostitution or sexual harassment. Some 
even argued that the peçe and the çarşaf were contrary to “national morality” 
and in fact enabled these ills to survive. 303 Those who sought morality and 
chastity in the peçe and the çarşaf had to see the immoral acts that were in fact 
being concealed by these veils.304 The “true” moral order would be established 
once these veils were removed; the anti-veiling campaigns were thus no 
offense to the male-dominated social structure.        
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III. c. The Legal Framework 
As shown in the preceding section, in most of the anti-veiling campaigns in 
the 1930s, the bans on the peçe and the çarşaf were issued by municipalities, 
more particularly, by a decision of the city councils. This was one important 
difference between them and the anti-veiling campaigns of the 1920s, which 
were predominantly organized by the provincial councils led by governors. As 
seen in the previous chapter, the provincial council of Eskişehir, for example, 
banned the peçe and the çarşaf by referring to the Law on the General 
Administration of Provinces (İdare-i Umumiye-i Vilâyat Kanunu). Enacted in 
1913 as the Temporal Law on the General Administration of Provinces (İdare-
i Umumiye-i Vilâyat Kanunu Muvakkati) and continued to be in force after the 
establishment of the republic, this law had increased the power of the 
provincial administrations.305 The principle of decentralization and the 
separation of functions in provincial administration were in fact confirmed by 
the Ottoman Constitution of 1876. However, there was also a growing 
tendency on the part of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) towards 
a more centralized system. The law in 1913 had brought a two-fold system of 
provincial administration: “one general, as components of the national 
apparatus of government, the other special or local, as decentralized 
administrative entities, with a recognized legal personality.”306 While trying 
to maintain central authority’s control, it allowed greater space on certain 
matters to the local administrators. Thus, the law has been interpreted in the 
literature as a decentralizing move.307 Although governors continued to be the 
most significant local actors in the republican era, municipalities begun to play 
a more active role, especially in the 1930s.308 The increase in the role the 
municipalities played in the anti-veiling campaigns should be analyzed as part 
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of this general trend and the strengthened position of the municipalities as 
instruments of modernization.  
Until 1930, municipal administration in the new republic was mainly 
based on the Ottoman municipal laws and regulations, which did not constitute 
an effective institutional tradition. Municipalities in the Ottoman Empire were 
weak in terms of both financial capacity and their position vis-à-vis other 
administrative structures, such as the governors or the vakıf system (charitable 
foundations).309 Perhaps the case of Istanbul was a little different, since the 
municipal organization, known as the Şehremaneti (Préfecture) was subject 
to different legislation, and therefore relatively more effective compared to 
others. This legal structure changed over time, with major transformations 
occurring during the Second Constitutional Period. Equally important were 
the changes in practice, namely, in the actual workings of the municipalities 
despite the fact that the legal framework remained intact. As Serçe 
emphasized, based on the case of the Izmir Municipality between 1908 and 
1913, practices that were in fact against or outside the scope of the law could 
become the norm, which had made the legacy of the Ottoman municipal 
administration more complicated than the legal regulations revealed on 
paper.310  
The importance attributed to the municipalities by the new Kemalist 
regime revealed itself initially in a couple of legal regulations enacted in the 
first years of the republic. Tekeli characterizes this period (1923-1930) as a 
preparation period for the restructuring of the municipal administration in the 
1930s, despite the fact that these early attempts remained loose and 
superficial.311 The first regulation, in February 1924, concerned municipal 
taxes, reflecting the aim to make municipalities more active by increasing their 
financial capacities.312 Also in February 1924, the Ankara Şehremaneti 
(Préfecture) was established; it was modeled on the Istanbul Şehremaneti to 
foster the urban development of the new capital. In March 1924, the Village 
Law (Köy Kanunu) was issued; this law was also concerned with reorganizing 
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the municipal administration by clarifying the administrative divisions.313 A 
few other legal regulations in the 1920s increased the capacity of the 
municipalities vis-à-vis other institutions, such as the vakıf administration. 
Introduction of the Civil Code in 1926 was one of these regulations, which 
crystallized the ideal of “modern life” and thus had an important impact on 
the decisions and workings of the municipalities.314       
Perhaps the most crucial change in this period was the law regarding 
the punitive power of the municipalities, Umur-u Belediyeye Müteallik 
Ahkam-ı Cezaiye Kanunu,315 which was issued in April 1924 and supported 
later by the articles regarding the municipal sanctions in the new Criminal 
Law in 1926.316 The law was suggested to the parliament as an urgent need, 
since the decisions of the municipalities were considered ineffective because 
they were unable to issue any sanctions.317 As Tekeli points out, empowering 
the municipalities with the right to impose penal sanctions was one major way 
in which the republican approach to municipal administration was different, 
since the lack of such a capacity was one of the main reasons for the weakness 
of municipalities in the Ottoman Empire.318 The law entitled the municipalities 
to impose fines in cases of non-compliance with the municipal decisions and 
instructions, and to prohibit artisans and merchants from engaging in crafts 
and trade for up to fifteen days. The sanctions of the municipalities were final, 
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and they were also entitled to imprison those who did not pay the fines.319 In 
1927, with an amendment in the law, persons fined by the municipalities were 
given the right of appeal.320 Empowerment of the municipalities with punitive 
power contributed to their role in the anti-veiling campaigns only in the 1930s, 
however, since it was only after the strengthening of the municipal 
administration with a new legal framework in 1930 that municipalities could 
become more active actors at the local level.  
The new Municipal Law was introduced in April 1930.321 The law was 
modeled on the French and German municipal laws322, and aimed at the 
reorganization of the local administrations in line with the aims of the new 
regime regarding social modernization and economic development. As Tekeli 
puts, the Municipal Law of 1930 marked a turning point in terms of the 
approach of the new regime to municipal administration. This understanding 
was particularly shaped by the principle of populism (halkçılık), which 
entailed acting “for the people despite the people” (halka rağmen, halk için); 
municipalities would become the agents that would create a civilized life in 
modern cities, even if this necessitated acting against the will of the people.323 
In other words, for the leaders of the republic, municipalities were not only 
concerned with building infrastructure for urban development; they were also 
promoters and implementers of modern visions of security, order, cleaning, 
culture and identity. This understanding had found its expression in the 
inauguration speech of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk for the legislative year in 
November 1935: 
 
It is one of our primary aims that within the Turkish land, all our cities, 
reaching far to the villages, would become a landscape of prosperity 
and development (bayındırlık). Any place that is home for a Turk will 
be an exemplary place for health, cleanness, beauty and modern culture. 
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323 Tekeli, 2009, p. 51. Tekeli also mentions the Law on the Protection of Public Health (Umumi 





In addition to the state institutions, I want the municipalities, which are 
directly in charge of these tasks, work with this view and thinking.324  
 
It should be mentioned that although the Municipal Law of 1930 
aimed at strengthening the municipalities, it also was a sign of the increasingly 
authoritarian tendencies of the Kemalist regime, determined to centralize the 
bureaucratic apparatus and enhance the control of the central authority. In 
other words, the new law was not designed to expand the autonomy of the 
local administrations with the aim of sharing the political power. Accordingly, 
municipal administration was an extension of the central administration, and 
as such, municipalities would work under the coordination and control of 
Ankara. Because of these characteristics, Gökaçtı, for example, characterizes 
the Municipal Law of 1930 as a reflection of the single-party regime’s turn 
towards statism, and argues that municipalities were seen only as useful 
instruments in the areas of urban development and progress.325 Thus the law 
aimed at both increasing the control and regulative power of the central 
authority over the municipal bodies, and widening the scope of activity and 
financial capacities of these bodies to penetrate and regulate the daily life in 
the cities.  
In addition, standardizing municipal administration all over the 
country was also a concern for the Kemalist regime. As Gökaçtı underscores, 
this standardization was not only secured by the new law, but also by the 
increased control of the central authority over municipalities, which found its 
manifestation in the circulars issued for the municipalities by the Ministry of 
Interior.326 Through these control mechanisms, campaigns organized on 
certain matters could quite easily spread and become standard practice. The 
fact that Ankara was setting the example for the rest of the cities was also a 
factor contributing to the standardization efforts.327 These efforts of course 
rarely guaranteed achieving same results in every city; however, 
municipalities were envisioned as the bridges that linked the aim of achieving 
contemporary level of civilization voiced by the central authority to the aim 
of creating civilized cities at the local level.    
                                                          
324 See T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi, term V, 2nd legislative year, vol. 6, meeting 1, 1 November 
1935. 
325 In this sense, Gökaçtı argues that the republican understanding of municipal administration 
was not very different than the one implied by the Ottoman legacy. See Gökaçtı, 1996, p. 128.  
326 Gökaçtı, 1996, p. 137.  
327 This was particularly visible in urban planning, reorganizing the public space in all cities 
with boulevards, town squares and Atatürk statues by following Ankara as the model of the 




Limited by the laws issued 
by the central authority as well as 
by its tight control, municipalities 
were nevertheless allowed a 
certain degree of freedom of 
action. As it was mentioned in the 
first article of the Municipal Law 
of 1930, they were defined as 
entities in charge of organizing 
and satisfying the common and 
civilized needs of the city and city 
dwellers at the local level. 
Expanding the scope of duties for 
the municipalities was one of the 
aims of the law, since the previous 
law regulating municipal 
administration was considered 
inappropriate for the modernizing 
efforts of the new regime and as an 
obstacle to progress.328 The law 
was quite detailed in specifying 
the duties of the municipalities, but 
it was also inclusive in the sense 
that these duties were framed in 
general terms, such as insuring the 
health, welfare and prosperity of 
the city dwellers. They were 
entitled to prevent anything that 
would harm the order, health and 
peace in the city. The first and 
second items of Article 19, in 
particular, entitled the 
municipalities with the power of 
enforcing measures to achieve 
these aims, as well as issuing 
orders and bans.  
                                                          
328 Tekeli refers to the Minister of Interior’s explanation on why a new municipal law was 
needed. See Tekeli, 2009, p. 60. 
Figure 3.4. A clip from a Bursa newspaper, 
reporting the meeting of the city council. The 
caption reads “At the City Council. The city 
plan and the issues of çarşaf and kafes were 





To enable municipalities to perform these newly assigned duties more 
effectively, the Municipal Law of 1930 also required all municipalities to issue 
a municipal police regulation (zabıta talimatnamesi). The municipal police 
would be responsible for the enforcement of all decisions of the 
municipalities, including the municipal bans and fines. With an additional law 
in May 1930 regulating the punitive powers of municipalities, municipalities 
were entitled to issue warnings (tenbihname) through which the city councils 
could announce the decisions and bans they issued, and the amount of fines 
that would be imposed in case of non-compliance.329 In some of the anti-
veiling campaigns, this law was used as a reference point to support the right 
of the municipalities to issue a ban. In Bergama, for example, a district of the 
province of Izmir, a committee formed by the city council prepared a new 
chapter for the municipal police regulation based on this law in order to 
include the bans on the peçe and the çarşaf in the regulation and the fines to 
be imposed in case of non-compliance.330 As it can be seen in the case of anti-
veiling campaigns, municipal warnings indicate that they were used by 
municipalities as a means to establish a modern urban life.  A warning issued 
by the city council of Ankara, for example, prohibited hanging anything on 
buildings that would look ugly or throwing garbage onto empty lands.331 Some 
of these warnings were shaped by circulars from Ankara. As mentioned 
earlier, these circulars played an important role in standardizing certain acts 
of municipalities. In April 1936, for example, Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya 
sent a circular to all municipalities asking them to take measures to reduce 
street noise.332 
The right to appeal the municipal sanctions, however, was an 
important factor limiting the effective implementation of municipal decisions 
in practice.333 To overcome this limitation, the punitive power of the 
                                                          
329 Tekeli, 2009, p. 87. For the full text of this law, see “Umuru belediyeye müteallik ahkâmı 
cezaiye hakkındaki 16 nisan 1340 tarih ve 486 numaralı kanunun bazı maddelerini muadil 
kanun,” Law no. 1608, 20 May 1930. 
330 Thus, the bans had become part of the municipal police regulation (zabıta talimatnamesi). 
The city council of Bergama also banned kıvrak, a local veil. See “Bergama’da Çarşaf, Peçe ve 
Kıvraklar Kaldırılıyor,” Anadolu, 6 December 1934.   
331 Tekeli, 2009, p. 87. 
332 Tekeli, 2009, p. 88. The ministry had in fact sent similar circulars before, thus the fight 
against street noise had been an issue on the agenda of the municipalities for a while. For 
example, see “Gürültü Mücadelesi,” Son Posta, 28 July 1934; “Gürültü,” Son Posta, 20 July 
1934.     




municipalities was increased further with an amendment in June 1934.334 It 
became mandatory to present a reason for an appeal; appeals not presenting a 
valid justification would not be accepted. In addition, mayors, deputy-mayors 
and department heads in the provinces, and mayors in the district capitals were 
empowered to issue fines (up to five liras in the provinces and three liras in 
the district capitals) when they themselves witnessed an action contrary  to the 
municipal decisions. These sanctions were irrefutable, thus the amendment 
severely limited the right of appeal, especially for fines in relatively low 
amounts. By giving the mayors and other high-level municipal administrators 
the right to impose sanctions, without the need for a written record or an 
approval of the municipal committee (belediye encümeni), the new law 
expanded their power considerably.  Press reports of the new amendment also 
emphasized the increasing power of mayors to impose municipal sanctions.335 
A columnist in a provincial newspaper claimed that with the new regulation, 
it would be easier to ensure that people would perform their duties for the city 
and the public, and municipalities would be able to fulfill their mission of 
satisfying the social and civil needs of the cities much more adequately.336  
Thus, by the mid-1930s, first with the 1930 Municipal Law, and then 
with subsequent laws strengthening their punitive powers, municipalities were 
empowered and provided with the necessary legal framework entitling them 
to issue decisions and apply sanctions that would regulate the behavior of the 
people as part of their aim of creating a “civilized” urban life.337 Municipalities 
intervened in daily conduct through their decisions concerning circumstances 
ranging from spitting in the streets to where to dry the clothes. Anti-veiling 
campaigns initiated by the city councils should be seen as part of the work of 
municipalities. The bans on the peçe and the çarşaf must have been considered 





                                                          
334 See “Umuru belediyeye müteallik ahkâmı cezaiye hakkındaki kanunu muadil 19-V-1930 
tarih ve 1608 sayılı kanunun bazı maddelerini değiştiren ve yeniden madde ekleyen kanun,” 
Law no. 2575, 15 July 1934. 
335 For example, see “Belediye Cezası,” Son Posta, 8 August 1934.   
336 Rıza Atilâ, “Belediye Cezaları,” Yeni Mersin, 23 June 1934.   
337 As Tekeli mentions, in promoting “civilized” life, municipalities and People’s Houses 
mostly acted in coordination; People’s Houses were the places of embodiment for the modern 
and civilized life style that municipalities were trying to create through their decisions. Tekeli, 





Anti-veiling campaigns of the 1930s can be analyzed in their entirety only in 
relation to the consolidation of the Kemalist regime as an authoritarian single-
party regime from 1931 onwards. With the severe impact of the Great 
Depression, Turkey turned towards statist economic policies. The principle of 
statism, however, marked the policies of the 1930s in all spheres and brought 
along a repressive atmosphere where the state not only suppressed all elements 
of opposition or expressions of social discontent, but also tried to transform 
the society through a radical project of cultural modernization. By initiating 
reforms that touched the daily manners of ordinary people and by institutions 
like the People’s Houses, the Turkish state increased its penetration in all 
domains of social life.      
In terms of the historical debates on women’s rights and social role in 
Turkey, the anti-veiling campaigns can be seen as a chapter in women’s 
emancipation as it was envisioned, propagated and put into practice by the 
Kemalist regime. The 1930s witnessed acceleration on the emphasis on 
women’s participation in public life as modern citizens, their political 
mobilization, and on their significance as the visual representatives of the 
progress of Turkish society. Removal of the peçe and the çarşaf, stigmatized 
as backward and uncivilized attire alien to Turkish national culture, came to 
be perceived as an indispensable part of women’s civilized status, and 
therefore, a sine qua non for the image of the new republic as a modern and 
civilized (read Western) regime. 
 The main wave of the anti-veiling campaigns began in 1934, a year 
that was characterized by the intensity of reforms initiated. Especially 
significant in terms of understanding the timing of the anti-veiling campaigns 
was women’s gaining of their political rights in December 1934. Right after 
this reform, the anti-veiling campaigns increased in number and spread rapidly 
all over the country as part of a national propaganda for women’s 
modernization and greater political roles. A large number of these campaigns 
resulted in the issuing of outright bans. The content of these bans varied in 
different cities, however, depending on the local dynamics as well as the 
composition of the actors involved. 
 A great majority of these bans on the peçe and the çarşaf were issued 
by the municipal councils. Municipalities were equipped with the necessary 
legal provisions by the Municipal Law of 1930 and following regulations to 
act as the agents of modernization at the local level. The existence of this legal 




municipalities in issuing a decision in a certain matter. In other words, the 
issuing of the municipal decisions and regulations concerning the behavior 
and daily conduct of people, albeit made easier with an authoritarian single-
party regime in power, was very much depended on the intentions of the 
municipal administrators, from mayors to the members of the city councils. In 
fact, the process leading towards the municipal decisions like the bans on the 
peçe and the çarşaf often involved administrators, groups and actors going 
beyond the boundaries of the municipal organization. Governors, 
administrators and members of the local party branches, People’s Houses, and 
local sports clubs and associations could all play a role in initiating and 
shaping these campaigns. The implementation of the bans was an even more 
complicated story, determined by the support as well as opposition coming 
from various local actors. Thus, one has to look at the local level to understand 
how the anti-veiling campaigns worked in practice, particularly to the role of 
the local elites and the interplay between the initiatives of the local actors and 

































“The reports of the inspectors who examined the local 
party branches were reviewed by the General 
Administrative Committee. The most striking point in 
the inspecting reports is the negligence and 
indifference shown by the local party administrators in 
fulfilling some of the duties that they are obliged to do 
according to the party regulations; duties that could 




I. Defining the Local Elite in the Turkish Context  
Despite the fact that Turkish modernization under the Kemalist regime has 
attracted an enormous attention in social sciences and is frequently used to 
analyze modernization, social development and authoritarian regimes since 
the 1950s, the question of how this regime was working in practice, not only 
through the visible high politics of Ankara but in the provinces, has been left 
largely unanswered. In classical analyses of the early republican era, Turkey 
is classified as an “exclusionary single-party regime,” which builds its power 
on the already existing divisions in the society and uses the party organization 
to mobilize its political base.339 In the Turkish case, this division was the 
division between the Westernized and educated urban classes, on the one 
hand, and traditional peasant masses, on the other. The RPP had built its power 
base mainly on the former while trying to “educate” the latter rather than 
mobilizing them for political participation. Atatürk’s own speeches, 
                                                          
338 A party circular to the local branches, 1936. See Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Genel 
Sekreterliğinin Parti Örgütüne Genelgesi, 1 İkincikanun 1936’dan 10 Haziran 1936 Tarihine 
Kadar, vol.8, Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1936, p. 13; see also PMRA 490.1 / 3.12.30, quoted in 
Murat Turan, CHP’nin Doğu’da Teşkilatlanması, Istanbul: Libra, 2011, p. 188. 
339 For example, see relevant chapters in Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The 
Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore 
(eds.), New York: Basic Books, 1970. See also Frederick W. Frey, “Political Development, 
Power and Communications in Turkey,” in Communications and Political Development, 




characterizing the party as “a school for the education of the common people” 
were seen as a basis of this.340 The fact that the RPP was dependent on the 
dominant classes, despite its populist rhetoric, has frequently been mentioned 
to point to the anti-democratic and elitist nature of the early republican 
regime.341 Some scholars have characterized early Kemalist Turkey as a 
“tutelary” system, which built itself on the main cleavage in the society. 
Initially, it had limited political participation, but did not aim to exclude the 
subordinated groups forever; as the country modernizes, the system would 
supposedly move into a more democratic one.342 
 One of the main shortcomings of such analyses was the neglect of the 
local as an important dimension of social and political change in the early 
republican period. In other words, the local, which has been usually referred 
as the “periphery,” was associated with the masses, with the peasantry, with 
the “traditional” sectors of the society, and thus as passive and comparatively 
less significant part of the analysis. In this line of thinking, the local had 
become a significant factor in Turkish politics, mainly with the transition to 
multi-party system in 1946. Although there is a point in this argument since 
elections did make the participation of the citizens in politics possible through 
direct voting, and thus the beginning of competitive politics was a major 
breakthrough, it would be misleading to argue that the local was ineffective 
and insignificant before the introduction of the multi-party system. In 
addition, as it was discussed in the introduction, the idea that authoritarian 
single-party regimes should be analyzed first and foremost by looking at the 
central politics has been rightly criticized based on new theoretical and 
empirical research on state and state-society relations. 
 The neglect of the local is particularly visible in the lack of analyses 
in the literature on the local elites. Where the political elite in Turkey are 
concerned, the emphasis is almost exclusively on the elite in the “center,” on 
                                                          
340 See Sabri Sayarı, “Some Notes on the Beginning of Mass Political Participation in Turkey,” 
in Political Participation in Turkey, Engin D. Akarlı (ed.), Istanbul: Boğaziçi University 
Publications, 1975, pp. 121-133. 
341 See, for example, Tunçay, 1992. 
342 See, for example, Ergun Özbudun, “The nature of the Kemalist Political Regime,” in 
Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State, Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (eds.), London: 
Hurst&Company, 1997[1981], pp. 79-102. Duverger’s classical analysis of single-party 
systems and particularly his discussion on the difference of the Turkish case from the fascist 
and communist single-party regimes have been quite influential in the literature on Turkey and 
used as a reference point in characterizing the Kemalist regime as a tutelary regime, ultimately 
aiming to establish a democratic system. See Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, London: 




the members of the high politics and bureaucracy in Ankara. In his classical 
work, The Turkish Political Elite, Frederick W. Frey, for example, focuses on 
the profile of the members of the parliament between 1920 and 1957.343 Frey 
explains this focus by referring to the focal position of the parliament; because 
there was a high degree of governmental integration in Turkey, “when one 
examines the social backgrounds of the deputies to the Grand National 
Assembly, one obtains, ipso facto, information on the backgrounds of all the 
cabinets and ministers, on the formal leadership of the Assembly, and on the 
top political party leaders as well.”344 In other words, these elite were the key 
to understanding Turkish politics; the impact of the local could be felt through 
its influence upon the deputies, conceptualized as “localism” by Frey.345 He 
acknowledges that these local pressures upon the deputies were present even 
during the single-party era, but he does not discuss in any detail how these 
pressures were working or what were the role of the local actors in this period. 
His analysis of localism is content with touching the increase in the impact of 
the local actors with the transition to multi-party era: “the opening up of the 
tutelary developmental system and the inauguration of a Western, multi-party 
parliamentary structure emphatically increased the representation of local 
forces, that is, of local elites.”346 
In a recent study, Ahmet Demirel revives Frey’s analyses and 
provides a more detailed profile of the members of the parliament during the 
single-party era based on new sources.347 Since Demirel’s focus is also on the 
central elite and the elections, the local is included to the degree that it could 
have an influence on the parliament, which is again measured by localism. He 
indicates that localism decreases from the second parliament (1923-1927) to 
the third (1927-1931), from 61.6 % to 47.4%, which signifies a weaker link 
                                                          
343 Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965. 
344 Ibid., p. 6. For Frey, one fundamental distinction through which the elite were defined was 
education. Among the educated class, the Western-educated modernists defeated the medrese-
trained faction; Kemalist reforms had aimed at ensuring this. See ibid., p. 38-41. Second to 
education was occupation.   
345 Localism was measured by looking at the ties of the deputies with the province they 
represented. In fact, for the period Frey studies (1920-1957), the overall degree of localism 
seems to be limited, since only 58% of the deputies were born in a province they represented. 
This percentage was higher for those members of the parliament who were involved with 
occupations like agriculture and trade. See ibid., p. 93-94.  
346 Ibid., p. 397. 
347 Ahmet Demirel, Tek Partinin İktidarı: Türkiye’de Seçimler ve Siyaset (1923-1946), Istanbul: 




between the parliament and the local.348 As a very minor incorporation of the 
local, Demirel also mentions an attempt by the regime leadership to 
symbolically include the sectors of the society who were not part of the 
political elite, and by doing so, to limit the increasing tendency in the 
parliament towards bureaucratization. For instance, in the 1931 elections, the 
RPP decided to nominate “ordinary” workers and peasants for membership in 
the parliament and 13 peasants and 10 workers were elected.349 
Although Frey’s work provided a significant first contribution and has 
been frequently cited, this tendency of focusing exclusively on the political 
elite in the capital has become dominant in the literature at the expense of 
overlooking the role of local actors and dynamics in the implementation and 
interpretation of the policies formulated by the “central elite” in Ankara. The 
reason behind this special focus on the central elite has been the state-centric 
framework shared by the main approaches to Turkish history and politics, as 
briefly touched in the introduction. Since the 1950s, the emphasis of the 
modernization theory on the bureaucracy and elite as the agents of social 
change has shaped the major studies on Turkey and left an important footprint 
for the subsequent analyses despite the critiques the theory received.350 In 
works that followed the strong state approach, the central elites are 
characterized as an undifferentiated group who perceive the state as vital for 
holding the community together, while being intolerant and suspicious 
towards the periphery.351 According to this approach, the dichotomy of 
“strong state vs. weak civil society” has shaped the Ottoman/Turkish polity 
and the bureaucratic elite achieved almost an unchallenged power under the 
Kemalist republic.352 In some formulations of this reading, not only that the 
state emerges as a concept that is above any other actor or notion in the 
political culture, but also that this “Ottoman/Turkish state” is seen as unique 
among its contemporaries in many aspects.353 
                                                          
348 In the fourth parliament (1931-1935), the percentage of deputies who represented their 
province of birth was 48.9; and in the fifth (1935-1939), it was 33.6. See ibid., p. 149; 203.  
349 It is important to mention that these candidates were determined through a very careful 
examination. The workers and peasants that would be nominated had to be nationalist and loyal 
to the principles of the regime; they should not be conservative and should be against any form 
of opposition. These deputies were supposed to maintain their original occupation, their links 
with their hometown and their “authentic” attire. See ibid., p. 117-122.  
350 For example, see Lerner, 1958; Lewis, 1961, and Berkes, 1998.     
351 See Heper, 1985. 
352 See particularly chapter 4 in Heper’s book on the development of bureaucratic 
transcendentalism. Ibid., pp. 67-97.   
353 For example, Ben-Dor and Akarlı argue that “the concept of state has been kept separate 




Perhaps the most hegemonic approach in Turkish studies in the last 
forty years, the center-periphery approach, which was first formulated by Şerif 
Mardin, follows a similar line of analysis with the strong state approach in 
terms of the emphasis on the center-periphery cleavage as the main cleavage 
and the confrontation between the state elite and the society.354 However, it is 
not state-centric in the sense that it incorporates the cultural and social 
dynamics into the analysis and attributes relatively more power and autonomy 
to the periphery, to the people excluded by the state ideology, to societal 
actors.355 According to this approach, the Ottoman tımar system and the 
control of the bureaucratic core of the state over the economy and society were 
the basis of the centralized order “designed to maintain the state’s authority 
over the nodal points of society.”356 The challenge to this centralized order 
had come from the periphery, from the provincial notables in the late Ottoman 
period. The center-periphery axis then merged with another source of social 
conflict with the beginning of the modernization efforts in late 18th century. 
This new conflict resulted in an intra-elite conflict at the beginning, dividing 
                                                          
Turkish history. This seems to have been true on various levels: in an explicit form among elites 
and intellectuals, and in a more incoherent, implicit form among the masses. Yet the image of 
State as a benevolent father, distinct from the elite, government or the community (as an ethnic-
religious-particularistic entity) seems distinctly Turkish and cannot be found in this form 
elsewhere in the Islamic Middle East.” See Gabriel Ben-Dor and Engin D. Akarlı, 
“Comparative Perspectives,” in Political Participation in Turkey, Engin D. Akarlı (ed.), 
Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975, pp. 157-162.  
354 See Mardin, 1973. 
355 Brockett argues that Mardin’s analysis has been an exception to the state-centric analyses 
and he “has consistently offered a multi-faceted challenge to the assumptions underlying the 
Kemalist narrative of top-down social transformation and secularization.” Although he is right 
in differentiating Mardin’s works as they are more sociologically oriented and Mardin himself 
suggested to focus more on the local, I doubt that the center-periphery analysis “stands out as 
an essential foundation for the emerging social history” of Turkey, as Brockett suggests. I 
follow the critiques of the center-periphery approach that I cited in the introduction. For 
Brockett’s comments on Mardin, see Gavin Brockett, “Introduction: Social History and the 
Historiography of Modern Turkey,” in Towards a Social History of Modern Turkey: Essays in 
Theory and Practice, Gavin D. Brockett (ed.), Istanbul: Libra, 2011, pp. 13-37. For Mardin’s 
comments on the importance of the local, see Şerif Mardin, “Projects as Methodology: Some 
Thoughts on Modern Turkish Social Science,” in Rethinking Modernity and National Identity 
in Turkey, Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (eds.), Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1997, pp. 64-80.      
356 Mardin, 1973, p. 172. There is a vast literature on the Ottoman tımar system, particularly 
dealing with the question of whether the Ottoman system was feudalism or not. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to discuss this literature. Suffice it to mention that the strong state and center-
periphery analyses that dominate the literature on Turkey argue that the Ottoman system was 
different and not feudal in the Western European sense. This system, it was argued, was 
efficient, however, in maintaining political stability in the Ottoman/Turkish context since it was 




the elite in the center into pro-Western and traditionalist/Islamist camps. As 
the modernist faction strengthened and dominated the state, Islam had become 
the element of the culture of the periphery and thus the center-periphery 
cleavage came to coincide with the pro-Western vs. traditionalist/Islamist 
divide; this cultural alienation of the masses from the rulers, of the periphery 
from the center, is a key component in the center-periphery analysis.357 
For those who followed this line of analysis, these divisions and 
tensions between the center and the periphery continued to characterize the 
social and political structure in republican Turkey. To overcome this 
challenge, one strategy of the state was to make some concessions to the 
notables to “facilitate the expression of their interest” and thus to acknowledge 
“the right of notables to participate in the single-party politics.”358 In fact, 
works that note the importance of the local by devoting a few paragraphs to 
explaining the social base of the Kemalist regime have largely emphasized the 
role of the local notables and their alliance with the central authority. 
Particularly the party, the RPP, has been described as “having born out of an 
alliance between the central military-bureaucratic-intellectual élite and local 
notables.”359 This was especially so for the formative years of the party, owing 
to the heterogeneous origins of the national movement during the War of 
Liberation. However, Özbudun suggests that this alliance continued 
throughout the single-party era despite the predominance of the “state 
bourgeoisie” and that “local notables also wielded considerable influence 
particularly at the local level.”360 Although the relationships between the state 
                                                          
357 Mardin, 1973, p. 175. See also Ergun Özbudun, Türkiye’de Sosyal Değişme ve Siyasal 
Katılma, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları, 1975, pp. 19-46. 
Emphasizing the continuation of this cultural alienation during the republican era, Özbudun 
argues that those elites who have been in opposition to modernist and secularist elite in the 
multi-party period and competed with them for power have found the Islamist periphery as a 
powerful source of votes. In other words, two oppositions were combined: the masses in the 
periphery and elites in opposition in the center, despite the fact that these oppositional elites 
(i.e., the leadership of the Democrat Party in the 1950s) were more similar to the central elite 
in terms of social and economic background. Ibid., p. 29.   
358 Engin Deniz Akarlı, “The State as a Socio-Cultural Phenomenon and Political Participation 
in Turkey,” in Political Participation in Turkey, Engin D. Akarlı (ed.), Istanbul: Boğaziçi 
University Publications, 1975, pp. 135-155.  Akarlı sees the Municipal Law of 1930 as one of 
these concessions given to the local notables. He also claims, mainly by following Mardin’s 
analyses, “that the notables were more or less effectively incorporated in the system by the 
1930s.” 
359 Özbudun, 1997, p. 82.  
360 Ibid., p. 84. Accordingly, there was an “implicit trade-off” between the center and the local 
notables. Özbudun argues that the strengthening of the center did not in fact decrease the 




and the local notables were far more complex,361 this complexity was ignored 
at the expense of emphasizing the determining role of the central policies. 
These analyses are also based on the assumption that as long as this alliance 
with the local notables was intact, there was no problem for the regime to 
apply its policies and keep its support. More importantly, such analyses reduce 
the local to the “local notables” to whom, they argue, other local agents were 
dependent, and thus, both the multiplicity of local actors and the complexity 
of local politics have been neglected.             
This deficiency has recently begun to be filled by an increasing 
number of studies that focus on the relationship between the central authority, 
the local elites and the societal forces in the shaping of state policies at the 
local level. This increasing interest in the study of the local has become 
particularly visible in the analysis of the connection between state formation, 
nationalism and political violence especially during the late Ottoman Empire 
and transition to the Turkish republic. In Sorrowful Shores, Gingeras, for 
example, points to the need to analyze the role of the central authority not as 
an exclusive force in these processes, but as one operating within the 
complexities of local society through the case of the South Marmara region 
between the Balkan Wars and the establishment of the Turkish republic in 
1923.362 Gingeras argues that even after the establishment of the Kemalist 
regime, there were limitations to Ankara’s control of the provinces and “local 
officials and provincial populations continued to resist or negotiate the rules 
laid down by the center.”363 This was one important factor contributing to the 
contradictory and ambiguous policies of Ankara towards Albanians and 
Circassians that remained in the region. In a more recent study, Üngör focuses 
on the population policies and nationalist homogenization in Eastern Turkey 
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361 For a good analysis of this complexity, see Meeker, 2002. For a discussion on the 
relationship between the state and the Kurdish notables, see Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, 
Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, London: Zed Books, 1992. 
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between 1913 and 1950, and provides a detailed account of these processes in 
their local context.364 Üngör’s analysis also reveals that the local elites played 
a critical role in the interpretation and organization of the central orders, and 
thus their behavior was determinant for the fate of Armenians who were 
subject to genocidal destruction. Though he does not deal with the question of 
local elites in detail, his discussion of the Kurdish deportations between 1916 
and 1934 also reveals that they had a significant role in the continuation of the 
social engineering policies in the region from the empire to the republic, since, 
like the continuity at the level of organizers of these policies, “the local elites 
too remained largely intact.”365 In his analysis of the education policies in the 
Kurdish region of Turkey, Üngör also mentions that the local elite were not 
simply implementers of the central policies; “they often take the initiative to 
propose suggestions.”366 
Perhaps the most inspiring and informative study for the purpose of 
this thesis is Michael E. Meeker’s analysis of the Ottoman legacy of the 
Turkish republic based on his ethnographical study of the Eastern Black Sea 
region, more precisely in the town of Of in the province of Trabzon. Meeker 
particularly focuses on the striking survival of the local social structures under 
the new regime, which have continued functioning as formative blocks of the 
state apparatus in the provinces. In Meeker’s analysis, the local elite networks, 
a complex of non-official elites that were prominent in the imperial system, 
have played an important role in this continuation; thus the founders of the 
Turkish republic “were able to rely on an already existing state society” and 
could support the official provincial administration with non-official social 
oligarchies. “As they did so, the new national regime came to exhibit a 
combination of institutional flexibility and rigidity, not wholly unlike what 
had previously characterized the old imperial regime.”367 Meeker shows how 
the central state could function by entering into alliances with the local elite 
both in the imperial system and during the republic. He, at the same time, 
acknowledges that the local elite could oppose the official policies 
strengthening centralized government, and “when such policies were 
nonetheless adopted, local elites proved adept at repenetrating and 
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recolonizing the new state system.”368 Thus, the local elites could 
accommodate themselves to the transformed state system even after radical 
revolutionary changes, such as the Kemalist reforms of the early republic.      
While discussing the local elite, Meeker’s focus, however, is mainly 
on the regional social oligarchy, represented by the influential local families. 
On the one hand, he mentions that these local actors always played a role in 
provincial administration and public life at the local level. The new regime 
allowed a certain degree of popular participation in governmental and non-
governmental organizations, aimed the incorporation of the native local actors 
in the new system and the state officials relied on the local elite. In his own 
words:  
 
Leading individuals from large family groupings had once again 
become intermediaries between state officials and the local population 
by the later 1940s. This had come about as state officials of the Kemalist 
period followed a governmental practice of the imperial period, turning 
to leading individuals from large groupings for assistance even though 
this contradicted nationalist ideology and institutions. As a 
consequence, an imperial state society at the local level had gradually 
but efficiently reoriented itself to become a national state society at the 
local level. Leading individuals from large family groupings, the 
descendants of aghas from agha-families, now appeared as nationalist 
rather than ottomanist in behavior, speech, and dress.369 
 
On the other hand, Meeker seems to separate the local elite from state 
officials and administration.370 As the quotation reflects, he argues that these 
local elites came to dominate the public sphere during the later decades of the 
Turkish republic, once the centralized and radical policies of the early decades 
were over.371 This is why he talks about local elites repenetrating, recolonizing 
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or reinhabiting the new state system after the “revolutionary” change.372 He 
argues that while their legitimacy was undermined for a brief period during 
the heyday of the Kemalist revolution, the regional social oligarchy revives 
itself following the transition to multi-party politics in the late 1940s.373 Thus, 
despite the fact that he acknowledges and portrays the complexities of local 
dynamics well, Meeker nevertheless focuses on the influential local families 
and tends to use a more narrow definition of the local elite.   
 Other scholars have drawn attention to the significance of “mid-level 
elites” or “mid-level professionals” in order to understand how the Kemalist 
ideology was translated into policies and how they were implemented. 
Chidress, for example, suggests that these mid-level elites were the products 
of state policies, but they were also their producers. Her research on the 
members of the Talim ve Terbiye Heyeti (Council of Educational Policy), a 
committee providing assistance to the Ministry of Education, reveals that their 
role was essential, since they designed, implemented and mediated the 
Kemalist experience.374 Although such analyses are crucial to seeing that the 
“Kemalist elite” in Ankara was not monolithic, but multi-leveled and diverse 
in their vision, the focus is nevertheless exclusively on the educated elite, since 
the concept of mid-level elite is defined mainly based on people’s education 
and subsequent career paths. Even in works that also follow these elites in 
practice in the provinces, this focus on the educated segments, the doctors, 
teachers, journalists etc., does not change.375 In other words, the local elites in 
this usage are again limited, this time to civil servants and professionals.         
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In his study of People’s Houses, Lamprou uses the concept of local 
elite in a broader manner.376 He focuses on the Kayseri and Balıkesir People’s 
Houses and looks at these institutions as places where various local actors 
meet, compete, negotiate and domesticate the policies imposed by the 
center.377 Lamprou’s analysis of the local power networks points to a more 
diverse group of local elites composed of both native and non-native people. 
He underlines that in the province centers, these “urban elite” were the people 
who staff all significant political, financial and social institutions. As he 
suggests, “local elites, local bureaucrats, but mainly members of the eşraf 
families [merchants and landowners] occupy the local party leadership, the 
Municipal and Provincial assemblies, the financial and cultural/social 
institutions of the region (Chambers of Commerce and Industry, City Clubs, 
various associations)” and they were the “middle men between the state and 
the rest of the local population.”378 In the case of Balıkesir and Kayseri, for 
example, the local party administrators were largely from the commercial and 
artisanal segments of the local society. Thus, the differentiation between the 
natives and the outsiders (appointed state officials), albeit important in many 
instances,379 does not necessarily need to be rigid; these institutions, as 
Lamprou shows in detail in the case of People’s Houses, could easily turn into 
a battlefield of power struggle between different local eşraf families or among 
the appointed state officials themselves.380 
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This study follows a similar line of analysis and suggests that the local 
elite have to be analyzed by a more inclusive approach. As it has been 
discussed above, it is not easy to refer to any concise definition of the concept 
of local elite in the existing literature, since it has been overwhelmingly 
dominated by the analysis of the central elites and macro level power relations. 
However, it is crucial to unpack the concept here and explain the working 
definition used in this study in order to underline more precisely the focus of 
analysis. I define the concept of local elite as a cluster of actors which is 
composed of members of the state and party administration at the provincial 
level, as well as local notables and the prominent members of all local 
institutions, from the People’s Houses to the sport clubs, professional 
organizations, associations, and the local opinion leaders and leading 
contributors to the local newspapers. Tekeli suggests that there was an 
interesting division of labor among the institutions at the local level in the 
single-party era, and that the urban life and the Kemalist policies of the 1930s 
and 1940s could only be understood by simultaneously analyzing these 
institutions and their members that were clustered around the party branch and 
the municipality in each province.381 I argue that this institutional diversity, as 
well as the diversity among the members of a single institution allowed for 
competition, conflict and negotiation, regardless of the strength of the 
ideological unity expected of them by the regime center. Some of the people 
who occupied these local institutions were appointed officials; but there were 
a considerable number of people in every city who were locals and were part 
of this local elite cluster. Simply put, they were the people, including both men 
and women, who formed the educated and/or high-status groups at the local 
level, assumed to be or characterized/represented as the “enlightened” 
segments of the population. This cluster of local elites coincides with a 
network of power relations at the local level. It is very important to emphasize  
that they were far from being homogeneous politically; the umbrella of being 
a “republican” or “supporter of the regime” that was supposed to cover these 
people was in fact wider than it is usually supposed in the literature on the 
single-party era. The shape that regime ideals would take in practice at the 
local level was as much a product of the conflicts and negotiations within these 
local elites as they were of the central policies. Before elaborating further on 
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this argument through discussing in detail the critical role the local elites 
played in the case of the anti-veiling campaigns of the 1930s, it is necessary 
to outline the position of the central authority on the matter of unveiling. 
 
 
II. Between Hesitation and Intervention: Ankara on the Anti-Veiling 
Campaigns  
The major character of the anti-veiling campaigns in the 1930s, as it could be 
followed from the newspapers of the time, was that they were “local.” It was 
obvious and publicly known that the regime leadership in Ankara favored 
“modern” clothing for both men and women in accordance with the 
modernization brought along by the new republic, but it was not clear whether 
the state –the president, the government, the party center, or the parliament- 
would do something concrete about the remaining of the “traditional” veils of 
women as their main outdoor wear, especially in the provinces. The news 
about the banning of the peçe and the çarşaf in some cities appeared as if they 
were of local origin, stemming from the vanguard role of provincial 
administrators as well as from the mobilization of local people to celebrate 
women’s increasing social status, their political rights and the modernization 
of the country in general. The fact that news of anti-veiling campaigns coming 
from the provinces were celebrated in the national newspapers that were 
almost semi-official publications of the ruling party was a sign of the support 
of the center for these attempts.382 However, on the surface at least, there was 
no indication of the direct involvement of the government, or a trace of central 
action by the party administration.  
Given the character of the Kemalist regime and the authoritarian 
single-party system it had established, it seems logical to assume at the first 
instance that such important interventions in people’s daily practices would 
not/could not be possible without the involvement of the central 
administration. In fact, if we follow the hegemonic state-centric 
interpretations of the current literature, or the center-periphery analysis 
emphasizing a coherent, monolithic center, one would expect that anti-veiling 
campaigns began with an order from Ankara. The aim of this section is to 
discuss the degree to which these assumptions are correct. Based on the 
available sources, it will be shown that Ankara was indeed involved in the 
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process, but the character of this involvement was far more complicated than 
dominant approaches to the Kemalist state would suggest; the way the central 
government and the party tried to control and coordinate the anti-veiling 
campaigns was more complex than sending well-formulated, consistent and 
concrete orders to the provincial administrators. It will be argued that the 
central administration, especially the Ministry of Interior and the RPP general 
secretariat, encouraged these local attempts to “modernize” women’s 
clothing, but the parameters and content of this modernization were not 
certain. On the one hand, the peçe and the çarşaf were stigmatized, very 
clearly, as backward and unwanted in official communiqués signed by some 
very high-ranking administrators; on the other hand, Ankara was quite 
cautious about intervening in women’s veiling. This ambiguity on the side of 
Ankara was reflected in its communication with the provincial administrators 
and party branches; thus its involvement in the process was at times 
ambivalent, sometimes even inconsistent. However, it also did not hesitate to 
intervene in the course of the campaigns more actively on certain occasions, 
especially when some local administrators acted over-zealously or 
indifferently, as well as in case of opposition and resistance in certain cities. 
The first document indicating the Kemalist regime’s involvement is a 
circular of the Ministry of Interior on 11August 1934. In this circular, the 
ministry informed the provinces that the issue of the peçe, the çarşaf and the 
peştamal should not be handled through decisions and orders, and in this 
important and sensitive matter, the targeted goals  should be achieved through 
encouragement (teşvik), inculcation (telkin) and propaganda.383 This circular 
shows that as early as mid-1934, Ankara had felt the necessity to advise the 
provinces that the issue of unveiling was an important but sensitive issue, and 
they should abstain from making  decisions and issuing orders on this matter. 
It also reveals that there were already locally initiated attempts or plans 
concerning the removal of, or at least decreasing/discouraging, the use of the 
peçe, the çarşaf, and the peştamal; the circular of the ministry was probably 
                                                          
383 I have not seen the original circular of the ministry, but its existence and content is mentioned 
in another circular sent by the ministry to the governor of Ordu. See Copy of the letter of the 
Minister of Interior to the Province of Ordu dated 14.5.1937, TNPA 13216-7/1, 18 June 1937. 
In one letter sent by the governor of Çanakkale, the governor mentions a circular sent by Ankara 
dated 17/2/1934. If this is true, then there should be a circular that was sent by the Ministry of 
Interior to the provinces even earlier than the one mentioned above. I have not encountered a 
document dated 17/2/1934. It is also possible that the date was written as 17/2/1934 by mistake 
in the letter of the governor of Çanakkale and it should refer to the circular of the ministry dated 
17/12/1934. For the letter of the governor, see, From the governor of Çanakkale to the Ministry 




aimed at controlling these attempts and keeping them within certain limits. 
Indeed, as early as August 1933, for example, the newly appointed district 
governor of Safranbolu, then a district of the province of Zonguldak, had 
banned the use of the çarşaf in the district capital.384 In Giresun, in April 1934, 
the removal of the peçe in the city was proposed to the city council by a 
council member, doctor Nabi Bey, and the council had unanimously accepted 
this proposal and had given the necessary authority to the mayor to announce 
it as a municipal ban.385 Although without an outright ban, it seems that an 
anti-veiling campaign had already begun during the years 1933 and 1934 in 
some other cities as well. Newspaper reports mention the removal of the peçe 
or the çarşaf by women themselves in Bursa and Kütahya, for example, but 
without specifying the source of the initiative or actors involved in the 
campaigns.386 
It seems that this first circular of the ministry could not achieve its aim 
since the Minister of Interior had to send another directive to all provincial 
governors and general inspectors on 17 December 1934, immediately after the 
enactment of the law granting women their political rights.387 As it will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section, this directive was in fact motivated 
by a letter received by the ministry from the deputy governor of Antalya, 
asking the opinion of the center on the issue of the use of the peçe and the 
çarşaf. It seems that the ministry considered it important to issue a general 
directive and thus inform all governors and general inspectors about the issue, 
instead of only replying the deputy governor’s letter.  
The directive of the ministry begins by mentioning that “it has been 
understood from communication” that there have been attempts to take 
various measures in some places to prevent women going out with the peçe 
and the çarşaf, and in some cities, the idea of using the municipal police 
(zabıta) force for this purpose has been considered by some local 
administrators. This opening sentence implies that in addition to the letter of 
the deputy governor of Antalya, there were probably other local administrators 
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consulting the ministry and asking the opinion of the center about taking a 
more forceful plan of action on the issue of unveiling. Having mentioned the 
existence of such initiatives without indicating any particular city, the 
directive of the minister continues by inviting the local administrators to be 
responsible and moderate in dealing with this issue. Seeming content with 
compliance of women with the modernization efforts in general and concerned 
that intervention in women’s veiling could cause reactions, the interior 
minister indicates that the governors have to focus on propaganda activities 
and steer clear of taking extreme measures related to the reforms: 
 
At a time when our women are in fact abiding by the requirements of 
our revolution, it is necessary to avoid carrying this issue too far by 
taking some measures that might cause undesirable reactions. The 
requirements of the revolution should not be enforced by municipal 
police force, but they should be got accepted through well-administered 
inculcation. Therefore, it would be suitable to be content with 
propaganda in the peçe and çarşaf issue as well.388 
 
In addition to demonstrating that some anti-veiling campaigns did 
begin as local initiatives, these circulars of the minister of interior are also 
crucial in clarifying the initial position of the regime on the question of 
unveiling. It shows that the regime favored a moderate and gradual 
transformation, with the aim of avoiding “undesirable reactions” on this 
sensitive issue. On the other hand, the directive quoted above can also be read 
as an invitation for the local administrators to promote propaganda for 
unveiling, and thus clearly indicates the involvement, or at least the 
encouragement, of the center regarding the anti-veiling campaigns. It also 
demonstrates, however, the will of the central authority to limit the tendency 
of some local administrators to be more radical in interpreting the regime 
ideals and putting them into practice. Thus, it points to an ambiguous attitude 
on the side of Ankara and reflects potential disagreements regarding how to 
struggle against the peçe and the çarşaf and how to promote “modern” 
clothing instead. 
These disagreements became visible at the 4th General Congress of the 
RPP in May 1935. The idea of issuing a law banning the peçe and the çarşaf 
country-wide was suggested to the congress by the delegates of the provinces 





of Muğla and Sivas, triggering a debate on the proper form of action.389 The 
commission that prepared a report on the suggestion took a negative position, 
maintaining that in the villages, where two-thirds of the population lived, the 
peçe and the çarşaf were not used, and in cities, where the rest of the 
population resided, these veils had been gradually removed without any 
legislation being needed. The veils, the commission claimed, had survived 
here and there only because of women’s respect for their fathers and husbands. 
The question was then whether it was necessary to take a measure on this 
issue; whether this “rotten fruit had to be tore off the branch” by an attempt 
by the center. Some members of the commission supported the idea that the 
government should intervene at least to eliminate the peçe by adding an article 
to the Police Law; this was necessary to achieve the targeted change faster.390 
In the end, however, the commission unanimously decided that there was no 
need for legislation, and the progress in this issue should be achieved by a 
“shortcut action” of the party and party-government institutions (parti ve parti 
hükümeti kurumlarının kestirme bir hareketiyle). The Minister of Interior, 
Şükrü Kaya, also supported the report of the commission and argued that the 
“woman revolution” had been viewed as one of the most fundamental 
principles of the Turkish revolution and thus was followed closely by the 
government. Approval of the suggestion of the commission on this issue by 
the general congress would be convenient for the government and it would be 
considered as an important directive. Having discussed the report of the 
commission, the general congress too rejected the idea of resorting to general 
legislation on unveiling, only, however, at the end of an intense debate. 
One of the delegates, Hakkı Tarık Us, a well-known journalist, author 
and a deputy of the province of Giresun, agreed that the peçe and the çarşaf 
issue should be the issue of the government and the party, but suggested that 
it should also be reconsidered in the light of the principles mentioned in the 
new party program accepted two days earlier by the general congress. Here, 
Us was referring to the “revolutionary” spirit of the party program. He added 
that the parliament had already issued legislation that equipped the Ministry 
of Health to organize Health Commissions in the provinces, which were 
empowered to remove the kafes. The question for Us was then why legislation 
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to ban the peçe was seen as unnecessary while there was a legal basis to 
remove the kafes. The çarşaf was a different matter, according to him, one 
that had economic aspects and perhaps involved fashion-related concerns of 
women. Us also claimed the necessity of exacting legislation by pointing to 
the already existing public desire to eliminate this form of dress. He mentioned 
the decisions already made and implemented by some provincial councils 
(such as in Trabzon in the 1920s and most recently in Adana) as indicators of 
this general need and desire; the fact that the provincial councils had felt the 
necessity to issue such decisions was  proof of  the spread of this need and 
desire in the country. Thus, he asserted that these local efforts must be 
supported by a revolutionary (not evolutionary) attitude on the part of the 
party, and that this issue should not be left to the course of time. Such a 
solution would also relieve those provincial councils that had hesitated to issue 
a decision with the concern that it would not be lawful. 
Tarık Us’s particular concern was the use of the peçe to hide one’s 
identity. As one of the members of the commission, this was the reason for his 
suggestion to ban the peçe by adding an article to the Police Law.391 A delegate 
from Yozgat, Yusuf Duygu, on the other hand, supported the idea that a 
general dress law was necessary. If the issue was left to the provincial councils 
or municipalities, some of them might not be willing to deal with it and could 
use the lack of a law as an excuse for their reluctance or inability.392 Duygu’s 
concern was more about the image these veils represented in the eyes of the 
foreigners. A woman delegate from Niğde, Naciye Osman Kozbek, also 
supported the compulsory removal the peçe. She argued that this was 
necessary since Turkish women had been given the right to work alongside 
men. In addition, she asserted that the peçe was a source of problems during 
the elections, because it could be used by some people to hide their identity, 
and thus lead to multiple voting by the same voter. 393 
Some delegates, however, had opposed the idea of issuing a law on 
unveiling. Aka Gündüz, for example, another prominent writer and journalist, 
who was also a member of the commission who prepared the report on the 
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congress who were supporting him by applauses. See, ibid., 145-147. 
392 Ibid., p. 149. 
393 Ibid., p. 151. According to the reporting of a local newspaper in Konya, Kozbek was so 
disappointed the suggestion to issue a law banning the peçe was rejected by the congress that 
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suggestion to legislate against the peçe and the çarşaf, claimed that there was 
no issue called the issue of the peçe and the çarşaf in the Turkish revolution. 
The Turkish revolution was not a revolution carried out for the peçe and the 
çarşaf. In response to Us’s intervention that the peçe and the çarşaf did exist 
as a reality, Gündüz insisted that they existed, but this was rather an issue 
concerning the municipal police (zabıta meselesidir). The municipal police 
and the gendarme could handle this problem; occupying the congress with 
such a minor issue like the çarşaf was not something in line with the ideology 
of the Turkish revolution.394 Another delegate from İçel, Dr. Muhtar Berker, 
also argued that a law was unnecessary, but his reasons were different. He 
claimed that not every task should be achieved by legislation. According to 
him, the existing laws on the provincial and local administration were enough 
for the willing authorities to handle this issue.395 
The debate on the issue of the peçe and the çarşaf at the general 
meeting was brought to an end by words of the Minister of Interior, Şükrü 
Kaya.396 According to Kaya, the congress was gathered to discuss important 
issues, not to argue whether a piece of black cloth should be removed by a law 
or by administrative measures. Like Gündüz, Kaya also characterized the peçe 
and the çarşaf issue as a minor one, not worthy of any discussion. He said that 
these veils were foreign to Turkish culture, and in villages, where the majority 
of the population lived, women’s faces were uncovered. A law banning these 
veils would represent Turkish women as attached to a piece of cloth and thus 
would depict a negative image. Kaya was certain that as an issue of security, 
the peçe was already properly being handled: nowhere were women voting 
with the peçe on their face, and the faces of all people entering the public 
places and all sellers at the markets were uncovered. The çarşaf, on the other 
hand, had economic dimensions. Some women were continuing wearing it 
because of economic difficulties. Thus a gradual approach would be more 
appropriate on this matter; it should be left to the taste and decisions of 
women, and the provinces should accomplish this task based on their own 
necessities, by determining their own ways. A law, however, could put the 
party in a difficult position.397 Perhaps more persuasively, Kaya had also 
added that if such a law were needed, the leader of the revolution would have 
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issued it already, referring to the unwillingness of Mustafa Kemal to intervene 
on this issue.  
Kaya’s speech could be considered as a relatively moderate one given 
that he suggested a gradual approach and underlined the importance of 
women’s own decisions, as well as those of the provinces. However, there 
were also rather critical elements in his speech that may be seen as indications, 
or at least as possibilities, of a more active attitude on unveiling on the side of 
Ankara. In other words, in his speech, he had also said things that could be 
interpreted as contradictory to his remarks on the need of following a gradual 
approach.  He first referred to the need for inculcation and urged the delegates 
of the congress to promise that they would practice and promote the removal 
of the peçe and the çarşaf in their own circles. Then, he went on to say that 
the party and the People’s Houses should “enlighten” people on this matter. 
And finally, Kaya ensured the delegates that the government had received the 
necessary message from the debate that took place in the congress and would 
act in accordance with this message, administratively and politically. The drift 
of the congress would inspire the government and the members of the 
parliament. He would end his speech by saying that “maybe the members of 
the party congress who will meet four years later would see this issue 
completely resolved.”   
The debate at the congress reveals the existence of different positions 
in the party. The central elite (deputies) as well as the delegates coming from 
the provinces had diverse opinions on how to struggle against the peçe and the 
çarşaf. The point that there should be a struggle to eliminate these veils, 
however, was clear and this had an impact on the tone of the directives 
conveyed by Ankara after the congress. Two months later, on 22 July 1935, 
the Minister of Interior sent a circular to all governors and inspectors general 
underlining, very explicitly, the will of the Kemalist revolution to do away 
with the peçe and the çarşaf and to provide Turkish women with a civilized 
social status.398 The language of the circular of the minister was more rigid 
compared to his previous circulars sent before the congress: he characterized 
the peçe and the çarşaf as veils originating from “foreign traditions” and 
“tangled around the head of the Turk by beastly lusts” (hayvanca ihtirasların 
Türk başına doladığı). The circular was sent as a letter directly addressed to 
the name of the governors and inspectors general. A copy of the circular was 
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also sent to the Secretariat General of the Presidency, the Prime Ministry, 
ministries, the Chief of the General Stuff, the General Gendarmerie 
Commandership (Umum Jandarma Komutanlığı), and the Directorate General 
of Provincial Administration, informing these institutions that the governors 
and the inspectors general were written a letter to take the “appropriate 
measures” (münasip tedbirler) and engage in inculcation for the elimination 
of the peçe and the çarşaf (çarşaf ve peçenin ortadan kaldırılması için … 
telkinler yapılması). 
What these appropriate measures would be was unclear in the circular 
of the minister, however. Because, again, he indicated that while the Kemalist 
revolution was determined to do away with the peçe and the çarşaf, “in the 
field of social policy, this reform was left to the civilized taste of women and 
men.” Thanks to this taste, the minister suggested, in the ten years since the 
establishment of the republic, impressive progress had been achieved. The 
critical point here is that while he emphasizes that “this reform was left to the 
taste of people,” he also mentions the contribution of the local administrators, 
referring to the local attempts to remove the peçe and the çarşaf since the 
1920s. The letter of the minister was in fact praising such attempts: 
 
In achieving this progress, the municipal and provincial councils have 
had significant influence. However, since these decisions [of the 
municipal and provincial councils] lacked the power of a law, there 
have been delays in their application in some places. In fact, at the 
congress [of the RPP] this year, while discussing the çarşaf and the peçe 
issue, critiques were voiced that the peçe survives as a bad tradition in 
some places. It was even suggested to immediately avoid this situation 
by enacting a law. But trusting the revolutionary and modernist 
character of the Turkish nation [Türk milletinin devrimciliğine ve 
yenileşme hissine güvenerek], the government suggested that this bad 
habit could be discouraged in time by propaganda and efforts 
[propaganda ve gayretlerle]. Recent researches and investigations 
reveal that the peçe and the çarşaf began to disappear almost 
everywhere; in big cities like Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, they 
disappeared completely, and in other places, partially. It is understood 
that those who come to the big cities from these places [where the peçe 
and çarşaf still partially survive], all remove their çarşaf and peçe, but 
they embrace them when they return to their hometowns because they 
fall into the traditions and people’s gossips. It is concluded that this 
revolution would also be completed with a few encouraging steps.399    
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Again unclear about what these “encouraging steps” could be, the 
minister suggests that the state officials must take the lead in this regard: “If 
everyone [every official] influences his family members and his immediate 
circle, this issue will then be solved naturally.” The ministry then was content 
with propaganda and refused the idea of enacting a law on this issue. Once 
again, Ankara emphasized that the state officials were its “natural hands” in 
the provinces. 400 The state had trusted in the personal influence of the state 
officials in their surroundings. However, the circular of the ministry could 
neither clarify the appropriate ways of doing propaganda, nor totally ignore 
the impact the local decisions of the municipal and provincial councils had in 
the past. Thus, it left the local administrators with a rather ambiguous advice. 
Both those who want to take an active way and force for a decision by the 
local councils and those who choose to remain more vigilant and trust in state 
officials being models for wider masses could find a legitimate point to refer 
in the letter sent by the minister.     
The only point where the circular of the minister urges the provincial 
administrators to be more cautious about the use of the peçe and the çarşaf 
and allows direct intervention was where these veils created a security 
concern, i.e., that they were used with the aim of hiding the identity of the 
user.401 The minister particularly suggests that women selling stuff in 
marketplaces with the peçe covering their faces, as one could encounter in 
Istanbul, should be warned first by using an appropriate language, and if they 
continue to wear the peçe, then they can be banned from selling their goods in 
the market. He also mentions that on occasions related to the issues of security, 
the police should be watchful about malevolent people, both men and women, 
in big cities, and for example should make sure that people wearing the peçe 
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...”    
400 For a party document characterizing state officials as the “natural hands” of the RPP 
(fırkanın tabii uzuvları) see, Memur bayanların fırkaya kaydedilemeyeceği, PMRA 
490.01/1.4.10, 2 September 1930. 
401 This in fact contradicts with what Kaya had argued at the general party congress. He had 
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in this way avoid public places such as steamships, trams, coffee houses and 
night clubs (gazino).402 
Following this letter by the Minister of Interior, one and a half months 
later, on 9 September 1935, the general secretary of the RPP sent a circular to 
local party administrators.403 The general secretary informed them about the 
circular sent by the Minister of Interior to the provincial governors and asked 
them to help the governors on the issue of the peçe and the çarşaf. This was 
an attempt by the party to secure the coordination of the local party 
administrators with the governors and thus to achieve a unified effort in the 
provinces. The general secretary also asked the local branches to inform the 
party center about the situation. Interestingly, on the same day the party 
secretariat sent the circular to the local party branches, on 9 September 1935, 
the Ministry of Interior sent its original circular (dated 22 July) to the governor 
of Denizli again, in order to make sure that he received it.404 
These circulars certainly paved the way for the acceleration of the 
anti-veiling campaigns and were read by some local administrators as 
Ankara’s call for action on the issue of unveiling. As it is understood from the 
replies of some of the local party branches to the circular of the general 
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403 See the letters from the RPP Yozgat, Muğla, Trabzon and Sinop local party administrations 
to the RPP Secretariat General, contained in PMRA 490.01/17.88.1. I have not seen the original 
letter sent by the general secretary of the party, but the response letters of some local party 
administrators mention that they had received such a circular. 
404 Apparently, when the circular of the ministry was first sent to the governor of Denizli as a 
letter to his name, the post office in Denizli forwarded it to the governorship of Samsun, since 
the governor of Denizli had just been appointed as the governor of Samsun. Having received 
the circular coming from Denizli post office, the governor of Samsun had informed the ministry 
that he received the circular, but not as the governor of Denizli but Samsun. Thus the ministry 
sent another copy to the new governor of Denizli on 9 September 1935. A copy of the relevant 
correspondence is contained in TNPA 13216-7/1. Whether the fact that this mistake was 
corrected on the same day the RPP general secretary sent a circular to all local branches was a 
coincidence is an open question. It is possible that this issue continued to be a topic of 
correspondence between the Ministry of Interior and the RPP Headquarters between 22nd of 
July (the date of the circular of the ministry) and 9th of September (the date of the circular of 




secretary of the party, the circular sent to the governors by the ministry of 
interior (22 July  1935) already triggered an effort on the part of the local elite 
before the coming of the circular of the party (9 September  1935), and led to 
joint meetings of the high staff of the governorships with the local party 
administrators, and in some cases, with the participation of the municipal 
administrators.405 In fact, even before the circular of the Ministry of Interior 
on 22 July, the impact of the debate on the peçe and the çarşaf at the party 
congress in May had already been felt at the local level. Local newspapers 
informed their readers about the discussions held at the party congress, 
including the one on the peçe and the çarşaf.406 Thus, the general public in the 
provinces had learned that issue of unveiling appeared as a concern in Ankara 
and was debated at the general congress of the party, even though the idea of 
handling it through a central legislation was rejected. In addition, since the 
minister of interior had asked the members of the congress to promise that 
they would first change the clothing of their own family and circles, this had 
created a pressure for the delegates of some provinces. A Trabzon newspaper, 
İkbal, mentioned the request that Şükrü Kaya had made to the delegates while 
reporting about the congress. An editorial addressed all delegates of Trabzon 
by name to remind them of the promise they made to the interior minister: the 
issue of the peçe and the çarşaf was now a problem of these delegates; they 
had promised to fight for women’s liberation from these veils and they would 
be ashamed of breaking their promise if they did not do so.407 
Delegates of some provinces had actually already created an initiative 
for unveiling right after the congress, without waiting for the following 
circulars coming from Ankara. In other words, the influence of the debates at 
the congress in Ankara was felt at the local level, especially among the local 
elite, through the participating delegates. The delegates of Sinop, for example, 
had informed all party members in the province about these debates in a party 
meeting after they returned back from Ankara.408 Having listened to the 
impressions of their delegates about the party congress, some members of the 
local party branch already suggested that the çarşaf should be removed in 
Sinop. In a general meeting organized at the local party branch one day before 
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the arrival of the circular of the general secretary of the party dated September 
9th, representatives from the party, the governorship and the municipality had 
come to an agreement that the çarşaf should be replaced with overcoats.    
Therefore,  it should be emphasized that although the circulars issued 
by the Ministry of Interior and the General Secretariat of the RPP (dated 22 
July and 9 September 1935, respectively) were very influential and resulted  
in an acceleration in the spread of the anti-veiling campaigns in the periphery, 
these circulars had been  sent to the local authorities after the peçe and the 
çarşaf had already been prohibited in some cities, and in some others, after an 
anti-veiling campaign (although without an outright ban yet) had already been 
initiated. Even the initial circulars of the interior minister in 1934, which were 
less imperious compared to the ones sent after the party congress, came after 
the initiation of campaigns in a number of cities. In other words, the local 
initiative had been playing a significant role right from the very beginning, 
and the involvement of the party center and the government accelerated 
gradually, and, as it will be discussed below, never reached a level that 
completely determined the process at the local level. Left vague and 
sometimes even incoherent in terms of the policy guidance of the central 
authorities, the anti-veiling campaigns were shaped by the local actors and 
circumstances. Especially the role and attitude of local elite were critical in 
fashioning the practice of the campaigns. 
 
 
III. Anti-Veiling Campaigns and the Role of Local Elites 
On 23 December 1934, only nineteen days after the enactment of the law 
granting women’s political rights, Cevat Alap, a journalist in İkbal newspaper 
in the province of Trabzon, addressed the local authorities from his column.409 
As we learn from his article, the governor of Trabzon had recently issued a 
circular and advised all state officials not to process the petitions of women 
wearing the peçe and the çarşaf. Alap requested from the authorities that this 
decision to be turned into a general ban including all public places:  
 
This ban can gradually be expanded to the following: A woman cannot 
sit in the park wearing the peçe and the çarşaf, cannot enter Güzelhisar 
Park, cannot come to the movie theatre, and finally, cannot wander in 
the market or bazaar. If we do not issue such a ban today, the revolution, 
the regime will, perhaps not today or next year, but soon. The regime, 
                                                          




the revolution, which has given women the right to elect and to be 
elected, will totally eliminate the peçe and the çarşaf, which are now a 
sign of being uncivilized, through a law like the one on the dress of the 
priests and hodjas.410 
 
It seems that for Alap, both granting women their political rights and the law 
regulating the clothing of the religious personnel were influential signs that 
the state could intervene in the dress of women. He supported the decision of 
the governor that limited the access of women wearing the peçe and the çarşaf 
to certain public services, but this was not enough; he was asking for a more 
forceful intervention. His essay was a call, a local voice, demanding the 
realization of regime ideals through a local initiative; he invited the local 
administrators to act before the central authority made a concrete move in this 
issue, without waiting for an order or a central regulation coming from 
Ankara. This was precisely what was expected by the regime from the local 
elites: to lead the way in social and cultural modernization. Local 
administrators, state officials and women in particular, were in a critical 
position in the eyes of Ankara as agents of change in the provinces. The role 
of women and the regime’s expectations from this role will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter. This section focuses on the critical position of the 
local elite in general and discusses in which ways and through which 
mechanisms they had a crucial impact on the shaping and implementation of 
the anti-veiling campaigns. Many local elites had also envisioned themselves 
in the role of being the agents of reform. For some of them, at least, men and 
women alike, there was no need for a directive to come from the center for 
every attempt made in the modernization process.411 Some of the local elites, 
however, were much less enthusiastic about unveiling, or hesitant, or even 
reluctant. As this section aims to demonstrate, this diversity of the attitude of 
the local elite, their different initiatives and strategies, and Ankara’s response 
to these initiatives are essential for understanding the complexity of the anti-
veiling campaigns in Turkey of 1930s.   
The most apparent initiative of the local elites was the leading role 
they had in propaganda efforts. Such efforts were especially put into practice 
by using the local newspapers. Given the difficulties the regime was facing in 
penetrating  society fully through established institutions because of limited 
state capacity, the local newspapers had gained an important function in the 
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eyes of the authorities in “convincing and leading” the masses.412 The 
provincial administrators also had very limited means at their disposal for 
propaganda apart from the newspapers; thus the local elite used them as a 
platform on which they tried to initiate and promote the anti-veiling 
campaigns at the local level. The propaganda activities of the local elite can 
be seen as expected, since propaganda was the only concrete advice mentioned 
in the circulars coming from Ankara. In this sense, their activities were in line 
with the suggestions of the regime; they were advised to do so. But some local 
newspapers began to publish articles written by local authors about the need 
for the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf earlier than the circulars of Ankara.  
One crucial character of this propaganda was that although their pro-
regime stance was obvious, there was nevertheless an effort to represent the 
desire for such a reform as a genuinely local one, voiced by the elites of the 
cities themselves. In other words, most of the local authors and journalists 
represented the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf as a natural end result of 
the modernization of Turkish society and themselves as the natural agents of 
this modernization. The language used in local newspapers about the anti-
veiling campaigns was a language especially emphasizing the agency of the 
local. Formulated as “we the new Turkish youth,” “the enlightened people of 
our city,” “the women of our city” or simply “the people” (of Bursa, of Konya 
etc.), this self-representation of the local elite had the aim of portraying the 
initiative as something expected from the historical position of their city as the 
“vanguard” city, and something their city had to do to be worthy of the 
revolution or not to fall behind the other cities in this struggle. This idea of 
being the vanguard city was an argument frequently used by the local elites in 
mobilizing the public in various cities.413 One can refer here to a dual 
competition simultaneously going on at the local level: there was a struggle 
among various members of the local elites to be the leading agents of change 
in their cities; and there was a competition among the cities to be the 
vanguards regarding the anti-veiling campaigns. 
Likewise, introduction of a campaign in a certain province capital 
soon came to affect the district capitals in that province, creating a snowball 
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effect and an atmosphere of competition. The way campaigns were reported 
in provincial newspapers shows how this comparison among the district 
capitals in a particular province created pressure on district administrations 
and how they felt the necessity to follow the province capital or other district 
capitals in banning the peçe and the çarşaf. Yeni Mersin, a newspaper of the 
province of İçel, for example, was reporting the inability of the district of 
Tarsus to launch a successful campaign against the peçe and the çarşaf during 
the year in 1933 despite the fact that there was a “movement” in the district 
and a general demand among the women.414 Expected results could not be 
achieved, because ineffective ways of action were preferred and the matter 
was not well followed, the newspaper claimed. The support of the district 
governor and the municipality were mentioned in the news, suggesting that it 
had become only a formality to issue such a ban in Tarsus. Yeni Mersin was 
“hoping” that Tarsus would follow the example of Mersin, the province 
capital, soon and celebrating that the çarşaf was already prohibited at parks 
and public places in the district capital. The suggestion of a woman member 
of the Tarsus municipal council to issue a ban became an item on the agenda 
of the council only at the beginning of 1935. Yeni Mersin was again pushing 
for a decision so that the women of Tarsus could get rid of this “ogre dress” 
(umacı kılık);415 it published commentaries inviting the members of the Tarsus 
municipal council not to buy the arguments of those who claimed that this 
issue could be solved naturally in the course of time. Rıza Atilâ, a columnist 
of Yeni Mersin, referred to how easily the peçe and the çarşaf had been 
removed in Mersin. This was a good example for Tarsus; any doubt in this 
issue would mean that Tarsus had failed to understand the great aims of the 
revolution.416 
Although the efforts of some local elite to represent the anti-veiling 
campaigns as genuinely local attempts were part of the propaganda, there were 
cases where the initiative did in fact originate locally, especially concerning 
the right way to organize and implement an anti-veiling campaign. One 
example of such an initiative can be followed in a letter of the deputy governor 
of Antalya to the Minister of the Interior towards the end of 1934, where he 
was curious about the opinion of the government and the party on the proper 
way of struggling against the peçe and the çarşaf.417 Conveying his opinion 
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that the Kemalist revolution attained yet another major achievement by 
granting women the political rights that they lack in the most civilized nations, 
he suggested that it would be inappropriate for Turkish women to welcome 
this achievement by wearing the peçe and the çarşaf. The deputy governor 
was convinced that these veils were showing Turkish women to foreigners in 
a primitive condition.418 More importantly, he argued that it was already 
proven by “years of struggle” that this issue could not be handled by 
inculcation. It is crucial here to note that the deputy governor’s 
characterization of the struggle against the peçe and the çarşaf as a struggle of 
many years refers to a degree of continuation at the local level between the 
earlier examples of the anti-veiling campaigns in the 1920s and the later ones 
in the mid-1930s. It also shows that while this struggle had been shaped by 
propaganda activities until then, some local administrator was convinced that 
there was need for more effective measures. In fact, at the end of the letter, the 
deputy governor was asking whether the government had made a decision or 
was planning to make a decision on the issue. If there was no such decision, 
he was requesting the permission of the ministry to use the municipal police 
to prevent women wearing the peçe and the çarşaf from entering public places 
such as parks and theaters in Antalya. Women’s gaining of their political 
rights was a good occasion for issuing such a ban, he suggested.  
This letter of the deputy governor of Antalya was before the circular 
of the minister on 17 December 1934, urging the governors not to use the 
police force and to use propaganda and inculcation only. It was in fact one of 
the reasons for the minister’s circular. On the same day he issued a circular to 
all governors and inspectors general on the issue, the minister also replied to 
the letter of the governor of Antalya separately: 
 
It is not appropriate to prevent women wearing the peçe and the çarşaf 
from entering any place, from walking here and there by using the 
municipal police forces. One should attain this goal only through well-
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administered inculcation. Therefore, it is also necessary to be content 
with propaganda in this matter.419 
 
Showing the determined will of a local administrator to initiate a forceful 
campaign, the letter of the deputy governor of Antalya also points to the 
tendency of some of the local actors to solve the issue by taking stronger 
measures. Despite the warnings of the minister, this tendency continued to 
guide the actions of some local administrators. This was partly because the 
circular sent from the Ministry of the Interior was clear about regime’s 
position regarding the use of the peçe and the çarşaf, but unclear about how 
to fight them apart from propaganda and state officials’ vanguard role. Once 
these efforts did not work or were found ineffective or insufficient, some local 
administrators saw themselves in a position to devise a stronger framework of 
action and could easily go beyond propaganda activities. The case of the 
province of Ordu is another good example reflecting such tendencies by local 
administrators. 
In Ordu, the fight against the peçe and the çarşaf had begun in the 
1920s.420 However, these earlier attempts were ineffective and the issue 
reemerged as a public concern in the province in the occasion of women’s 
acquiring of their political rights in 1934.421 As it is understood from a number 
of documents, there were efforts, including a municipal ban, to eliminate the 
peçe and the çarşaf in the province during the course of 1935.422 These efforts, 
it seems, also proved unsuccessful, since the governor of Ordu informed the 
Ministry of Interior on 5 March 1937 that he had banned the peçe, the çarşaf, 
and the peştamal in Ordu as of 23 April 1937.423 He indicated in his letter to 
the ministry that previous decisions and measures taken by some institutions 
in the province over the years had not been applied effectively. Thus, he, as 
the governor of the province, had felt the necessity to issue a declaration 
banning these veils: 
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In a nation like ours that had taken its place among the advanced nations 
of the world, it is a national and civic duty for every citizen to 
acknowledge the civilized rights deserved by women, who had acquired 
an advanced status and had proved their political capacity. It has been 
possible for some time [in Ordu] to encounter the peçe and the çarşaf, 
which certainly do not fit the women of an advanced and civilized 
nation. In addition, it has also been seen that scarves and umbrellas have 
been used in unnecessary occasions. Especially the hamam peştemals 
reveal a very ugly scene. The achievements of our generation today are 
thanks to the loyalty and obedience to the principles, to the regime; and 
the civilized Turkish regime does not favor such ugly and weird clothes. 
Every citizen should know well that those who do not follow the 
revolution, the regime, would be considered as inclined to 
reactionarism (irticaa meyyal); they would be perceived as impaired by 
this horrible will and tendency (bu çirkin arzuve temayül). Those men 
who use their civilized rights perfectly should respect the civilized 
rights of their wives; it is a national and legal duty and obligation for 
them to constrain their wives to follow these [civilized 
rights/principles] (riayete icbar eylemeleri).424 
 
In the declaration, it was also announced that the names and addresses 
of those who did not abide by the decision would be registered by the 
municipal police and the police officers in the province capital and district 
capitals, and by the village governors and members of the council of elders in 
the villages. These names would be handed over to the highest state authority 
in every administrative unit and they would be fined, from 5 liras to 25 liras, 
based on the Law on the Provincial Administration. In addition, petitions of 
those women who wear these veils would not be issued in the public offices 
and courts, and the officials who work at these state offices should report such 
cases to the relevant authority. The declaration also announced that not only 
the workers themselves but also the owners of the factories and companies 
would be held responsible from the clothing of the women workers. Since the 
state offices were a symbol of civilization, the declaration also reminded the 
state officials to be sensitive regarding the clothing of their wives and related 
women.  
 The declaration of the governor of Ordu is one of the most 
comprehensive declarations in the struggle against the peçe and the çarşaf. 
From the workers at the factories to women in the villages, the governor had 
attempted at a very ambitious plan of action in the unveiling issue. Particularly 
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significant was the direct link he established between the wearing of the peçe 
and the çarşaf, and its being “reactionary, believing that the use of these veils 
was a direct form of opposition to the regime. He was probably very proud of 
this comprehensive plan of action, and informed the Ministry of Interior with 
the hope of demonstrating his devotion to the principles of the regime as a 
governor. On the 28 April 1937, five days after the ban on the peçe, the çarşaf 
and the peştamal was put into practice in Ordu, the governor informed the 
ministry of the application process and the immediate results.425 In his letter, 
he reported that the ban had been put into effect under the close control of the 
municipal police, supported by the police and the gendarmerie forces. The 
ban, he noted, “had been applied with complete success;” there remained no 
trace of the peçe, the çarşaf or the peştamal in Ordu, and women, including 
all district capitals and villages of the province, had removed these uncivilized 
clothes.426 
 Having received this last letter reporting the results of the ban, the 
ministry realized that they did not receive the first letter to which the 
declaration of the governor of Ordu was attached. The ministry had asked the 
governor to send a copy of the declaration where he explained the content of 
the ban.427 This shows how closely the center wanted to control the process 
and know about the details of the anti-veiling campaigns. Having read the 
copy of the declaration, the Minister of Interior felt the necessity to warn the 
governor regarding its content. He reminded the governor of the earlier 
circulars of ministry, urging the local administrators to act responsibly and 
carefully on the issue of unveiling, and warned him that he had no right to 
enforce a punishment based on the law mentioned in his declaration, the Law 
on the Provincial Administration: 
 
I) Your declaration on the ban on the peçe, the çarşaf and the peştamal 
has been analyzed. It is not right to issue a punishment based on the 
Law on the Provincial Administration and not to process the petitions 
of women who come to the state offices and courts wearing the peçe, 
the çarşaf and the peştamal, as you announced in your declaration. It 
has been clearly ordered by a circular no. 3613 dated 11.8.1934 and by 
a letter directly sent to the governors through the General Police 
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Headquarters dated 22.7.1935 that the issue of the peçe, the çarşaf and 
the peştamal was mainly left to the good taste and manners of our 
women, that it should not be dealt by issuing decisions and orders, that 
it is necessary to act very carefully on this important and sensitive issue, 
and that the targeted goals should be achieved through encouragement, 
inculcation and propaganda. It has been also noted that the families of 
the state officials should lead the way on this issue through 
encouragement and propaganda. 
 
II) In order to apply the punitive measures in the article 68 of the Law 
on the Provincial Administration, it is necessary that your order is based 
on law; however there is no law that mentions a ban on the peçe and the 
çarşaf, explicitly or implicitly. Since under a republican administration, 
every order and declaration should be based on law, and since the peçe 
and the çarşaf are not banned by a law, it is completely against the spirit 
and aim of the law to issue a punishment to those who wear these veils 
based on the Law on the Provincial Administration. 
 
III) The second article of your declaration is also against the law. 
Because both the courts and other official departments are obliged to 
process the appeals of all citizens, regardless of their clothing. 
However, they can ask those women whose faces are covered to open 
their faces in order to identify them. But they cannot refuse to issue the 
petitions of women because they come to the offices wearing the çarşaf 
or the peştamal. If they do such an unlawful act, they face an 
administrative investigation based on regulations. 
 
IV) Because of the reasons explained above, I ask that the punitive 
measures mentioned in the declaration should not be applied, and this 
task should be realized in a natural way, through measures suitable to 
local circumstances and through encouragement and propaganda.428 
 
This harsh letter by the Minister of Interior clearly shows that Ankara 
was still very hesitant about directly intervening in women’s veiling through 
bans and orders in May 1937. Minister Şükrü Kaya had felt the necessity to 
underline in his letter, over and over again, that the act of the governor was 
unlawful. His emphasis on the republican character of the regime and the duty 
of all state offices to process the requests of the citizens regardless of their 
dress is particularly remarkable. The Minister could allow leeway for the right 
to remove women’s peçe in state offices where there was a need to identify 
them, but rejected any measure that would ignore women’s appeals on the 
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basis of their use of the çarşaf and the peştamal. Most importantly, perhaps, 
was the reminder that there was no law banning these veils, and thus the 
governors had no right to issue a punishment based on the Law on the 
Provincial Administration or any other law. 
On the other hand, Ankara certainly knew that there were decisions 
and orders issued by city councils in other provinces and district capitals, and 
as far as it can be traced in official documents, it had shown no such forceful 
opposition against such decisions as it did against the declaration of the 
governor of Ordu. It seems that to issue a decision as part of the municipal 
bans based on the legal capacity of the municipalities to maintain order and 
attain urban development was acceptable or tolerable for Ankara, while an 
anti-veiling campaigns as ambitious and comprehensive as the one organized 
in Ordu was not. It is also clear that even if a municipal decision or a ban was 
declared by a certain city council, Ankara was still reluctant to apply that 
decision or ban by issuing fines, and was certainly more alert if such decisions 
were put into practice by the local administrators by using the municipal police 
or the gendarmerie. In fact, all documents show that Ankara consistently 
warned the local authorities against the use of force in the unveiling issue. The 
insistence of the interior minister to stick to encouragement, inculcation, and 
propaganda should be seen in the light of these concerns. This insistence, 
however, was vague regarding what the local authorities should understand 
from “encouragement” or “inculcation” and what measures or tactics should 
be used to make them a reality. In other words, the local administrators were 
left alone with the knowledge that, on the one hand, this “task of unveiling” 
should be realized, but on the other hand, it was not clear how this would be 
done. The advice of the Minister of Interior to the Governor of Ordu that it 
should happen “naturally” and through “measures suitable to local 
circumstances” is emblematic of the attitude of Ankara; the minister had given 
this advice without hinting at what these measures might be.  
In fact, even after the circular of the minister and contrary to his order, 
some local authorities did use the municipal police to implement the decision 
to impose a ban on the peçe and the çarşaf. In a few instances, such as in 
Denizli and Bursa, women who continued to wear the peçe and the çarşaf had 
to pay fines for not obeying the municipal regulations.429 In some of the 
                                                          
429 Hakkı Uyar, “Tek Parti Döneminde Denizli’de Siyasal Hayat,” in Uluslararası Denizli ve 
Çevresi Tarih ve Kültür Sempozyumu: Bildiriler 1, Ayfer Özçelik et al. (eds.), Denizli: 
Pamukkale Üniversitesi Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Yayınları, 2006, pp. 561-579. 
Uyar mentions the names of ten women who were fined in November and December 1935. We 




notices published in local newspapers concerning the bans, women were 
warned of the possibility of municipal police intervention in cases of 
noncompliance.430 In Bergama, a district of the province of Izmir, the city 
council announced that not only women who did not comply with the decision, 
but also shop keepers who employed women wearing the peçe and the çarşaf, 
and persons who harassed women wearing “national” attire (national meaning 
“modern;” unveiled), would be fined.431 In some cities, decisions of the city 
councils to ban the peçe and the çarşaf were put into practice by physically 
removing women’s veils in the streets by the police or soldiers and by 
charging the police to patrol in the main streets, checking women’s 
compliance.432 
There were some among the local elites who tried to complain to the 
authorities in Ankara about the way the anti-veiling campaign was 
implemented in their cities. On 30 July 1935, the deputy governor of the 
province of Kastamonu sent a letter to the Minister of Interior, informing him 
about the anti-veiling campaign.433 The deputy governor ensured the ministry 
that the local authorities had paid the utmost attention to the removal of the 
uncivilized clothes like the peçe and the çarşaf, and at the last meeting of the 
city council, it was unanimously decided that these veils should be eliminated 
in the province. He also noted that the decision was immediately put into 
practice and the police forces were prepared and acting very carefully; the 
deputy governor was certain that this ugly tradition would fade away in a very 
short period of time. Almost a month later, the ministry received another letter 
from a certain state official, the second commissioner Tahsin, through the 
General Directorate of Security, complaining that in Tosya, a district of the 
province of Kastamonu, the gendarmerie had forcefully removed some 
women’s peçe and çarşaf in the streets after the decision of the district 
municipal council.434 It was also stated in the complaint letter of the official 
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that because of this, people of the district were offended. Having received this 
complaint, the Ministry of Interior asked both the governor of Kastamonu and 
the General Directorate of Gendarmerie to report on the issue.435 The governor 
of Kastamonu replied by assuring the minister that the decision of the 
municipality of Tosya had been put into practice  with the help of the state 
officials and enlightened people of the town, and that no action by the 
municipal police was needed and no complaint had been  received. The city 
council of Tosya, the governor added, had made this general decision 
regarding the peçe and the çarşaf based on the circular of the ministry on 22 
July 1935. According to the governor, only some prostitutes who are in any 
way under the control of the municipal police and who continued to wear the 
peçe and the çarşaf were called to the police station and warned to not to use 
these uncivilized clothes; no honorable woman was forced by the 
gendarmerie.436 
Such cases imply that Ankara was indeed aware of these actions of 
the local authorities, and tried to limit and reduce them, but could not get them 
fully under control. This may hint at the limited capacity of the regime to 
coordinate the campaigns. It may also suggest that, particularly in cases like 
the anti-veiling campaigns of the 1930s, where policy guidelines from the 
center were loose and ambiguous, disagreements both among the elite in 
Ankara as well as between Ankara and the provinces tended to come to surface 
and thus created an ambiguous situation in terms of how to turn a reform ideal 
into reality. Because of this ambiguity, some local administrators had 
difficulty trying to promote unveiling while balancing the concerns mentioned 
by Ankara and the demands stemming from the local environment. The 
governor of Sinop, for example, asked for the guidance of the Minister of 
Interior since some members of the local RPP branch and the municipal 
council of Sinop were insisting on a council decision to ban the çarşaf, while 
the governor was concerned that this would be against the circulars coming 
from Ankara: 
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Having learned from newspapers that in many provinces the çarşaf was 
removed and overcoats were adopted instead, we have received 
proposals from the local party branch and the municipality that the 
General Provincial Council should also issue a decision here in order 
for the çarşaf be removed and overcoats be adopted by the public. 
Based on the circular of the high authority of the ministry, we have been 
trying to handle this issue through encouragement, inculcation and 
propaganda instead of issuing decisions and orders, to realize it as a 
progress emerging out of our women’s own willingness; we have not 
abstained from working towards creating the opportunities for our 
women to adopt the style and form of clothing that women in big cities 
had already generally accepted. Although we have achieved some 
results, the çarşaf has not been removed because of the impact of old 
traditions, and those local women who had come to the municipality 
wearing overcoats during the last elections have again begun wearing 
the çarşaf. Thus, some [members of the local party branch and the 
municipal council] are claiming that this issue should be handled by 
issuing a decision and making the removal of the çarşaf compulsory, 
following the example of the decision the Provincial Council had issued 
several years ago for the removal of the peçe. I am in need of and ready 
for your guidance regarding the situation and for the meeting of the 
Provincial Council.437 
 
What seems clear is that the lack of definite guidelines from the 
central authority on how to remove the peçe and the çarşaf significantly 
increased the space of action for the local elite. They were in a position to 
decide the mechanisms through which people would be mobilized, the 
methods through which they would be “convinced” or “inculcated,” or the 
social occasions where new forms of dress and gender relations would be 
promoted. For example, the governor of Maraş organized a meeting for forty-
three male state officials from the province of Maraş and nearby provinces 
whose wives were using the peçe and the çarşaf.438 He “convinced” these state 
officials at the meeting that they would make their wives remove the peçe and 
the çarşaf, and thus be good examples for the rest of the community.  Ten days 
later, he organized a tea and dancing party at the People’s House where forty-
one of these male state officials participated with their wives having removed 
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their veils and dressed in “civilized” clothing.439 The news that “native 
officials” (yerli memurlar) of Maraş had kept their promise to the governor 
and attended the tea party with their unveiled wives even made it to the 
national newspapers.440 As the case of Maraş shows, minor state officials who 
were locals of the cities in which they were living and working were 
particularly under pressure from the provincial administrators. They were 
among the first people who were expected to support the anti-veiling 
campaigns.   
In addition, the members of the city councils, local party branches and 
People’s Houses were organized to support unveiling. In Antalya, for 
example, the mobilization to fight against the peçe and the çarşaf had in fact 
been accelerated before the letter of the deputy governor of the city to the 
interior ministry, and predominantly by the involvement of the local party and 
People’s House elite. The party branch had organized a tea party on 13 
September 1934, specifically to “encourage women to engage in social 
activities.”441 At the tea party, the head of the party branch, Şerafettin Bey, 
gave a speech that explained the duties of the “enlightened” women of 
Antalya, one of which was to eliminate the “peçe and çarşaf mentality” 
symbolizing “backward womanhood” and to encourage and spread civilized 
clothing.442 This first initiative was followed by a meeting at the Antalya 
People’s House.443 The aim of the meeting was to discuss the peçe and the 
çarşaf issue. Three days later, the formation of a committee to fight the peçe 
and the çarşaf by the women members of the Antalya People’s House 
themselves was announced in an Izmir newspaper, with the comment that this 
fight was seen as necessary since women had to work hand-in-hand with men 
for the good of the nation.444 In Siirt, after the decision of state officials to 
remove the peçe, women who removed their peçe were invited, along with 
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their husbands, to a special movie screening organized by the People’s House. 
The way found in Çankırı to create a mixed-gender environment in the 
province where women could participate without the peçe and the çarşaf was 
to organize a New Year’s celebration at the People’s House, to which 
members of the House would all come with their wives and daughters who 
had removed their peçe and çarşaf.445 In Kayseri, as part of the “war against 
the peçe and the çarşaf,” a tea party would be hosted by the mayor, Nazmi 
Toker, where the members of the city council would participate with their 
wives.446 In other cities as well, activities that were associated with “modern” 
social life and expected to increase women’s participation in public life begun 
to be organized more often.447 
Local elites also played a leading role in organizing efforts to help 
women to adapt to the new dress codes. In some cities, local institutions and 
associations, such as the local branches of the Red Crescent, provided poor 
families with overcoats.448 In Trabzon, a special committee was formed with 
the collaboration of the People’s House, the municipality, the Red Crescent, 
the RPP, and the Chamber of Commerce for the same purpose.449 In Maraş, 
the People’s House distributed a hundred and fifty overcoats to poor 
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women.450 In Antalya, a similar committee was established under the authority 
of the provincial council to help those women in need.451 The committee 
helped women convert their çarşaf into an overcoat, and if this was not 
possible because of the fabric of the çarşaf, to obtain a new one. The head of 
the committee was the wife of the governor of the city and she led the efforts 
every day at the party office, where the committee worked. The committee 
also tried to collect money from charitable donors to help poor women and to 
support the sewing expenses. In Akşehir, a district of the province of Konya, 
the tailors were assiduously sewing overcoats while the party inspector visited 
the city at the peak of the mobilization for the removal of the peçe and the 
çarşaf.452 Similarly, in Soma, a district in the province of Manisa, all tailors 
were sewing overcoats day and night after the city council banned the çarşaf 
and the peştamal.453  
In the relatively wide space of action they enjoyed on the issue of anti-
veiling campaigns, some local elites tended to follow a more gradual strategy, 
while trying to convince the center that they had taken all the necessary 
measures to promote unveiling. For instance, in Çorum, the peçe was banned 
by a municipal decision. In order to remove the çarşaf, however, a steadier 
approach was adopted. Like the governor of Maraş, the governor of Çorum 
had first tried to mobilize the minor officials who were locals of the province, 
and given them a certain period of preparation to adopt the new dress codes.454 
At the end of this period, on 15 September 1935, he organized a meeting at 
the People’s House to which all minor officials were invited with their family 
members, who had now replaced their çarşaf with an overcoat.455 In the 
meantime, having carefully observed the reception of this mobilization by the 
general public, he then invited the leading members of the local party branch 
and the municipality to a joint meeting. At the meeting, there were some who 
argued that because of economic reasons, people should be given six months 
to remove their çarşaf. However, others insisted that this task must be handled 
sooner, and thus due to these pressures, the municipality banned the use of 
çarşaf as of 29 October 1935, Republic Day. The governor also informed the 
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ministry that they had not heard from the district capitals yet, but it should be 
considered as natural that they would follow the provincial capital on the issue 
of unveiling. Writing to the Minister of Interior on 22 November 1935, a 
month after the ban on the çarşaf was put into practice, the governor reported 
that because women were under the influence of a long tradition of 
conservatism and backward mentality, progress would be achieved gradually: 
 
Since the population of the city of Çorum is small, the moral and 
traditional principles have acquired special and personal importance. 
This situation has put women under the pressure of şekilperestlik 
[formalism, excessive adherence to outward appearance] and made it 
difficult for them to act according to their personal thinking and 
initiatives. Official intervention and action have been considered 
necessary and appropriate to fight against these social pressures, and to 
empower free behavior and personal initiative. And as a result of 
official control and application, the majority of women could remove 
their çarşaf. However, it is not possible to deny that one can encounter 
older or poor women wearing the çarşaf and thus disobeying the ban in 
some neighborhoods. It is necessary to consider it just a matter of time 
that these women would also feel the obligation to comply and adopt 
the new styles. Village women, who have been using the çarşaf in the 
remote parts of the city and in the markets, are now coming to the city 
center having removed the çarşaf. In the districts of the province, the 
peçe has been removed, but an actual success could not be achieved in 
the removal of the çarşaf. It is no doubt that the initiative in the province 
center would have an impact over the district capitals. The results of the 
application, however, could result in adoption of weird forms of 
clothing. The belief in and insistence on the covering of the head have 
been playing a major role in the emergence of such results. Without a 
doubt, gossips that emerge because of quick adaptation to the new 
forms of clothing would slowly lose their impact, and a normal 
condition would be settled. Because, a repeated application of 
something would result in the change of manners, and stability would 
result in the emergence of tradition.456 
 
Thus, the governor was in fact preparing the ground for the acceptance 
of a slower pace of transformation in the province of Çorum, due to poverty 
and heavily conservative character of the community. Likewise, the governor 
of Kırklareli also informed the Minister of Interior and the Inspector General 
of the Trace Region that all state officials and their families had removed their 
                                                          





peçe and çarşaf in the center of the province, but in the district capitals and 
villages, only a small number of women could began wearing overcoats 
because of poverty.457 Although their peçe was removed, some of them were 
continuing to wear the çarşaf since it was expensive to get an overcoat. 
Therefore, the governor added, although this job would be closely observed, 
it would be managed slowly. There was a similar situation in the province of 
Sivas. As the governor reported, women of Sivas had easily and happily 
removed the peçe by themselves, while the total removal of the çarşaf was 
more difficult and necessitated further efforts.458 It would be managed, the 
governor claimed, in a short period of time.   
This tendency to lower the expectations of Ankara and to be content 
with gradual change might also be related to the fact that the circulars of 
Ankara were mainly concerned with and insisted on the modernization of the 
clothing of the state officials and their families. Thus, in their reports to the 
center, some local administrators emphasized the adoption of “modern 
clothing” by the state officials and the success they achieved on this matter, 
without deliberately mentioning the reaction of the general public or any 
possible impact this change in the clothing of the officials had on the clothing 
of the ordinary citizens. The governor of Diyarbakır, a predominantly Kurdish 
province in the Southeast Turkey, would report, for instance, that  the wives 
and close relatives of the state officials were increasingly removing their peçe 
and çarşaf, and beginning to adopt civilized clothing, and that they were 
happily participating in public meetings with their new clothing.459 The report 
of the governor, however, did not include any information regarding the 
attitude of the rest of the population of Diyarbakır regarding this significant 
change.      
Some local elite, on the other hand, presented a very positive picture; 
there was in fact a pretty common tendency among the local elites to represent 
the anti-veiling campaign in their city as a total success and as an effort that 
found acceptance from the general public, especially from the women of the 
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city. This positive image regarding the results of the anti-veiling campaigns 
was reinforced by the local newspapers as well. “The women happily 
welcomed the decision of the city council” was a very common expression 
attached to the news reports about the bans on the peçe and the çarşaf. Some 
local newspapers were clearly taking this to extremes and could claim that the 
total removal of these veils was achieved overnight.  On 1 July 1934, a local 
newspaper, Yeni Mersin, reported the beginning of the çarşaf ban in Mersin, 
informing the readers how easily and happily the new ban had been accepted 
by the people of the city.460 Since the peçe ban had begun twenty days earlier 
than the çarşaf ban, the newspaper emphasized that not even a single woman 
had faced investigation because of noncompliance, and almost half of the 
women had already removed their çarşaf right after the decision of the 
council, without waiting for the ban to be applied. Claiming that the decision 
to ban the peçe and çarşaf had originated from a public demand in the city, 
whose most significant sign was women’s willingness to remove these veils, 
the newspaper announced July 1st as the “day of liberty for the women of 
Mersin.” The next day, only one day after the çarşaf ban came into effect, Yeni 
Mersin was announcing the total disappearance of the çarşaf in Mersin.461 
Likewise, on 2 May 1935, the local newspaper Antalya informed its 
readers that the campaign against the peçe and the çarşaf in the city of Antalya 
was continuing with great success, and that women’s willingness to abide by 
the decision to remove these veils, despite the financial difficulties, deserved 
to be appreciated.462 The report of the party inspector, Adnan Menderes, on 
Antalya at the end of 1935 in fact confirmed these accounts given by the 
newspaper. He indicated in his report that the peçe and the çarşaf had been 
removed in the city quite easily, without any reaction or gossip, and that this 
could be interpreted as a lack of opposition to the revolution.463 One of the few 
women members of parliament and a deputy of Antalya, Türkân Baştuğ, also 
reported on 27 November  1935 that the issue of veiling, “which divides the 
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life into two spheres,” had been settled, especially in the city center in Antalya, 
as well as in some district capitals. She had seen no veiled women in the city 
center, and women were living a normal life together with men in the public 
sphere.464 
Such reports by the party inspectors and deputies indicate the state of 
the anti-veiling campaigns and the attitudes of local elites; thus, the regime 
had certain means to monitor what was going on at the local level. However, 
the inspectors were not specifically asked to report on the issue. In other 
words, we do not see information on the anti-veiling campaigns in all reports. 
Rather, many of the governors reported to the Minister of Interior after 
receiving his circular on 22 June 1935, and almost all of them reported a very 
positive picture. These reports by the province governors shared a very similar 
language, usually repeating the exact phrases used in the circulars coming 
from Ankara while referring to the peçe and the çarşaf. In other words, they 
were responding to Ankara by using Ankara’s own language. Apart from these 
very similar introductions, the governors were assuring Ankara that the 
necessary measures were taken, but they would very rarely explain in detail 
what these measures were. Nor would they give any detailed report about the 
application process. Moreover, like some local newspapers, some governors 
also tended to exaggerate the success of the anti-veiling campaign in their 
provinces. The governor of Afyon, for example, informed the ministry that a 
week after the ban on the peçe and the çarşaf was put into practice, 90% of 
the women in Afyon, who until then had used only these veils, complied.465 
The governor of Giresun reported that the çarşaf was banned in the city and 
women were very happy about this decision and they were in full 
compliance.466 The deputy governor of Balıkesir also reported how easily the 
removal of the peçe and the çarşaf was accepted by the people of the province, 
and in the liberation day celebrations organized in the province capital on 7 
September 1935, there was not even a single woman wearing these veils 
among the thousands who gathered in the streets and squares.467 In Çanakkale, 
the propaganda efforts were successful, as the governor reported; in the 
province and district capitals, most of the women had begun wearing 
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overcoats following the example of the families of the state officials, and in 
the villages, women had made their own overcoats out of the local clothes.468 
In Kars, “a little signal” by the governorship of the province was enough to 
achieve a total success; the çarşaf was eliminated altogether without creating 
any room for gossip or discontent (sızıltı), meaning that it created no 
discussion, opposition and appeared as if it was a natural transformation.469 
Some governors tended to represent this success as a result of their 
own constant efforts. The governor of Maraş, for example, continuously sent 
reports to the Ministry of Interior from the mid-1935 onwards, explaining how 
his efforts ended up achieving a successful and smooth transformation of 
women’s clothing in a province like Maraş, which had been impeded by 
entrenched conservatism. On 13 August 1935, the governor informed the 
ministry that the women of Maraş were very traditional and the first thing that 
captured his attention when he was appointed to this province was the çarşaf 
and the thick peçe women wore. 470 Five months later, on 3 January 1936, he 
reported that all women in the province capital had removed their peçe and 
çarşaf thanks to the anti-veiling campaign.471 
As mentioned in the previous section, the General Secretary of the 
RPP had also asked its local branches to report on the situation regarding the 
anti-veiling campaigns. Like the governors, the local party administrators 
rarely mentioned any obstacle, problem or hesitation regarding the process, 
however.472 On 5 November  1935, the head of the party branch in Maraş, for 
example, informed the general secretary that together with the governor of the 
city, he had explained the necessity of reforming women’s clothing to the 
members of the city council and they all happily accepted and signed the 
decision banning the peçe and the çarşaf, and as had been done everywhere in 
the country, these veils would be removed in Maraş by January 1st.473 Writing 
on January 10th about the result of the ban, he reported, like the governor of 
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Maraş, that it had been applied successfully and not even a single woman went 
onto the streets or into the markets of Maraş wearing the peçe and the çarşaf 
anymore, and that the çarşaf had been replaced by the overcoat.474 
However, in Maraş, the effect of the anti-veiling campaign was in fact 
very limited. In 1936, the party inspector reported that even the leading 
families of the city seemed to be unwilling to abide by the decision to ban the 
peçe and the çarşaf, linking this attitude to the same attitude they had 
developed a decade ago against the hat reform:  
 
No reactionary tendency or counter-revolutionary activity is detected. 
There are people who are cursing their fellow townsmen for blackening 
the name of their hometown since they were formerly condemned for 
their opposition to the hat; but there are also people who think that those 
who were condemned were ignorant and naïve, and that that movement 
[against the hat] was overplayed. What is certain is that the people are 
extremely religious (koyu bir tassup içinde) and even the wealthy of 
today acquired their wealth by appearing religious (mutassıp 
görünmekle). As it was the rich, even the members of the administrative 
board of the party, who were the last people to wear the hat back then, 
today, they are still the same rich families who do not remove the peçe 
and the çarşaf because of the same concern [for appearing religious].475 
 
According to another report written in 1940, in Maraş, apart from two 
or three local families, women from families that were supposed to be liberal 
and young-minded were wearing long overcoats to the heels and carrying 
umbrellas to hide themselves, day and night. There were even women coming 
from upper class families who were not going out or were visiting the hamam 
or their neighbors at night only, regardless of how enlightened these families 
were.476 In 1943, the report of the party inspector mentioned the negative 
image of the only woman member of the local party administration, Nuriye 
Bülbül, in the eyes of the religious residents of the city, since she was the first 
woman to remove the çarşaf in Maraş and thus played an important role in the 
anti-veiling campaign.477  
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 As the documents discussed so far reveal, the Ministry of Interior was 
the main actor in Ankara that tried to control and monitor the anti-veiling 
campaigns in the provinces. Accordingly, the main addressee of the circulars 
of the ministry, the governors, seem quite influential in the process. This is 
also partly because of their high “visibility” in the archives. Governors were 
of course the representatives of the central authority and they were appointed 
administrators who were not natives of the provinces they governed. As such, 
it can be questioned to what extent they can be seen as “local” actors. 
However, the examples analyzed above reflect that even these appointed 
“outsiders” were far from composing a monolithic group that simply acted as 
transmitters of the central policies. Some of them surpassed the limits drawn 
by the central orders, others pretended that they fully implemented them. 
Thus, even if they were at the heart of the state structure, governors had a 
certain capacity to act as local agents in the provinces. A more complex and 
diverse picture could be seen regarding the role of the local elite once one 
looks deeper into the local context. Since the anti-veiling campaigns, at least 
the bans on the peçe and the çarşaf, were initiated by the city councils, 
municipalities appear as important institutions of negotiation and 
domestication of reforms. Moreover, the members of the local party 
administration and the People’s Houses could equally play a role, depending 
on the way the anti-veiling campaign was organized in a given locality. The 
city councils, in particular, could host quite diverse actors: natives and non-
natives, professionals and merchants, hard liner Kemalists and more hesitant 
moderates or even conservatives. It was generally the councils where 
deliberate opposition or unwillingness of some local elites regarding the anti-
veiling campaigns surfaced most. There was a struggle within the local elite 
in some cities on the proper way to approach the unveiling issue.  
One main conflict that arose in a number of city councils was over 
issuing an outright ban, since some members openly resisted this idea. In 
Alanya, for example, a district of the province of Antalya, there had been a 
debate among the members of the municipal council on whether the 
municipality should issue a decision on the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf. 
As the party inspector Adnan Menderes reports, some members of the council 
rejected the idea by arguing that the municipality should not intervene in this 
issue and that they had no right to interfere with the feelings of the people.478 
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As a result, the decision of the municipal council of Alanya only mentioned 
that “the municipality would encourage the removal of the peçe and the 
çarşaf,” a decision the inspector characterized as vague and meaningless.479 A 
member of the council, Kâmil Kemal, who was also a member of the party 
administration in Alanya, opposed this decision of the council and attached an 
annotation. The district governor of Alanya had also intervened in the situation 
to revise the decision. Although sufficient information concerning the result 
of this attempt is lacking, it seems that pro-regime members of the city 
councils played an active role in trying to achieve a strong decision on the 
issue in council meetings. In cases where they were ineffective or there was 
reluctance to issue a decision, governors or local party administrators were 
involved in convincing the council members accordingly. Similarly, in 
Mersin, some people opposed the idea of banning the peçe and the çarşaf, 
arguing that it would be very difficult to apply such a ban and that this issue 
should be handled by an evolutionary approach.480  
In some cases, the local elite also debated whether the city councils 
had indeed the right to make a decision to ban the peçe and the çarşaf. The 
city council of Bergama settled on forming a committee to investigate the 
municipal law. Having come to the conclusion that the municipalities had the 
legal capacity to issue such bans, the city council of Bergama banned the peçe 
and the çarşaf eventually.481 It seems that a similar debate had arisen in the 
Ereğli district of the province of Konya. In Ereğli, the peçe and the çarşaf 
were removed by the municipality in April 1935. In August, a Konya 
newspaper reported that all women in the distinct capital had replaced their 
çarşaf with an overcoat.482 The party inspector had visited Ereğli around the 
same time. In his report in December 1935, while he noted that he did not see 
any visible opposition to the party in general, he had heard that there were 
talks in the town, here and there, on whether the municipality had indeed the 
right to remove the peçe and the çarşaf.483 
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In the Hadim district of the province of Konya, the opposition came 
from within the RPP, which is interesting in itself to see that even in the party 
structure opposing views could exist. The party inspector’s report mentioned 
that the local party president in Hadim had complained about the difficulties 
he faced in trying to get a decision on the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf 
because of the opposition coming from the “fanatically-minded” (softa kafalı) 
members of the local party administration.484 These people who were 
opponents of unveiling were seemingly supportive of the decision, but when 
it came to the implementation of the anti-veiling campaign, they would most 
probably be unwilling to encourage the people of Hadim accordingly and to 
promote the regime ideals. This example confirms Lamprou’s emphasis that 
as one moves downwards from provincial to sub-provincial level, composition 
of the party cadres overlaps more with the general social structure; thus it 
became more probable to see even within the party structure those who could 
oppose the regime policies or who were at least unwilling to promote them 
actively.485     
Another interesting example that shows how the anti-veiling 
campaigns were in fact shaped by the power struggles among the local elites 
who occupied different institutions is the case of Seyitgazi, a district of the 
province of Eskişehir. In Seyitgazi, the municipality had banned the peçe and 
the çarşaf, but this decision created discontent in the city. As the governor of 
Eskişehir reported to the Ministry of Interior, the emerging negative 
propaganda about the municipal ban and this “overcoat incident” did not only 
include ordinary people, but also the elites, people who were holding a 
position in the local politics.486 Some neighborhood delegates (mahalle 
mümessilleri) wanted to prepare a report requesting that the application of the 
ban be postponed. Moreover, some members of the city council had held a 
secret meeting in a certain house, discussing the possibility of organizing a 
vote of no confidence for the mayor. Ahmet Akalın, a member of the council, 
had written a notice and had informed the district governorship against 
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Mehmet Özdemir, with whom he was at odds. Akalın accused Özdemir of 
initiating these secret activities. Based on this notice and the secret inspection 
of the police (kaza zabıtası), an investigation was begun. What is very 
important is that Mehmet Özdemir was not only a member of the city council, 
but also the president of the Seyitgazi branch of the RPP. In addition, the head 
of the local branch of the Airplane Association, Mustafa Özdemir, who was 
probably from the same family, was also among those who were accused. 
Mehmet Özdemir’s brother, a grocer named Veli, was also on the list. Thus, 
if the accusations were correct, some very important members of the local 
elite, who were natives of the city, including the head of the local party branch, 
were part of the “movement” against the anti-veiling campaigns. Even if they 
were not against it ideologically, they were at least using the social discontent 
that emerged because of the anti-veiling campaign in the city as an opportunity 
to challenge the mayor by a vote of no confidence. Although the governor 
informed the ministry that no “movement” was detected as a result of the 
secret investigation, a list of thirteen people, including the head of the RPP 
branch and his relatives, was turned over to the court for further 
investigation.487      
Some members of the local elite would inform Ankara if there was 
reluctance in the application of the anti-veiling campaign in their provinces. 
They considered this as an opportunity to prove their loyalty to the regime. On 
1 June 1936, an official from the 4th Bureau of the Directorate of the Police in 
Gaziantep, a certain Mr. Yazıcıoğlu, made it known  that he was working in 
his position “with a feeling of pride and with full effort,” and he wanted, 
respectfully, to forward to the General Director of the Police  certain 
information he had received. He reported that there had been talk among the 
people of the province of Gaziantep about the attitude of the governor 
regarding the issue of unveiling.488 According to the letter of the official, the 
governor had initially wanted to act firmly and forcefully for the removal of 
the çarşaf, but retreated from this initial attitude due to the threatening letters 
he had received. The governor, according to the official, had left the people 
free to make up their own mind on this matter. Having received this letter, the 
Minister of Interior wrote directly to the governor of Gaziantep, asking 
whether this information was true and whether he had given the people the 
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right to decide for themselves. The Minister also demanded an urgent report 
from the governor about the measures and efforts that were put into practice 
on this matter in his province.489 
The letter of the ministry to the governor of Gaziantep shows that the 
attitude of the central elite in Ankara changed considerably if they sensed a 
possibility of opposition or reluctance on the side of the local administrators. 
In such cases, Ankara preferred to act more assertively, favoring direct 
involvement mainly through pressuring the governors, or by having the 
inspectors general intervene in the situation. The case of Gaziantep also shows 
that the disagreements among the local elite and their rivalries for the approval 
of the center had an impact on the course of the campaigns in a certain 
province. The case of Trabzon is perhaps one of the best examples illustrating 
the tensions between local actors. It clearly shows the ways in which the anti-
veiling campaigns were shaped at the local level through the struggles and 
negotiations of the local elite, and how Ankara intervened in these conflicts 
and competition if their outcomes were not in line of its expectations and if 
the results of the tensions risked a backlash.  
In Trabzon, the anti-veiling campaign first began with propaganda 
efforts in the local newspapers from October 1934 onwards, followed by a 
petition of the members of the youth and sports clubs, led by a youth club, the 
Trabzon Home for Adolescents (Erginler Yurdu), to the city council 
requesting a ban on the use of the peçe and the çarşaf in February 1935.490 
Although the petition of the youth club was welcomed by the mayor and 
presented to the council for discussion, the first decision of the council was to 
postpone the discussion until the report of the administrative committee (idare 
encümeni) on the appropriateness of the proposal had been received.491 At the 
next meeting of the council, however, the issue could not be discussed since 
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were certain that the peçe and the çarşaf would be removed by a decision of the council. 
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there were not enough members present.492 In fact, some members of the city 
council had opposed the idea by arguing that banning of the peçe and the 
çarşaf would be disgraceful for the city.493 The sports clubs had to give the 
same petition to the provincial council in April 1935, most probably due to the 
reluctance of the city council and its tendency to postpone the process.494 It 
seems, however, that this move also did not result as expected, since at the 
April meeting of the provincial council, the issue of the peçe and the çarşaf 
was not on the agenda.495 The opposition in the city council continued for a 
year and the opposing members were able to postpone the talks at the council 
meetings several times in order to prevent a decision.496 Meanwhile, in his 
reply to the circular sent by the secretary general of the party in October 1935, 
the head of the local party branch did not mention the council’s opposition 
and indicated that the peçe had disappeared in Trabzon and that to remove the 
çarşaf, of which only a few examples remained, he would consult the governor 
and they would together take the necessary measures.497 In fact, the situation 
was quite different; the peçe had not disappeared and the çarşaf was still an 
issue. During this year, Trabzon newspapers published several articles, 
commentaries and news reports trying to mobilize the people of the city, 
especially the women, to support the anti-veiling campaign, to remove the 
peçe and the çarşaf, and to pressure the council to obtain a decision. As 
mentioned earlier, some newspapers particularly tried to use the discussion on 
the peçe and the çarşaf at the 4th Congress of the RPP in May in order to 
pressure the members of the local party branch in Trabzon. The caption of the 
local newspaper Halk on the congress was emblematic of this strategy of 
forcing the Trabzon party elite to act: “Members of the RPP promised to 
remove the çarşaf and the peçe.”498 
The turning point to overcoming the resistance, it seems, was indeed 
the intervention of the local party administration. In October 1935, Halk 
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reported that the administrative council of Trabzon RPP and the party councils 
of the districts of the province had held a meeting at the local party office and 
discussed the measures that needed to be taken to remove the peçe and the 
çarşaf in Trabzon.499 Local newspapers reported that a decision by the city 
council was expected soon.500 Yet, opposing delegates managed to postpone 
the issue at the October and November meetings as well. In the end, with the 
pressure coming from the local party administration and the governor, the city 
council of Trabzon banned the peçe and the çarşaf on 4 February 1936 with a 
majority decision, declaring May 4th as the day the ban would go into effect. 
501 As reported by a local newspaper, an official message about the banning of 
the peçe and the çarşaf, which was prepared by the local RPP administration 
(CHP il yön. Kurul başkanlığı) and cosigned by the provincial authority 
(vilayet makamından tevdi edilen) was approved to be put on the agenda by 
the city council.502 In fact, the provincial council led by the governor was 
called for a general meeting on the February1st, just two days before the 
beginning of the regular meeting of the city council on the 3rd. Local 
newspapers were already reporting a week before that a decision to ban the 
peçe and the çarşaf was expected from these meetings.503 Thus, there was 
clearly an intervention by the local party branch and the governor in the 
process. This was how a decision to ban the peçe and the çarşaf by the city 
council was secured in Trabzon. In fact, in the public declaration of the ban in 
the local newspapers, it was mentioned that the decision of the city council 
had been approved by the governorship.504 There are indications that the 
Trabzon RPP administration also followed the process after the declaration of 
the ban by the city council. It issued a notice for entire party organization in 
the province of Trabzon and the People’s House regarding the necessary 
measures that should be taken before the enforcement date of the ban.505 It was 
based on this notice that the People’s House administrative council decided to 
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organize a general meeting at the house to which people would participate 
together with their family members.506 
However, the tension regarding the anti-veiling campaign in the city 
probably had its reflection in Ankara since the recently appointed inspector 
general of the region, Tahsin Uzer, took a firm position in controlling the 
situation and making sure that the aims of the anti-veiling campaign were 
achieved. Towards the end of February, he mentioned the issue in a speech he 
delivered at the Trabzon People’s House.507 Having stressed that the peçe and 
the çarşaf could not have a place in a civilized Turkey, Uzer urged the 
audience to support the attempts of the Trabzon youth to change the dress of 
Trabzon women into a civilized form so that they could become more 
effective. For him, this was not a matter of showing the face, but a struggle 
for women to use their social rights. He had also asked members of the 
audience to convey this request to their sisters and daughters. Uzer’s 
involvement in the process probably had an impact on other local actors and 
institutions. In fact, the notice of the local party administration mentioned 
above was probably a consequence of Uzer’s pressure, or least, a result of his 
influence. As the British Pro-Consul in Trabzon informed the British Embassy 
in Ankara in March 1936, Tahsin Uzer’s main aim since his arrival in the city 
had in fact been to develop a modern social life in Trabzon, and especially to 
increase women’s participation in the social activities organized and 
encouraged by the inspector general, and hence to fight against women’s 
seclusion.508 The inspector had criticized the failure of the Trabzon 
municipality to initiate a ban on the wearing of the peçe and the çarşaf, 
regretting that the ban had been delayed until May 4th. Inspector General Uzer 
also added that if he had been in Trabzon at the time he would not have 
allowed the delay. Thus, Uzer was pressuring for a more effective and 
aggressive anti-veiling campaign. The Pro-Consul also noted the plan of the 
inspector general to arrange an evening party to which only those renowned 
for their religious fanaticism and their wives would be invited.  
It seems, however, that the attitude of the inspector general increased 
the tension rather than alleviating it. A few weeks later, the British Pro-Consul 
reported to the embassy in Ankara that the reaction against the anti-veiling 
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campaign had grown in the city and he was informed that the mayor of 
Trabzon was receiving anonymous letters containing death threats. The wife 
of the mayor was attacked and other instances of violence also occurred 
because of the way the anti-veiling campaign was put into practice: 
 
On April 13th the wife of the President of the Municipality was assaulted 
and injured in the street by a man who tore her dress and underclothes, 
calling them immoral. The police are now searching for the culprit who, 
if found, will, it is stated, be punished in an exemplary manner. It is 
reported that at Palatane [today’s Akçaabat, a district of the province of 
Trabzon S.A.] a man killed a gendarme who according to the 
regulations obtaining there had forcibly removed his wife’s veil. I 
understand that great animosity prevails locally against the municipality 
as a result of the decision regarding women’s dress, and especially 
against the Third Inspector General and his staff who, owing to the 
conduct of most of them, are considered unfitted to the task of civilizing 
the region, being commonly referred as “a band of debauchees.” I am 
informed that the recent visit of the Fleet to Trebizond and its 
surroundings was made with the object of cooling the reactionary 
feelings of the local population and of reminding them that force was 
behind the authorities.509 
 
The case of Trabzon shows that local elites could be part of the 
opposition to the anti-veiling campaign, and could present a quite open and 
strong resistance by using their power, as exemplified by the efforts of some 
members of the Trabzon city council to block the council meetings. It also 
shows, however, the state reflexes against such resistance and its channels of 
pressuring opposing views were also strong. In the case of opposition to the 
anti-veiling campaign, Ankara and all levels of state administration were 
involved in the process.510 However, despite this ideological determination 
and efforts to control and coordinate the campaigns, “undesirable reactions” 
were not or could not be avoided, as was advised in the circulars of Ankara. 
The possibility of such tensions might have concerned many local 
administrators so that, even though a decision was made to remove the peçe 
and the çarşaf in some cities, its implementation was carried out rather 
reluctantly. For example, reporting from the Kadınhan district of the province 
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of Konya in the fall of 1935, the party inspector indicated that no action had 
yet been taken on the issue of peçe and çarşaf despite the existence of a 
decision to abolish them.511 Thus, both the efforts leading to an anti-veiling 
campaign and its implementation were complex processes, which were not 
and could not be determined by the orders of coming from Ankara. Nor they 
could be shaped only by a particular group of elite, such as state officials, 
because they were appointed, more powerful or educated. Their similarities 
and general characteristics notwithstanding, each anti-veiling campaign in 
1930s Turkey was shaped by a complex matrix of actors and dynamics on the 
ground. The attitude of the local elite, which was a composite group in itself, 
was definitive.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion    
The study of the local has been largely neglected in the analyses on the single-
party period in Turkey. If addressed at all, it has mainly been referred to as the 
periphery, associated either with the local notables or the peasant “masses,” 
and considered important to the extent that it could “react” to central politics 
and to the main reforms and policies of the Kemalist regime formulated and 
imposed by Ankara. When the elite has been analyzed, the focus has been 
almost completely on the high political and bureaucratic actors, ignoring the 
critical role the local elite played in interpreting and implementing those 
reforms and policies. This chapter has discussed in detail this critical role 
played by the local elite in the anti-veiling campaigns of the 1930s. The 
analysis presented here not only supports the recently flourishing literature, 
which points to the limits of Ankara’s power in controlling the provinces, but 
also challenges the image of the central Kemalist elite as a monolithic bloc, 
always consistent and determined in enforcing radical policies.       
The close reading of Ankara’s position on the issue of unveiling 
shows that it was quite moderate at the beginning and careful not to create an 
open, general movement, an inkılap (revolution), for changing women’s 
clothing as it had so enthusiastically did in many other issues, such as music 
or language. In the initial circulars sent to the provinces, the Ministry of 
Interior was hesitant to push for more action for the removal of the peçe and 
the çarşaf, other than using propaganda, fashioning the state officials as role 
                                                          





models and “encouraging” women to follow these “modern” examples by 
creating the suitable occasions and opportunities. Thus, although Ankara, 
especially the Ministry of Interior and the General Secretary of the party, tried 
to control what the local administrators were doing and to coordinate the local 
efforts, this involvement was more complex than imposing a well-formulated 
and consistent reform agenda. The debate on unveiling at the RPP Congress 
in 1935, which was discussed in detail above, reveals that there were diverse 
positions in the party, and although there was an agreement that the peçe and 
the çarşaf were not “civilized” attire, there was no consensus on how they 
should be removed. Ankara’s role increased gradually, with the tone of the 
circulars sent by the Ministry of Interior changing into a more determined one. 
The Ministry of Interior became more involved in the anti-veiling campaigns 
and pressured provincial administrators in certain provinces where there was 
resistance or indifference shown by some local actors. However, neither the 
policy of leaving the issue mainly to the local administrators nor the insistence 
to stick with the propaganda efforts changed. Attempts of certain local 
administrators to implement the bans on the peçe and the çarşaf by force were 
consistently opposed by Ankara; but at the same time, these attempts were not 
or could not be fully controlled. Lacking detailed and solid policy guidance 
and encouraged to find their own ways to fight against the peçe and the çarşaf, 
the local elite had considerable space for negotiating, interpreting and 
domesticating the “orders” coming from Ankara and to shape the anti-veiling 
campaigns at the local level.    
Some local elites envisioned themselves as the agents of change in 
their provinces, and thus were quite active in shaping the anti-veiling 
campaigns, supporting propaganda efforts and creating various mechanisms 
to “convince” people to participate in this change. As the example of Antalya 
showed, local initiation was there right from the beginning; some local actors, 
men and women alike, did not wait for orders from Ankara for their initiatives 
to foster modernization. Some administrators also did not hesitate to opt for 
stronger measures to make sure that their initiatives were successful despite 
the fact that those measures were not within the “acceptable” limits set by 
Ankara. Some, on the other hand, tried to follow a gradual strategy, in order 
to keep the balance between what they understood as Ankara’s expectations 
and the realities of the local situation. Thus, as the case of the governors of 
Çorum shows, some local administrators could settle for a slower pace of 
change in women’s clothing by playing up the existence of poverty or the 




making sure that the minimums indicated in Ankara’s circulars, such as the 
compliance of the state officials, were fulfilled. 
As the main addressees of the central government, provincial 
governors of course were in a significant position vis-à-vis Ankara’s efforts 
in coordinating the campaigns at the local level. However, as the discussion 
above showed, the anti-veiling campaigns were not in the hands of a few local 
administrators; they were indeed processes in which many actors and 
institutions were involved, from members of the city councils to the 
columnists of the major local newspapers. Many of the anti-veiling campaigns 
had in fact begun not as initiatives of the governors, but of one or two local 
institutions, which helped them to appear, at least on the surface, more like the 
collective efforts of various local elite groups. The fact that almost all the bans 
on the peçe and the çarşaf were issued by the city councils put the 
municipalities in a critical position, which could be abused by those actors 
who were more reluctant on the unveiling issue, as in the case of Trabzon. The 
city councils were generally the place where implicit resistance or deliberate 
opposition to anti-veiling campaigns appeared the most. In fact, the examples 
analyzed above show that even some governors or local party members, 
however ideologically loyal they were assumed to be as local agents of the 
regime, could be quite hesitant in intervening in women’s clothing. Thus, it is 
difficult to make generalizations, associating certain kinds of local actors with 
certain attitudes. While it is safe to argue that state-appointed actors seemed 
to be more willing to support the campaigns and the opposing forces usually 
came from actors who were locals of the places in question, such divisions 
were not always clear-cut. “Native” supporters of the campaigns could be 
equally vocal at the city councils or other local institutions. This is why, this 
chapter suggested that the concept of elite has to be seen in broader manner; 
it cannot be reduced to local notables or state-appointed provincial 
administrators.  
Taking this diversity of the attitudes of the local elite into 
consideration and analyzing them by situating them into their place in the 
complex matrix of power at the local level is essential to understanding the 
shaping of each anti-veiling campaign in Turkey of the 1930s. However, it is 
also essential to keep in mind that the local elites had to operate within the 
complexities of the local society. In other words, the implementation and 
outcome of the state policies in the provinces were not solely determined by 
acts and attitudes of the local elite. In fact, when one particularly looks at the 




veiling campaigns, it becomes clear that they had to face the opposing local 
forces on the ground and act accordingly. This was why,  for example,  some 
local elite  tried to avoid issuing an outright ban on the peçe and the çarşaf, 
while at the same time covering this “choice” by claiming that their city was 
already very “modern” or that the people of their city were in fact “conscious” 
regarding revolutionary ideals and necessities of modern life.512 In effect, the 
creative ways ordinary people tried to react to the anti-veiling campaigns not 
only influenced the attitudes and choices of the local elites, but also the 
outcomes of the campaigns. Resistance shown by male societal actors also 
made women’s attitudes all the more important, since it was them, at the end 
of the day, who would make the choice to remove or keep on their peçe and 
çarşaf. It is to these questions of popular resistance and women’s agency we 
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Popular Resistance and Women’s Agency  
 
 
“Trabzon bayanları, çarşafları atalım 
Hürriyete, güneşe, hayata kavuşalım… 
… 
Bu milletin kalmasın noksan hiç bir tarafı, 
Atalım göze batan şu karanlık çarşafı… 
Duydum ki Türk kadını onu atmış her yerde, 




I. Diversifying the Local: Multiple Actors, Multiple Voices 
The previous chapter underscored the importance of looking at the local in 
order to understand how the Kemalist regime worked in practice. It discussed 
at length how the policies of Ankara cannot be analyzed by focusing solely on 
the acts and discourse of the central elite, as has been the case in the literature. 
In fact, it demonstrated that even a deeper examination of the orders and 
circulars sent by high authorities in Ankara does not suffice to understand the 
form the policies took in the provinces, since the local administrators were not 
passive receivers of these orders. Moreover, by focusing on the “local elite,” 
a cluster of actors that  comprise  the power networks at the local level, 
Chapter 4  suggested that the local elite was  a composite group that cannot be 
reduced to provincial administrators or local notables. Situated in different 
institutions and positions at the local context, these elites played a significant 
role in the shaping of the policies of the regime on the ground, as it was shown 
in detail in the case of the anti-veiling campaigns. In other words, so far, the 
discussion has focused on introducing the local into the analysis of Kemalist 
regime in the 1930s, and particularly, on diversifying the concept of “elite” in 
two senses: to emphasize the equally critical role the local elite played in the 
shaping of the policies, and the multiplicity of actors that compose the “elite” 
at the local level. 
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 However, it is crucial to note that the significance of the local cannot 
be reduced to the attitude of the local elite and the ways in which they 
negotiated and domesticated the policies of Ankara either. Just like the central 
authority was one actor operating within the complexities of the local society, 
the local elites were also surrounded by the same complexities and had to act 
in relation to the attitudes and reactions of ordinary people. It is only through 
analyzing these relations at the local level, the dynamics between the central 
authority, the local elites and the societal forces, that we can understand the 
shaping of the policies and the extent of social change that has come about as 
a result of these policies. Thus, the local has to be diversified; the role the non-
elite actors and subordinated sectors of the society played should also be 
analyzed so that the multiplicity of the voices at the local level can be 
addressed. Moreover, women, who are a much less visible group in the 
conventional literature than men, deserve special attention. This invisibility 
cuts across the elite-non-elite divide; women’s story is rarely told, and when 
told, the women are not analyzed as the “agents of the narrative.”514 Hence, 
any attempt to recover the voices of the local also needs to address this 
deficiency.  
This chapter aims to do this in the case of the anti-veiling campaigns. 
Its focus is twofold. First, it concentrates on non-elite actors at the local level. 
It discusses popular reactions and resistance to anti-veiling campaigns of the 
1930s. It will be argued that, generally speaking, people’s choice to mainly 
follow relatively “secure” strategies of resistance confirms Hobsbawm’s 
analysis that the subordinate classes are rather more interested in “working the 
system… to their minimum disadvantage.”515 The trouble these strategies of 
resistance created at the local level, particularly for the local authorities who 
had to deal with them on the ground, also reveals that such resistance was 
quite effective.516 However, it will also be demonstrated that the reactions of 
ordinary people to the anti-veiling campaigns reflect the diversity of responses 
to the policies of the state, which included circulating rumors, engaging in 
negative propaganda and sending anonymous complaint letters. In other 
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words, people were involved in acts and expressed attitudes that went beyond 
passive resistance in their everyday experience; they could attempt to 
challenge, negotiate, and influence the policies of the state.  
Second, the chapter focuses on women and discuss their reactions to 
the anti-veiling campaigns in a separate section. Since the primary concern of 
the anti-veiling campaigns was women, it becomes all the more important to 
analyze their role and influence. My aim here is to highlight women’s agency 
in the anti-veiling campaigns, to emphasis their “visibility” and to show their 
contribution in the shaping of the process at the local level. In doing so, I also 
aim to demonstrate the space the anti-veiling campaigns created for various 
forms of women’s involvement in the campaigns, and thus the analysis of their 
agency should go beyond the dichotomy of passive compliance and resistance. 
The emphasis is on women’s roles as subjects of Kemalist modernization in 
the provinces, rather than its object, and on their capacity to manipulate, adapt, 
modify and domesticate the new dress codes in complex ways.     
 
 
II. Popular Resistance to Anti-Veiling Campaigns  
As emphasized in the previous chapter, the state-centered and elite-centered 
approaches prevail in the literature on early republican Turkey. One important 
outcome of this dominance has been the failure to analyze ordinary people’s 
responses and reactions to the tremendous changes the Kemalist reforms tried 
to introduce. The experience of the larger masses and their participation in the 
modernization process have been mostly overlooked. While Brockett focused 
on the examples of collective action against the secularist reforms of the 
regime, a few other historians have tried to focus on other means of responses, 
such as petitions, complaint letters and everyday forms of resistance.517 In fact, 
putting well-known rebellions and incidences aside, people largely refrained 
from organized, mass resistance to Kemalist reforms, and instead opted for 
comparatively safer and easier strategies, such as putting a protest letter on the 
door of a mosque or circulating rumors and gossip. In this sense, people in 
Anatolia conform to Scott’s analysis that “the most subordinate classes 
throughout most of history have rarely been afforded the luxury of open, 
organized, political activity.”518 In addition, the form of resistance has been 
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closely related to the form of domination, the character of the regime, and 
people’s expectations of retaliation.519  
Popular resistance to women’s unveiling in fact predates the 
organized anti-veiling campaigns of the mid-1930s. Considering the 
increasing number of women, especially in big cities, who had “modernized” 
their dress in some way since the late-Ottoman times, combined with the 
earlier attempts of anti-veiling campaigns in the 1920s, it is predictable that 
reactions to this transformation would also follow. For example, in 1929, a 
preacher at the Büyük Mosque in Yozgat, Ethem Hoca, claimed during his 
sermon that unveiled women (açık gezen kadınlar) were prostitutes.520 He was 
put on trial because of this provocative insult and other “reactionary 
comments” he made. Apparently, he was also sent to court a year earlier for 
the same reason.521 Such cases of religious-based opposition initiated by 
preachers or imams in the mosques continued in the 1930s, as well, and 
usually targeted the secularist policies of the regime, in general, categorized 
as “opposition to regime” in the official documents. However, in some reports, 
we see references to specific issues, such as women’s unveiling. In May 1935, 
for example, at the peak of the anti-veiling campaigns all over the country, a 
certain Sheikh Musa was sent to court in Istanbul for criticizing the republican 
regime in his sermons. He was preaching against the regime’s Westernizing 
policies, and particularly, its agenda to emancipate women and to remove the 
çarşaf.522 Similarly, on 27 December 1935, in Mersin, a preacher by the name 
of Hadımlı Ahmet Hoca, told a crowd during his sermon at the Yeni Mosque 
that unveiled (açık gezen) women were shameless, and when they die, their 
funeral prayer should not be performed. Immediately, an investigation was 
launched into the case and Ahmet Hoca was arrested. Having heard of the 
incident, the Prime Ministry had felt the need to warn the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs. According to the Prime Ministry, the frequency of such 
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examples show the looseness of the regime rather than its rigidity; it was either considering it 
unnecessary to issue harsher punishments for these kinds of crimes, or was hesitant to do so. 
See Koçak, 2011, p. 37-38.  





examples demonstrated that the directorate was not careful enough when 
selecting preachers.523             
In the absence of organized opposition, it seems that the most 
common way of resistance to anti-veiling campaigns was to engage in 
negative propaganda about women’s unveiling. In addition to the preachers 
and imams, ordinary people were also involved in such propaganda activities. 
Rumor was the main way in which people tried to communicate their 
discontent and to decrease social support for, or at least compliance with, the 
anti-veiling campaigns.524 In the official communications between Ankara and 
various local actors in the provinces, as well, the fear of counter propaganda 
was in fact visible and such activities were usually mentioned as rumor or 
gossip. The phrases like “there is no negative propaganda” (menfi propaganda 
yapılmadığı), or “the peçe and the çarşaf have been  removed without leaving  
any opportunity for discontent and gossip” (hiçbir sızıltı ve dedikoduya 
meydan bırakmadan) or “those with  harmful ideas and aims were not allowed 
to act” (fena fikir ve maksat takip edenlerin bu vasıta ve fenalıklardan 
istifadelerine meydan ve imkan verilmemiş) were used by some governors in 
their reports, for example, probably to assure Ankara that they were 
successfully handling the threat of resistance.525 In some cases, however, such 
propaganda activities against the anti-veiling campaigns were reported to 
Ankara by the local authorities. In the Seyitgazi district of the province of 
Eskişehir, for example, there were people who attempted to propagandize  
against the ban of the municipality on the peçe and the çarşaf by spreading the 
idea that unveiling was immoral and contrary to  tradition. This was reported 
by the district governor of Seyitgazi to the governor of Eskişehir, who then 
                                                          
523 For all correspondence between the Prime Ministry, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the 
Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Public Prosecutor of Mersin, see PMRA 
030.10/26.151.7. Another imam in Mersin criticized the new image of women and the hat 
reform in his sermons. “Vay Yobaz,” Köroğlu, 8 January 1936, quoted in Metinsoy, 2014.    
524 Even years after the anti-veiling campaigns, rumors that women would go back to wearing 
the çarşaf or men would remove the modern hat were circulated. It seems that there were 
expectations or propaganda that there would be retreat from certain reforms of the regime 
especially after Atatürk’s death in November 1938. See Metinsoy, 2014. 
525 See, the letter from the Governor of Sivas to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 13216-7/1, 3 
September 1935; the letter from the Governor of Yozgat to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 
13216-7/1, 12 November 1935; and from the Governor of Kars to the Ministry of Interior, 
TNPA 13216-7/1, 27 April 1936, respectively. As mentioned in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the 
governor of Izmir, Fazlı Güleç, also used similar phrases even though there was no open ban 
on the peçe and the çarşaf in the city; nor even was there any visible anti-veiling campaign in 




forwarded the news to the Ministry of Interior.526 Having received the news, 
the ministry had asked the governor for the identities of those people and what 
measures had been taken regarding them.527 Apparently, as mentioned in the 
previous section, the people of Seyitgazi had thought that the decision of the 
municipality to ban the peçe and the çarşaf would be implemented 
immediately and by force. Since the majority of them were poor farmer 
families, many women could not afford to buy an overcoat and thus had to 
wear men’s overcoats. This created disquiet in the city and people begun 
publicly complaining about the situation. Consequently, the governor sent a 
letter to the ministry. In it he reported  that, as further investigation revealed, 
people in fact were not engaged in negative propaganda against unveiling, but 
rather were complaining and gossiping about the immediate implementation 
of the ban.528 The ban of Seyitgazi municipality advised that the peçe and the 
çarşaf be replaced by hats and overcoats; the complaints had grown out of the 
inability of people to obtain this “modern” clothing.  
What was interesting about the case of Seyitgazi was that in addition 
to ordinary people who were accused of making these complaints, there were 
people who were engaged in the local politics and part of this “movement” 
(cereyan), as characterized in the report of the governor of Eskişehir. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, some neighborhood delegates (mahalle 
mümessilleri) and members of the city council were accused of being involved 
in the opposition to the anti-veiling campaign. Thus, it seems, the public 
discontent over the implementation of the ban on the peçe and the çarşaf 
became part of a conflict between groups of local elites. If the accusations 
were correct, the head of the local party branch was indeed trying to challenge 
the mayor by a vote of no confidence, and interestingly, he was doing so by 
being part of, or at least by taking advantage of, the popular resistance that 
had emerged against the application process of the anti-veiling campaign. In 
fact, opposition or reluctance shown by some local elite in the course of the 
anti-veiling campaigns, especially against issuing of outright bans, often 
coincided with the social discontent already existing in the local community. 
In other words, while it was possible to encounter examples where some 
members of the city councils or even local party administrations in some cities 
                                                          
526 Letter from the Governor of Eskişehir to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 13216-7/1, 22 
January 1936. 
527 Letter from the Ministry of Interior to the Governor of Eskişehir, TNPA 13216-7/1, 31 
January 1936.  





opposed these bans and thus were accused of being “fanatical” by the 
representatives of Ankara,529 there were also cases, such as Trabzon, where 
the resistance shown by some local elite in the city council and social 
resistance shown by ordinary people complemented, and probably, reinforced, 
each other. Therefore, it is also important to keep in mind that it is not always 
possible to differentiate resistance by the elite and popular resistance; a native 
owner of a grocery store could be a member of the city council and could be 
accused of being part of the same opposition “movement” with an ordinary 
man complaining about the ban of the municipality, as in the case of 
Seyitgazi.530  
Another form of resistance to anti-veiling campaigns was sending 
complaint letters to central authorities. These complaint letters could be 
written by lower-ranking officials who would accuse their superiors for their 
misconduct during implementation process of the campaigns, as in the case of 
Tosya district of Kastamonu, or by citizens themselves, as in the case of 
Ödemiş district of Izmir.531 In fact, in the case of Ödemiş, we see a local 
notable, İsmail Efe, complaining to higher authorities after having already 
communicated with the local administrators himself. In his letter, İsmail Efe 
was saying that he had first told the district governor that the representatives 
in the parliament in Ankara did not have consent for the use of the police force 
in the issue of unveiling, but the district governor had paid no attention to 
this.532 Thus, those local actors who were sending complaint letters were 
convinced that local administrators were acting without the consent of Ankara 
and thus exceeding their authority; or at least they had the hope that Ankara 
would not tolerate a forceful removal of women’s veils. The complaint letters 
                                                          
529 Such as the cases of Alanya district of the province of Antalya and Hadim district of the 
province of Konya. For more on opposition to anti-veiling campaigns by local elites, see 
Chapter 4. 
530 See the letter from the Governor of Eskişehir to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 13216-7/1, 
7 February 1936. 
531 For the former, see the letter from second commissioner Tahsin to the General Directorate 
of Security, TNPA 13216-7/1, 21 August 1935. For the latter, see İsmail Efe’s letter dated 18 
December 1937, quoted in Yılmaz, 2006, pp. 78-79. 
532 İsmail Efe’s letter is addressed to a certain Hamdi Bey, but Yılmaz does not explain the title 
of Hamdi Bey or his exact position other than stating that he was a high level state official. The 
interesting case with the letter of İsmail Efe is that he urges Hamdi Bey to let Celal Bey know 
about the situation. Thus his aim was in fact to reach Celal Bayar, the prime minister. As it is 
understood from his second letter, İsmail Efe had in fact known Celal Bayar personally, and 
had discussed this issue with him beforehand. This was how he knew that Ankara was against 
the use of force in the unveiling issue. For his second letter, see ibid., p. 82. For a more detailed 




would also contain information  about the social discontent such wrongdoings 
of local administrators created among ordinary people and thus warn Ankara 
about the possibility of a social reaction or harm in the image of the regime.             
One sector of the society that constantly consulted the local authorities 
or tried to contact Ankara through letters against the anti-veiling campaigns 
was the weavers of the çarşaf or the peştamal. Since anti-veiling campaigns 
directly influenced their trade, the concern of the weavers of the çarşaf or 
peştamal was mainly economic. In fact, this group was not limited to the 
producers of the these veils; in places where the bans included certain men’s 
clothes, those who were employed in weaving the fabric  for the manufacture  
of these clothes also reacted and sent petitions to the authorities.533 In some 
cases, weavers tried to influence the authorities in Ankara and limit the impact 
of the anti-veiling campaign in their localities by reporting all the misconduct 
in which the local administrators engaged in the implementation process of 
the bans on the peçe and the çarşaf. A certain weaver from Aydın, Dokumacı 
Ahmet Şevki, for example, even sent a telegraph to president Atatürk, 
explaining that horrendous instructions (dehşetli emirler), which included  
stationing watchmen in the streets and tearing off the peçe and the çarşaf of 
women, had been  given by the local administrators to remove the peçe and 
the çarşaf in the province.534 He characterized these acts as a violation of basic 
individual freedoms and law (hürriyet şahsiye kanun ayaklar altında 
çiğnenmektedir). Dokumacı Ahmet Şevki also informed the president that he 
reported these acts to the governorship of Aydın. However, the governorship 
had considered it enough to reply to his complaints by referring to the decision 
that banned the use of the peçe and the çarşaf, and did not provide a further 
explanation. He asked the president to see to it that such actions be stopped if 
they were unlawful. As it is understood from his telegraph, Dokumacı Ahmet 
Şevki had also sent a telegraph to the president a year earlier, when there had 
                                                          
533 One interesting case is the case of Maraş, where not only the peçe and the çarşaf, but also 
the baggy trousers of men, which were locally called karadon (literally, black pants), and aba 
(kind of a shirt without arms) were also banned. An owner of a weaving loom that was 
producing the fabric for karadon, Biçuv İbrahim from the Kılıç Ali neighborhood of Maraş, 
had sent petitions to the governorship, to the municipality, to the local party branch, as well as 
to the party headquarters in Ankara. The local authorities tried to convince him that he could 
produce the fabric for the modern trousers that the men of Maraş were now supposed to wear. 
They were also trying to help these weavers to establish a cooperative in order not to revitalize 
the craft. See correspondence from RPP Maraş Administration to RPP Secretariat General, 
PMRA 490.01/17.88.1, 24 January 1936.              
534 Telegraph from Dokumacı Ahmet Şevki to president Atatürk, TNPA 13216-7/1, 16 August 




been attempts made by the governorship to remove the peçe and the çarşaf. 
Apparently, this earlier telegraph Şevki sent had an impact, and although it is 
not clear what they were, certain orders were sent to the governor of Aydın. 
Thus, Şevki was following the same strategy and applying to the president in 
order to limit the attempts of the governorship of Aydın.   
The governor of Aydın, on the other hand, informed the Ministry of 
Interior on 17 August, 1935, one day after the telegraph of Dokumacı Ahmet 
Şevki, that the decision of the city council dated August 9th to ban the peçe, 
the çarşaf, and the peştamal had been received very well by the people of the 
province, and that no opposition or difficulty had been faced during the 
implementation.535 The only opposition was that of a peştamal weaver, Şevki, 
who had informed the governorship that he would be left unemployed if the 
ban on the peştamal was implemented. He was informed that he could 
continue weaving the peştamal cloth to be used at the public baths, the hamam. 
The governor warned the ministry that the same weaver had send a telegraph 
to the president during the previous attempts at unveiling and managed to get 
some orders issued (emir getirttiği). According to the governor, it was also 
understood that Şevki would attempt to do the same this time as well. The 
governor finished his letter to the minister by characterizing Şevki as a person 
with a very low social status (içtimai mevkii çok düşük) and by indicating that 
they were also taking into consideration that “this guy” could encourage some 
action on the matter (bu adamın teşvik eylemesi ihtimali göz önünde 
tutulmaktadır), probably referring to the possibility that Şevki could engage 
in some propaganda activities against the anti-veiling campaign.         
As mentioned above, the governor was indeed right in expecting 
Dokumacı Şevki to send a new telegraph to the president. Apart from the 
resistance of a peştamal weaver and his insistence on directly complaining to 
the president about the local affairs, the case of Dokumacı Şevki is also 
interesting in that it reveals how the Ministry of Interior handled such cases. 
The ministry sent to the governor of Aydın a code (şifre) asking for the identity 
of Ahmet Şevki, whether the signature on the telegraph was true or factitious, 
and what this guy wanted.536 In other words, the ministry asked that an inquiry 
                                                          
535 Letter from the Governor of Aydın to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 13216-7/1, 17 August 
1935. The decision of the city council was put into practice on the 14th of August, only five 
days after the decision.  
536 Code from the Minister of Interior to the Governorship of Aydın, TNPA 13216-7/1, 26 
August 1935. This code was sent as an urgent case and was a supplement to a previous code 




be made about Ahmet Şevki by the governorship. The governor of Aydın, 
Salim Günday, responded to the code of the ministry with a detailed 
explanation of who Ahmet Şevki was and what he wanted.537 According to the 
report of the governor, Ahmet Şevki was originally from Buldan, and he was 
mainly an artisan whose job was to weave and sell the peştamal garb. He was 
also known as the husband of a girl from Dinar (Dinarlı kızın kocası), since 
he got married to a “free” girl (serbest kadın) from Dinar when he was young. 
He had no reputable social position among the people and he was a half-wit 
(yarım akıllı). In  previous years, when there had been  attempts to remove the 
peştamal in Aydın, Şevki again  sent “exaggerated” telegraphs and petitions 
to Atatürk, to the Prime Ministry, and to the ministries, and had managed to 
postpone the initiative. The governor again rejected Ahmet Şevki’s 
accusations and assured the ministry that the implementation of the ban was 
uneventful and not a single woman was fined. Apparently, Ahmet Şevki had 
tried to encourage opposition against unveiling by showing people the 
response he received from Atatürk to his telegraph a year earlier.  His actions, 
however, had been ineffectual, according to the governor. No opposition to or 
complaints about the ban on the on the peçe, the çarşaf or the peştamal in the 
province of Aydın had been received, and, having seen this, Ahmet Şevki had 
changed his attitude.  
Unfortunately, there is no information in this correspondence 
regarding Atatürk’s response to Ahmet Şevki’s telegraph in 1934. It is 
interesting, however, to note that Atatürk indeed had replied to the complaint 
he received about anti-veiling campaigns, and apparently, due to his 
intervention, the campaign that year had been postponed, as it is indicated in 
the governor’s letter. It is also not certain whether the president received 
Ahmet Şevki’s telegraph in 1935. It is also interesting to see that the ministry’s 
reaction to Ahmet Şevki’s constant complaints was quite skeptical, despite the 
fact that the governor explained the reason behind his opposition to the 
campaign as being mainly economic. In response to the governor’s letter, the 
ministry reminded the governor in Aydın that Ahmet Şevki’s intention could 
very well stem from his reactionary ideas, rather than from his economic 
concerns.538 In other words, the ministry was not satisfied with governor’s 
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537 From the Governor of Aydın to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 13216-7/1, 26 August 1935. 
538 From the Minister of Interior to the Governor of Aydın, TNPA 13216-7/1, 7 September 
1935. In the same file, there is a letter from the undersecretary to the minister, Şükrü Kaya, 




explanation and asked him to follow Ahmet Şevki more closely, to send his 
photograph, and to investigate on whose behalf he was acting and whether he 
was a member a religious order (tarikat). The ministry also urged the governor 
that necessary measures should be taken to prevent Ahmet Şevki from 
disturbing “high authorities.” It is evident that the ministry was uncomfortable 
with Ahmet Şevki’s telegraphs to the president. Having received the 
additional order, the governor sent another letter after a few weeks, 
summarizing the results of his investigation: 
 
1- Dokumacı Ahmet Şevki’s situation is being closely monitored.  
2- Based on the investigations so far, although it is understood that he 
has a poor character and morals and is tainted by his addiction to 
gambling, no relationship had been detected between him and any 
religious order. In my opinion, he was provoked by a few backward-
minded people on the issue of the peştamal, and encouraged by the 
reply he had received to his telegraph to Atatürk the previous year, he 
repeated the same initiative this year. He is a worthless person with no 
position in his own community, and with a tainted past. He has no 
relationship with the religious orders.    
3- We are trying to find Ahmet Şevki’s photograph. I respectfully 
submit that it will be sent as soon as it is obtained.539      
  
The case of Dokumacı Ahmet Şevki of Aydın shows that any attempt 
at questioning or complaining about the anti-veiling campaigns was associated 
with a potentially more general ideological opposition to the regime and was 
thus approached with great suspicion by the Ministry of Interior. A similar 
reaction of the ministry can be seen in another case as well. On 18 September 
1935, the governor of the province of Konya sent a letter to the Ministry of 
Interior indicating that a certain man named Taşçı Ahmet (Ahmet the 
stonecutter) from the sub-district (nahiye) of Sille had circulated a rumor that 
a gendarmerie soldier who had been assigned a task in one of the villages was 
killed because he tried to remove a woman’s çarşaf.540 Supposedly, he was 
killed by the brothers of the woman who was attacked. Ahmet had also told 
                                                          
undersecretary of the ministry of interior to the minister of interior Şükrü Kaya, 13216-7/1, 2 
September 1935. There is a hand-written note on the letter saying that Ahmet Şevki could 
possibly have reactionary intentions. This is probably the minister’s own writing. Based on this 
note, it seems, the ministry has sent a second order to the governor asking for more 
investigation.  
539 From the Governor of Aydın to the Ministry of Interior, 13216-7/1, 1 October 1935. 





people of his hometown Sille that a policeman and a gendarmerie were also 
killed for the same reason in the center of Konya. Having heard about such 
talk, the governorship had begun an investigation, and as a result, had found 
out that Ahmet was responsible for them. Upon being questioned, Ahmet said 
that he had heard about the killings while three men were talking at a 
coffeehouse in the province center. However, he could not identify the people 
from whom he had heard the story. His case was sent to the court as the police 
was of the opinion that he himself had created false stories and helped spread 
them, even among the little children of Sille. The Ministry of Interior again 
found the case suspicious and asked the governor of Konya to closely watch 
Ahmet’s situation, to investigate his ethnic origin and whether he had any 
connections from outside (hariçle ilgisi olup olmadığının), and to send 
Ahmet’s picture and fingerprints.541 Twenty days later, the governor of Konya 
sent the picture and fingerprints, but assured the ministry that Ahmet was an 
ignorant man who had not engaged in any anti-regime activity in the past.  
There was also no information indicating that he had any connections from 
outside (hariçle de bir ilgisi işidilmemiştir).   
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Figure 5.1. Letter sent by the governor of Konya to the Ministry of Interior to 
which Taşçı Ahmet’s picture and fingerprints were attached. TNPA 13216-7/1, 





Based on the existing documents, it is impossible to tell for sure 
whether the stories told by Taşçı Ahmet about the killing of two gendarmerie 
soldiers and a policeman in the province of Konya were at all true. However, 
the killing of or attacks against the gendarmerie, the police officers or the 
municipal police forces because they intervened in women’s clothing during 
the implementation of the anti-veiling campaigns were in fact not pure 
construction. In the province of Trabzon, for example, the British Pro-Consul 
reported that a man had killed a gendarmerie soldier who had forcibly 
removed his wife’s veil in the district capital of Akçaabat.542 As discussed in 
the previous chapter, some local administrators had had a very hard time in 
handling cases of resistance to the implementation of the bans on the peçe and 
the çarşaf through the use of police force. The mayor of Trabzon had received 
anonymous letters threatening his life.  His wife was physically attacked in 
the street and injured.543 Similarly, the governor of Gaziantep was accused of 
retreating from his initial firm position on the issue of unveiling because he 
had received threatening letters.544 Thus, in addition to attacks against the 
police forces and soldiers, it seems that sending threatening letters to the local 
authorities who were seen as responsible for the anti-veiling campaigns, or 
even targeting their unveiled female family members, were ways some people 
used to stop the anti-veiling campaigns, or at least to prevent the authorities 
from using force while implementing the bans.      
 
 
III. How to approach women’s agency 
A great deal has been achieved in the last four decades in making women a 
subject of historical enquiry.545 From major historical developments to the 
histories of ordinary people, “her-story” has begun to be told and thus the 
conventional historiography, in which women were mainly invisible, has been 
challenged. Feminist historians, aiming to go beyond simply incorporating 
women into old schools of social history or writing “her-story” as 
supplementary to the existing grand narratives, have increasingly begun to use 
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543 Ibid. 
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545 For a general discussion on the achievements of feminist historians, see Joan Wallach Scott, 
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gender as an analytic category.546 The objective in doing this has been to 
emphasize that gender is not a separate or complementary topic of analysis 
but rather a fundamental and essential part of any historical narrative. 
Studying gender is a method for rewriting history; it consists of not only 
analyzing men and women in relation to one another, but also studying how 
gender shapes the structure of social, economic and political authority.547 Scott 
explains this in the following way: 
 
The realization of the radical potential of women’s history comes in the 
writing of narratives that focus on women’s experience and analyze the 
ways in which politics construct gender and gender constructs politics. 
Female agency then becomes not the recounting of great deeds 
performed by women, but the exposure of the often silent and hidden 
operations of gender which are nonetheless present and defining forces 
of politics and political life.548 
 
The use of gender as an analytic category, and in relation to that, 
feminist approaches to women’s agency, have been informed by the questions 
raised about the structuralist analyses of power and domination.549 In the 
feminist understanding of agency, women’s choices, behaviors and reactions 
are not determined by structure (i.e., patriarchy); they have a capacity to act 
upon their world and “to reinterpret received gender models contextually.”550 
 As Najmabadi points out, however, the achievements of feminist 
history have been geographically uneven.551 While a longer distance has been 
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547 Scott, 1983, p. 153. 
548 Ibid., p. 156. For more, see also Joan Wallach Scott, Gender and the Politics of History, 
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550 Azam Torab, “Piety as Gendered Agency: A Study of Jalaseh Ritual Discourse in an Urban 
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covered in European and American history, in Middle Eastern history, less 
progress has been achieved in introducing women into social history, and 
gendering history is still a marginal endeavor. Studies about women in modern 
Middle Eastern history have mainly focused on outlining women’s roles in the 
nationalist movements of the late 19th century and in the modernizing reforms 
that were put into practice once independence was gained and nation-states 
were established in the region. In other words, the most popular topic has been 
the link between nationalism and modernization, and the centrality of the 
“woman question” in this framework.552 While most studies have tried to deal 
with this question and have focused on what this centrality entailed for women 
by writing her-story, relatively fewer analyses have attempted to deal with the 
issue of how gender fundamentally altered the way modernity was imagined 
and constructed, and how central women’s agency was in this construction.553 
As Paidar stressed in her work on Iran, any discourse on the question of 
political and social reorganization of the society, whether the discourse of the 
political elite or that of other societal actors, has indeed entailed a redefinition 
of gender relations,554 and women were part of this redefinition process. 
Because portraying Muslim women as submissive and passive receivers of 
patriarchal male policies and domination has been historically very salient, 
especially in the West, feminist scholars of the region have paid particular 
attention to the question of Middle Eastern women’s agency. Although an 
important contribution has been made in this vein, the focus has largely been 
on women’s movements, which were mainly composed of upper-middle class 
educated women. In other words, understandably, vanguards of feminism and 
women’s rights in major countries of the region were the topic of early works 
and the emphasis, thus, has remained largely on feminist agency.  
Nevertheless, though limited, a wider discussion on women’s agency 
has also emerged in the field of Middle Eastern women’s studies and the 
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question of how to approach and analyze this agency has received more 
attention recently. In her ethnographic study of an urban women’s mosque 
movement in Cairo, which has emerged as a part of the Islamic revival in 
Egypt in recent decades, Saba Mahmood questions the model of agency that 
“seeks to locate the political and moral autonomy of the subject in the face of 
power” and argues that such an understanding of agency severely limits our 
capacity to understand the lives of women who participate in religious 
movements such as the one she studies.555 Although such movements can be 
seen as male-dominated, it would be misleading, she claims, to explain 
women’s participation in them as false consciousness or internalization of 
patriarchal norms. By referring to the feminist literature that examines how 
women use the conceptual and practical resources of various religious 
traditions to foster their own interests, she suggests that this too should be seen 
as a site of women’s agency.  
Here again, Mahmood’s suggestion is to go beyond restoring the 
absent voices of women and showing their roles in the making of history. 
Moreover, her proposal is to enlarge the existing feminist literature by taking 
into consideration the instances where women do not engage in an “explicit 
feminist agency,” and to “look for expressions and moments of resistance that 
may suggest a challenge to male domination.”556 She advocates thinking of 
agency “not simply as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination, 
but as a capacity for action that specific relations of subordination enable and 
create.”557 This is a capacity to act, to the extent that it is possible, to achieve 
one’s interest, choice or self-expression. As regards to women’s agency, this 
capacity refers to women’s efforts to shape their own lives in whatever way 
possible.  
There are two important repercussions of such an understanding of 
agency. First, as Mahmood stresses, it enables one to see power as a set of 
relations that not only dominates the subject, but also creates possibilities for 
her. Following Foucauldian analysis and Butler’s concept of “subjectivation,” 
Mahmood reminds us that the very conditions and processes that subordinate 
women can also provide the means through which they become agents. In fact, 
an increasing number of studies in the field of Ottoman/Turkish women’s 
history have begun to rethink the changing state policies and modernizing 
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reforms in this sense. In her study of the politicization of reproduction in the 
19th century Ottoman Empire, Gülhan Balsoy, for example, looks at the ways 
in which policies to discipline the female body, and to regulate and medicalize 
women’s sexuality, which mainly aimed at establishing a legal and medical 
control over women’s lives, enabled women to situate themselves as agents.558 
Ottoman government’s laws and regulations banning abortion, she argues, 
cannot be read only as signs of absolute state domination over women’s 
bodies. It was also through these laws and regulations that Ottoman women 
gained legal subjectivity.559 Balsoy also reminds us that the state attempts to 
control female sexuality and body were never without limitations and 
contentions, and as repressive as they were in many respects, they entailed 
opportunities for women.560 Likewise, the prescriptive books and news 
discourses on pregnancy and childbirth that emerged in the 19th century “were 
both empowering and oppressive at the same time.”561 They were drawing 
new limits and boundaries for women, but also attributing responsibility to 
them. By analyzing these new milieus of state control and domination over 
women’s bodies and sexuality as part of the pronatalist policies of the 19th 
century Ottoman state, Balsoy concludes that  “in return for bearing the 
children needed for a prosperous country, women received their share in the 
promised redefinition of the relationship between the Ottoman state and 
society.”562 
Second, such an analysis of women’s agency is also giving rise to 
thinking about women’s acts, attitudes, choices and motivations that goes 
beyond the dichotomy of resistance and subordination.563 In other words, there 
may be a variety of ways women react to social and political changes that 
impact their lives, including but not limited to open resistance and full 
submission. In addition, what seems to be resistance or compliance in the first 
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instance may very well not be intended as such by women themselves. Or, 
even if women’s first reaction was compliance, it might not mean submission 
to domination. On the contrary, it might be one way of, and possibly the most 
rational/effective tactic for, handling the situation. As Torab underlines, 
compliance provides security and social recognition for women in certain 
contexts, and can be turned into an advantage, a source of power. Thus 
“compliance is often the result of rational assessment of the situation and its 
viable alternatives. It is not always a matter of simple choice, nor does it 
automatically entail agreement.”564 Likewise, there may be instances of 
“resistance” that are “momentary, fragile and often not even conscious.”565 
Similarly, women may behave such that simultaneous processes of 
compliance and resistance can be seen. It is imperative to analyze, therefore, 
women’s reactions and attitudes through such a multifaceted conception of 
agency. This is also necessary to avoid attributing an unchanging essence to 
women. As Inden notes, we need to keep in mind that “all agents are relatively 
complex and shifting.”566 In other words, women do not act in isolation, but 
in relationship to one another and within the constraints generated by the male-
dominated social structure and male agents. Moreover, their actions are 
subject to change based on the context within which they find themselves.  
This chapter aims to demonstrate that the anti-veiling campaigns in 
early republican Turkey and the ways in which women reacted to them reflect 
such a multi-layered notion of agency. An important body of literature is 
available analyzing the impact of the modernizing reforms of the early 
republic on women and women’s changing social status in the society. 
Feminist scholars of modern Turkey have successfully revealed that although 
the Kemalist regime had championed a discourse of women’s emancipation, 
women were largely instrumentalized and they were seen mainly as objects of 
social change rather than as active subjects.567 This gendered analysis of 
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Kemalism finds its most salient and famous formulation in Kandiyoti’s article 
summarizing women as “emancipated but unliberated” citizens of the new 
republic.568 It should be underlined that this feminist critique has been 
essential in decoding the patriarchal nature of the new regime and its reforms 
as far as the gender roles and women’s social positions are concerned.  
As Bozdoğan emphasizes, however, this compelling critique “does 
not alter the progressiveness of the reforms as viewed in their own time, 
especially by women themselves, who felt empowered by their new rights and 
new visibility in public life.”569 In other words, patriarchal and limited as they 
were, the legal and social reforms  introduced by the Kemalist regime 
significantly increased the space and capacity for women’s visibility and 
participation in the public life, as well as for their empowerment in their 
personal lives. Similar to Najmabadi’s analysis of Iranian modernization, one 
can argue that the Kemalist project of modernity can also be seen as 
simultaneously regulatory/controlling and empowering for women.570 
Moreover, some women, at least, were active supporters and even initiators of 
the Kemalist reforms. This agency of course was not limited to compliance 
and support. If we turn our attention away from the discourse and reforms of 
the Kemalist elite at the center and look more at the ways in which policies 
were implemented at the local level, we can see that women could influence 
these policies in many different ways. That is to say, although it has been much 
less appreciated in the literature, women had as much an impact on the shaping 
and implementation of the Kemalist reforms as they were influenced by them. 
Especially the policies such as the anti-veiling campaigns, which were mainly 
local in character and put into practice based on the discussions and 
negotiations at the local level, allowed even larger space for women’s agency. 
If all the complexities of the campaigns that were discussed in the previous 
chapters are taken into consideration, one can understand better that there was 
in fact a wide range of possibilities for the new dress codes to be manipulated 
in the public sphere and women had the capacity to adapt, modify and/or resist 
them in various ways. Thus, this chapter suggests that the feminist critique of 
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early republic has to be revisited and enlarged in order to reflect this 
complexity of women’s reactions and roles in the shaping of the Kemalist 
experience.    
 
 
IV. Women in the Anti-Veiling Campaigns 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, anti-veiling campaigns in 
the 1930s were much more effective than the earlier attempts to remove the 
peçe and the çarşaf in the 1920s. They were more organized, wide-spread and 
determined; they more consistently targeted the use of the peçe, the çarşaf and 
other local veils and replaced them with “modern” clothing through the power 
of local institutions and actors, including municipalities, members of the local 
sports clubs, governors and members of teachers’ associations. They had a 
strong impact on the shaping of new gender roles and codes not only in the 
political sphere, state offices and educational institutions, and   the urban 
space, but also in the daily life of ordinary people, at the heart of gender 
relations in the private sphere. In this sense, however inconsistent and 
ambiguous in practice and diverse in discourse they were, it should be 
underlined that these campaigns nevertheless touched the lives of many 
women.  
This section aims to discuss how women responded to these 
campaigns and to show the diversity of these responses. As mentioned in the 
previous section, women’s agency is conceptualized here as women’s 
capacity to act and is seen as consisting of more than the dichotomy of 
resistance and subordination. Thus, dividing the section into two sub-sections 
only serves to present the discussion in a more organized way rather than to 
reproduce this dichotomy. The sub-sections and various types of women’s 
reactions they discuss should be read as a continuum or scale of responses 
women could embrace; while different groups of women in the same city 
could follow different strategies, negative or positive, to the same anti-veiling 
campaign, a particular woman could also change her attitude towards veiling 
or unveiling in time depending on the changing dynamics/conditions around 
her.  
 
IV.a. Non-compliance, resistance, selective adaptation 
Public discourse on anti-veiling campaigns in the 1930s, as it was reflected in 
the local newspapers, overwhelmingly emphasized women’s compliance. 




women’s approval of the changes and their willingness to adopt the new 
clothes. This was partly a result of the propaganda the local newspapers had 
initiated; they shared a similar language to imply how the bans on the peçe 
and the çarşaf were well-received and enthusiastically supported, particularly 
by women, by using titles like “women remove their peçe” or “women throw 
off their çarşaf”. In fact, such reports highlighted women’s agency on 
purpose; it was a strategy, a part of the attempt to present these campaigns as 
local initiatives, as changes stemming from women’s genuine desire to alter 
their clothing. However, below the surface of this propaganda, there were 
many ways in which women tried to resist anti-veiling campaigns or at least 
to limit the influence the campaigns had on their own choices.    
One common way women used to resist unveiling was disobedience. 
There were women who continued to wear the peçe or the çarşaf in the public 
sphere despite the existence of open bans in their cities.571 In Bursa, for 
example, a local newspaper reported on 10 October 1935 that because of 
women’s disobedience, the municipal police had to apply legal sanctions, and, 
as a result, over a hundred women were fined for wearing the peçe or the 
çarşaf in a few months’ time.572 It seems, however, that such actions of the 
municipal police were insufficient to overcome women’s disobedience in the 
city. In the following months, the existence of women who insisted on wearing 
the peçe or the çarşaf continued to draw the attention of some local 
newspapers and some members of the city council in Bursa.573 There were 
discussions on the implementation process of the ban, and some argued for an 
even more vigorous enforcement of the council decisions.574 Another place 
where women insisted on wearing the çarşaf despite the ban and the threat of 
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fine was Sivas. Two sisters who were fined for entering a government office 
with their black çarşafs, did not hesitate to write a letter to Ankara, 
complaining about the fines issued by the local authorities, arguing  that there 
was no law banning these veils.575 In Denizli, there were also women who 
continued to wear the peştamal veil in certain neighborhoods in the provincial 
center, and in some district centers and villages.576 Local newspapers of the 
city reported some of those women who were fined by publicly listing their 
names.577 Similar news about women who tried to avoid authorities by hiding 
from them or reports mentioning women’s insistence on using the peçe or the 
çarşaf, especially in the remote neighborhoods away from city centers, can 
also be seen in other provinces.578 Sometimes, the continued use of the peçe 
and the çarşaf in some cities could create reactions in other cities where the 
bans were implemented. The situation in the big cities, such as Istanbul, 
Ankara and Izmir, had a particularly great impact on people living in the 
provinces. The head of the local party branch in Yozgat, Yusuf Duygu, for 
example, complained that people from Yozgat who travelled to these big cities 
and saw women there wearing the peçe and the çarşaf were surprised about 
Yozgat’s insistence on unveiling when they returned.579 Thus, he indicated to 
the General Secretary of the RPP that it was critical that these veils be removed 
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very rapidly, altogether everywhere, especially in big cities. This consistency 
was significant in order to prevent rumor and discontent in the periphery.         
If women did not or could not challenge the bans by open 
disobedience, they tried to find other ways to handle them. One way was to 
minimize, as much as possible, the frequency at which they left their houses. 
In other words, some women tried to avoid adopting the newly imposed 
outdoor clothes such as overcoats by remaining in their private spheres. A 
complaint letter sent from Tosya, a district of the province of Kastamonu, to 
the General Directorate of Security indicates that the decision of the city 
council to ban the peçe and the çarşaf was implemented in the district center 
by using the gendarmerie.580 As claimed in the letter, the soldiers forcefully 
removed some women’s çarşaf in the middle of the street, leaving them in a 
very difficult situation.581 Having seen or heard these instances, women in the 
district center and in the villages refrained from leaving their houses. Village 
women who were accustomed to regularly visiting the district center on the 
day of the city market stopped going to Tosya. 582 Similarly, in Maraş, there 
were women who did not step outside their houses for years, as reported by 
the governor in 1939. Some of them preferred to travel in carriages at night to 
visit their relatives.583  
Another way in which women handled the ban on the peçe and the 
çarşaf was using alternative means to cover themselves. The most noteworthy 
of these alternative means was to use umbrellas to replace the peçe. Women 
would hide their face with the umbrellas they carried so they could follow the 
norms of veiling without violating the ban. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the governor of Ordu complained that some women began to carry 
umbrellas unnecessarily. 584 Similarly, in Maraş and Kilis, women were using 
umbrellas day and night to hide themselves.585 In Rize, the use of umbrella for 
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veiling purposes reached such a level that the decision of the city council to 
ban the peçe also asked women to not carry umbrellas.586 In addition to the 
use of umbrellas, some different combinations of outdoor attire that would 
provide women with a middle ground, that is, that would not violate either the 
bans on the çarşaf or the traditional customs, also prevailed. Hence, using long 
and wide (usually black) headscarves, and preferring overcoats that reached 
the heels, thus providing a veiling closer to full-body covering, could also be 
seen as means employed by women to overcome the difficulty the banning of 
the çarşaf had created  for them.587  
One indication of women’s reluctance to adopt the new clothes was 
the frequency of notices published in the newspapers calling on women to 
abide by the decisions. In Trabzon, for example, where there was also 
resistance by some male members in the city council against issuing a ban, a 
lot of women were hesitant to remove their peçe and çarşaf.588 Therefore, 
several articles and notices were published in the local newspapers to convince 
women that the peçe and the çarşaf were inappropriate customs, not Islamic, 
and were the major obstacles to women’s progress and participation in the 
social life. The emphasis on the “non-Islamic” character of the peçe and çarşaf 
was particularly visible, showing that there was a widespread perception that 
those women who insisted on wearing these veils were doing so because of 
religious reasons. There was also a perception that women were reluctant to 
comply with the necessities of a “modern” social life because of the 
conservative attitude of the Turkish society in general, or because traditional 
norms (not necessarily Islamic) were very dominant. Those who stressed this 
dominance of the traditional norms as the major obstacle before the 
modernization of women’s clothing also referred to the social resistance to 
women’s public visibility in general. The same local newspapers in Trabzon 
that complained about women who insisted on wearing the peçe and the çarşaf 
also complained that women were not active in the public life of the city in 
general. For example, women were not willing to participate in the activities 
of the People’s House. The inability of the theater section of the Trabzon 
People’s House to stage plays, for example, was directly related to the 
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disinclination of women to appear on stage.589 Even the women teachers in the 
city were reluctant to participate in such activities.590 Having seemed to 
understand that women were trapped between the traditional norms and the 
necessities of the “new” life, these male authors would nevertheless not 
abstain from blaming women for their inability to overcome this difficulty - 
for not being brave enough to challenge this social pressure. Cemal Rıza, a 
columnist in Halk, addressed the women of Trabzon by saying that it was 
unacceptable for them to still be reluctant to join the modern social life, and 
not to be able to get rid of the peçe and the çarşaf after all the progress they 
had accomplished in other fields: 
 
The revolution has given you the rights you have been denied for 
centuries. You have gained all the seats you deserve. Is there any point 
in looking at your rights from behind the kafes? You too know, see and 
enumerate the meaninglessness of bad customs, of useless habits. Why 
do you not get rid of the peçe and the çarşaf? There is a sun, a life, a 
light awaiting your new existence that got rid of the peçe and the çarşaf? 
What difficulty do you see in front of reaching this life, this light as 
soon as possible?591 
 
Another common theme in explaining resistance or hesitance of 
women to removing the peçe and the çarşaf was that they were forced by men 
to continue to wear these veils.592 Male authors of the newspapers were 
especially alert to men’s attitudes regarding unveiling, and did not hesitate to 
address them directly in their articles: Turkish men would not represent their 
sisters to the world in a bad way, as backward women;593 and their reluctance 
(rather than women’s) could be the real reason for the slow pace of progress 
in unveiling.594 There was also propaganda calling on women to be strong vis-
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à-vis the men who force them to veil. In Trabzon, for example, where 
women’s compliance with the bans on the peçe and the çarşaf was low, local 
newspapers were trying to convince women not to obey their husbands or 
other closely related men. In an anonymous article, the local newspaper Halk 
was particularly addressing those women who wait until the deadline imposed 
by the city council to remove their peçe and çarşaf, warning them to not listen 
to the men who preach to them to do so.595 Women were advised by the 
newspaper to reply those men in following words: 
 
I am the one who creates the society. The society awaits me. We will 
get out of this backward veil that slaps our social existence for once and 
all; we will throw off the çarşaf just like you have removed and 
mangled the fez. Like you, we will adopt civilized clothing. … Even if 
it came late, the decision of the municipality has emerged out of our 
deep desire to be part of the civilized life, out of our long lasting interest 
in joining society. 
 
Such news reports and comments on them usually did not use 
incriminating language against women who continued to wear the peçe and 
the çarşaf. However, there were some examples of a more radical tone that 
tended to represent especially those women who continued to dress in the 
black çarşaf as reactionaries who opposed the revolutionary ideas of the new 
regime. Their participation in the public sphere was seen by some as a direct 
attack on the creation of a civilized, modern public life, which was seen as the 
first condition for entering the world of civilized nations. In one of his articles 
emblematic of such a tone, Aka Gündüz, a prominent columnist and play 
writer of the time, claims that there are three groups of women who continue 
to wear the çarşaf: old women, young women who are forced to wear this veil 
and young women who willingly insist on wearing it.596 Older women who 
continue to use the çarşaf can be excused, according to Gündüz, because it is 
understandable that they remain loyal to old traditions. It is, however, 
unacceptable for young women to follow the example of these older women. 
If they do, Gündüz suggests, this means that they either deliberately oppose 
the new regime’s ideals, or that they are forced to do so. The latter could be 
excused; but conscious disobedience to the dictates of the civilized life by 
younger generations, who insist on participating in the public sphere in 
“uniform-like” çarşaf was unacceptable. That is why he argues that one should 
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be very skeptical about those groups of women who wear black çarşafs in 
similar styles and wander in the most crowded areas in cities together. For 
him, this cannot be seen as normal and should be approached as a kind of 
demonstration; what he calls a “çarşaf demonstration” (çarşaf nümayişi). He 
characterizes women who dress in black çarşaf as “demonstrators” of a 
different kind; those who do not protest in usual gatherings or by organizing 
uprisings, but by simply wandering around in the public sphere with their 
“silk, chic and black” çarşaf. “Çarşaf demonstrations” were a clear sign of 
reaction to the new - to what was civilized and modern. This “black unity,” in 
his own words, must have been organized and planned by the “backward 
mind” still alive and waits to be crashed by the forces of the revolution. Aka 
Gündüz here warns his readers about the possibility of unconventional 
political demonstrations: demonstrators against the regime should not always 
need to carry Derviş Mehmet’s flag and shout; they can also use a fashionable, 
silk, black çarşaf.597 
It is important to note that although Gündüz’s article was originally 
published in a well-known pro-regime national newspaper, Hakimiyeti 
Milliye, it was then reprinted in some local newspapers. Thus, such concerns 
about women who continue wearing the peçe and the çarşaf also had local 
resonance, and this was because of still high visibility of women wearing these 
veils. In other words, there was awareness that anti-veiling campaigns could 
remain limited in impact, at least in the short run. In fact, Gündüz’s article was 
motivated by the same awareness; because these veils were so durable and 
because many women were reluctant to remove them, he claimed that 
decisions by local authorities to ban these veils were important, but it would 
take a long time for these decisions to be publicly accepted as a norm. His aim 
was to warn the public that some women’s resistance should be taken 
seriously, and this struggle should continue if Turkey wants to be part of the 
civilized world. One fear was that Turkey’s image would be harmed because 
of the visibility of women wearing the peçe and the çarşaf. As explained in 
Chapter 3, this question of “what the Europeans would think about us” was in 
fact a major motivation behind the anti-veiling campaigns in general. 
However, it seems that there was a more particular concern about women’s 
noncompliance with the anti-veiling campaigns; there was a fear that this 
noncompliance would be seen as resistance to the regime in the West as well. 
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In fact, an article published in an American newspaper, Daily Eagle, had 
alerted both the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.598 As 
the Turkish Embassy in Washington DC reported, the article claimed that in 
Kastamonu and in some other Anatolian cities, groups composed of six to 
eight women would prefer to go out to the streets wearing thick peçes and 
çarşafs. This was perceived as a protest against the “modern” clothing that 
had been introduced by the regime. The article was based on a telegraph the 
newspaper had received from Ankara. The Ministry of Interior sent a reply to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that such news were fabrications of those who 
wanted generate or strengthen the idea in the West that Turks were backward-
thinking (geri düşünceli).599 The Ministry of Interior was asked to refute the 
article.  
Although it is hard to find detailed information, there are indications 
that women’s compliance with the ban on the peçe was higher than their 
compliance with the ban on the çarşaf. Some provincial governors indicated 
in their reports to Ankara a similar tendency; while women had “easily and 
happily” removed their peçes, the çarşaf was only “partially” removed as a 
result of the anti-veiling campaign.600 It was probably easier, or more 
acceptable, or desirable for women to expose their face than to replace their 
çarşaf. The fact that the struggle against the peçe had a longer history, and 
that it was much strongly stigmatized as the “veil” to be removed because of 
the symbolic meanings attributed to the opening of the face, it can be argued 
that the removal of the peçe began earlier than the removal of head covering 
or full body covering as provided by the çarşaf. It was also probably perceived 
as more “doable” by the general public compared to the removal of the çarşaf. 
An article in a Trabzon newspaper, for example, complained that while 
women easily got rid of their peçe, the çarşaf proved more durable despite all 
the propaganda against it.601 Specifically targeting the çarşaf, the author 
claimed that the removal of the peçe was in fact more important and symbolic 
                                                          
598 Circular from the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 
13216-7/1, 28 October 1935. 
599 Circular from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, TNPA 13216-7/1, 
19 November 1935. There is another circular sent from the General Directorate of Security to 
the General Directorate of Press (Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü) informing the later about the 
circular sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking the ministry to refute the article. See the 
circular from the General Directorate of Security to the General Directorate of Press, TNPA 
13216-7/1, 27 November 1935.  
600 See, for example, the letter from the Governor of Sivas to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 
13216-7/1, 3 September 1935.   




to reflect the civilized character of the nation, and the will of Turkish women 
had succeeded in achieving this task. Yet, although the çarşaf was a foreign 
tradition and thus should be easier to remove according to the author, women 
of Trabzon were very reluctant to do so.  
This reluctance of women cannot, of course, be understood without 
taking into account the patriarchal and conservative social dynamics by which 
they were surrounded. In fact, references to social pressures in explaining the 
unwillingness of women to remove their veils was common in the reports of 
the local authorities to Ankara, and these cannot be read only as attempts of 
these actors to create excuses for their inability to enforce a successful anti-
veiling campaign in their localities. Especially in less developed or smaller 
provinces or in places where there was a more homogenous local culture, 
ethnically or religiously, the conservativeness of the society regarding 
women’s public appearance was a major concern for women in the issue of 
veiling/unveiling as well. Thus, the strictness of patriarchal social control of 
women played a key role in their decision to veil or unveil. The governor of 
Sinop, for example,  reported in March 1935 that many of those local women 
who had removed the çarşaf and came to the municipality building with an 
overcoat during the national elections a month earlier,  in February 1935, again 
switched back to wearing the çarşaf due to the influence of old customs.602 It 
seems that the local propaganda regarding the modernization of women’s 
clothing in Sinop had some effect on the women of the city, at least in the 
beginning, and many women had chosen to unveil only during the elections, 
perhaps because there was more public attention on them during this first 
voting process after women gained their political rights in December 1934. 
Once the elections were over, however, many of them continued to use the 
çarşaf instead of the overcoat. Similarly, in Çorum, the governor attributed 
women’s insistence on wearing the çarşaf despite an open ban to the 
entrenched moral and traditional norms in the province.603 Under such 
circumstances, he maintained, it was very difficult for women to make up their 
own minds and adopt new forms of attire at the expense of having to face 
social pressure and exclusion. The poor and the older women proved 
                                                          
602 From the governor of Sinop to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 13216-7/1, 4 March 1935. 
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1935. A similar argument was employed by the governor of Maraş. See, the governor of Maraş 
to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 13216-7/1, 13 August 1935. The governor of Çankırı was 
also complaining in 1939 about communal pressure on women and religious fanaticism, which 
made it very difficult for most of the women of the city to adapt to the new clothing norms. See 




particularly determined to wear the çarşaf. Even in the circulars sent from 
Ankara to the provinces, this idea that the peçe and the çarşaf were surviving 
in the provinces due to social pressures was salient. As quoted in Chapter 4, 
the circular of the Minister of Interior on 22 June 1935  claimed  that these 
veils had been  totally removed in big cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, 
but were in use in other provinces because of the power of traditions and 
because women were afraid of gossip.604 In fact, the minister indicated that 
women living in places where the peçe and the çarşaf were surviving would 
adopt the overcoat when they visited big towns, but then would go back to 
wearing the veils when they returned to their hometowns. A contemporary 
observer also points at how local community pressure influenced women’s 
ability to unveil. In her tour through Eastern Anatolia, Lilo Linke notes the 
reaction of a woman she met on a train from Malatya to Adana in mid-1935 
to the banning of the peçe and the çarşaf in the city. Having learned the news 
of the ban, the woman stated that women of Adana were lucky since they did 
not need to worry about what people would say about them if they removed 
their çarşaf.605 The bans, it seems, were making it easier to unveil for those 
women who would like to unveil but were not able to do so because of the 
social pressure they were surrounded by.    
The extent of pressure the patriarchal and conservative character of 
the society put on women can also be seen in the harassment and attacks some 
women faced because they removed their veils. In other words, in addition to 
labeling, gossiping and exclusion, which would already make women’s daily 
life very difficult and thus hard to bear, women also had to cope with the threat 
of physical harassment in case of unveiling. In the province of Afyon, for 
example, women who had removed their çarşaf were harassed and assaulted 
by some men in the streets. As the governor reports, these “malicious men” 
would make a pass at women, saying “what nice domestic goods we have” (ne 
iyi yerli mallarımız varmış),606 or use ruder language words, and even 
                                                          
604 From the Minister of Interior to general inspectorships and provinces, TNPA 13216-7/1, 22 
July 1935. 
605 Linke, 1937, p. 231. 
606 Here, the verbal assault cited in the report of the governor, “what nice domestic goods we 
have,” probably had a double connotation and was also referring to another contemporary 
campaign to promote the use of “domestic goods.” In the aftermath of the Great Depression, 
the 1930s in Turkey witnessed a national campaign aiming to minimize the effects of the 
economic crisis by encouraging saving and promoting the use and consumption of domestic 
products. For this task, a special association, the National Economy and Savings Society (Milli 
İktisat ve Tasarruf Cemiyeti), was established by the support of the regime in December 1929. 




physically attack them.607 A certain Emine, for example, a 20-year-old woman 
who was the daughter of Mevlüt and wife of İsmail from the neighborhood of 
Nurcu in the center of Afyon, was physically harassed by Abdurrahman, son 
of Ahmet from the Kırkalioğulları family in the Mecidiye neighborhood. 
Abdurrahman had harassed Emine because she was unveiled when she was 
passing by the İstasyon Avenue of Afyon with her child on November 12th. 
He had grabbed Emine’s arm and began dragging her down the street. Emine 
was rescued only by the assistance she received from people around them.  
Abdurrahman was captured and handed over to the police.  As indicated in a 
subsequent report from the governor, however, he was acquitted of this 
crime.608 Similarly, the decision of the city council of Bergama, a district of 
the province of Izmir, to ban the peçe, the çarşaf, and the peştamal also 
included an article indicating that those who would hurt and harm women 
wearing “national” (meaning “modern”) attire would also be fined.609 This 
shows that such acts either happened in Bergama or at least there was a strong 
concern that they could happen once women unveiled. In order to apply it 
more effectively, the committee that prepared the ban also proposed to the city 
council that the chairs placed in front of the coffeehouses should also be 
removed. These chairs, according to the committee, were occupied by 
unemployed men (işi gücü olmayan), who could harm those women who 
would pass by in national attire. Having heard of these cases of harassment 
and attacks against women, Ankara had urged the local authorities to 
strengthen their measures against such actions, to apprehend immediately 
those who were involved, and to report on the results of the legal 
                                                          
propaganda purposes, which were active in publishing booklets and posters, and organizing 
exhibitions, conferences and meetings. The association was particularly active in organizing 
events during the Savings and Domestic Products Week (Tasarruf ve Yerli Malı Haftası), 
celebrated each year in 12-19 December. For more information, see Doğan Duman, “Milli 
İktisat ve Tasarruf Cemiyeti,” Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi 1(2), 1992, pp. 
127-141. See also Doğan Duman, Ulusal Ekonominin Yapılanmasında Yerli Malı Haftaları, 
Izmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 2001.  
607 From the Governor of Afyon to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 13216-7/1, 13 November 
1935. 
608 From the Governor of Afyon to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 13216-7/1, 25 May 1936. 
609 “Bergama’da Çarşaf, Peçe ve Kıvraklar Kaldırılıyor,” Anadolu, 6 December 1934. Metinsoy 
claims that in the 1930s, “numerous men who verbally attacked women in the streets were 
sentenced to imprisonment or a heavy fine” after the Ministry of Justice issued a circular in 
1929 ordering the judicial authorities to take legal action against those men who harassed 
women. Metinsoy, however, does not explain in detail whether these cases of imprisonment or 




procedures.610 It seems that Ankara was concerned that such kinds of events 
could be used as excuse for open or secret opposition and provocation.      
Women also had to confront the pressures coming from the state 
authorities and various local actors pushing for unveiling. Considering 
especially the cases where fines were imposed and the municipal police, the 
police or the gendarmerie were involved in the implementation process of the 
bans, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that some women were coerced, 
and probably had to remove their veils even if they did not want to.611 In other 
words, women were caught between two patriarchal forces. On the one hand, 
religious concerns, traditional habits, social and family pressures surrounding 
women certainly played an indispensable role in their attitudes towards 
unveiling;  on the other hand, the pressures coming from the state authorities 
created yet another obstacle to women trying to  realize their own preferences 
and choices as individuals.  
In addition to these factors, economic reasons also had a great impact 
on women’s ability to comply with the new dress codes. Because anti-veiling 
campaigns promoted the replacement of the çarşaf with an overcoat and 
presenting it as the “modern” outdoor clothing of women, the removal of the 
çarşaf was equated with the adoption of an overcoat, which was unfamiliar to 
many people in the provinces, in short supply and more expensive than the 
çarşaf or other local body veils, such as the peştamal. The çarşaf or the 
peştamal had become customary, were locally produced and thus easily 
available for people. Considering that the majority of the population lived in 
the rural areas and in poor conditions, acquiring an overcoat was not easy. 
Some women openly complained about this by writing letters to newspapers 
and explaining their inability to afford overcoats.612 In fact, the inability of the 
poor people to abide by the decisions of the local institutions banning the 
                                                          
610 For example, see the letter from the Minister of Interior to the Governorship of Afyon, TNPA 
13216-7/1, 28 November 1935. 
611 In addition to the case of Tosya mentioned above, there were other instances where women 
were physically attacked. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a complaint letter from Aydın 
claims that women’s çarşafs were forcefully removed. Telegraph from Dokumacı Ahmet Şevki 
to president Atatürk, TNPA 13216-7/1, 16 August 1935. 
612 A woman from Çorum and groups of women from Milas had written to the newspaper, 
Köroğlu. They were not against unveiling but they were complaining that overcoats were very 
expensive. A group of men from Akseki had also written a letter to the same newspaper 
indicating that they were unable to afford an overcoat since they were poor people living on 





çarşaf was also observed by the authorities.613 Thus, the widespread tendency 
of the local administrators to allow more time for the removal of the çarşaf in 
the decisions was not a coincidence. Poverty also explains why local 
institutions such as the People’s Houses, the Red Crescent, the party branches, 
and chambers of commerce were mobilized to provide poor women with 
overcoats. In some cities, the wives of the governors or mayors were 
personally in charge of these organizations to help poor women to replace their 
çarşaf. As mentioned earlier, in Antalya, for example, a special committee 
was formed by the provincial council to help poor women and the head of this 
committee was the wife of the governor.614 In Trabzon, the wife of the mayor, 
Emine Kadri Evren, was in charge of the efforts of the Red Crescent to provide 
poor women with overcoats.615 In fact, even for these initiatives, it was hard 
to provide enough overcoats for women in need.616 They tried to mobilize 
donors to collect money for the initiative, or to convert women’s çarşafs into 
overcoats in cases where the cloth of the çarşaf was suitable for such a 
change.617 In Çanakkale, for example, village women tried to produce 
overcoats out of the local cloth they had woven themselves.618 In places where 
such initiatives did not exist or could not provide the number of overcoats 
needed, women had to find other ways to handle the difficult situation in 
which they found themselves. In Seyitgazi, for example, a district of the 
province of Eskişehir, the ban on the çarşaf was put into practice immediately, 
thus those women, who could not afford to buy an overcoat but had to go out 
to work, had to wear men’s overcoats and jackets.619 This “awkward scene” 
created a reaction in the district. The people of Seyitgazi, the majority of 
whom were poor farmers, complained that the municipality should have 
                                                          
613 For example, see the letter from the governor of Çorum to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 
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Interior, TNPA 13216-7/1, 27 September 1935.  
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615 “Kızılay fakirlere 50 manto dağıttı,” Halk, 30 April 1936. 
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“Halkevi çok fakir ailelere manto yaptıracak,” Halk, 27 February 1936. As it can be followed 
by local newspapers, all initiatives combined, they could provide 319 women with overcoats in 
Trabzon: 200 by the Red Crescent, 119 by the local party administration. See “Kızılay fakirlere 
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617 This was the case in Antalya, for example. 
618 Letter from the Governor of Çanakkale to the Ministry of Interior, TNPA 13216-7/1, 21 
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postponed the implementation of the ban on the çarşaf until the end of harvest 
season so that people could at least save some money to comply with the new 
dress codes.     
Such examples also point to the various ways in which women in 
different cities reacted to the clothing change. In other words, the effectiveness 
and the influence of the anti-veiling campaigns were uneven; depending on 
the social, cultural and economic factors in different cities, and differences 
across social classes in a particular city, there were significant variations 
regarding how women dressed.620 Age would also matter.621 Even within the 
same family, generational differences would play a role; a mother would 
continue to use some kind of a headscarf, while her daughters could be totally 
unveiled. Also, a woman who used to veil by wearing the çarşaf, could adopt 
a turban or a hat for some time, but could prefer to use a headscarf as she gets 
older. Thus, just as in the case of the 1920s, in the 1930s it is rather more 
appropriate to talk about a coexistence of many forms of veiling and 
unveiling.622 The peçe and the çarşaf never totally disappeared, but decreased 
at least during the campaigns, though perhaps more in some places than 
others.623 More “modernized” forms of veiling, ranging from larger 
headscarves to turbans, became common. In fact, women’ insistence on 
veiling,  more particularly, on covering  their hair, whether in a more 
traditional form or in more modernized, modified forms, clearly influenced 
the outcome of the anti-veiling campaigns. In other words, the insistence on 
                                                          
620 In fact, even before the anti-veiling campaigns of the 1930s, these factors already caused a 
change in women’s clothing. Graham-Brown suggests, for example, that the change in women’s 
clothing was partly a result of the shift in the meanings attributed to certain dress forms: “In 
Turkey, in 1890, the wearer of a yashmak and a charchaf would have been assumed to come 
from a well-to-do elite family. In 1930, a woman from that class would have been recognizable 
by the fashionable cut of her dress and coat or suit…” Graham-Brown, 1988, p. 132. Yashmak 
(yaşmak) is a veil that was used together with the ferace, which consisted of two pieces, a head-
veil and a face-veil. It was replaced by the peçe with the spread of the çarşaf. 
621 For a similar observation by a contemporary author who underlined the difference between 
the old generation of women and the new in terms of adopting modern clothing in Istanbul in 
1934, see A.E., “Yüzü kapalı gezen kadın,” Son Posta, 6 August 1934. 
622 For various examples of women’s adaptation to new clothing and their new ways of covering 
their hair, see Oya Baydar and Feride Çiçekoğlu (eds.), Cumhuriyet’in Aile Albümleri, Istanbul: 
Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998.   
623 Yılmaz argues that the regional differences can in part be explained by the limits of the RPP 
penetration in the periphery. Yılmaz, 2006, p. 66. Yılmaz also refers to a report by the governor 
of the province of Hakkari, where he indicated that the notable native families continued to 
wear the peçe and the çarşaf despite the anti-veiling campaign. The governor was pointing at a 
difference between the civil servants who were natives of the region and those who were not; 




the covering of the hair had an impact on the general public discourse on 
women’s clothing, and also, on the expectations of the Kemalist elite. As 
mentioned above, even a Kemalist as radical as Gündüz was willing to accept 
the fact that it would take a long time for the ideals to be internalized by the 
masses. As a matter of fact, however dominant the image of “modern” Turkish 
woman was, in the popular press, there was not a total disappearance of 
women with some forms of head covering, for example.624 In other words, 
since the co-existence of many forms of women’s clothing in practice was 
undeniable, the tendency of the Kemalists to opt for a more gradual 
transformation in the matter of modernization of women’s dress grew; the 
“symbolic ‘revealing’ of the face and body operated within constraints 
recognized and accepted by authorities prompting dress reform.”625 Thus, in 
addition to the patriarchal concerns of the Kemalist male elite and their fear 
of “over-Westernization” of Turkish women,626 it was women’s insistence on 
having a say on what they wear that drew the boundaries and limits of the anti-
veiling campaigns. 
 
IV.b. Compliance, Support, Participation  
It would be misleading to think that women’s compliance can be seen as a 
matter of pure propaganda. Although it is impossible to know the exact 
percentages, there were in fact many women who removed their peçe and 
çarşaf. Likewise, it would also not be true to attribute this compliance of 
women to the repressiveness of the campaigns and women’s fear of the regime 
or the social pressures. Some women willingly removed their peçe and çarşaf, 
having seen anti-veiling campaigns as an opportunity to adopt the new clothes, 
to relax the rules of seclusion, to follow fashion, or simply because they 
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thought it was more convenient to do so.627 Since anti-veiling campaigns 
addressed all women and aimed at achieving a mass movement of change in 
women’s clothing, they also created a chance for individual women, who had 
the intention or desire to remove these veils, to do so in groups. In other words, 
it can be argued that  those women who were prepared to remove these veils 
but were afraid or reluctant to do so on their own might have found it easier 
and more preferable to change their outdoor clothing  together with other 
women and as part of a politically supported and socially propagated local 
campaign. In fact, although less obviously, such opportunities were available 
even before the main wave of anti-veiling campaigns had begun in 1934. 
Women participating in public education or joining the workforce were among 
the factors that significantly increased their capacity to socialize with 
unveiling as a norm, or at least to familiarize with the idea that their clothing 
can change just like their social status. In Tarsus, for example, a local factory 
distributed over 300 overcoats to women workers in November 1933 so that 
they could remove their peçe and çarşaf.628 Some other working women in the 
town also followed this example and begun wearing an overcoat instead of the 
çarşaf. The public cotton factory in Adana went one step further in 1934 and 
introduced a standard dress for its 1200 workers, composed of both men and 
women. As reported in a national newspaper, especially the new elegant dress 
for women workers, “black dress with a white belt,” had emancipated them 
from the baggy trousers, the peçe and the çarşaf.629      
As briefly discussed in Chapter 3, the beginning of the 1930s 
witnessed an increasing stigmatization of the peçe and the çarşaf as 
uncivilized attire and the promotion of European dresses as the norm in a 
number of media, ranging from propaganda posters of the RPP to the various 
milieus of popular culture. As Shissler argued in the context of beauty 
contests, the new practices and norms introduced or legitimatized under the 
new regime in the 1930s “shifted the parameters of where women could go 
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and what they could do;” they entailed a “redefinition of the concept of 
respectability or honor, namus, and an expansion for women of the limits of 
the social contract.”630 Similarly, the anti-veiling campaigns also enhanced 
women’s capacity to make choices and expanded the space in which women 
could realize them. This does not mean that this happened to the same degree 
everywhere, or that all women enjoyed the advantages of this redefinition 
equally. However, it should not be overlooked that anti-veiling campaigns and 
the discourse and propaganda regarding women’s clothing in the press and 
popular culture significantly contributed to the relaxation of certain social 
norms, by marking the removal of the veil as “normal,” acceptable and even 
desirable, by redefining “socially acceptable standards of women’s dress.”631 
This redefinition was reinforced by the encouragement of the adoption 
of “new” dresses to replace the çarşaf in various ways, the most important of 
which was the flourishing of the sewing courses for women in the provinces. 
In other words, women were not only persuaded to remove their “old” clothes, 
but they were also trained to create their new clothes by learning modern 
sewing techniques and the latest fashion patterns.  Usually called  the Biçki ve 
Dikiş Yurdu (literally, Home for Cutting and Sewing), schools that provided 
sewing courses for women were opened by both private initiative and public 
institutions like the People’s Houses.632 The opening of such a place in a 
certain city was usually announced in the local newspapers and included 
detailed information such as its address or the school from which the head of 
the course graduated.633 It was also common for such schools to provide 
courses on hat making, which would make women’s access to “modern” 
headwear easier and cheaper. This would be especially emphasized in the ads 
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and then a sewing house, which was called Beyaz Dikiş Yurdu (White Sewing Home), in 
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muvaffakiyeti,” Hakkın Sesi, 25 January 1936. One of the sewing courses was called “Modern 
Family Sewing Course” (Asri Aile Dikiş Yurdu) in Trabzon. See “Trabzon Halkevinde Biçki ve 




about sewing courses. These sewing schools also frequently organized fairs, 
exhibitions, and fashion shows to display the clothes, hats, flowers and other 
home decoration items they produced for the general public. Always reported 
on in the local newspapers, such organizations were sometimes hosted by the 
People’s Houses or the party buildings, and attended by the highest local 
administrators and other leading members of the local society in the 
provinces.634 In some cities, the contribution of the sewing schools to 
replacing the çarşaf with the overcoat during the anti-veiling campaigns was 
particularly emphasized. In Trabzon, for example, only a few weeks before 
the enforcement of the ban on the peçe and the çarşaf, the sewing schools were 
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635 “Peçe ve Çarşaf tarihe karıştı,” Halk, 23 April 1936.  
Figure 5.2. Women at a sewing course in 1930s Hacı Bektaş, a district in the 
province of Nevşehir.  
Source: Cumhuriyet’in Aile Albümleri, Feride Çiçekoğlu and Oya Baydar 





In addition to the sewing courses offering short-term training for 
women, seemingly organized predominantly for women in the provinces, a 
more limited number of women had the chance to acquire a longer education 
and thus more complex skills in sewing at the Girls’ Institutes (Kız 
Enstitüleri). As vocational schools established in 1929 specifically for training 
girls, these institutes aimed at creating educated, modern and rational 
housewives.636 One of the main components of this project was equipping 
women with the knowledge necessary to make their own clothes, and 
preferably, to help spread them as the norm. Graduates of the institutes would 
be the role models for all other Turkish women, and through the clothes they 
created, for sale, for exhibition or for themselves and women around them, 
they would symbolize the transformation of ordinary Turkish woman under 
the republic.  
Women’s positive attitude towards the removal of the peçe and çarşaf 
was not limited to their simple compliance with the bans or campaigns 
initiated by men. There were, in fact, many women, mostly from the local elite 
families or among state officials, who organized meetings, gave speeches, and 
supported unveiling by being part the campaigns. Especially local women’s 
associations, women members of other associations and sports clubs or of the 
local branches of the Red Crescent and the Turkish Airplane Association were 
actively involved. The Diyarbakır Women’s Association, for example, 
organized a meeting where the head of the association, Behiye Baturay, 
declared their wish for the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf, which, she 
argued, had no connection with women’s honor or Turkish women’s 
dignity.637 Equally, women could act as facilitators and initiators of these 
campaigns. In fact, one of the earliest examples of an anti-veiling campaign 
was the decision of a group of women in Bursa on October 29th, Republic Day, 
in 1933 to remove their çarşaf and to declare this publicly in order to inform 
and encourage other women in the city.638 A similar decision was made by a 
group of women in Kütahya in May 1934.639 
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637 “Diyarbekir kadınlar derneği…,” İkbal, 27 January 1935.  
638 “Bursada artık çarşaf giymeyecekler,” Cumhuriyet, 29 October 1933.  




Women’s role as facilitators or initiators of the anti-veiling campaigns 
was particularly valid for women who were politically active. As it was briefly 
discussed in Chapter 3, Turkey in the 1930s witnessed an increase in women’s 
political mobilization. Women’s acquisition of the right to participate in the 
local elections in 1930 was a turning point and their membership in the party 
began to be promoted by the regime leadership in Ankara. The completion of 
women’s political rights with their participation in the national elections 
beginning in December 1934 created an even stronger momentum for 
women’s greater involvement in political life, in the party, in provincial and 
municipal councils, and also in other institutions, like the People’s Houses. 
Although it was promoted by the regime leadership, women’s increasing 
participation in political life clearly widened the space for their participation 
in the public life in general. In other words, as can be followed from the 
provincial newspapers, not only did women’s membership in the party begin 
to increase by the beginning of 1935, but their membership in other 
institutions and associations also grew along with their political 
mobilization.640 Many women willingly became politically and socially 
active, and they usually participated very enthusiastically and vocally in the 
institutions they joined. This was especially so in issues related to women, 
including unveiling. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, in the 
General Congress of the RPP in May 1935, among those who supported the 
idea to enact national legislation banning the peçe was a women delegate from 
Niğde, Naciye Osman Kozbek. In fact, in its report on the congress, one local 
newspaper claimed that it was a women delegate who first submitted a 
proposal to the congress for such legislation. 641 The newspaper argued that 
this women delegate had promised her fellow women in her constituency that 
the peçe and the çarşaf would be removed. Some local decisions to ban the 
use of the peçe and the çarşaf were in fact made on the basis of the proposals 
of women members of the local councils. In Mersin, for example, the capital 
of the province of İçel, Zekiye Hanım, a women member of the city council, 
submitted a proposal to ban the çarşaf.642 In Tarsus, a district of the province 
of İçel, the proposal to ban the peçe and the çarşaf was submitted to the city 
council again by a women member, Meliha Dağseven.643 In Bursa, the 
suggestion to have the kafes removed from windows was made to the city 
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council by the deputy mayor, Zehra Hanım, the first women deputy mayor of 
Turkey.644 In Maraş, it was Nuriye Bülbül, the only women member of the 
local party administration, who was the first woman in the city to remove her 
çarşaf.645 In Antalya, a women’s committee of the People’s House was the 
forerunner of the anti-veiling campaign.646 
Women’s roles as facilitators and initiators of the anti-veiling 
campaigns were not limited to a small number of women who were members 
of the local councils or the People’s Houses. Women became the vanguards 
of the campaigns in relatively higher numbers especially in the context of their 
acquiring the right to vote and to be elected in December 1934. In gatherings 
women organized in various cities to celebrate this right, the removal of the 
peçe and the çarşaf was advocated as part of women’s efforts to be worthy of 
this reform. A news report states that in Ordu, for example, women who 
gathered to celebrate and to send telegram messages to Atatürk and Prime-
Minister İnönü indicating their appreciation for having gained this right, 
decided to no longer wear the çarşaf, which they saw as the legacy of the 
sultanate.647 Likewise, in Kilis, about a hundred and fifty women gathered to 
celebrate their political rights and decided to remove the peçe.648 In Muğla, a 
group of women also led the call to organize a campaign to remove the çarşaf 
as part of their decision to be politically more active.649 They had gathered to 
discuss the issue of becoming members of the party, the People’s House and 
other institutions, and to remove their çarşaf. In Bor, a district of the province 
of Niğde, about forty women organized a meeting at the library of the People’s 
House, where they all removed their peçes and requested that the veils be kept 
in the museum. They also asked the municipality to issue a ban on the use of 
the peçe in their city.650 At similar meetings in Izmir and Konya, women’s 
speeches drew a direct link between the opening of the doors of public life in 
the republican regime and their liberation from the social seclusion 
symbolized by the peçe and the çarşaf: “The Turkish woman, who, until 
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yesterday, was supposedly incapable of doing anything else than napping 
behind her kafes and stumbling in her çarşaf, has progressed as fast as an eagle 
in flight in her short life of 11 years.”651  
This equating of the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf with the 
gaining of women’s political rights continued in subsequent years. It was in 
fact reinforced by women themselves and used to mobilize other women in 
the struggle against segregation and veiling. It became for women a milestone 
that differentiated between a period characterized by women’s segregation 
and their degraded status in the society, and a new era marked by women’s 
increasing public visibility and roles.652 At a meeting at the Antalya People’s 
House held to celebrate the first anniversary of the political rights of women, 
Nihal Güzey pointed to this difference in her speech addressing the Turkish 
woman:  
 
In days when the women of the advanced nations were living in total 
freedom, the sultanate had reserved you a space behind the kafes and 
covered your face with a thick and black piece of cloth. It had seen no 
harm in insulting you by believing that this kafes and piece of cloth 
would be the guardians of your chastity. The Atatürk revolution, on the 
other hand, could not digest this insult that was deemed worthy of you. 
It has showed that you are not a slave but a human being that deserves 
respect worthy of civilized people. It has given you freedom. You have 
come into existence. You have also lifted and taken away that black 
cloth on your face that was of use for nothing.653      
 
Women also wrote in the local newspapers to promote unveiling, 
directly addressing the women of their city. The idea frequently emphasized 
by women was that they could modernize their dress themselves, without any 
need for men’s guidance, in conformity with modernization and with the aim 
of reaching a better position in society. In her poem entitled “Let’s Throw off 
the Çarşafs,” which was published in a local newspaper, Hayriye Ural, a 
woman from Trabzon,  emphasized how Turkish women easily adjusted to the 
major changes the Kemalist revolution had introduced, and  called on  them 
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to do the same on  the issue of unveiling as well.654 In her opinion, it was 
meaningless for the women of Trabzon to adhere to the meaningless and 
outdated veil called the çarşaf at a time when all archaic beliefs were in fact 
being eliminated. Having emphasized that the çarşaf had nothing to do with 
religion and had been removed in other cities, she invited the women of 
Trabzon not to fall behind in bringing about this change.  
The discrepancy in terms of veiling (and in fact, in terms of women’s 
social status in general) between Istanbul and Ankara, on the one hand, and 
Anatolia, on the other, had often been mentioned as a sign of the 
disadvantaged position of the women living in the periphery of the country, 
and, thus, the anti-veiling campaign was promoted as an opportunity to fill the 
gap by women themselves in the periphery. In her article entitled “Let’s do 
away with veiling,” Nihal Güzey drew the attention of the women of Antalya 
to this opportunity:  
 
Why do we [as women of Anatolia] not benefit from the right that our 
revolution has given to women? Are we still going to continue to wear 
this dress that does not belong to us at a time we passionately struggle 
against foreign culture and get rid of the Arab alphabet?655 
 
For her, women of Anatolia should also adopt civilized clothing in order to be 
part of the social life, and “enlightened” women should be the vanguards for 
them, especially in removing the peçe before all else. She also warned these 
enlightened women against wearing fancy overcoats and hats, since ordinary 
women were possibly not removing their çarşaf because it would be too 
expensive to replace them with modern clothes. That is why she stressed the 
necessity of creating options to adopting modern clothes in an affordable 
manner, one solution of which would be training women to make their own 
overcoats and hats at free courses. She suggested that these free courses could 
be organized by People’s Houses. 
This acceptance of new clothing by a significant number of women 
was represented as “women’s struggle against the peçe and the çarşaf.” These 
examples, indeed, reflect some women’s support for the anti-veiling 
campaigns. Equally, these examples are also an indication of the regime’s 
satisfaction with the gradual change that this support was supposed to bring in 
                                                          
654 Hayriye Ural, “Çarşafları atalım,” Halk, 30 March 1936. For a similar call written again by 
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the future. In the eyes of the Kemalist elite at the center, women’s approval 
and adoption of modern clothing was the most significant precondition of the 
success, and unlike in other reforms, they were more patient to wait for the 
ultimate success, trusting in women’s agency to spread the reform. Moreover, 
particularly educated women did not think of these campaigns and the 
propaganda concerning them as instrumentalization of women. In fact, as 
presented above, they participated in the campaigns to “modernize” women’s 
clothing, primarily because the clothing change was so thoroughly related to 
the ideas opposing women’s seclusion and supporting their participation in the 
public life. Thus, for particular groups of women at least, it was an alliance 
with the regime - an alliance through which they gained the political support 
for their decades-old struggle against traditional norms and achieved the right 










Figure 5.3. Women at the Develi branch of the Airplane Association, the province of 
Kayseri, 1930s. They are seen wearing overcoats; some with headscarves.   
Source: 75 Yılda Değişen Yaşam, Değişen İnsan: Cumhuriyet Modaları, Derya Özkan 





V. Conclusion  
Despite the fact that there were significant local varieties in terms of both 
scope and effectiveness, it can be argued that anti-veiling campaigns of the 
1930s created an important impetus for the change of women’s clothing in 
Turkey. They played a role, at least for a certain period of time and more in 
some places than others, in the decreasing use of the peçe and the çarşaf, 
though they did not result in the total removal of these veils. And although 
bans were enacted  in most of the cities where the campaigns were initiated, 
and in some places,  were in fact imposed strictly, at least for a certain period 
of time, there was no massive protest or collective action against the anti-
veiling campaigns. However, this hardly meant that there was no resistance; 
both the central authorities in Ankara and the local administrators had hard 
time dealing with the creative ways in which people responded to the 
campaigns and the various forms of selective adaptation they underwent. 
From circulating rumors to sending letters, people’s “repertoire of responses” 
was in fact quite rich.656   
Perhaps, the way the anti-veiling campaigns were put into practice 
determined the way people responded. Since the campaigns were mainly local 
in character and unveiling was not imposed by a central degree or law, the 
reactions were mostly organized against the local authorities. In some cases, 
reactions involved both members of local elite and ordinary people, blurring 
the distinction between elite and popular resistance. The examples discussed 
above reveal that some people who complained to Ankara about the provincial 
administrators were of the opinion that they were acting outside the scope of 
their authority, and even against the will of the center. The case of Aydın, 
where the president responded to the complaint of a local peştamal weaver 
and sent orders to the local authorities, actually confirms that such an opinion 
could have some basis. However, as far as the attitude of the Ministry of 
Interior was concerned, one can argue that any act of questioning or 
complaining about the campaigns was approached quite suspiciously. Thus, 
the local administrators had in fact strong backing from Ankara in 
implementing the anti-veiling campaigns. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 4, this 
backing had its limitations; Ankara could act quite ambivalently when it came 
to the use of force by the provincial authorities. In fact, in cases where force 
was used in the implementation of the anti-veiling campaigns, the resistance 
                                                          




was stronger; as in cases of Trabzon and Gaziantep, it could even include 
countering the intervention by the police or the gendarmerie by force, and 
threatening the authorities.        
 As the main target of the anti-veiling campaigns, women were in a 
central position in shaping the process. Between the poles of passive 
compliance and open resistance, women had various ways of handling this 
dramatic change. While some women resisted the bans on the peçe and the 
çarşaf and continued to wear these veils despite the threat of punishment, 
some others supported the campaigns and even participated in them as 
initiators or facilitators. Many of them tried to find a kind of middle way 
through which they could deal with the multiple pressures and difficulties they 
were facing; the pressure for unveiling as imposed by the anti-veiling 
campaigns, the social and cultural pressure for keeping the veil as imposed by 
the local community and/or the family members, and their own preferences. 
Some of them withdrew from the public life for some time, others tried to veil 
by using other means, and still others creatively adapted their outdoor clothes 
by domesticating the new norms. For some of them who were more educated 
and/or with high social status, not only the removal of the peçe and the çarşaf, 
but also total unveiling was happily welcomed; for some others, this was a 
more gradual process, a journey from wearing the çarşaf to covering their 
head with a turban or a kind of headscarf, and eventually, to opting for a 
modern hat. Thus, it is crucial to acknowledge this diversity of women’s 
responses, to take into consideration the various ways through which they 
involved in the anti-veiling campaigns as agents, and to underline that these 
responses and agency shaped the process in each locality critically.        
 In this sense, it is also crucial to revisit the scholarship on women in 
the early republican era in the light of these analyses. Particularly the 
examples where women actively participated in the anti-veiling campaigns 
and promoted them challenge the salient argument that the clothing reforms 
of the Kemalist regime associated political agency only with men.657 Women 
were not only victims to be liberated; the roles attributed to women were 
indeed far more complex. It can be argued that one of the goals of the anti-
veiling campaigns was to create modern female subjects that would not 
passively follow the Kemalist male elite, but would actively participate in and 
further the modernizing reforms, especially at the local level. Thus, like in 
other state policies, the anti-veiling campaigns entailed regulation and control 
of women’s bodies and choices while at the same time providing opportunities 
                                                          




for them to position themselves as agents. This empowering aspect of the 
Kemalist policies on women should be analyzed alongside their patriarchal 










































Reflections on the Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World 
 
 
“Afghanistan, which hitherto had not taken any step to 
improve women’s condition, is currently taking 
important steps to educate women and to free them 
[from traditional bondage]. Aren’t they Muslims? Aren’t 
they more religious than we? We see that this newly 
created civilized nation [of Afghanistan], is far ahead of 




I. The Turkish Case in a Larger Context  
In her article on unveiling in early 20th century Egypt, Baron indicates that the 
veil has been “the quintessential metaphor for Middle Eastern women.”659 
This can in fact be suggested for all Muslim women, including those living 
outside the Middle East. Although its history did not begin with Islam and it 
has been a complex and changing issue with multiple aspects that cannot be 
reduced to the field of religion, the practice of veiling and the wider system of 
gender seclusion have been overwhelmingly associated with Muslim 
societies, marking their “difference” from their “Western/modern” 
counterparts.660 When modernization and “catching up with the West” became 
the primary agenda of the modernist state elites and intellectuals of the Muslim 
countries, the “woman question” was soon the main issue; everywhere “the 
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sphere of women was localized as the sphere of backwardness to be reformed, 
regenerated and uplifted.”661 The veil, in particular, was of central concern; its 
removal would be the most visible metaphor for the social change the 
modernist elites envisaged. Thus, neither the debate on women’s veiling nor 
the state’s attempts to “modernize” women’s clothing was unique to Turkey. 
The Turkish case was part of a wider picture and should be analyzed not only 
in relation to the influence of the West and its imagination by the Turkish elite, 
but also, equally, in relation to the experiences of other predominantly Muslim 
societies. This is essential given the great extent of intellectual and cultural 
exchange within the Muslim world in the 19th and early 20th centuries. As 
Cronin has maintained, modernist Muslim elites were primarily influenced by 
each other. Both travel between the major urban centers of Muslim countries 
and the accelerated circulation of newspapers and books within the Muslim 
world were of central importance in this process. Thus “across the Arab, 
Ottoman and Iranian worlds, across the Caucasus and Central Asia, and 
among the Muslim communities of the Balkans, reformers, operating within a 
newly integrated transnational Muslim intellectual environment, identified the 
same problem of ‘backwardness’ resulting from the same general and specific 
causes, and proposed the same remedies.”662 With these strong historical ties 
and political parallel in  the background, the Kemalist experience, however 
Western-oriented it was, should be seen in a larger Muslim context; it is 
crucial to understanding how other experiences of state-led unveiling of 
women influenced and were influenced by the Kemalist program and practice 
of unveiling.          
The Ottoman modernization under the Young Turks and the 
subsequent Kemalist reforms introduced under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership 
inspired other Muslim leaders. King Amanullah of Afghanistan and his 
Foreign Minister Mahmud Tarzi, a prominent nationalist and modernist 
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intellectual and mentor of the Young Afghans, had a special admiration for 
Mustafa Kemal, for instance.663 The relations between the two countries in the 
1920s were based on collaboration in modernization efforts, with Turkey 
supplying advisors and experts to Afghanistan, and hosting Afghan students, 
including women, for education.664 It was also no surprise that on his way back 
from his tour of Europe, King Amanullah visited Turkey, as the first head of 
state to make an official visit to the Turkish Republic.665 Similarly, Reza Shah 
of Iran has been likened to Atatürk in the literature in terms of his authoritarian 
modernism. It has been argued that he was inspired and encouraged by 
Turkey’s progress under Atatürk’s leadership and modelled many of his 
reforms on the Kemalist experience.666 His visit to Turkey in 1934, which 
lasted a month with visits to all major cities of the country, also influenced 
Reza Shah, and it has been claimed that he speeded up his efforts for reform 
immediately after he returned to Iran.667        
Apart from political leaders, bureaucrats, intellectuals and elite circles 
in other Muslim countries were also influenced by the developments in 
Turkey. Some of these people had indeed received their education at an 
Ottoman institution. The provincial elite that formed the Ottoman ruling-class 
in the Arab lands before WWI, for example, continued to enjoy power 
andprestige after the war. Thus, just like the Kemalist cadres in Turkey, their 
political visions were very much shaped by their Ottoman experience and by 
the questions of reform and modernization they were exposed to during the 
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late empire.668 Similarly, the Turkic-speaking modernist Muslim elite of the 
Russian Empire had particularly strong intellectual and political ties to their 
Ottoman counterparts. Developments in the Ottoman Empire, and later in 
Turkey, always attracted special attention in the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
The influence of Kemalist Turkey was so significant that some Uzbek 
historians, for example, would argue that in Uzbekistan “the idea of women’s 
emancipation was carried forward by the example of Turkey.”669 
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Figure 6.1. Afghan students who were sent to Istanbul for education, 1928. 
Source: Yaiha Baiza, Education in Afghanistan: Developments, Influences 




Especially inspiring and influential was the Turkish War of 
Independence. Mustafa Kemal’s role as the “savior of Turkey” had 
contributed immensely to his popularity within and beyond the Muslim world. 
As Georgeon suggests, Kemalism was seen as part of the revolt of the East 
against the West, and thus celebrated as a model struggle for liberation from 
Western imperialism.670 Although this admiration suffered a serious backlash 
among some groups with the abolition of the caliphate by the new regime in 
Turkey in 1924, and the subsequent  reforms involving  secularization, the 
Kemalist modernization experience continued to be a constant reference point, 
negative or positive, in major political discussions and disputes in the Middle 
East and beyond.671 As Cleveland contends, “reforms emanating from Ankara 
served as a kind of sounding board against which certain Arab spokesmen 
tested their fundamental beliefs on the issues of cultural identity, social 
progress, and the means of acquiring a place among the nations.”672 While the 
Kemalist reforms like the full secularization of the civil code in 1926 had 
impacts on the debates on civil code in other Muslim countries,673 the strength 
of the women’s movement in Turkey in the 1920s, particularly the struggle of 
Turkish Women’s Union for suffrage, had a great effect on and encouraged 
women’s activists elsewhere to make similar demands.      
The political elite and intellectual circles in Turkey were of course 
aware of these influences. In fact, Georgeon suggests that Kemalists indeed 
                                                          
670 François Georgeon, “Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası (1919-1938): Bazı İşaret Taşları,” in 
Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası, İskender Gökalp and François Georgeon (eds.), Istanbul: Arba, 
1990, pp. 11-53.  Georgeon notes that Mustafa Kemal was the most popular person in the 
Islamic world during 1922 and 1923. He adds, however that in addition to the Turkish example, 
Japan and Soviet Russia were also inspiring for Muslim societies that were under European 
colonial influence. For the influence of Turkish War of Independence on Indian Muslims, see 
Gain Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in 
India, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. On the influence of the Japanese model, 
see Cemil Aydın, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-
Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. 
671 For example, the positive image of Mustafa Kemal in the eyes of Indian Muslims changed 
dramatically after the abolition of the caliphate. At a meeting of the Khilafat Committee in June 
1924, the title “The Sword of Islam” given earlier to Mustafa Kemal was suspended. See 
Minault, 1982, p. 206. Picard also points to the abolition of the caliphate as a turning point for 
the changing attitudes of the Arab nationalists vis-à-vis Kemalism. See Picard, 1990, pp. 64-
69. Cleveland discusses the reactions of the Arab public opinion to Kemalist secularism, 
particularly the critique of Shakip Arslan, a prominent Arab intellectual, who accused Kemalists 
of “the elimination of the very foundations of Islam.” See Cleveland, 1981, p. 18.   
672 Ibid., p. 22. 
673 For example, Iraqi intellectuals had demanded a similar reform along the Turkish example 
from the British authorities in the 1920s. Noga Efrati, Women in Iraq: Past Meets Present, New 




aimed at promoting “new” Turkey, especially in independent and semi-
independent Islamic countries.674 Although the perception of the Europeans 
had been the primary mirror in which Kemalists would see and represent 
themselves, the reflections in other Muslim-majority countries of what was 
going on in Turkey were also very important. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
positive articles, commentaries and news published in Western newspapers 
about Turkey would be translated into Turkish and widely circulated through 
both national and local newspapers. The same was valid for the commentaries 
and news praising Turkey in the press in Middle Eastern countries and beyond. 
Particularly important was the image of Kemalist Turkey and its influence in 
Iran and in Arab countries that were former-Ottoman territories. Not only was 
news about reforms in Turkey translated from Syrian, Egyptian and Iranian 
newspapers into Turkish and published in national and local newspapers, 
similar developments in these countries were equally followed and reported 
in the Turkish press.675 In other words, the parallels between Turkey and other 
Muslim countries in terms of modernization efforts would always be noted 
and underlined.  
One dynamic at play here was the aim to position Turkey, implicitly 
or explicitly, as “the model country” in the Muslim world.676 Starting in the 
late 1920s, representations of Turkey as the “bridge” between the East and 
West became widespread in the Turkish press; it was depicted as a reflector, 
shedding light towards its “less developed” Eastern neighbors.677 In Tekin 
Alp’s Kemalizm, the capital Ankara was portrayed as a city in heavenly light 
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(nur şehri): “the kıble for the intellectuals in Egypt, Iran and Afghanistan is 
not Mecca anymore, but Çankaya. Atatürk is not Emirülmü’minîn (the leader 
of believers/Muslims) like the Turkish leaders in the Ottoman era; he is a 
person that inspires Muslims and guides them.”678 Such depictions of Kemalist 
Turkey as the center or the leading country in the Islamic world were not only 
concerned with promoting Kemalism outside Turkey; they would also support 
the proud national identity constructed under the new regime and thus 
reinforce the national image inside the country. Moreover, legitimacy of the 
reforms in Turkey was strengthened by making references to comparable 
initiatives in countries that were closest in terms of culture and history. In 
other words, the aim was also to send the message that Turkey was not alone 
in the Muslim world in pursuing radical modernization efforts. This was 
particularly crucial for those reforms that were potentially more risky in terms 
of fueling social opposition. Changes regarding women and most visible 
aspects of social life such as clothing were thus among the most significant 
issues. This was why any development related to them, particularly women’s 
clothing and veiling, in other Muslim countries would be closely followed by 
Turkish public opinion and would be highlighted by the Kemalist press.679 In 
fact, some of these developments would be reported in the Turkish press by 
using a language that would make them sound more significant and 
widespread than they actually were. For example, the removal by six Syrian 
women of their veils at a meeting in Damascus would be reported with the 
caption “women of Damascus have removed the peçe and the çarşaf.”680    
Moreover, in reporting the changes in women’s clothing in other 
countries, Turkish women would be depicted as the forerunners among the 
Muslim women. Many newspaper articles from Middle Eastern newspapers, 
and speeches and declarations of women’s associations in other Muslim 
societies praising Turkish women’s achievements were frequently published 
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in both national and local newspapers in Turkey.681 The idea that Turkish 
women’s removal of the peçe and the çarşaf was celebrated by Arab women 
in countries like Egypt and Syria, and this encouraged them to initiate a similar 
rebellion against “backwardness” is visible in some of these articles translated 
from Arab newspapers.682 In fact, some opponents of unveiling in Arab 
countries were also directly referring to unveiled Turkish women, since they 
were setting a negative example. Shakib Arslan, for example, would write 
numerous articles denouncing the insistence on unveiling in Turkey a sign of 
moral deprivation.683 So the public interest in what was going on in Turkey 
was there; but it was exaggerated by the Kemalists to the point that they would 
link all reforms regarding women in other Muslim countries to the 
developments in Turkey.684 This would also help them to further underline the 
“necessity” or “significance” of the reforms they wanted to initiate in the 
country. Even at the local level, this idea that modernization efforts could not 
be considered as solely national issues because of Turkey’s position as the 
model country in the Muslim World was apparent. For example, during a 
discussion at the city council of Bursa on the implementation of the ban on the 
peçe and the çarşaf, council member Rıza Yücer would support a firmer 
implementation by claiming that the removal of these veils would no longer 
be seen as an inner problem. For him, it was unacceptable that there were still 
women in Bursa wearing the peçe and the çarşaf while “even” the women of 
those countries who were following Turkey in their modernization efforts had 
already begun to remove them:  
 
In one of our meetings, we decided to ban the peçe and the çarşaf. There 
is no doubt that this decision is being carried out. However, the issue 
reached such a point that the peçe and the çarşaf are no longer only the 
concerns of Turkey. Even those countries like Egypt, Iran and Syria, 
which consider us as their guide on the road to revolution and 
civilization and begin to walk on the revolutionary road that we indeed 
have paved, are prohibiting the peçe and the çarşaf. Under these 
                                                          
681 For example, see “Mısır Kadınlar Briliği ve Türk Kadını,” Yeni Adana, 10 January 1935; 
“Mısır kadınlar birliği başkanının ajans muhabirine beyanatı,” Halk, 31 January 1935; “Mısır 
kadınlarının tebriği,” Kars, 14 February 1935. 
682 For example see “Mısır’da Peçe aleyhinde Nazire Zeyneddinin Faaliyetleri,” Hakkın Sesi, 6 
February 1936.  
683 Cleveland, 1981, p. 19.  
684 This can be followed in the commentaries published in Turkish newspapers on the reform 
projects in other Muslim countries. Tekin Alp, for example, would also explain reforms in 
Pahlavi Iran and Emir Amanullah’s Afghanistan by their “copying” of the reforms in Turkey. 




circumstances, we definitely do not want to still come across women 
wearing the peçe and the çarşaf in our streets. We should speed up the 
implementation of our decision. And for example, we should not 
process the requests of those who have business with the municipality 
and come here [the city hall] wearing the peçe and the çarşaf.685 
 
 The word “even” that Yücer uses explains the degree to which Turkish 
elites, even those at the local level, internalized the idea that Turkey was (or 
had to be) more “advanced” compared to other Muslim countries. This was of 
course subjective at many levels, yet politically useful for Kemalist purposes. 
In reality, the exchange among the Muslim countries and their influences on 
each other were never one-sided. While it was correct that Turkey was among 
the forerunners in the Muslim World in terms of achieving national 
sovereignty and introducing modernization reforms, this hardly meant that it 
was the model for others. Rather, it was one among many inspirations and 
references, which itself was inspired and influenced by other examples. 
Moreover, in each particular context, the issues of women’s veiling and 
unveiling were first and foremost discussed as part of much bigger questions 
such as how to be modern and to be “accepted” as modern in Western eyes. 
Muslim countries were partly in solidarity and partly in competition in the 
struggle for modernization, and influenced each other not so much on the 
stance to take on the question of veiling, but on how to deal with it. In other 
words, the veil should be removed, this was perceived as something given if 
one wanted to be modern and look modern; the question was rather how it 
would be removed.            
 
 
II. The Arab World, the Caucasus, and Central Asia 
While analyzing women’s unveiling in different contexts, it is crucial to take 
into consideration the scope of these experiences. In other words, the issue of 
whether unveiling remained as a debate among the intellectuals in the press 
and thus affected only a limited number of elite women, or turned into a 
general call for all women is an important dimension to consider. Can we talk 
about a campaign against veiling if there was no banning of the veil, local or 
general, for example? How are we to analyze the case of Egypt, where it is 
highly debatable whether there was even a movement or mobilization for 
                                                          




unveiling, in relation to the case of Turkey, where there were local yet 
widespread bans on the veil?  
 Also important is clearly defining what the concepts of veiling and 
unveiling referred to in each particular context. In other words, just as veiling, 
unveiling has meant different things in different places, and could acquire 
different meanings over time in a particular country. The most remarkable 
difference between the unveiling debate in the Arab world and the one in Iran 
or Turkey, for example, is that the former was mainly about the removal of 
the face veil. As Baron underlines, the widespread dispute in early 20th century 
Egypt was about al-sufur, unveiling, which referred to taking off women’s 
face cover, since al-hijab, veiling, was a generic term signifying the covering 
of the face.686 In Syria and Lebanon under the French mandate as well, the 
debate on unveiling was mainly concerned with the removal of the face 
cover.687  
In Egypt, the country that perhaps influenced the Arab world the most, 
while the debate on veiling had begun earlier, some of the urban elite women 
began to remove their face cover in the early 20th century.688 This was a 
process during which unveiling became a metaphor for Egypt’s independence 
from British rule. Studying the visual representations of the Egyptian nation 
in the press, Baron indicates that when Egypt began to be depicted as a 
woman, from the early 1900s onwards, she had no face covering but she was 
always modest in dress.689 Thus, she was not a mirror image of French 
Marianne, for example; protecting local customs or “national” characteristics 
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was always a major concern in the Egyptian modernist and nationalist 
imagination, as it was for many nationalisms in the wider non-Western 
context. Towards the 1930s, depicting Egypt as a young woman in European 
dresses was very common in the cartoons, but she was always with a 
headscarf. The “new woman” that this image of Egypt was representing was 
marked by her difference not only in clothing, that is, in her removal of the 
face veil and adoption of European attire, but also in education and 
participation in social life.    
In addition to secular nationalism, Islamic modernism was also an 
influential ideology shaping Egyptian discourses of revitalization in the early 
20th century. The feminist movement had also legitimized its demands with 
reference to these two main political agendas.  Islamic modernism, in 
particular, “accorded space for a feminism within the framework of the 
religious culture and provided a congenial climate for its evolution.”690 As a 
call to reinterpret Islam, Islamic modernism provided Muslim men and 
women the tools with which to criticize certain prescriptions, such as the face 
veil, from within an Islamic point of view. While women’s voice was based 
on their own personal experiences, men’s pro-feminist discourse emerged 
primarily out of a search to explain their country’s “backwardness” vis-à-vis 
the West.691 Just like for the Ottoman/Turkish male elite, for many educated 
Egyptian men, women’s low position in society appeared as one of the main 
reasons for their country’s “backwardness.” Qasim Amin, for example, as one 
of the pioneers of these male elite advocating women’s rights and the author 
of the much influential Tahrir al-Mar’ah (The Liberation of the Women), had 
called for an end to face veil in addition to other signs of women’s seclusion 
and suppression, such as polygyny, based on the argument that these practices 
were not Islamic.692 The editor of the newspaper al-Sufur (Unveiling), which 
was founded in 1915,  argued that not only Egyptian women but the whole 
nation was veiled, referring to the national revival that would be symbolized 
by the removal of the face veil.693 
 However, the real momentum for the removal of the face veil in Egypt 
was created by the members of the feminist movement. During the first two 
decades of the 20th century, leading Egyptian feminists like Huda Sharawi and 
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Bahithat al-Badiyah remained veiled. They argued that although the veil 
symbolized sexual difference, women should retain it until the society became 
ready for its removal.694 This gradualist approach, Badran suggests, turned the 
veil into a feminist tool which would assist women in their claim to participate 
in public life.695 They also insisted, however, that women would decide for 
themselves when to unveil; they did not need a call from male progressives, 
just like they refused to be guided by male traditionalists.696 Sharawi’s 
removal of her face veil in 1923, the year when the Egyptian Feminist Union 
was established with Sharawi as its president, is referred to by scholars as a 
turning point leading to the unveiling of many Egyptian women.697 In her 
return from an international women’s meeting in Rome, she appeared with her 
face uncovered. This was an individual but symbolic act, and perhaps a 
political statement that had helped with the unveiling of many others. 
Sharawi’s picture with her face uncovered and with new style head covering 
immediately appeared in the press and kept being reprinted over the years.698  
Egyptian feminists would also try to inform the public about unveiling 
in other countries, such as Turkey and Lebanon, through their publication, 
L’Egyptienne.699 Towards the end of 1930s, the face veil had largely removed 
by urban women thanks to these initiatives taken by the women’s rights 
activists themselves. The fact that the veil did not become a national symbol 
in Egypt and thus the new unveiled Egyptian woman could be deployed as a 
symbol of a modern and independent Egypt against British colonialism helped 
women to legitimize and advance their claims against the face veil.700 This 
was very different from the case of Algeria, where the veil became the ultimate 
symbol of being Algerian against the culturally more aggressive colonialism 
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of the French.701 In fact, in 1937, the Fatwa Committee of Al-Azhar declared 
that the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence did not oppose the removal of 
the face veil, and the Maliki School did not require the covering of the face. 
This can be interpreted as an indication showing the extent of legitimacy 
enjoyed by Egyptian feminists in their struggle against the face veil. As 
Badran suggests, “in this way the state, though the religious authorities, 
merely gave its indirect blessings to what women themselves had already 
achieved and what the peasant majority had always enjoyed.”702 
The debate on unveiling in other Arab countries was very much 
influenced by the example of Egypt. Early advocates were male intellectuals 
who were inspired by Qasim Amin, like the Iraqi poet Jamil Sidqi al-Zahari.703 
Women’s organizations were concerned primarily with women’s education 
and health, refraining from open mobilization for unveiling. In fact, the first 
women’s organization established in Iraq in 1923, the Women’s Awakening 
Club, for example, was disbanded because of the reactions that came from 
conservative circles. Despite the fact that members of the club had tried to 
explain that their goal was the advancement of the nation, the word 
“awakening” was perceived by the ulema as a call to discard the veil.704 Thus, 
inspired by the acts and writings of the Egyptian feminists, those Arab women 
in other countries who were advocates of unveiling mostly opted for 
individual removal of the face veil. Sometimes such symbolic public acts of 
unveiling were performed by women in groups on different occasions across 
the Arab world. A group of Syrian women first removed their face veil in 
nationalist demonstrations in Damascus in 1922; Muslim and Christian 
women of Jerusalem also unveiled during similar nationalist demonstrations 
in 1929; some intellectual Arab women unveiled for their public lectures on 
women’s issues, like Habibah Manshari in Tunis in 1929 and Anbara Salam 
in Beirut in 1927.705 The publishing of a book entitled Unveiling and Veiling 
(al-Sufur wa al-Hijab) by a Lebanese woman, Nazira Zayn al-Din, in 1928, 
however, created perhaps one of the most heated debates on unveiling and  
had reverberations  not only in Greater Syria but across the Middle East.           
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The debate on unveiling in Syria had indeed begun quite early as part 
of the discussion going on in the late 19th and early 20th century Ottoman 
context. Damascus-based religious conservatives were criticizing unveiling 
and mixing of men and women in public, for example, while at the same time 
supporting women’s educational rights and political activity.706 Gelvin 
suggests that these ulema circles were also influential in the popular 
committees established during the brief Faysali interregnum (1918-1920), 
which organized campaigns to prevent women from wearing European style 
attire.707 During the Mandate period, the discussion on women’s un/veiling 
was overshadowed by the dynamics of the colonial rule, just like the 
discussions on women’s suffrage that had begun in the Syrian Congress in 
1920.708 Because there was a dual legal system under the French Mandate 
(religious patriarchs had the right to supervise the religious law and personal 
status law), women’s rights activists had to face a direct conflict with the 
religious elites in formulating and defending their demands publicly.709  
Speaking from within an Islamic framework, Zayn al-Din’s book 
argued that covering the face was against the spirit of Islam. Moreover, 
addressing the French state, it “made an explicit appeal for the precedence of 
civil law over religious law in issues of the veil and personal status.”710 Zayn 
Al-Din’s book was translated into several languages in a year and received 
positive reactions especially from modernist circles. News of her book and her 
activities to promote her ideas in Beirut even reached the pages of provincial 
newspapers in Turkey. A Bursa newspaper, for example, published an article 
from a Beirut newspaper, celebrating Zayn al-Din as a “heroine Arab 
woman.”711 However, while she was even compared to Qasim Amin and 
Mustafa Kemal by some, many people opposed the book severely. The ulema 
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in particular responded by declaring the issue as a religious one, thus a matter 
of religious law under their authority. Al-Din’s direct appeal to the French 
state for support on unveiling shaped the debates and reactions on this issue 







In the 1930s, upper-class women’s adoption of French style dress and 
their participation in the public life gradually increased, which also triggered 
increasing reactions and even physical attacks against them by men.712 It 
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seems that unveiling remained limited to the elite circles; apart from a few 
bold women who had removed the veil, unveiling did not become a 
widespread phenomenon.713 Even in Beirut, where elites adopted European 
customs more rapidly compared to the elite of Damascus, Muslim women 
would continue to wear veils until the early 1940s; they would remove them 
when they visited the Europeanized parts of the city but would put them on 
when they returned to their own neighborhoods.714 In the 1930s, the agenda of 
the women’s movement in Syria and Lebanon also became more moderate, 
emphasizing patriotic motherhood rather than the issues of unveiling or 
suffrage. This was also a move that should be understood within the context 
of colonialism; women were active supporters of the nationalist opposition 
against this domination.  
 
They apparently believed that the support of a vital and unified 
women’s movement could help nationalists win their struggle against 
the French, much as women had done in Egypt’s 1919 revolution. Once 
nationalists controlled the state, they would be able to fulfill women’s 
demands for rights. Women’s leaders expected that an independent 
nationalist state would be secular and reform-minded, and would wield 
greater power over religious law than the French mandatory regime 
could.715       
 
Thus the colonial context significantly altered the dynamics of the demand for 
and the debate on unveiling. It was easier to denounce it as an imitation of the 
West; it could easily be a matter of controversy between men and women as a 
result of gender anxiety and men’s fear of demasculinization under the 
colonial rule. It could, thus, easily be postponed until the nationalist victory. 
This points to an important difference in non-colonial contexts, such as Turkey 
and Iran, despite the fact that the anxieties stemming from the fear of 
“being/becoming too Western” were also part of the debate in these 
countries.716   
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the meeting and went out to the street unveiled, the newspaper reported. “Şam kadınları peçe 
ve çarşafı attılar,” Cumhuriyet, 14 April 1936.     
714 Thompson, 2000, p. 180. 
715 Ibid., p. 146. 
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the colonial context brings into the picture, she contrasts the case of Syria and Lebanon not only 




 A sort of in-between case was Afghanistan. A buffer zone under the 
impact of imperialist rivalries in the 19th century, Afghanistan was under the 
heavy influence of the UK until it became independent in 1919.717 To achieve 
this, however, King Amanullah Khan had given up an important income of 
the state, the annual subsidy the British government had been paying to control 
Afghanistan’s foreign affairs, which significantly limited the capacity of the 
state mechanism available to him.  Wide suggests, although usually 
underplayed in the analyses of the 1920s Afghanistan, the extremely weak 
economic situation of the country and thus low capacity of the state should be 
taken into account in discussing both the reform agendas of King Amanullah, 
including reforms regarding women, and reasons behind their very limited 
impact, and even, in some cases, failure.718 The king’s attempt to raise the state 
revenue by increasing taxes and cancelling former subsidies to tribal leaders 
only contributed to his unpopularity and to the rising social discontent with 
his modernization policies. In addition, his radical approach to state building 
by expanding the size of government and bureaucracy and by increasing the 
number of state employees under this economic hardship turned his decade-
long rule into “a period of both intense reform and social revolts.”719   
 The anti-veiling campaign in 1920s Afghanistan, if it can indeed be 
called a campaign, was the removal of the face veil by Queen Soraya during 
a speech given by King Amanullah in the palace in October 1928. At the 
moment he uttered in his speech that Islam does not dictate that women cover 
their faces, the queen stands up and removes her transparent face veil, and 
several other women attending the lecture follow her.720 The queen, in fact, 
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719 Saikal, 2012, p. 60. See also Wide, 2014, pp. 176-178. 
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had appeared totally unveiled and in Western style clothing during the royal 
couple’s tour in Europe a few months earlier. She was criticized in Egypt and 
Iran for this during their visit.721 Thus, the act of the removal of the face veil 
by a handful of high-level women in the state bureaucracy was the final stage 
of this clothing change that had started during the tour. Apart from this 
symbolic performance, however, there was neither a law nor a decree that 
enforced unveiling. The use of the face veil and chadari (usually known as 
burqa) were discouraged through presenting royal women as examples, but 
this had limited effect on society other than the high classes and state officials 
of Kabul.722 As Poullada indicates, “Queen Soraya’s unveiling act on the 
palace steps no doubt offended the more traditional, but it must be noted that 
few felt forced to imitate her example. The fact is that during Amanullah’s 
reign nearly all women who traditionally wore the veil continued to do so.”723 
His attempt to prohibit the use of the veil on certain streets of Kabul also 
proved short-lived.724 The state was simply incapable of imposing any 
systematic reform on clothing; “unlike Atatürk’s or Reza Shah’s ‘authoritarian 
modernization,’ where cultural reforms can be read as assertions of state 
power, Amanullah’s exhortation to unveil only stressed the limitations of that 
power.”725    
 Yet, it has been widely argued that Amanullah Khan’s unveiling 
policy cost him his throne. Given that he had in fact done very little concerning 
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(ed.), New York: Routledge, 1997, pp. 75-100.    
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English Queen Mary, while covering her hair in Egypt. King Amanullah was wearing a hat. See 
Wide, 2014, p. 185. In Iran, in an interview with her in a women’s journal, the queen 
characterized the veil as a tribal custom, gradually became related with religion. She said that 
it was intended to bring social decency, but turned into a restriction on women’s advancement. 
See Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, Conceiving Citizens: Women and the Politics of Motherhood in 
Iran, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 151-152.  
722 Chadari was a full-length cover. Similar to the unveiling policy, polygamy was never 
outlawed but only discouraged through an informal campaign that utilized Islamic references 
and by setting King Amanullah and Queen Soraya’s marriage as an example, despite the 
reforms to secularize the legal system. Saikal, 2012, p. 78. 
723 L.B. Poullada, “Political Modernization in Afghanistan,” in Afghanistan: Some New 
Approaches, George Grassmuck, Ludwing W. Adamec and Frances H. Irwin (eds.), Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1969, pp. 99-148.  
724 Baiza, 2013, p. 91. Wide also mentions an announcement in the official newspaper 
prohibiting the use of borqa. However he indicates that there is no source showing that this was 
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women’s veiling, this seems too simplistic an explanation. In fact, he had 
initiated a more systematic campaign to modernize men’s dress, which fueled 
hostility towards the king.726 Moreover, the reach of the reforms introduced 
during   Afghanistan in the 1920s could hardly exceed the boundaries of the 
capital Kabul. However, his general policies regarding women’s education, 
their greater participation in the public life, and symbolic change exemplified 
by the unveiling of royal women certainly played a role in the demonstrations 
and uprisings against his rule that began in 1928.727 As Saikal suggests, they 
at least “provided his opponents with more effective ammunition to fuel 
agitations in Afghan microsocieties against what they termed his ‘infidel’ 
rule.”728 Especially outside Kabul, the influence of rumors and hearsay about 
the change in women’s dress in Kabul played an important role in creating a 
perception that veiling was banned, and thus in fueling the hostility towards 
the king.729 Among the demands of the rebellious chieftains and ulema were 
the king’s divorce from Queen Sorayya, closure of all girls’ schools, recalling 
of the girls sent abroad for education, and restoration of the veil.730 The first 
decision of the new government established after the overthrown of 
Amanullah Khan in 1929 was the prohibition on woman leaving home without 
an escort and the policy of allowing unveiling was cancelled.731    
 A quite different trajectory can be seen in the anti-veiling campaigns 
initiated in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. Although developed almost 
simultaneously with the symbolic efforts for women’s unveiling in 
Afghanistan and arguably motivated by the reforms regarding women in 
Kemalist Turkey in order not to fall behind this bourgeois counterpart, anti-
veiling campaigns in Central Asia and the Caucasus ended up being atypical 
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examples in many ways.732 Particularly the case of Soviet Uzbekistan stands 
apart as the most violent experience. Launched publicly on International 
Women’s Day (8 March) in 1927 at a large demonstration, the Hujum 
(literally, attack), the Communist party-led anti-veiling campaign aimed at the 
removal of the full-body covering robe (paranji) and face veil (chachvon).733 
Vanguards would be the party members and their immediate families, and they 
would perform this role through collective unveilings in party meetings, 
conferences and congresses.734 The burning of the veils in these gatherings 
became the symbol of the Hujum. There was no outlawing of the veil, but the 
state increasingly used force to create consent.735 While there were different 
individual and collective reactions to the campaigns, resistance was strong in 
general. The Muslim clergy called upon Uzbek men to attack women who 
were unveiled. An estimated 2,500 Uzbek women were murdered by the male 
opponents of unveiling.736  
This unparalleled level of violence came to characterize the Soviet 
anti-veiling campaigns in the literature, emphasizing the role the radical and 
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734 Northrop, 2004, p. 84. 
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Elizabeth Heineman (ed.), Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2011, pp. 56-70. 




anti-religious policies of the Communist Party played across the Soviet East. 
Northrop argues that having perceived Muslim women as victims of 
patriarchal oppression, the party utilized the idea of women’s emancipation as 
a strategy to find Bolshevik allies.737 In his analysis, although the Hujum was 
initiated by Soviet women activists in the Uzbek Communist Party, Uzbek 
women were almost completely absent in the party ranks and thus the 
campaign was mainly guided by the Zhenotdel, the women’s section of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. According to him, not only in 
Uzbekistan but also in other Muslim countries of Soviet Union, unveiling was 
experienced as an imposition from outside, a reflection of the “civilizing 
mission” of the Bolsheviks, and hence, should be analyzed as “part of a wider 
narrative of European interactions with the colonial subject.” This colonial 
nature, Northrop suggests, also transformed the meaning of the veil for the 
Central Asian Muslims: “wearing a veil became more than a narrowly 
religious or moral matter; for many people it also became an act of political 
and national resistance to an outside colonial power.”738 In this sense, he finds 
the closest example to the Soviet anti-veiling campaigns of the 1920s in 
colonial Algeria in the 1950s, where the veil became the ultimate symbol of 
the struggle against the French.739  
Kamp’s analysis of the Hujum differs from that of Northrop in 
essentially two ways. First, she emphasizes the pre-Soviet roots of the 
discussion of women’s emancipation and unveiling among the modernists of 
Central Asia (the Jadids). She argues that “reforming” women was already on 
the agenda of early 20th century Muslim reformers, who began discussing 
unveiling around 1910. Their ideas deeply influenced the activists that would 
be part of the anti-veiling campaigns during the Soviet era. In other words, 
there was an indigenous motive for women’s modernization already under 
way in Muslim Central Asia and Caucasus before the Bolshevik Revolution.740 
Second, Kamp underlines women’s agency in the anti-veiling campaigns, 
particularly the vanguard role the initiatives of the Muslim women activists 
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played in the early 1920s.741 She suggests that instead of approaching the 
Hujum in the background of a struggle between the colonizer (Soviet Russia) 
and the colonized (Uzbeks), it should be analyzed as a multisided struggle in 
which the Uzbek women and men were the primary actors.742  
Similar to the Uzbek case is Soviet Azerbaijan, where the party-led 
anti-veiling campaign launched in 1928 in fact originated in the debate among 
the Azeri women themselves. Already in 1917, at a Congress of Muslim 
Clergy of Transcaucasia, Azeri women had appeared with uncovered faced 
and without the chador and these initiatives for unveiling continued through 
the activities of the Muslim women’s clubs after the Bolsheviks seized power 
in 1920.743 Thus, as Heyat suggests, the argument common among Soviet 
historians that “Azeri women (along with Muslim Central Asian women) were 
liberated from the veil for the first time by the Soviet government” is 
incorrect.744 In 1926, inspired by reforms in Turkey and news about unveiling 
in Uzbekistan, the debate on the chador accelerated in Azerbaijan and soon 
turned into a party-led initiative. Although there was never a law or a decree, 
there were directives issued by party and state organizations.745 Like in 
Uzbekistan, the unveiling momentum of the women’s activists in Azerbaijan 
became a project at the hands of the party; a shift that Kamp characterizes as 
significant. This shift not only changed the parameters of women’s activism 
and the symbolic meaning of the veil, but transformed unveiling into “a site 
of violent conflict.”746 While the acceleration of the polarization on the issue 
of veil and increase in the level of violence threatened many women, it also 
led some women activists to participate in the anti-veiling campaigns more 
resolutely. The murder of a housewife, Sareyye Khalilova, by her father 
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because she was unveiled in Baku in January 1930 became a turning point in 
Azerbaijan, for example. Meetings were organized across the country to 
denounce the veil and to declare commitment to “the path of Khaliova.”747 By 
the end of 1930s, the majority of the younger generation Azeri women were 
unveiled.      
Similarities have been drawn between the Muslim Soviet republics, 
on the one hand, and the anti-veiling campaigns in Turkey and Iran, on the 
other, in broad terms, with regards to the role of the state in social change, in 
diminishing the power of the clergy and decreasing the public visibility of 
Islam. However, as Kamp suggests, the Soviet republics differ in that the state 
had greater coercive power at its disposal than did the state in Turkey and 
Iran.748 In addition, although Kamp rightly argues that colonialism should not 
overshadow the analyses of the anti-veiling campaigns that were put into 
practice in Muslim societies under Soviet Union and should not blur the role 
played especially by Muslim women activists, the presence of a colonial 
power was nevertheless a significant factor changing the dynamics of the 
unveiling debate in fundamental ways, as also underlined for the Arab context 
above. The fact that Turkey and Iran were independent states and that they 
were never directly colonized certainly sets them aside as the two closest 
examples of modernization in the Muslim world, in general, and of change in 
women’s clothing, in particular.   
 
 
III. Iran, Albania and Turkey: Some Comparative Remarks 
It can be argued that three cases - Iran, Albania and Turkey - differ from other 
examples discussed above and need to be explored in more detail and in 
comparison to each other. The authoritarian regimes of Iran, Albania and 
Turkey organized more systematic, determined and effective anti-veiling 
campaigns compared to other countries in the Muslim world. The similarity 
between these three examples of anti-veiling campaigns is actually part of a 
more general parallelism that exits between Iran, Albania and Turkey during 
the inter-war era: not only in the changes regarding women’s clothing, but also 
in many other fields; reforms initiated in these countries were guided by very 
similar modernization projects. This parallelism has received greater attention 
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in the case of Iran and Turkey.749 Inter-war Turkey and Iran have been viewed 
as different from other Muslim countries because they were formally 
independent nation-states that were never directly colonized. Moreover, they 
had adopted very similar laws and reforms under parallel authoritarian 
regimes, which were closely informed by each other. Thus, it has been argued 
that they show sufficient similarity for a historically grounded comparison in 
various fields.750 In fact, the similarities with inter-war Albania are not any 
less significant. Albania was also an independent nation-state, where 
modernization reforms were put into practice by an authoritarian regime led 
by strong and Western-oriented political elites, who were informed by the 
experiences of other Muslim-majority countries, particularly by Turkey. Just 
as Atatürk and Reza Shah had emerged as “men of order” in response to the 
intellectual, political and economic questions originated in the 19th century, 
the Albanian nation-state under the leadership of King Zog I was shaped by 
very similar concerns that fashioned the authoritarian regimes of Southeast 
Europe, including Turkey.751 In all three countries, the nationalist agenda 
emphasizing the national identity, history and language emerged and 
developed side by side an equally strong desire to “catch up with the West” 
and to attain recognition as a modern, equal nation among the “civilized” 
states. The “woman question” and change in the way people dressed were 
central to this process.  
 However, no study has yet analyzed the anti-veiling campaigns in 
Iran, Albania and Turkey together. While there have been some attempts at 
comparing the policies of the Kemalist and Pahlavi regimes regarding 
women’s clothing, they did not go beyond outlining the issue in very general 
terms, and Albania was never included in the picture as a comparable example. 
Among the three, the Iranian case has received more attention, partly because 
most of the official documents related to the anti-veiling campaign of the first 
Pahlavi era were published by the Islamic regime in the 1990s and thus the 
                                                          
749 See Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher (eds.), Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization 
under Atatürk and Reza Shah, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004; Touraj Atabaki (ed.), The State and 
the Subaltern: Modernization, Society, and the State in Turkey and Iran, London, I. B. Tauris, 
2007. For an earlier discussion that can be considered as an introductory piece, see Roger Owen, 
State, Power and Politics in the Making of The Modern Middle East, New York: Routledge, 
1992, pp. 26-30.  
750 Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher, “Introduction,” in Men of Order: Authoritarian 
Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah, Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zürcher (eds.), 
London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, pp. 1-12. 
751 See Berd J. Fischer (ed.), Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of 




issue was more accessible and perhaps politically more “urgent” for scholars 
to explore because of the compulsory veiling imposed on Iranian women. 
More importantly, the anti-veiling campaign in Iran in the 1930s has been 
singled out in the literature as the most decisive, authoritarian and harshly 
implemented example. As one of the pioneers of the field of Iranian Studies 
has indicated, kashf-e hijab (unveiling) was the most radical component of the 
Women’s Awakening project of the Pahlavi regime, reflecting a “unique 
absolutist approach” to the issue of women’s dress.752 This “uniqueness” 
stemmed from the argument that Iran under Reza Pahlavi was the only country 
to make unveiling compulsory country-wide. While most scholars of Iran 
emphasize this by claiming that veiling was banned by the shah, without 
detailing how, some specify the means through which it was banned. Kashani 
Sabet, for example, claims that the prohibition of chador was decreed and 
legislated,753 while Paidar suggests that the removal of the veil was ordered by 
a decree of the shah in January 1936.754 Moreover, even when scholars agree 
on the means through which the veil was banned in Iran, ambiguity remains 
as to what exactly was banned as the veil. Both Ettehaideh and Paidar, for 
instance, argue that a decree was issued by the shah; but while the former 
claims that the decree prohibited the chador, the latter says it prohibited both 
the chador and the scarf.755 
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Houshang Chehabi, “Banning of the Veil and its Consequences,” in The Making of Modern 
Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah, 1921-1941, Stephanie Cronin (ed.), London: 
Routledge, 2003, pp. 193-210. 
753 See Kashani-Sabet, 2011, p. 156. She uses both words; on page 155, for example, Kashani-
Sabet argues that the decree for unveiling became law, implying that the decree came first and 
then tuned into a law. Iranian chador is very similar to Turkish çarşaf and thus can be seen as 
its equivalent.  
754 Parvin Paidar, Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 106-107. She also claims that the decree ordered the 
police to remove women’s veils.  
755 Ibid., p. 107; Mansoureh Ettehaideh, “The Origins and Development of the Women’s 
Movement in Iran, 1906-41” in Women in Iran from 1800 to the Islamic Republic, Lois Beck 




The Iranian case became such an important benchmark that while only 
little was known about women’s unveiling in Kemalist Turkey except for 
some general remarks, many scholars have come to the conclusion that it was 
far less radical compared to Iran. This conclusion was also reinforced by 
scholars of Turkey writing in English. The lack of a comparable law banning 
veiling in Turkey has been interpreted as lack of intervention in women’s 
clothing by the Kemalist regime.756 As a result, there emerged in the literature 
a consensus that in Turkey, “it was wisely considered that an outright ban on 
the veil would provoke a catastrophic storm”757 and thus “there was never any 
forced unveiling.”758 Despite the fact that scholarly attention on comparative 
aspects of the Kemalist and Pahlavi modernizations has been on the rise and 
very important works have been published, the comparison of the anti-veiling 
campaigns in Turkey and Iran remained limited to such general conclusions, 
lacking detailed and solid information regarding the precise content, 
implementation and consequences of these campaigns.  
Recent research on both Iran and Turkey has attempted to fill this gap 
and produced a different picture. As Rostam-Kolayi and Matin-asgari argue 
in their critique of the scholarship on the Iranian case, recent studies actually 
reveal that anti-veiling campaigns in Turkey and Iran “had more in common 
than previously appreciated.”759 Rostam-Kolayi and Matin-asgari change the 
parameters of the comparison, since they suggest that “Iran’s kashf-e hijab 
was neither legislated nor ‘decreed’ by Reza Shah;”760 there was in fact no 
banning of the veil countrywide in Iran. And again, contrary to what has been 
argued, there was in fact forced unveiling in Turkey, albeit at the local level, 
as this study has demonstrated in detail throughout previous chapters. 
Moreover, if there was one country that indeed legislated against the veil, it 
was Albania; yet, very little has been said about this “uniqueness.” Equally 
little explored was the degree to which Albania can be discussed as part of the 
                                                          
756 It seems that a few short but important articles published in Turkish were not accessible to 
scholars who have attempted making comparative remarks. As emphasized in the introduction, 
these articles have not received the attention they deserved in Turkish-written sources either. 
For these leading articles in Turkish on anti-veiling campaigns in Turkey, see Çapa, 1996; Uyar, 
1996; Yakut, 2002.   
757 John Norton, “Faith and Fashion in Turkey”, in Languages of Dress in the Middle East, 
Nancy Lindisfarne-Tapper and Bruce Ingham (eds.), London: Curzon Press, 1997, pp. 149-177.  
758 Chehabi, 2003, p. 193. 
759 Jasamin Rostam-Kolayi and Afshin Matin-asgari, “Unveiling Ambiguities: Revisiting 1930s 
Iran’s Kashf-e Hijab Campaign,” in Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: Gender, 
Modernism and the Politics of Dress, Stephanie Cronin (ed.), London: Routledge, 2014, pp. 
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most sensible comparison; the one between Turkey and Iran. This section is 
an attempt to discuss these three cases together. One significant handicap is 
that we do not know as much about the Albanian case as we do about Turkey 
and Iran. Clayer’s article seems to be the most detailed account available in 
English, in addition to sources on general parameters of modernization in 
Albania.761 Thus, comparative remarks about Albania are mainly derived from 
her account.              
In Albania, the a-religious character of the state had been underlined 
by the nationalist elite right from the start. As a European nation-state whose 
population was composed of multiple religious communities, Muslims being 
the majority, Albania was established as a secular state in order to strengthen 
the national identity and unity in the face of this religious diversity.762 The 
idea of reforming Islam was on the modernization agenda of the elites even 
before the gaining of independence in 1920,763 and remained so, along with 
the idea of attaining state control over religious institutions once the state was 
established.764 The monarch of modern Albania, King Zog I, formerly known 
as Ahmet Zogolli, received his high school education in Istanbul, at Lycée 
Impérial de Galatasaray, where he was exposed to the ideas of the Young 
Turks.765 Directly involved in the Albanian national struggle against the 
Ottomans and then in the state-building process, King Zog was also influenced 
by the elite circles of Vienna when he was exiled there during WWI. He was 
determined not only to break Albania away from its Ottoman past, but also to 
refashion the nation as a truly modern European one.766     
                                                          
761 Nathalie Clayer, “Behind the Veil: The Reform of Islam in Interwar Albania or the Search 
for a ‘Modern’ and ‘European’ Islam,” in Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: 
Gender, Modernism and the Politics of Dress, Stephanie Cronin (ed.), London: Routledge, 
2014, pp. 231-251.  
762 Ibid., p. 231.   
763 Albania declared its independence during the Balkan Wars in 1912. However, it was 
occupied in WWI. Its independence was finally recognized by the international community in 
1920. 
764 For earlier debates on reforming Islam in Albania, see Nathalie Clayer, “Adapting Islam to 
Europe: The Albanian Example,” in Islam und Muslime in (Südost)Europa im Kontext von 
Transformation und EU-Erweiterung, Christian Voss et Jordanka Telbizova-Sack (eds.), 
München: Verlag Otto Sagner, 2010, pp. 53-69.   
765 For more, see Jason Hunter Tomes, King Zog of Albania: Europe’s Self-Made Muslim 
Monarch, New York: New York University Press, 2004. 
766 In fact, even his adoption of the name Zog as his imperial name was in order to distance 
himself from the Ottomans, to get rid of the Turkish sounding original family name Zogolli, 
which had a Turkish suffix (-oğlu). He also did not choose to officially use his first name, 




Although this was also the goal of the Kemalist regime in Turkey, the 
Ottoman legacy continued to influence both countries in many ways. In fact, 
Albania was late among the Balkan states in achieving independence from the 
Ottoman Empire, and when it “emerged from the First World War it was still 
in many respects Ottoman, from its architecture to its religious make-up as 
well as many aspects its economic, social and political structure.”767 On top of 
this Ottoman legacy shared by the two countries came authoritarian regimes 
led by two “Balkan strongmen.”768 In particular, policies regarding religion 
and religious communities in inter-war Albania show striking similarities to 
those followed in Turkey under the Kemalist regime. Like in Turkey, the 
Albanian state aimed at establishing its control over religious affairs.769 Both 
countries opted for very radical secularizing reforms, such as abolishing the 
religious courts, the change of the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday, and 
the adoption of a secular Civil Code. Particularly the last one differentiates 
Turkey and Albania from Iran and other Muslim-majority countries where 
family laws were never fully secularized. The Albanian Civil Code, which 
was adopted in 1929, three years after the adoption of Swiss Civil Code in 
Turkey, was mainly based on the French Code Napoléon, with articles taken 
from Italian and Swiss Codes.770 As in Turkey, the Albanian Civil Code aimed 
at granting equal status to all citizens and secularizing the personal status law. 
It abolished polygamy and turned marriage into a civil matter, making 
provisions for a general divorce process for all Albanians regardless of their 
                                                          
767 Bernd J. Fischer, “Introduction,” in Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers 
of Southeast Europe, Bernd J. Fischer (ed.), London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2006, pp. 1-
18.  
768 Ibid., p. 1. 
769 This state control also included the use of Islamic institutions and practices for nationalist 
and modernist policies of the state. For example, Ramadan sermons were used in Albania to 
advise Muslims on the significance of national unity, progress and civilization. Clayer, 2014, 
p. 232. The Kemalist regime in Turkey also systematically used the sermons as a means of 
political communication and indoctrination. Sevgi Adak, “Kemalist Laikliğin Oluşum 
Sürecinde Ramazanlar (1923-1938),” Tarih ve Yoplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar 11, Fall 2010, pp. 47-
88. In contrast to Turkey, however, where the regime tried to severely suppress the religious 
orders, the Albanian state continued to recognize these orders as part of the Islamic community. 
In fact, particularly the Bektashi doctrine had been highlighted and promoted as liberal Islam 
by Albanian nationalists since the end of the 19th century. These modernist nationalists were 
also emphasizing the equality of men and women, and as part of this, they were opposed to 
women’s veiling. See Nathalie Clayer, Arnavut Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Avrupa’da 
Çoğunluğu Müslüman bir Ulusun Doğuşu, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2013, 
p. 372. 
770 Owen Pearson, Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History, Vol. I, Albania and King Zog: 




religion. As such, it severely limited the power and control of the clergy of all 
religions over their communities.771   
 As in all other countries, the use of the veil in Albania was 
predominantly an urban issue. However, the perçe (face veil) did not 
necessarily refer to religious differences. For example, as Isa Blumi indicates, 
while rural women, both Muslims and Catholics, would work in the fields 
unveiled, women living in the cities, again both Muslims and Catholics, would 
be veiled in late-Ottoman northern Albania.772 Nevertheless, in the 1920s 
when un/veiling became a political debate in newly independent Albania, the 
measures and propaganda were targeting the Muslim community. Women’s 
unveiling became an issue as part of the discussions on improving women’s 
social position, during which Turkey was one of the reference points. In 1923, 
for example, a deputy in the Albanian parliament referred to Latife Hanım’s 
visit to the Turkish parliament having removed her face veil.773 The same year, 
at the congress of the Albanian Muslims in Tirana, abolishing women’s 
veiling was discussed as a necessary reform for the progress of the country.774 
In all major political developments throughout the 1920s, such as during the 
introduction of the Civil Code, the issue reappeared. The first open official 
action was taken in 1929. The Ministerial Council banned the perçe and the 
ferace, with the Ministry of Justice giving the necessary orders to the police 
stations not to offend people during the application of the ban and to work 
together with the district councils to convince women to remove these veils. 
Although it is not clear who was behind the initiative, it seems that some 
religious leaders among the Islamic community were also supporting 
unveiling.775 Associated not only with backwardness and fanaticism but also 
with the Ottoman past, the characterization of the perçe and the ferace in the 
discourse of the Albanian secularist elite was very similar to the perception of 
                                                          
771 Pearson suggests that while Muslims showed no dissent to such changes, the Catholic clergy 
protested the adoption of the secular Civil Code but achieved no result. See ibid., p. 308. 
772 Isa Blumi, Rethinking The Late Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Social and Political 
History of Albania and Yemen 1878-1918, Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2003, p. 147.  
773 Clayer, 2014, p. 237. A proposal was discussed in the parliament in 1923 which suggested 
that the government should make propaganda through the national Islamic congress in order to 
improve women’s social life by taking Turkey as an example. Ibid., p. 247, fnt. 14. 
774 Vickers suggests that even the most conservatives reluctantly agreed at the congress that this 
was a necessary reform. Miranda Vickers, The Albanians: A Modern History, London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2001, pp. 108-109. 
775 Clayer does not give the details of the ban. Some sources claim that the president of the 
newly elected national Islamic Congress had asked the Minister of Justice to ban the veil. 
Clayer, however, argues that this is unlikely. She thinks that it was the initiative of the political 




the peçe and the çarşaf in the Turkish context. It is also telling that although 
there was a central decision, it nevertheless envisaged the involvement of the 
local administrative units to “convince” women, adding a strong local 
dimension to the process, as in Turkey and Iran. Similarly, this decision shows 
that the caution taken to avoid reactions was also present in the Albanian case. 
In fact, the punitive measures remained unclear. Clayer indicates that in the 
years following the ban, the anti-veiling campaign was implemented mainly 
through propaganda in the newspapers and lectures. Women who were 
government employees, such as teachers and midwives, were closely checked, 
however; as in the anti-veiling campaigns in other countries, these groups of 
women were the easiest target for the Albanian state to control and pressure.776 
One important difference of the Albanian anti-veiling campaign was that 
unlike in Turkey and Iran, where the çarşaf and the chador were equally part 
of the unveiling debate, in Albania, the campaign in the 1920s was concerned 
with the ferace, which was a lighter outdoor dress compared to the çarşaf and 
the chador.777 The support of some religious intellectuals should also be noted; 
it seems that the anti-veiling campaign in Albania was a result of a wider 
consensus.   
Although the Turkish example was a reference point in the early 
unveiling debates in Albania, the country indeed went further than Turkey. 
There was no equivalent in Turkey of the Albanian ministerial decision to ban 
                                                          
776 Clayer also indicates that in the year 1935, punitive measures were taken against some 
women for not obeying the ban. However, there is not further detail. Ibid., p. 234. 
777 It can be argued that Albania differs in this regard because it is a Balkan country. In the 
Balkans, Muslim women’s veiling was, generally speaking, lighter. In many Balkan contexts, 
the debate was on the use of the ferace. For example, Neuburger suggests that when Bulgarian 
reformers discussed veiling in the 1930s and 1940s, their focus was on the headscarves of the 
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than a peasant head-scarf tied across the chin instead of in the back of the neck.” Tying scarf 
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also emerged from among the Muslim minority with the influence of Kemalism. The Bulgarian 
state, however, did not support this impetus. Mary Neuburger, “Difference Unveiled: Bulgarian 
National Imperatives and the re-dressing of Muslim Women, 1878-1989,” in Anti-Veiling 
Campaigns in the Muslim World: Gender, Modernism and the Politics of Dress, Stephanie 
Cronin (ed.), London: Routledge, 2014, pp. 252-266. Similarly, the Balkans differ in terms of 
the attitude of the ulema towards the issue of unveiling. It seems that the Muslim clergy was 
more divided, and there were some liberal or reformist groups among them that were more open 
to unveiling and ready to cooperate with the reformist political authorities on this. For the cases 
of Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia, see respectively, Clayer, 2014; Muhammed Aruçi, “The 
Muslim Minority in Macedonia and Its Educational Institutions during Inter-War Period,” in 
Islam in Inter-War Europe, Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain (eds.), London: Hurst, 2008, pp. 
344-361; Xavier Bougarel, “Farewell to the Ottoman Legacy? Islamic Reformism and 




veiling; the initiatives against veiling in Turkey in the 1920s, indeed, remained 
limited to a few local attempts, as discussed in Chapter 2. Compared to 
Albania, in both Turkey and Iran, systematic efforts at changing women’s 
clothing came later and were first preceded by attempts at reforming men’s 
clothing.778 Unlike unveiling, in both countries, the changes in men’s headgear 
were issued through legislation. While Turkey’s Hat Law came in 1925, in 
Iran, the Pahlavi hat was made compulsory in 1928 as part of the Uniform 
Dress Law, which was not limited to headgear, but included all aspects of 
men’s clothing.779 The emphasis on the Iranian case was on the 
standardization of dress for the purposes of national solidarity. The Pahlavi 
hat was represented as national headgear rather than an imitation of the 
European hat, which would be later made compulsory in 1935, following Reza 
Shah’s visit to Turkey in 1934.780 In both countries, the regulations to 
modernize men’s clothing in the 1920s did not concern women, but echoed a 
similar change in women’s clothing in the public debates, as well as in the 
social protests that emerged against them.781  
In Iran, as in Turkey, the discussion of women’s veiling goes back to 
the 19th century, but it remained an issue for a long time mainly among the 
                                                          
778 I could not find a detailed analysis of the discussions on men’s headgear or clothing in 
Albania. Pearson indicates that in Albania “a stricter code of dress for men was also introduced 
which stipulated that the wearing of national costume was to be confined to national holidays.” 
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comparative analysis, Cronin suggests that there were indeed attempts to transform male 
clothing and headgear everywhere in the Muslim world except the USSR. Cronin, 2014, p. 14.                                                
779 Houchang Chehabi, “Staging the Emperor’s New Clothes: Dress Codes and Nation-Building 
under Reza Shah,” Iranian Studies 26(3-4), Summer/Fall 1993, pp. 209-229. The “uniform 
dress” was later explained in detail by regulations issued by the Ministry of Interior. It was 
defined as a Pahlavi hat and a European suit. There were exceptions to the law, however. 
Clerics, Sunni religious authorities, religious students and scholars were exempted from the 
law. Ibid.; Kashani-Sabet, 2011, p. 153 
780 Mohammed-Ali Forughi, then the Iranian ambassador to Ankara, had complained from the 
Pahlavi hat in 1928 and suggested the adoption of the European hat since this would standardize 
the dress of Iranians with the outside world. See Chehabi, 2004. Chehabi claims that the 
European hat, called as the international hat, was made obligatory for all state employees in 
Iran by a cabinet degree in 1935 and in this Reza Shah was inspired by the example of Turkey. 
Ibid.   
781 In the protests against the introduction of European hat in Iran in 1935, for example, it was 
rumored that this directive would be followed by the banning of the women’s veiling. Chehabi, 
2003. Similar rumors had emerged in Turkey after the Hat Law of 1925, as discussed previously 




elite and no attempt was made by the state to remove it until the mid-1930s.782 
There were no equivalents in Iran of the local attempts at unveiling initiated 
in the 1920s in Turkey. The first woman who publicly unveiled in Iran was 
Babi poet and theologian Fatemah Baraghani, known as Tahereh Qorrat al-
‘Ayn. Her removal of the veil at a Babi meeting in Baadasht in 1848 created 
a huge unrest, which resulted in her eventual arrest.783 Although there was 
some relaxation in gender segregation and veiling beginning with the 
constitutional period, in the early decades of the 20th century, there was no 
consensus among the modernist intelligentsia about unveiling, and women’s 
rights activists had different opinions even on the use of the face veil 
(picheh).784 However, there was a small but active group of feminists who had 
unveiling on their agenda in the early 1920s. As one of the pioneers, the 
president of the Patriotic Women’s League (Jam’iyyat-e Nesvan-e Vatankhah) 
Mohtaram Eskandari had removed her veil in Tehran in 1925, but stoned and 
harassed in the street for her actions to support unveiling.785 Similarly, 
Sadigheh Dowlatabadi, the editor of another women’s journal, Women’s 
                                                          
782 For early discussions on unveiling in Iran, see Camron Amin, The Making of the Modern 
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Press of Florida, 2002, pp. 16-79; Afsaneh Najmabadi, “Authority and Agency: Revisiting 
Women’s Activism during Reza Shah’s Period,” in The State and the Subaltern: 
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Amin, 2002, p. 257, fnt. 22. For more on Tahereh Qorrat al-‘Ayn, see Abbas Amanat, 
Resurrection and Renewal: The Making of the Babi Movement in Iran, 1844-1850, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1989. See also Milani, 1992.    
784 See Najmabadi, 2007. For example, Kashani-Sabet notes the reports of American 
missionaries which depicted this relative relaxation in women’s veiling in late 1910s and early 
1920s for elite Iranian women. See Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “Dressing up (or down): Veils, 
hats and consumer fashions in interwar Iran,” in Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: 
Gender, Modernism and the Politics of Dress, Stephanie Cronin (ed.), London: Routledge, 
2014, pp. 149-162.    
785 See Sadeghi, 2007, pp 77-79. The Patriotic Women’s League was a feminist organization 
founded by Mohtaram Eskandari in 1922. The league was closed in 1933; the state feminism 
of the Pahlavi regime took it over. See also Eliz Sanasarian, The women’s rights movement in 




Voice (Zaban-e Zanan), had also discarded the chador.786 In the late 1920s 
and early 1930s, while an increasing number of urban elite women had indeed 
removed their face veil, the removal of the chador still remained controversial, 
however. This was probably why it was still considered risky when three 
Muslims students of the American Girls’ School in Tehran attended their 
graduation unveiled in 1929.787 Najmabadi claims that the regime seemed to 
be against the removal of the chador as late as 1932, and there were 
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See Rostam-Kolayi and Matin-asgari, 2014, p. 138, fnt. 25.  
787 Kashani-Sabet, 2014, p. 154. 
788 Najmabadi, 2007, pp. 162-163. 
Figure 6.3. A clip from Turkish national newspaper Cumhuriyet, showing 
“modern” Iranian women watching a sports game. The caption reads 
“Iranian women progress in the way to development with an incredible 
speed.” Cumhuriyet, 25 November 1935.  
 
 




In the mid-1930s, a more determined agenda for the modernization of 
women’s clothing emerged in all three countries. The change in women’s 
attire was already underway, but as the regimes became more authoritarian, 
they became more aggressive about controlling and shaping it. In Turkey and 
Iran, this process coincided with the suppression of all independent women’s 
initiatives and organizations; the state would be the sole actor in determining 
the limits of “women’s liberation.”789 In Iran, the move for unveiling took off 
with the founding in May 1935 of the Kanun-e Banuvan (The Women’s 
Center), which was a direct regime initiative. It should be also underlined, 
however, that some prominent members of the 1920s’ generation of feminists, 
such as Fakhr Afaq Parsa and Sadigheh Dowlatabadi, were also members of 
the board of the center; they “began to cooperate with the state in the hope of 
fulfilling their long overdue dreams.”790 One of the aims of the center was the 
removal of the veil. It started an open campaign for it by getting its own 
members to convince their relatives and others in their social milieu and by 
encouraging the participants of its meetings to unveil.791 As Sadeghi indicates, 
“the center provided the organizational apparatus for propagating the idea of 
unveiling and its implementation.”792 Reza Shah’s oldest daughter was the 
president of the center, thus the female members of the royal family were at 
the center of the campaign for unveiling. This was in fact one important 
similarity between Iran and Albania: the role the royal women played in the 
unveiling process. In the Albanian case, as well, King Zog’s three sisters were 
the role models in their Westernized dress, making public appearances, tours 
and visits throughout the country to push for unveiling, including even the 
cities which were known for their Muslim conservatism.793  
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in both countries. While Women’s Union was closed down in 1935 in Turkey, following the 
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790 Sadeghi, 2007, p. 82. 
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 Albania, however, is distinct from both Iran and Turkey in that it is 
the only country to pass a law banning the veil. The Albanian parliament 
approved the Law on the Ban on Face Covering, which prohibited women 
from covering their face, wholly or partially, on 8 March 1937.794 Women who 
did not abide by the law would be punished with a fine not exceeding 500 gold 
francs.795 As mentioned earlier, the face veil was in fact banned in Albania in 
1929. It seems, however, that this earlier attempt was ineffective and the 
regime felt the need to ban it again, this time by enacting a law. This time as 
well, the implementation of the law was supported by propaganda and with 
additional activities that were organized especially in the provinces.796 In 
addition, it is important to note that when unveiling became an issue of 
legislation in Albania, its scope was narrowed and kept limited to the face veil; 
the earlier ban in 1929 also included the ferece, which was not touched by the 
law issued in 1937. As in the earlier attempt, this time, a degree of support 
from the religious leaders was seen as necessary. The head of the Islamic 
Community had issued a fatwa eight days before the enactment of the law, 
declaring that it was not forbidden in Islam for women to show their face.797 
According to the law, men who attempted to prevent women from obeying the 
code, who engaged in propaganda in favor of the veil, and who did not exert 
their authority to implement the law would also be fined.798 These were 
measures taken against social opposition to unveiling. In contrast to the 
official account, which claimed that the reform was a success, there was in 
fact significant unrest. While the police tried to control in the streets women’s 
compliance with the law, some women refused to do so or adopted new forms 
of veils, which they could use to cover their faces occasionally, when 
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795 Pearson, 2004, p. 385. 
796 A Turkish newspaper reported ten days after the enactment of the law in Albania that the 
king had ordered the opening of literacy courses for women in the provinces,  as well as courses 
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peçe menedildi,” Cumhuriyet, 18 March 1937. 
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798 Clayer, 2014, p. 214. In fact, Pearson indicates that “anyone attempting to prevent women 
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encountering a police officer.799 Conservative Muslims’ discontent with the 
unveiling law seemed to be one of the driving forces behind the unsuccessful 
revolt that broke out in May 1937 in the south, which was led by a former 





Turkey and Iran opted for a different strategy: avoiding direct 
legislation, handling the issue mainly at the local level, and guiding and 
monitoring the local administrators through certain ministries. As was the case 
for Ankara, the initial position of Tehran on unveiling was cautious. The first 
directive on unveiling sent to certain provinces by the Ministry of Interior of 
                                                          
799 Clayer, 2014, p. 235. 
800 Vickers, 2011, p. 135. Pearson, on the other hand, claims that the objective of the revolt is 
unclear. However, he also notes that the revolt might have been benefitted from the uneasiness 
among the Muslims. Pearson, 2004, p. 386.   
Figure 6.4. A clip from a local 
newspaper in Konya, 
announcing the banning of the 
peçe in Albania, with an 
illustration of King Zog.  




Iran on 9 December 1935 was very similar to the tone and language used by 
the Turkish Ministry of Interior in its initial directives to the provinces: 
 
[To local] governments of Arak, Hamedan, Garrus, Malayer, 
Kermanshah, Sanandaj and Golpaygan: The subject of kashf-e hijab 
must be encouraged by [local] governments and the police without 
forcing kashf-e hijab on anyone. Preachers and others who might 
oppose or talk against it must be immediately arrested and punished by 
the police. Act in a very prudent and dignified manner. Report the 
progress of this matter routinely via secret code.801       
   
The subsequent directives were primarily issued by the Minister of 
Education, to be implemented by the Minister of Interior by monitoring the 
governors. In fact, Rostam-Kolayi and Matin-asgari suggests that the key actor 
in Iran’s anti-veiling campaigns was the Ministry of Education, since the 
directives sent by the Ministry of Interior also referred to its directives, 
emphasizing the importance of girls’ enrollment in school, the role of women 
teachers, and finally, other state officials.802 The Minister of Education, Ali-
Asghar Hikmat, was responsible for the campaign’s initial conception and 
implementation.803 As in Turkey, the state officials, especially female 
teachers, would be the vanguards, and the process would be managed by 
organizing conferences, meetings and social gatherings.804 Differently than in 
Turkey, however, in Iran, the instrument emphasized in the directives on 
unveiling to get women to adopt European dress was the national education 
system. One of the most detailed directives on unveiling was one sent by the 
Ministry of Education to all local officials in charge of education in the 
provinces.805 This directive called for all public elementary schools to be co-
educational and for all elementary and secondary schools to adopt a uniform 
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802 Attempts at changing the clothing of state officials began earlier. Kashani-Sabet mentions 
that Reza Shah decreed in 1931 that employees of the ministries should put on homespun 
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circulars. Kashani-Sabet, 2011, p. 153. 
803 Rostam-Kolayi and Matin-asgari, 2014, p. 132. Cheabi also refers to Hikmat’s banning of 
the veil for teachers and students as an initial step of unveiling in Iran. See Chehabi, 1993, p. 
216. 
804 Chehabi indicates that in Iran “state employees were to be given loans to buy new clothes 
for their wives, and to be put on unpaid leave of absence if they did not bring their unveiled 
wives to official functions.” Ibid., p. 219.   




dress for all students, which they had to wear in school as well as on the street. 
Although mentioned implicitly, it was obvious in the directive that the dress 
codes for students excluded the chador. The transformation of the clothing of 
ordinary adult women, on the other hand, would be achieved through the 
conferences, meetings and gatherings to be organized in the provinces by 
Ministry of Education officials. It was the duty of these officials to act as 
examples for other women and to inform them about the dress codes “common 
among chaste and noble families in civilized countries;” women should be 
told that these dress codes were in fact not alien to Islam or Iranian culture. 
Local administrators and heads of police were required to attend such 
organizations with their wives having removed the chador, and thus, to foster 
the development of mixed-gender environment.806     
 Hence, as far as the content of the directives issued by the state are 
concerned, it seems that unveiling in Iran was compulsory only for school 
girls, female government employees and wives of male government 
employees. And for many of these women, it meant not only the removal of 
the face veil and the chador, but also the headscarf, even if it was not explicitly 
dictated in the official documents.807 In other words, the norm set by the 
families of the Shah, the high level bureaucrats and the urban elite in general 
was the full adoption of European dress, including the replacement of 
headscarf with a hat. This seems to be parallel to the Turkish case, where most 
urban and provincial elite, as well as female government employees had 
removed their headscarf as well.808 However, what is different in the Turkish 
case is that the anti-veiling campaigns in Turkey deliberately targeted 
changing ordinary women’s dress; the bans issued by municipal councils were 
concerned with the removal of the face veil and the çarşaf by all women. In 
other words, the unveiling of school girls and female teachers in Turkey in the 
1930s was achieved much earlier, through the regulations of the Ministry of 
Education, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Thus, to the extent that the content of 
the state directives and local decisions were concerned, the anti-veiling 
campaigns of the 1930s in Turkey can be seen as more comprehensive 
compared to the ones during the same period in Iran. In other words, their 
                                                          
806 Ibid., p. 130. 
807 In some occasions, however, wives of government employees in the provinces appeared in 
compulsory gatherings wearing headscarves rather than hats. For one anecdote, see Chehabi, 
1993, pp. 218-219. 
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intent was the imposition of unveiling on all women, regardless of whether 
they were state officials. 
 However, in practice, this difference tended to lose its significance, 
since, in the Iranian case as well, the anti-veiling campaigns surpassed the 
limits of the ministerial directives. In both countries, the local character of the 
anti-veiling campaigns and the ambiguity of the attitude of the center gave the 
provincial authorities greater space for action. In some of the provinces, the 
anti-veiling campaigns were implemented quite strictly by some local 
authorities despite the orders coming from the center cautioning them to 
refrain from using force. As it was discussed in previous chapters, in some 
provinces in Turkey, local authorities tried to limit veiled women’s access to 
public places, such as parks, movie theaters, or state offices, contrary to the 
circulars sent by the Ministry of Interior. A similar tendency can be seen in 
the conduct of local Iranian administrators. A British consular report from 
Tabriz in February 1936, for example, mentioned that veiled women were 
excluded from public baths, public carriages and movie theaters. Moreover, 
doctors were ordered not to admit veiled women to the hospitals.809 As in 
Turkey, in Iran as well, unveiling was imposed on some women by force, 
although it was discouraged officially. Like Ankara, Tehran knew about this 
misconduct.  In fact, there are oral historical accounts of police violence even 
in Tehran; Sadeghi tells the story of a woman who was stopped by a policeman 
for wearing a scarf, which he pulled off forcefully.810 Reports of occasional 
use of violence led the Iranian Minister of Interior to warn the local authorities, 
once again, against such offenses in 1938. The minister had emphasized the 
need to be prudent and to act with good intentions in order to avoid reactions, 
misunderstandings and problems, especially in conservative provinces such as 
Qom and Mashad.811 Thus, it seems there was room to act differently in more 
“appropriate” provinces; such unclear points were perhaps one source of 
difficulty (and opportunity, by the same token) for local administrators in 
interpreting the directives coming from Tehran.812 The caution taken by the 
Pahlavi regime to not disturb traditional segments of the society and to not 
contradict the Islamic norms had in fact proved partly effective. There was no 
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812 Chehabi, for example, mentions some local authorities who requested more policemen from 
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fatwa issued against unveiling by a major cleric in Iran;813 some clerics even 
supported it.814 Iranian women used various strategies to find their way. 
Hiding or adoption of long overcoats and scarves were common; in some 
instances, the authorities interpreted this as resistance to the policy of 
unveiling.815 When unveiled, some women faced harassment and violence by 
members of the local populace for abiding by the new dress codes. Confronted 
by these various reactions on the ground, but at the same time, ordered by 
Tehran to fight against veiling and encourage unveiling, the authorities 
struggled to follow a consistent policy at the local level.816          
  In conclusion, the similarities between the anti-veiling campaigns in 
the 1930s in Turkey and Iran were greater than previously acknowledged by 
the literature. Both Ankara and Tehran were careful not to create reaction; 
they tried to adopt a gradual strategy and to foster unveiling mainly through 
the help of the state officials and local elite. Although a complete 
Europeanization of women’s dress was the ideal, for the most part, state 
intervention was directed mainly against face veil, çarşaf and chador, 
otherwise allowing a range of possibilities to adapt to the new codes. In fact, 
just as what unveiling entailed in mid-1930s Iran – primarily, the removal of 
the face veil and discarding of the chador – happened to be seen acceptable as 
“Islamic veiling” under the Islamic Republic, the target of the anti-veiling 
campaigns in mid-1930s Turkey – again, removal of the face veil and 
discarding of the çarşaf – was essentially achieved, since when the “Islamic 
dress” reemerged beginning in the 1960s and became a political issue in the 
1980s, women’s new veiling style – a long overcoat and a headscarf – was 
very much in line with the Kemalist standards of unveiling. As Rostam-Kolayi 
and Matin-asgari claims for the Iranian case, this is an ironic conclusion for 
the Turkish case as well.817 Nevertheless, it reflects the extent to which the 
authoritarian regimes of Iran and Turkey in the 1930s were careful not to 
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level clerics at the local level. See ibid.  
814 Chehabi, 1993, p. 220. 
815 Note the similarity with the accounts coming from some provinces in Turkey, reporting 
women who adopted long overcoats. See Chapter 4.   
816 Chehabi, for example, notes that this increased the frequency of violence against unveiled 
women. Chehabi, 1993, p. 220.  
817 Rostam-Kolayi and Matin-asgari explains this ironic conclusion as follows: “the core thrust 
of the 1930s ‘unveiling,’ essentially calling for women’s faces to be uncovered and the 
discarding of the chador, was not only accepted as compatible with Islam in the post-Reza Shah 
era, but continued as ‘Islamic hijab’ even under the Islamic Republic”. Rostam-Kolayi and 
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contradict existing patriarchal and even Islamic norms. It also shows that these 
regimes tended to adapt to local circumstances to a certain degree, no matter 
how keen they were to transform them. This was perhaps a question of state 
capacity and penetration into society, rather than a question of ideological 
flexibility.       
This is also a good point to think of the differences among the three 
countries. In comparisons between Turkey and Iran, it has been emphasized 
that Turkey’s greater proximity to Europe and the greater intensity of its 
interactions with the West prepared a more advantageous setting for 
modernization reforms.818 The same could be argued for the case of Albania 
since, as a county located in Europe, the aspiration to look and live like a 
European was very strong and considered very urgent from the start. In fact, 
during the debates on unveiling in the mid-1930s, Albanian politicians and 
intellectuals who advocated a ban on veiling claimed that this was necessary 
if Albania wanted to be seen as part of Europe and included among the 
European countries.819 Thus, this strong motivation should have played a role 
in Albania’s uniqueness as the only country to legislate against the veil. One 
can also trace the difference of Iran in this regard by following measures taken 
prior to the anti-veiling campaign of the mid-1930s, which aimed at 
weakening gender segregation and opening more space for women in public. 
For example, in 1928, the police received orders to allow women to visit 
public places unveiled and women were permitted to speak with men in the 
streets and to use the same carriage with them, and in 1935, those women who 
were unveiled in Tehran received police escort against street attacks.820 Such 
measures were not considered necessary in Turkey or in Albania, where 
gender segregation was comparatively more relaxed already, at least in major 
cities.      
Perhaps a more important factor was Turkey’s early experience with 
modernization, and consequently, its relatively more centralized state and 
better organized bureaucracy. This is the second dimension that has been 
underlined in the literature as an advantage of Turkey compared to Iran. While 
Reza Shah was likened to Atatürk in terms of aims and methods of 
modernization, as far as the means he had at his disposal to realize these aims 
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were concerned, he was rather compared to Sultan Mahmud II, an Ottoman 
sultan notable for his reforms to modernize the state in the early 19th century 
(reigned 1808-1839).821 The fact that “state initiated and privately backed 
reforms had a much longer history, scope, and cumulative effect in the 
nineteenth century Ottoman Empire compared with the few, short-lived, and 
limited measures at reform in Qajar Iran”822 contributed immensely to the 
republican regime’s efforts at modernization after the collapse of the Ottoman 
state. As Atabaki and Zürcher argue, “where Reza Shah had to build a state, 
Atatürk, during his 15-year rule (1923-1938) could transform an existing 
one.”823 Although more studies are needed to compare the capacity of the 
Albanian state specifically with regards to the issue of organizing and 
enforcing an anti-veiling campaign, interwar Albania has been generally 
analyzed as a weak state in the literature, both economically and politically.824 
Vickers suggests that “during the interwar years, Albania remained Europe’s 
least developed and poorest state by far.”825 Although King Zog managed to 
unify the country in the second half of the 1920s, local tribes and landowners 
were still quite powerful and their loyalty to the regime was secured by 
distributing them important posts in the army and by a related pension 
system.826 From the very beginning, Italian influence was significant and 
accepted on the basis of financial support, and later in the 1930s, this influence 
took the form of an increasing Italian penetration in Albania.827 In fact, Clayer 
suggests the revitalization of the unveiling debate in Albania in the mid-1930s, 
which resulted in the enactment of the ban on the face veil in 1937, coincided 
with a deep economic and political crisis in the face of rising tension with 
Italia.828 The true purpose of the law was to underline the image of Albania as 
a European country; at a time when Albania’s sovereignty was under threat 
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822 Najmabadi, 1991, p. 55. 
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Barbara Jelavich, The History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century, Volume II, Cambridge: 
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825 Vickers, 2011, p. 120. 
826 Ibid., p. 118. 
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by Italy, the aim was to reinforce the idea that “Albania should be a sovereign 
country among the other Western countries.”829        
Another important dimension to consider, which is directly related to 
the question of state capacity, was the institutional means through which 
cultural modernization was put into practice. It can be argued that the main 
channel of transforming the society, perhaps for all modernizing regimes, was 
the national education system. Modern education was the key for the Iranian, 
Albanian and Turkish political elite to create patriotic, modern citizens and to 
integrate the masses into their regimes. Entering the school system meant a 
major transformation for children, and particularly for female students, this 
meant the removal of the veil.830 This was not enough, however, for a 
comprehensive and rapid change in women’s clothing. The question was the 
capacity to apply the decisions or laws issued by the central elite regarding 
unveiling in the provinces. In this respect, I would argue, that the Kemalist 
regime was more capable and successful in diffusing into the local and 
diversifying the channels through which the targeted cultural changes could 
be realized, or at least, propagated and promoted. In comparisons between 
Turkey and Iran, this institutional capacity of the Kemalist regime has been in 
fact underlined by a number of scholars. Owen, for example, pointed to the 
importance of the establishment of a political party by Atatürk and the 
administrative, organizational and ideological capabilities this provided for 
the working of the regime.831 Likewise, Abrahamian stressed that Atatürk 
ruled with the help of a political party, while Reza Shah was able to  benefit 
from neither the support of the intelligentsia to the degree that Atatürk could 
nor the assistance of an organized political party.832 One could add to this the 
significance of the establishment of the People’s Houses in Turkey, which 
provided yet another channel for the regime for political and cultural 
indoctrination at the local level.833 Moreover, the institutional diversity in the 
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830 In fact, in terms of establishing schools and the number of female student in every level of 
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comparison between Turkey and Iran, “the first modern school for girls was established in 
Istanbul in 1858, in Tehran, not until 1907. A Teachers’ Training College for women was 
opened in 1863 in Istanbul, in 1918 in Tehran. … Women gained access to university education 
in 1914 in Istanbul, but only in 1936 in Tehran.” Najmabadi, 1991, p. 55. 
831 Owen, 1992, pp. 27-29. 
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Turkish periphery, which was highlighted in Chapter 4, was also crucial for 
both hosting diverse local actors and giving them opportunities to position 
themselves as “local initiators” of certain reforms, such as unveiling. In other 
words, however limited the capacity of the local party branches, People’s 
Houses, municipalities, and local associations, for instance,  in inter-war 
Turkey were when analyzed on their own, comparatively speaking, they were 
an advantage for  the Kemalist regime when it adopted the strategy of handling 
the issue of unveiling at the local level. Perhaps, the role that the 
municipalities played in the anti-veiling campaigns in the 1930s and the fact 
that the bans on the peçe and the çarşaf were local, and were nevertheless 
“discussed” and issued by city councils – at least through a seemingly more 
inclusive process – should not be underestimated. This does not mean that the 
Kemalist regime was any less authoritarian compared to Iran or Albania – only 
that the authoritarian regime in Turkey had relatively better means available 
to function at the local level and to penetrate the society. The lack of this 
institutional capacity in Albania, for example, was perhaps one of the reasons 
why the anti-veiling campaign remained ineffective despite the ambitious 
move of the regime to enact a law on the issue.   
On top of this difference in terms of state capacity and institutional 
organization at the local level came the difference between the attitudes of the 
political leaders. In particular, Reza Shah’s attitude towards the anti-veiling 
campaign deserves attention since it can possibly explain, at least partly, why 
the Iranian case has been analyzed as more comprehensive and repressive than 
it was on paper. Although there was no legislation in Iran banning the veil, 
and no central degree issued by the shah prohibiting the veil country-wide, the 
role both the regime center and the Shah and his family played in the process 
was publicly very visible. The anti-veiling campaign had begun by the direct 
involvement of Reza Shah and his wife and daughters, as well as the family 
of all high-level bureaucracy in Tehran, which was probably quite influential 
in spreading the perception that the shah indeed ordered unveiling. For 
example, many sources indicate that unveiling became a state policy and was 
publicly launched by a speech made by Reza Shah at a ceremony at Tehran 
Teachers’ College on 7 January 1936, which was covered by the press. 
Evidently, a notice was sent beforehand to all women teachers and wives of 
ministers, high military officials and high bureaucrats asking them to attend 
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the ceremony having removed the chador and adopted European clothes and 
hats instead. Shah’s wife and daughters had also adopted Western attire. Later, 
in her memoir, Reza Shah Pahlavi’s eldest daughter, Ashraf Pahlavi, would 
also recall this ceremony as the beginning of the unveiling process. She would 
claim that after this ceremony, her father ordered all women to unveil.834 The 
day of the ceremony, 7 January (17th of Day in Persian calendar), would be 
known as “Women’s Emancipation Day” (Rooz-e Azadi-ye Zan).835 In fact, 
even prior to this event, throughout 1935, British and American diplomatic 
sources  reported the possibility a ban on veiling Iran based on their 
observations of  and communications with Reza Shah and his close circle 
bureaucrats.836 Symbolic as it was, the ceremony on 7 January 1936, and 
further involvement of Reza Shah and his family in the process must 
nevertheless have played an important role in the wide-ranging form the anti-
veiling campaigns took in practice in Iran, despite the more limited nature of 
the official directives.837 In fact, it is quite probable that the shah had given 
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The brief survey this chapter provided on the anti-veiling campaigns in the 
Muslim world shows that they have “broad similarities” and an “extra-
ordinary synchronicity,” as Cronin suggests in her comparative account.839 
Having analyzed the modernist agendas that emerged in almost all Muslim 
countries during the inter-war era, she asserts that “although very different 
political formations, these regimes, whether elite nationalist or communist, 
were all opposed to what they viewed as the reactionary forced of Islam and 
tradition, forces which they equated and conflated, and all wished to create a 
new and modern woman, unveiled, educated and integrated into the 
workforce.”840 Likewise, in all examples, the emphasis on the necessity of 
remaking the nation’s women along modern lines existed side by side with an 
equally strong emphasis on protecting women’s morality. The fact that anti-
veiling campaigns emerged as part of a nation-building process, they were 
directly influenced by the ideological hegemony of nationalism, and as a part 
of it, strengthening of certain patriarchal gender norms, such as sexual purity 
and morality.841 It can be argued that the “modern-yet-modest” formulation 
was valid in varying degrees in all attempts to change women’s clothing in the 
Muslim world.842 Since dress was also considered as a marker of the national 
identity, as much as it was of modernity, the removal of the veil was not 
presented as complete Westernization and never defended as pure adaptation 
to European norms; in some contexts, it became a necessity of national 
solidarity, in some others it came to mean a return to a national Golden Age, 
where men and women were working for the national prosperity.  
 In fact, the nationalist discourse shaped the discourse on unveiling in 
many different ways. The increasing emphasis on the national health, for 
example, had its impact on the ways in which unveiling was promoted and 
propagated. Women’s health as mothers of the nation began to be seen as 
indispensable for raising children with strong minds and bodies, and the idea 
that veiling prevents women from receiving enough sunlight, or women’s 
seclusion prevents them from doing sports was quite widespread across the 
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modernizing regimes in the Muslim world. As mentioned in Chapter 3, in 
Turkey this would led to the involvement of local health commissions in the 
process of banning the peçe and the çarşaf. In Iran, for example, the directives 
sent by the Ministry of Education on unveiling underlined the need to increase 
opportunities for girls to engage in  sports at schools; promoting women’s 
physical training, and forming groups like Girl Scouts, would be the first step 
in this regard.843 Another nationalist framework used for unveiling was to 
argue, for example, full-body covers were not dictates of Islam but a “foreign” 
culture. Accordingly, the çarşaf in Turkey and the chador in Iran would be 
alien dresses imposed by the Arabs, whereas the ferece in Albania would be 
the symbol of Ottoman domination. One aim of such arguments was also to 
counter the opposition to unveiling based on religious reasons. In fact, both 
the official state discourse and the elite discourse in various levels sometimes 
defended unveiling by seeking legitimacy in Islam, arguing, especially, that 
the face veil does not exist in Islam. All regimes referred frequently to the 
similar attempts and initiatives in other Muslim countries, in order to be able 
to claim the appropriateness of unveiling to Islam; other Muslims too were 
supporting it. 
 Nowhere were women passive receivers. In countries like Egypt, 
Syria, Turkey and Iran, initial moves for unveiling came from early feminists 
or women’s rights activists, albeit in some cases they remained as symbolic, 
individual acts. However, almost everywhere, the anti-veiling campaigns 
benefited from the support of those women who had already unveiled or easily 
adapted themselves to the new norms and became involved in spreading 
unveiling. In even the most systematic attempts at unveiling, such as in 
Albania, Iran and Turkey, the modernizing regimes depended heavily on the 
loyalty and agency of female state officials, particularly school teachers, to 
perform and promote their message among the masses. The national education 
system was perhaps the most important means through which change in 
women’s dress was realized. Even in countries where there was no systematic 
anti-veiling policy, the most important momentum for unveiling came when 
women entered school. Increase of girls’ schools and their adoption of special 
uniforms provided the opportunity for younger generations to unveil and to 
dress differently than their mothers. Different cases of anti-veiling campaigns 
also show that the majority of the women, who were not part of the school 
system and were part of the poor masses, tried to adopt the new dress codes 
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and domesticate them in variety of ways; the combination of many forms of 
dress and veiling, especially long overcoats and headscarves became common.  
Societal reactions also took many different forms. While in some 
cases, such as Turkey, there was no collective action or demonstration, in 
others, such as Albania and Afghanistan, some anti-regime uprisings used 
unveiling as a tool to mobilize social discontent. The fact that these 
authoritarian regimes were in fact more cautious about imposing unveiling 
than they were imagined to be is an important conclusion. One exception in 
this regard was the anti-veiling campaigns under the Soviet rule, where 
violence against unveiled women was widespread and systematic. However, 
even in these oppressive examples of anti-veiling campaigns, ordinary 
people’s reactions were not as simple as passive compliance vs. active 
opposition. Rather, as Northrop underlines, people could utilize many 
different and complex strategies, “from studied obliviousness to passive 
resistance to the spreading of gossip and rumors. They also included varieties 
of creative subterfuge around questions of law and everyday life.”844 In fact, 
the role of rumor and hearsay was strikingly high in anti-veiling campaigns 
everywhere. This was probably so because the parameters of the campaigns 
remained a bit unclear everywhere, except, perhaps, in Albania, where 
unveiling was imposed through enacting a law. Even there, however, as 
everywhere, the implementation process was the key, and local variations and 
attitudes of those who were obliged to apply the decisions on the ground were 
definitive. Moreover, just like they influenced inner dynamics in each country 
in significant ways, rumor, perceptions, exaggeration and misinformation also 
played an important role in assessing the experiences of other countries. As 
mentioned earlier, the Turkish press, both national and local, tended to 
exaggerate the scope of unveiling in other Muslim countries and used this as 
an extra motivation for promoting the campaigns. Some reports in the Western 
press about Turkey mistakenly presented the anti-veiling campaigns either as 
countrywide by ignoring their local character or as a compulsory reform based 
on a law or decree by the central government.845 The impression that the veil 
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was banned in Turkey was also widespread in other Muslim countries. For 
example, during the discussions in Soviet Uzbekistan on whether to ban the 
veil by law or decree, both opponents and proponents of the idea referred to 
the Turkish case, mistakenly, as an example of banning the veil by decree.846 
Similarly, the idea that the Afghan king was overthrown because he outlawed 
the veil was also used as an argument supporting the necessity to be more 
cautious and to avoid banning the veil.847 News claiming that Reza Shah 
banned the veil in Iran could be seen in the Turkish press as early as mid-
1935.848  
A comparative look at the anti-veiling campaigns in different Muslim 
countries also reveals that dress change was as much an economic issue as it 
was a political and cultural one. The removal of women’s conventional 
clothes, be it a peştamal in a Turkish district or a ferece in an Albanian town, 
was difficult not only because these clothes were traditional or customary, but 
also because they were cheap and usually local products, more easily 
accessible to the ordinary people, the majority of whom were poor and rural 
in all Muslim countries in the 1920s and 1930s. A European-style overcoat or 
hat was much more expensive and difficult to find. This economic side of the 
story shaped people’s attitude towards unveiling everywhere. For example, as 
Wide convincingly shows, the trade of second-hand clothes and manufactures 
from British India was central for the “economy of dress” in inter-war 
Afghanistan; thus what people wore was determined more by their practical 
concerns and conditions than they were by the ideological priorities of the 
state. He draws a conclusion which in fact describes the dynamics of clothing 
change in a wider context:  
 
A ‘market place’ of goods and ideas has helped connect the economic 
to the intellectual, the material to the cultural, and move discussions of 
the period beyond all-too-prevalent oppositions of ‘tribalism,’ 
‘conservatism,’ ‘religiosity,’ ‘xenophobia’ on the one hand, and 
‘modernization,’ ‘Westernization,’ ‘secularization’ and ‘globalization,’ 
on the other. It is not that these terms have no explanatory force. But 
dress is a lived practice that cannot be reduced to such abstractions.849  
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These broad similarities notwithstanding, anti-veiling campaigns in 
the Muslim world differed from each other in crucial ways. As this chapter 
tried to show, from elite discussions to diverse encounters with Western 
colonialism, many factors played a role in these differences. I argued that three 
countries, Albania, Iran and Turkey experienced the most systematic, 
determined and effective anti-veiling campaigns. The parallels between these 
three countries in terms of their political regimes and modernization policies 
also constituted a similar framework for their anti-veiling campaigns. 
However, there were also critical differences between them. Albania was the 
only country in the Muslim world that legislated against the face veil. Turkey 
and Iran, on the other hand, put more emphasis on the fight against unveiling 
at the local level, but still utilized different means and strategies. A 
comparative look at the Turkish case reveals that its greater state capacity and 
institutional variety at the local level set it aside from the other countries. The 
Kemalist regime could operate in the provinces through institutions that were 
greater in number and stronger. As seen in Chapter 4, in Turkey, many actors 
and institutions were involved in the shaping and implementation process of 
the local anti-veiling campaigns, from governors to the local branches of the 
RPP, from city councils to People’s Houses, from local newspapers to sports 
clubs. This did not make the Kemalist state any more pluralist or less 
authoritarian, but this institutional diversity clearly added to the dynamism of 
the reform process. The Pahlavi regime’s strategy to impose unveiling through 
the ministries, while appearing to be similar to the Turkish case, could not and 
did not compensate for this institutional strength of Kemalism and the 
relatively greater room this strength allowed for negotiating and domesticating 
the anti-veiling campaign in the periphery.    
As a final remark, it should be emphasized that the reading provided 
here regarding the anti-veiling campaigns in the Muslim world is concerned 
with the inter-war period. Both national and international dynamics changed 
for all countries in the following decades. Everywhere, however, the issue of 
unveiling continued to be an issue of struggle, a main axis for political debates 
and conflicts with strong symbolic and ideological underpinnings. The debate 
on banning the veil reemerged in the Soviet Union in the 1940s.850 In 1943, a 
group of Syrian women submitted a petition asking for official unveiling, 
which led to protests by Islamists; and Muslim women who joined the 
Christian women’s march in Beirut in November 1943 removed their face 
                                                          




veil.851 In 1959, celebrating the 50th anniversary of the 1919 Revolution and 
women’s participation in it, Esther Fahmi Wisa delivered a speech entitled 
“the emancipation of Egyptian women and their freedom from the veil” at the 
Opera House in Cairo.852 Moreover, new countries where Muslims were a 
minority joined the struggle against veiling in the aftermath of WWII: in post-
war Yugoslavia, bans were issued on the use of face veil both in Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; in Bulgaria, an anti-veiling campaign was launched 
by the new communist regime in the late 1950s.853 And in Turkey, the debate 
on unveiling resurfaced in almost every decade, and each time, with new 
dimensions and discussions added. A constant, however, was the controversy 
around the Kemalist policy of unveiling in the 1930s, which continued to set 
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853 For Bulgaria, see Neuburger, 2014. The ban on the face veil in Serbia and Bosnia was 
reported in a Turkish newspaper, Cumhuriyet, in 1947 and in 1950, respectively. See 
“Sırbistanda Müslüman kadınlarının peçe kullanması yasak,” Cumhuriyet, 9 April 1947; 
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who attended the conference had removed their face veil following the example of the president 
of the conference, Satyavati Rajput. See “Hind kadınları peçeyi atıyorlar!,” Cumhuriyet, 22 
February 1941. A Canadian newspaper of the time also reported the removal of the veil at the 
same conference, but the emphasis was on the condemnation of the purdah (veiling and 
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In his pioneering work, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Berkes 
characterizes the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in Turkey in 1926 as “the 
greatest coup of the new period” and “the most constructive achievement” of 
the Kemalist regime, “because the wheels of the society were thus put on a 
new track.”854 In discussions on the civil code and family law in building up 
to this reform, the Kemalists favored a unified system of codes based on 
secular principles, which, according to them, was a necessity if Turkey wanted 
to be part of the modern world. To exemplify this determination of the 
Kemalist elite, Berkes quotes a speech of Mustafa Kemal in 1925, where he, 
as the leader of the new regime, made this point very explicit:   
 
The Turkish Revolution signifies a transformation far broader than the 
word revolution suggests. … It means replacing an age-old political 
unity based on religion with one based on another tie, that of nationality. 
This nation has now accepted the principle that the only means of 
survival for nations in the international struggle for existence lies in the 
acceptance of the contemporary Western civilization. The nation has 
also accepted the principle that all of its laws should be based on secular 
grounds only, on a secular mentality that accepts the rule of continuous 
change in accordance with the change and development of life’s 
conditions as its law.855 
 
Berkes then goes on to underscore the revolutionary character of adopting a 
fully secular Civil Code by quoting the Minister of Justice, Mahmut Esat 
(Bozkurt), who defended the new law based on similar lines on the day it 
passed in the parliament, 17 February 1926. In his speech, Mahmut Esat had 
in fact placed the idea and the aim behind the introduction of the new code 
within the larger framework of Kemalist modernization: 
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We must never forget that the Turkish nation has decided to accept 
modern civilization and its living principles without any condition or 
reservation. ... If there are some points of contemporary civilization that 
do not seem capable of conforming to Turkish society, this is not 
because of the lack of capability and native capacity of the Turkish 
nation, but because of the medieval organization and the religious codes 
and institutions which abnormally surround it. ... The Turkish nation, 
which is moving with determination to seize contemporary civilization 
and make it its own, is obliged not to make contemporary civilization 
conform to the Turkish nation, but to adjust its steps to the requirements 
of contemporary civilization at all costs.856 
 
The determined voice that can be heard in Mustafa Kemal’s speech 
and in Mahmut Esat’s comments on the new Civil Code can in fact be traced 
in other Kemalist reforms and policies of the early republican era. One can 
refer to several other speeches of Mustafa Kemal or members of the high 
Kemalist elite where their strong political will and the ideological motives that 
shaped the general frameworks of the Kemalist reforms can be examined. In 
fact, such analyses have dominated the literature on Kemalist modernization; 
the visions of the Kemalist elite in Ankara and what they had to say about the 
targets and aims of the policies they introduced have been the starting point of 
any analysis on these policies. They have  also been read as reflecting the 
ultimate character of the Kemalist modernization “projects,” which have been 
seen as solid, well-formulated plans of a cohesive group of political elites to 
change the society in a top-down manner. In this line of thinking, “social 
change, seen as self-propelling movement with an internal spring, has no 
place;” it is rather seen as promoted and shaped by the “projects” of the elites, 
or as they are usually called, of the “social engineers.”857 As Brockett suggests, 
the “assertion that what the Kemalist elite believed should happen was indeed 
taking place” has been very strong in the literature,858 and thus little attention 
has been  given to the study of the implementation process of the reforms as 
they were translated into concrete policies and doings of the various levels of 
state agents in the provinces. As valuable and informative as it is, Berkes’s 
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analysis of the new Civil Code, for example, does not offer sufficient clues to 
understanding why in the 1930s one could still encounter practices that were 
clearly against this law. In 1931, for instance, the party report on the concerns 
and requests raised in the local congresses of the RPP in 38 provinces included 
notes that in the villages of some provinces, such as Artvin, Erzincan, Erzurum 
and Kars, marriages were carried out only by the religious hodjas, and thus 
these marriages were unregistered.859 According to the report, the local RPP 
representatives had demanded such acts be prevented, and the Ministry of 
Justice was also informed on the issue.860 Newspapers of the 1930s, national 
and local alike, were indeed full of news about such issues of unregistered 
marriages and births, and the many attempts by the state to have them 
registered by granting a pardon.861 This evidence shows that the Civil Code 
was still contested in the periphery years after its introduction and could not 
be fully implemented, despite the resolute voice of the political elite in 
Ankara.      
This thesis has departed from a similar discrepancy between “the fact 
and fiction” in the study of the Kemalist modernization. Drawing on the case 
of the anti-veiling campaigns of the 1930s, it aimed to challenge the elite-
centered analysis of the early republican era by focusing on how the state 
policies were shaped and experienced in the provinces. The analysis presented 
here has been informed by a theoretical perspective that focuses on a relational 
understanding of state-society relations, emphasizes the importance of the 
local, and acknowledges the agency of the societal actors. It aimed to reveal, 
in the example of the anti-veiling campaigns in the 1930s, a more detailed and 
complex picture of the Kemalist reforms and policies in the periphery that 
takes into account the ambiguities, hesitations, contradictions, unanticipated 
consequences, negotiations and compromises embedded in the modernization 
process. In doing so, this study has sought to contribute to a recently 
increasing body of literature on the social history of the early republican 
period that sheds more light on the micro dynamics of social change.  
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860 Similarly, despite the fact that the new Civil Code clearly banned polygamy, it continued to 
exist in the following decades. For a discussion on this issue, see Nicole A.N.M. van Os, 
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The case of the anti-veiling campaigns is particularly illuminating 
when it comes to studying such micro dynamics. Unlike many other Kemalist 
reforms, there was no law or central decision guiding the implementation of 
the campaigns in the provinces. Although Ankara clearly encouraged the local 
administrators, and tried to control and coordinate their initiatives for 
women’s unveiling, the campaigns remained as local phenomena and were 
mainly fashioned by the local actors and circumstances rather than by 
directives coming from the center. In fact, as discussed in detail in Chapter 4, 
the directives coming from Ankara were usually weak in terms of policy 
guidance, and at times, vague and even inconsistent. As such, anti-veiling 
campaigns can be seen as an ambiguous reform agenda in terms of content 
and application. This ambiguity, it can be argued, created even a broader space 
for various actors to be involved in the shaping of state policies, and combined 
with their local character, turned the anti-veiling campaigns into a very rich 
case to observe these complex interactions between state and societal actors. 
The public debate on the proper way for women to veil themselves 
and the characterization of the peçe and the çarşaf as uncivilized clothing 
originated in the late Ottoman Empire. Although the “new woman” of the 
republic was promoted to symbolize a radical break with the Ottoman past, 
neither the search for a new womanhood nor the idea that linked social 
development, progress and modernity with women’s emancipation and 
modernization of their clothing was new. The change in women’s clothing and 
the decrease in the use of the peçe and the çarşaf were already under way 
among the elite women in major Ottoman urban centers. Ottoman women’s 
increasing participation in the work force and their efforts in the war years 
prepared a fertile ground for their further visibility in the public sphere in the 
republic. The initial attempts to intervene in the clothing of women in the 
1920s, which can indeed partly be seen as a continuation of the tradition of 
state regulation of clothing in the Ottoman era, had built on the modernist 
discourse and practices that emerged during the empire, but also furthered 
them by opening the way for direct intervention in women’s veiling.         
As discussed in Chapter 2, the anti-veiling campaigns in the second 
half of the 1920s were local, narrow in scope, limited in number and largely 
uninfluential in practice. While some of them seemed to be encouraged by the 
central elite, the campaigns were mainly the initiatives of the local elite. It was 
demonstrated that they emerged immediately after the enactment of the Hat 
Law of 1925 and were undoubtedly part of the public debate and general 




argued that the Hat Law functioned as a reference point and source of 
legitimacy for those provincial elite, men and women, who wanted to initiate 
a similar modernization attempt with respect to women’s clothing in their 
localities. Particularly significant was the influence of the hat reform 
experience in shaping the way the question of women’s veiling was handled. 
The Kemalist strategy of dealing with women’s clothing not by issuing a law 
or a central degree was informed by the reactions the hat reformed received. 
However, I also argued that part of the reason for this choice should be found 
in the patriarchal concerns of the Kemalist regime while trying to trigger 
change in women’s social position and public roles. The patriarchal agreement 
between the elite and non-elite male actors was to “protect” women’s morality 
from the ills of “too much” Westernization. This patriarchal agreement, 
combined with the fear of a social reaction even wider than the hat reform 
received, fed into the tendency of the Kemalist regime to transfer the question 
of unveiling to the provincial level, to trust  the modernist ambitions of the 
local elite, and thus to be content with a more gradual change in this “sensitive 
issue.” 
While it can be argued that this tendency continued throughout the 
single-party era in broad terms, we see a bolder attempt to remove the peçe 
and the çarşaf in the 1930s, which I call the main wave of the anti-veiling 
campaigns. Local attempts to eliminate the peçe and the çarşaf would be 
applied in a much more comprehensive manner during this main wave, both 
in terms of content and the scope, and the strength of the propaganda efforts 
regarding it. I suggested that this main wave should be analyzed in the context 
of 1930s Turkey, which was characterized by an increasingly authoritarian 
regime that consolidated its power and was more determined to penetrate the 
society and to intervene in ordinary people’s cultural and daily practices. In 
other words, the anti-veiling campaigns could be understood as part of a new 
phase the Kemalist regime entered in the 1930s, marked by the policy of 
statism not only in economic sphere but also in other fields. This new phase 
was also shaped by an assertive move for cultural modernization, of which the 
anti-veiling campaigns were an important component alongside other bold 
reforms, such as the adoption of Western measures and the language reform. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the year 1934 had witnessed a particularly intense 
reform movement in this direction, including the anti-veiling campaigns, the 
Surname Law, the Dress Law, and women’s gaining of their full political 
rights. The relationship between the Kemalist regime’s turn to statism and the 




thesis needs to be analyzed further based on other examples to get a more vivid 
picture of this “second phase” of Kemalism in the 1930s. The anti-veiling 
campaigns were perhaps one of the best ways of looking at the “cultural” 
codes of the regime, which aimed at creating a more “civilized” society, both 
in visual and behavioral terms. However, I think, these series of reforms that 
we have associated with cultural modernization should not be seen as being 
limited to such discursive and ideological categories of “modern,” “civilized” 
or “new,” as they were frequently addressed by the Kemalists themselves. 
They should also be seen in a broader context of state centralization, as 
components of an increasing attempt on the side of the regime in the 1930s to 
restore its legitimacy, to enlarge its ideological hegemony, and to increase 
regulation, systematization, and homogenization in order to inventory various 
aspects of daily life of its citizens and bring them under control. It is I think in 
this way that we can see the integrated nature of economic, political and 
cultural spheres as well as the links between different policies of the single-
party era more clearly. 
One mechanism in the 1930s through which such parallel processes 
of modernization and state penetration infused deeper into the provinces was 
the municipal administration, which was significantly strengthened by the 
Municipal Law of 1930 and reorganized as one of the local promoters of 
modern life. As analyzed in Chapter 3, this law and the subsequent 
amendments to increase further the punitive powers of the municipalities had 
in fact drawn the legal framework within which the anti-veiling campaigns of 
the 1930s were shaped and implemented. In this sense, it was no coincidence 
that when direct bans were issued on the use of the peçe and the çarşaf in a 
great majority of the anti-veiling campaigns, they were issued by the city 
councils acting on the basis of  the Municipal Law. However, it would be 
misleading to see the anti-veiling campaigns as municipal regulations only 
because the bans were issued by the city councils. In fact, one of the major 
findings of this thesis is the multiplicity of institutions and actors involved in 
the process leading to an anti-veiling campaign and its implementation 
thereafter. In other words, just as it was possible to see mayors or city council 
members who were unwilling to use the legal capacity of the municipalities to 
initiate an anti-veiling campaign, it was also common to see sport clubs, local 
associations, local newspapers, People’s Houses, the local RPP branches or 
the members of the provincial councils that pushed for an effective campaign. 
Depending on the locality, one or more of these actors and institutions could 




issued by the city council being one component of the process. The 
implementation of the campaign was even more complex, since it was shaped 
by the support as well as resistance of various actors at the local level, and 
simultaneously, by the interaction between Ankara and the provinces. That is 
why this thesis suggested that in order to better analyze the single-party era, it 
is imperative to bring the local back into the analysis, to keep a micro-macro 
balance, and to reconsider the periphery not as a locus of the “traditional,” the 
“masses,” or religious opposition to Kemalism but as a sphere of interaction 
between various actors and positions, where Kemalism and daily state 
practices were negotiated.         
A closer look at the anti-veiling campaigns as they were experienced 
at the local level reveals a number of crucial insights regarding 1930s Turkey. 
First, the problematic aspects of focusing on high politics of the capital 
notwithstanding, the dominant tendency in the literature to picture a 
homogeneous and unified Kemalist political elite is misleading. The detailed 
discussion on the position of Ankara on the anti-veiling campaigns in Chapter 
4 revealed that the high Kemalist elite was not only in fact less monolithic 
than they have been imagined to be, but also could act quite hesitantly and 
reluctantly on certain issues. As in other policies, Ankara was involved in the 
anti-veiling campaigns through various channels, the main ones being the 
Ministry of Interior and the RPP General Secretary. However, the nature of 
this involvement and the working of these channels were quite complex and 
they ensured neither a solid control over nor a consistent implementation of 
the anti-veiling campaigns. The Kemalist elite’s hesitations, as clearly 
surfaced in the RPP congress in 1935, continued throughout the process and 
the basic consensus on the need for encouragement, inculcation, and 
propaganda regarding unveiling, as constantly appeared in the circulars sent 
from Ankara, had little effect in uniting the experiences in different provinces. 
As shown in Chapters 4 and 5, the regime center acted much more consistently 
and cohesively in cases it perceived an open resistance. It equally reacted quite 
steadily to those provincial administrators who pushed for an aggressive anti-
veiling campaign, going beyond the authority they had been given by Ankara. 
It is, I think, also significant to remember in this regard that the use of force 
in the anti-veiling campaigns was also consistently rejected by Ankara, though 
it could not be avoided.  
Second, the role and the attitudes of the local elite were decisive at all 
levels. One of the most important findings in this matter is the fact that in some 




who envisioned themselves as the representatives and the agents of 
modernization in the periphery. In other words, the anti-veiling campaigns 
cannot be seen as directed and imposed from Ankara only; they were 
supported and even initiated by some local modernists, native and appointed 
alike, and thus emerged as a result of more widely shared ideological premises 
and ambitions. Some local elites, on the other hand, varying from provincial 
governors to native members of city councils, were content with a more 
gradual change on the issue of women’s veiling. There were also those who 
had reservations about, or even critical of, the anti-veiling campaigns. Even 
provincial governors, perhaps the most coherent group ideologically and 
educationally, could interpret the central policies and reforms in quite diverse 
ways. This variety formed the basis of another important argument of this 
thesis: not only that the concept of local elite is essential in analyzing the 
Kemalist state in action, but also that the local elite should not be seen as 
monolithic or limited to state-appointed officials. Rather, it should be defined 
in an inclusive manner, as a composite group broad enough to embrace power 
networks at the local level. It is crucial to remember that while salient 
differences like native vs. non-native, or educated vs. non-educated proved 
important in many instances, these differences among the local elite were not 
as rigid and bold as they have usually been assumed in the literature. 
Third, the local, or the “periphery,” had many components. As argued 
in Chapter 5, the local has to be diversified to reflect the multiplicity of the 
actors and voices it contains. Much like the central elite in Ankara, the local 
elite also did not act in a vacuum; their actions were shaped in relation to the 
reactions coming from the ordinary people, the real addressees of the state 
policies. The subordinated sectors of the society had an influence on the anti-
veiling campaigns in various and creative ways, such as circulating rumors 
and writing anonymous letters. While popular resistance to the campaigns 
remained largely within the limits of “secure” strategies, some anti-veiling 
campaigns, especially those that were enforced through the police or the 
gendarmerie, received violent reactions. Reactions to the campaigns also 
reveal that popular resistance cannot be reduced to religious or traditional 
reasons, as would be expected from the “periphery,” as it is depicted in the 
literature. Popular resistance was significant, for example, particularly in 
making the economic aspect of the campaigns more visible to the authorities. 
The local producers of the çarşaf and the peştamal, as well as poor people 
who were unable to afford the “modern” clothes to replace them reacted to the 




 Forth, this thesis argued that since women were the main target of the 
anti-veiling campaigns, their agency should be highlighted. In other words, 
women’s roles in this process, as both facilitators and actors that tried to adapt, 
shape, modify and/or resist the change the Kemalist regime wanted to initiate, 
should be particularly underscored. Chapter 5 demonstrated that some women 
played an active role in the anti-veiling campaigns, not only as supporters but 
also as initiators of the bans issued by local institutions. Some women tried to 
resist the intervention in their clothing in various ways, while others 
domesticated new clothes by adapting them to local circumstances or by 
embracing new forms of covering their hair. A detailed look at women’s 
reactions to and involvement in the anti-veiling campaigns showed that 
women’s agency should be analyzed and conceptualized by going beyond the 
dichotomy of open resistance and passive obedience. It also demonstrated that 
these campaigns could not be understood within the parameters of the never-
ending debate on whether they were liberating or oppressive. Women’s 
unveiling in the early republic has been discussed by the critics of Kemalism 
in Turkey as one of the most powerful symbols of Kemalist oppression, and 
became highly politicized, especially during the headscarf debate in the recent 
decades. While the Kemalist narrative celebrates such policies as the 
emancipation of women, contemporary historiography that has emerged as a 
critique of this narrative has largely represented women as victims of them. In 
both accounts, however, women have been characterized as passive receivers 
of state policies. I tried to show that this was not the case. Based on my 
analysis of women’s agency, I also suggested that the feminist critique of 
Kemalist modernization should also respond to some women’s willingness to 
be part of this experience because they thought it provided a potentially 
broader space for women’s self-actualization.862 In other words, we can 
acknowledge and address the various ways women were involved in the anti-
veiling campaigns, resisted to them or altered them, without reducing this 
variety to rigid categories like full emancipation or oppression. Equally, we 
can analyze possibly empowering aspects of the anti-veiling campaigns for 
some women, without undermining their authoritarian character and without 
                                                          
862 The feminist literature on Kemalist modernization partly touched upon this willingness by 
emphasizing a small group of professional women who were seen as having “internalized the 
Kemalist message.” See, for example, Deniz Kandiyoti, “End of Empire: Islam, Nationalism 
and Women in Turkey,” in Women, Islam and the State, Deniz Kandiyoti (ed.), Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1991, pp. 22-47. However, this analysis needs to be enlarged to also 
include those women who were actively participated in the shaping of the Kemalist policies in 




ignoring the fact that some women became victims of state and male violence 
because they refused to unveil or veil. 
 In Chapter 6, I discussed the Turkish anti-veiling campaigns within 
the broader context of the Muslim world. I argued that despite the fact that the 
Kemalists turned their face to the West as the ultimate reference point, they 
never missed to make references to their “Eastern,” “less developed” 
neighbors and brothers, in order to increase the legitimacy of their policies 
inside the country and to promote their “leadership” in modernization of the 
Muslim world outside the country. Developments regarding women’s clothing 
and veiling in other predominantly Muslim countries were closely watched 
and they could be used as motives to foster anti-veiling campaigns at the local 
level. For Kemalists, in Ankara and in the provinces alike, Turkey was the 
model country, and thus Turkish women were and should be always leading 
the way for modernization of Muslim women’s social positions, including, 
their clothing. In effect, the interaction among different Muslim societies was 
never one-sided. On the question of women’s unveiling, the modernist 
regimes of the inter-war era shared common visions and ambitions, but 
differed significantly in terms of how to deal with it. 
 The analysis provided in Chapter 6 demonstrates that the debates on 
and attempts at women’s unveiling in different Muslim countries all stemmed 
from a similar search for a new, modern and national woman. From the Arab 
countries to Soviet Muslim republics, modernization of women, and as part of 
it, modernization of women’s clothing, echoed modernization and 
development of the nation as a whole. In all experiences, though in varying 
degrees, unveiling was presented as a national cause rather than a pure 
imitation of the West, and a particular emphasis on protecting women’s 
morality accompanied the emphasis given to their new roles as modern 
citizens. The reactions the anti-veiling campaigns received and the ways in 
which women tried to cope with them also revealed significant similarities 
across the cases. One important conclusion perhaps is that no matter how 
authoritarian the political regimes in inter-war Muslim world were (as all of 
them were), the implementation of the authoritarian policies like the anti-
veiling campaigns was never without contestation and almost never took the 
shape the central elite envisioned. From cultural to economic factors, many 
dynamics altered the original “projects” and the end results were always 
shaped by an interplay between various actors and discourses.  
 I highlighted the anti-veiling campaigns in Albania, Iran and Turkey 




discussed these three cases comparatively not only to understand the 
interaction between them, but also to emphasize the distinctive characteristics 
of the Kemalist regime in 1930s Turkey more vividly in the light of its closest 
contemporaries. The comparison shows that the Kemalist regime was 
relatively more capable of infusing its ideology deeper into the society, 
integrating relatively broader segments of the population to its circles of 
power, and providing relatively larger institutional variety and capacity to 
embrace these actors as agents at the local level. In 1930s Turkey, the 
Kemalist state functioned in the provinces through various institutions: the 
local branches of the RPP, the People’s Houses, the municipalities, the city 
councils, the provincial councils, and various associations. The anti-veiling 
campaigns were shaped by the initiatives and acts of these institutions, which 
functioned as settings accommodating different actors and positions. I argued 
that this institutional diversity and capacity did not make the anti-veiling 
campaigns in Turkey any more democratic. Nor did they make the Kemalist 
regime in the 1930s less authoritarian. But I think it is safe to argue that the 
Kemalist regime was relatively more capable of adjusting negotiation, 
domestication and variation without endangering its political power and 
ideological hegemony compared to its contemporaries in the Muslim world. 
In this sense, the findings of this thesis support Meeker’s observation that the 
Kemalist regime allowed a certain degree of popular participation in 
governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to incorporate the 
local actors in the new system, much like the way the Ottoman state operated 
in the provinces. It is, I think, also crucial to see the capacity of Kemalism to 
mobilize people, from teachers to school children, from women to various 
local elites if we are to understand its salience as a political reference beyond 
the single-party era.   
In relation to this point, I should emphasize as the last concluding 
remark that the reading of the 1930s Turkey this thesis has suggested based 
on the example of the anti-veiling campaigns should be seen as an attempt to 
further our understanding of the authoritarianism of the period. In other words, 
this reading does not diverge from the general characterization of the Kemalist 
single-party state as an authoritarian state, but claims to provide a better 
account of how this authoritarian state actually worked. There is no doubt that 
the Kemalist regime in the early republican period was an authoritarian 
regime, and though in varying degrees, the modernization policies initiated by 
this regime touched every sector of the society, as the political elite in Ankara 




political elite in Ankara, and the policies, reforms and instruments of this 
authoritarian regime were influenced and shaped by its encounters with the 
society, with the realities and dynamics of social life it faced when operating 
in practice. In other words, it is the encounter and interaction of the state and 
the society out of which the social change, or the various “projects” of 
Kemalist modernity, took their final form. Therefore, as Migdal suggests, one 
needs to look at those spaces where this encounter and interaction occurred; 
spaces where the project of modernity initiated by the elite met the society, 
and where they transformed one another.863 The case of the anti-veiling 
campaigns in Turkey of the 1930s demonstrates that the state policies of the 
single-party era and the change they created could be understood fully only 
by looking at the interactions of the state and the society, by focusing on the 
concrete forms these policies took in the provinces, and by appreciating the 
multiplicity of actors and agencies at the local level, the state being only one 























                                                          





The table below shows the cities (provincial capitals, district capitals, and sub-
districts) where there was an outright ban. It does not include the cases where 
there was an anti-veiling campaign but the campaign did not lead to an 
outright ban (or cases where it is unclear whether it did or not). For example, 
in Diyarbakır, the campaign seems to be limited to a decision by the members 
of the People’s House, and thus it is not included in the table below. Therefore, 
it should be noted that the actual number of anti-veiling campaigns was higher 
than the number of cases included in the table. The bans are listed 
chronologically, based on the time the decisions were made and declared 
rather than the time the bans became effective. Enforcement dates, if known, 
are mentioned in the Notes column. Since provincial newspapers do not 
specify on which day exactly the decision was made when reporting on the 
bans, I use only the month and the year for the date of the bans. I used the 
name of the issuing authority as it appears in the source. For example, if the 
ban was reported only as a municipal decision (belediye kararı), I noted the 
municipality as the issuing authority. If it is specifically mentioned that it was 
the city council (belediye meclisi), then I specified the city council, an organ 
of the municipality, as well.    
 
It should also be noted that the list provided below does not claim to be 
comprehensive. Although it is the most comprehensive list available in the 























Giresun Peçe City Council 
Cumhuriyet 







Mersin Çarşaf City Council 
Cumhuriyet 
7 April 1934 
The proposal to 
ban the çarşaf 
was submitted 
to the city 
council in 
April. The ban 
was put into 
practice on July 
1st. See also 
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The decision of 
the city council 
was to ban 
tailors from 
sewing the 
çarşaf. On the 
February 10th, 
the kafes was 
banned. The 
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removed by the 
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women had 
time until the 
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1 March 1935 
Women were 
given a period 
of one year to 
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7 March 1935 
See also Halk, 








25 April 1935 
The ban was 
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25 April 1935 
Noncompliance 
would be fined, 
ranging from 5 
to 50 liras. See 
also Hakkın 
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18 May 1935 
Peçe and 
Yaşmak were to 
be removed 
immediately. 






10 July 1935 
Both the local 
party 
administration 
and the District 
Health Council 
(Sağlık Kurulu) 
























3 August 1935 
See also Halk, 
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The ban was 
put into 
practice on 15 
September 



































































































It is not clear 
which 
institution 
issued the ban. 
August 
1935 






































































It is not clear 
which 
institution 

















































































The peçe was 
















there was a 





included a ban 












was initiated by 
the People’s 
House earlier 
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5 March 1937 
The peçe, the 
çarşaf, and the 
peştamal were 
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Turkish Prime Ministry Republican Archives (PMRA) 
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Kemalisme in de Periferie:  
Anti-Sluiering Campagnes en Verhoudingen tussen Staat en 




De Kemalistische periode van modernisering is vaak beschreven als een 
periode van autoritaire modernisering gekenmerkt door een aantal zeer 
radicale hervormingen geformuleerd door de heersende elite en top-down 
opgelegd aan de samenleving. Deze hervormingen zijn vaak gekenmerkt als 
“modernisering van bovenaf” en onderzocht aan de hand van een staat-
gecentreerde benadering, welke zich vooral richt op de intellectuele 
bevlogenheid, de ideologische fundamenten en het politieke discours van de 
Kemalistische elite, waarbij in het bijzonder de visie, ideeën en “projecten” 
van Mustafa Kemal Atatürk centraal worden gesteld. Ondanks dat al sinds de 
jaren 1960 de aannames van de modernisering theorie, die de klassieke 
literatuur over de moderne Ottomaanse/Turkse geschiedenis domineren, 
worden bekritiseerd, heeft de aanpassing in het theoretische kader bijna niet 
voor een verandering gezorgd in de focus op de staat en de elite. Nieuwe 
benaderingen die meer sociologisch van aard waren, zoals de centrum-
periferie analyse, gingen niet verder dan de tweedeling tussen staat en 
samenleving. De gecompliceerde socio-historische realiteit, zoals de 
welwillendheid van de staatsvertegenwoordigers om te onderhandelen en tot 
een compromis te komen met de heersende gewoonten en structuren in de 
samenleving, en de neiging van de staatsvertegenwoordigers om de 
hervormingen op verschillende en zelfs behoorlijk creatieve manieren aan te 
pakken is veelal buiten beschouwing gelaten. 
Recentelijk zijn nieuwe studies verschenen waarin de focus niet 
langer op de staat en de elite ligt. In deze studies worden er vragen gesteld als 
hoe de staatshervormingen werden geïmplementeerd, hoe de beleidsplannen 
naar de provincies werden gebracht en werden vertaald naar dagelijkse 
routines van de staat, en hoe dit beleid onderdeel uit ging maken van het 
alledaagse leven van de gewone bevolking. Dat deze vragen worden gesteld 
is het resultaat van een verschuiving in het theoretische kader en de concepten 
die worden gebruikt om de relaties tussen staat en samenleving in vroeg 




onderaf school” subaltern studies, de relationele sociologie en de 
antropologische perspectieven met betrekking tot de staat en relaties tussen de 
staat en samenleving hebben een cruciale rol gespeeld in deze verschuiving.  
Door zich te baseren op de theoretische inzichten afkomstig van deze 
verschillende studierichtingen en in het bijzonder op de state-in-society (de 
staat in de samenleving) benadering van Joel Migdal, maakt dat deze 
dissertatie onderdeel is van de recentelijk bloeiende literatuur over de 
Republiek Turkije, en draagt hier verder aan bij. Net als Migdal probeert de 
auteur zowel de relatie tussen de staat en de samenleving te bezien als meer 
dan een dichotomie, als  de sociale verandering tijdens de Kemalistische 
modernisering te analyseren als een relationeel proces. Dit gebeurt door zowel 
rekening te houden met de rol van de mensen in de maatschappij als met de 
beperkingen van de staatsmacht. In algemene termen is het een onderzoek naar 
de verhoudingen tussen de staat en de samenleving in de jaren 1930 in Turkije, 
met als doel te begrijpen hoe het Kemalistische beleid en de hervormingen 
werden ontvangen, geïnterpreteerd, onderhandeld, en overeengekomen, maar 
ook hoe er weerstand werd geboden door verschillende groepen in de 
provincies. Het punt waarop deze studie focust om deze onderwerpen te 
bespreken is de regulering van vrouwelijke kledij zoals in de anti-sluiering 
campagnes in de jaren 1930.  
De campagnes die zich alleen  richtten op de peçe (gezichtssluier), de 
çarşaf (volledige lichaamsbedekking) en bepaalde locale variaties op de 
çarşaf, werden voornamelijk georganiseerd op lokaal niveau en gevormd door 
de interactie tussen de initiatieven van de lokale elite en de betrokkenheid van 
de staat om deze initiatieven te coördineren en reguleren. Een gebrek aan een 
nationale wet of decreet die de kleding van vrouwen reguleerde en aan stevige 
en consistente  richtlijnen vanuit de hoofdstad, alsook het lokale karakter van 
de anti-sluiering campagnes liet ruimte  voor discussies, onderhandelingen en 
lokale variaties, welke uiteindelijk resulteerden in een ingewikkelde en 
minder radicale transformatie in hoe vrouwen zich kleedden in de provincies. 
Daar komt bij dat het feit dat het bedekken van het haar nooit openlijk is 
besproken ervoor zorgde dat er meer ruimte was voor selectieve assimilatie 
van het beleid door vrouwen. De anti-sluiering campagnes in de jaren 1930 in 
Turkije zijn een duidelijk voorbeeld van interventie van de staat; een 
voorbeeld dat erg dubbelzinnig was, en divers en inconsistent in de uitvoering. 
Als zodanig biedt de kwestie van de anti-sluiering campagnes een rijk terrein 




staat, lokale elite en gewone mensen te onderzoeken, alsook de manier waarop 
ze op elkaar inwerkten en werden uitonderhandeld. 
Deze studie is de eerste monografie die zich bezhoudt met de anti-
sluiering campagnes in de vroege Turkse Republiek en haar bijdrage aan de 
bestaande literatuur is tweeledig. Ten eerste presenteert ze een gedetailleerd 
overzicht van de discussies over en de pogingen tot het ontsluieren van 
vrouwen in Turkije vanaf de laat-Ottomaanse periode, en focust ze op de 
belangrijkste golf van anti-sluiering campagnes in het midden van de jaren 
dertig door deze in te kaderen als onderdeel van een nieuwe fase waarin het 
Kemalistische regime zich in die tijd bevond. Hierdoor geeft ze een zeer 
veelomvattend verslag van de anti-sluiering campagnes in de vroege Turkse 
Republiek door het onderliggende algemene politieke betoog te analyseren en 
te kijken naar de wettelijke en institutionele mechanismen waarmee ze werden 
geformuleerd en toegepast. Dit geeft een beeld van alle aspecten van de 
campagnes en plaatst deze in de context van de hervormingen in het algemeen. 
Ten tweede gaatde studie, terwijl ze kijkt naar de hoofdkarakteristieken van 
de anti-sluiering campagnes in de provincies en  deze analyseert als een 
algemeen verspreid hervormingsproces,  tegelijkertijd ook dieper in op de 
lokale context. Door veel nadruk te leggen op het belang van het bestuderen 
van de lokale aspecten, analyseert de studie de campagnes in de context van 
de ingewikkelde situatie van de lokale omstandigheden en de politiek. Maar 
door dit te doen focust ze niet op slechts een aantal gevallen. Ze verdiept zich 
in het lokale, in de micro dynamiek van de campagnes in verschillende 
gevallen en onderzoekt deze aan de hand van gangbare conceptuele kaders 
zoals weerstand en vertegenwoordiging. Twee van deze conceptuele kaders in 
het bijzonder die worden toegepast om de anti-sluiering campagnes te 
bestuderen zijn die van lokale elite en vrouwen vertegenwoordiging, hetgeen 
de analyse in deze studie van de campagnes onderscheidt van die van andere 
onderzoekers. Deze tweeledige analyse van de scriptie is gebaseerd op een 
combinatie van verschillende bronnen: een selectie van lokale kranten, de 
archieven van de Turkse centrale staat en poltitie en rapporten van 
Amerikaanse en Britse diplomaten.  
De dissertatie bestaat uit vijf hoofdstukken. Hoofdstuk 2 richt zich op 
het debat over het (ont-)sluieren van vrouwen en pogingen tot anti-sluiering 
campagnes van voor de jaren 1930, namelijk vanaf de oorsprong van de 
kwestie in het Ottomaanse Rijk in de 19e eeuw tot de vroege initiatieven tot 
het organiseren van anti-sluiering campagnes in de jaren 1920. Hoofdstuk 3 




van vrouwenontsluiering en situeert deze in de bredere context van Turkije in 
die periode, gekenmerkt door een verandering naar een meer autoritair regime 
dat graag de samenleving binnendringt en haar controle over de economische, 
sociale en culturele domeinen vergroot. Naast het geven van een macro beeld 
van Turkije in de jaren 1930, bespreekt dit hoofdstuk ook in detail de timing, 
de omvang, het betoog en het juridische kader van de anti-sluiering 
campagnes. Hoofdstuk 4 focust op het lokale en kijkt in het bijzonder naar de 
rol die de lokale elites speelden in de anti-sluiering campagnes. Het laat zien 
dat als samengestelde groep de houdingen van de lokale elites divers waren 
en ze een cruciale rol speelden in het vormen van de campagnes in de 
provincies. Hoofdstuk 5 bespreekt de onderwerpen van weerstand en 
vertegenwoordiging en kijkt naar de houding en reacties van de gewone 
mensen, en in het bijzonder naar de rol van vrouwen, in de anti-sluiering 
campagnes. Hoofdstuk 6 plaatst de Turkse anti-sluiering campagnes in het 
grotere overzicht van de Moslim wereld in termen van de debatten over, en de 
pogingen tot, het veranderen van de kledij van vrouwen tijdens het 
interbellum. Het laat zien dat ondanks een algehele trend van de ontwikkeling 
van een betoog over kwesties van vrouwen en de modernisering van hun kledij 
in de gehele Moslim wereld, deze kwesties op verschillende manieren werden 
benaderd. Albanië, Iran en Turkije worden vergelijkend behandeld om de 
kenmerkende aspecten van de Turkse anti-sluiering campagnes van de jaren 
dertig beter te benadrukken. 
Deze dissertatie concludeert dat de heersende neiging in de literatuur 
tot het beschrijven van een almachtige Turkse staat en een eensgezinde 
Kemalistische politieke elite misleidend is. De rol en de houding van de lokale 
elites en van verschillende maatschappelijk betrokkenen waren bepalend op 
alle niveau’s. Daarom is het essentieel om het lokale niveau te bestuderen bij 
een analyse van de Kemalistische staat in actie en om de ingewikkelde 
manieren te zien waarop het staatsbeleid werd aangevochten, gebruikt en 
gedomesticeerd in de provincies. Deze studie beargumenteert ook dat de 
centrum-periferie dichotomie meer verbergt dan dat hij uitlegt; zowel het 
‘centrum’ als de ‘periferie’ hebben vele componenten en ze zijn op 
verschillende manieren met elkaar in interactie. Het beleid en de 
hervormingen van de Kemalistische eenpartijstaat werden gevormd door zijn 
ontmoeting met de samenleving, met de realiteit en de dynamiek van het 
sociale leven waar het mee in aanraking kwam in de praktijk. De kwestie van 
de anti-sluiering campagnes in Turkije in de jaren dertig laat zien dat het 




volledig kan worden begrepen door te kijken naar de wisselwerking tussen de 
staat en de samenleving, door te focussen op de concrete vormen die dit beleid 
aannam in de provincies en door de veelheid van deelnemers en 
vertegenwoordigers op lokaal niveau te waarderen, waarvan de staat er slechts 
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